INTRODUCTION

Chapter I. Kurds - one of the most ancient peoples

1.1 History of the Kurds from ancient times to the 19th century

1.2 The current state of the Kurds

Chapter 2. Stages of the struggle for independence

Chapter 3. Culture and art of the Kurds

3.1 Religious views of the Kurds

3.2 Rites and games of the Kurds

3.3 Kurdish culture

CONCLUSION

LIST OF USED SOURCES AND LITERATURE

INTRODUCTION

If the Jews were lucky that their interests at some point coincided with the interests of the Soviet Union and the United States and the state of Israel was created, then the Kurds were less fortunate. Although the problem was the same, and it was easier to solve it than in the case of Israel, since the majority of the Kurdish population continued to live in the territory of historical Kurdistan. But this territory turned out to be at the center of the struggle for the survival and self-determination of peoples, and if without lofty words, then, in fact, this is a struggle for oil, water, and energy resources. The rich natural resources located on the territory of Kurdistan, and the internal interests of the countries on whose territory Kurdistan is located (Syria, Iraq, Turkey, Iran), did not contribute to the solution of the Kurdish problem.

In addition, the Kurdish national movement has been and remains divided, numerous Kurdish parties sort things out among themselves, and the world community, in turn, is not interested in creating an independent Kurdish state. Now we are no longer talking about creating a single Kurdish state, the Kurds only claim to create autonomies within the four countries where they historically live.

The situation in each of the four parts of Kurdistan is different. In Iran, there are local radio and television broadcasts in Kurdish, it is possible to publish literature in Kurdish, but Kurds do not have the right to be represented in the Iranian parliament, although Iranian Armenians, Assyrians and Jews have this opportunity.

Syria also denies both the existence of the Kurdish problem itself and the right of the Kurds to self-determination. Although Damascus skillfully uses the Kurds in solving the problems of its relations with its neighbors - Turkey and Iraq.

Kurdish parties continue to compete with each other. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) share influence in Iraqi Kurdistan.

The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), i.e. the Turkish Kurds, accuses these parties of pursuing their narrow "feudal" interests at the expense of the interests of the people as a whole. Representatives of the PKK argue that the temporary well-being of the Iraqi Kurds depends only on the help of Western states, which do not allow Saddam Hussein, as has happened more than once, to completely destroy the appearance of Kurdish autonomy.

Of course, there is some truth in these accusations, without the protection of Western states, the Kurdish enclave in Iraq could not exist, much less prosper. The PKK, on ​​the other hand, took upon itself the protection of the interests of the Kurds not on a territorial basis, but on a social basis. In turn, other Kurdish parties challenge the right of the PKK to be the mouthpiece of the Kurdish people - although the influence of this party, especially among Turkish and Syrian Kurds, laid the foundations of a nationwide Kurdish movement. However, the partisan struggle of the PKK in Turkey also did not lead to the realization of the idea of ​​national autonomy. And after the arrest of its leader Abdullah Ocalan by the Turks, the position of the PKK was shaken.

Numerous Kurdish parties are also calling for help from Russia, since this region is in the zone of our geostrategic interests.

The scientific significance of the topic is determined by the fact that today one of the acute problems in the Near and Middle East is the issue of granting self-government (partial or complete) to areas of compact residence of Kurds in ethnographic Kurdistan, divided during the First World War between four countries of the region - Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran. At present, this problem is becoming important due to the fact that the ongoing struggle of the Kurds for their national rights in Turkish (North), Iraqi (South), Syrian (Western) and Iranian (East) Kurdistan excites Russian Kurds, whose ancestors are from predominantly from Northern and Eastern Kurdistan. Feeling a certain legal protection from the state, Russian Kurds are making efforts to ensure that the Russian Federation intensifies its Middle East policy in order to provide moral and political assistance to their foreign relatives. Russian Kurds are doing a lot of work in this direction among various political currents in Russia, as well as in some power structures. The result of this activity was a series of events - the holding of "round tables" in some Moscow institutions, which took place this year. Their goal is to draw the attention of practical organizations to the development of the state concept of Russia on the Kurdish issue.

The relevance of this work is determined by the fact that the Kurdish problem seems to be too noticeable and important geopolitical factor, so that many countries, both regional and not geographically related to the Middle East region, would not seek to use it in their own interests. An important factor determining the increased attention of the West to the Kurdish problem is economic interests, the possibility, under the pretext of protecting the Kurds, to come close to the oil wealth of Iraq.

Kurdistan is of particular importance in connection with the project of transporting Caspian oil to the Eastern Mediterranean through the territories inhabited by Kurds, which is entering the implementation stage. Western countries investing heavily in this project are interested in maintaining control over the region for the long term.

In this regard, we have set the following goals and objectives in this work:

1. Determine the degree of national consolidation of the Kurds. Consider the history of the development and formation of this people. Consider the stages of the Kurdish struggle for independence.

2. Consider the culture and art of the Kurdish people. What is the degree of self-consciousness of the Kurds? Is there a single idea and goal that would bring the Kurds closer not only culturally and religiously, but also politically?

In our work, we relied on the work of such domestic and foreign researchers of this problem as Khaki Dler Ismail, M.A. Gasratyan, A.A. Isaev, Sh.Kh. Mgoi, M.S. Lazarev, O.I. Zhigalina, V. Nikitin, V. Danilov, G. Shakhbazyan, B. Rasul, Sh. Ashiri, N.Z. Mosaki. In addition to these works, the periodicals "Asia and Africa Today", "Vostok=Oriens", "Ethnosphere" and Internet resources from the sites http://world.ng.ru and http://www.kurdistan.ru were used in the work.

Chapter I. Kurds - one of the most ancient peoples

1.1 History of the Kurds from ancient times to the 19th century

The Kurds are one of the most ancient peoples of Western Asia. They claim to be descendants of Noah. Their ethnogenesis and history have not been studied enough. For three millennia, they have retained their culture and language, although they have never united under a single government.

By the end of this year, a new state, Kurdistan, may appear on the world map. So far only in northern Iraq. In any case, the referendum on the independence of Iraqi Kurdistan, which is scheduled for autumn 2017, may lead to this. What consequences can this have?

How to solve the Kurdish problem in Syria

Recently, the Kurdish theme has become very popular in the media. This is understandable: the Kurds are very successfully fighting in Syria and Iraq against the militants of the terrorist group ISIS (“Islamic State”, an organization banned in Russia), the Turkish army is fighting against them, they are being armed by the United States ... In a word, the Kurds are now in vogue.

Thanks to this, many people know that the Kurds are the most numerous divided people in the world: the traditional Kurdish territories, where about 40 million Kurds live, are divided between Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. At the same time, in all these countries, the Kurds consider themselves an oppressed minority, subjected to oppression by the Turks, Iranians and Arabs, respectively.

It is also known that the Kurds have long dreamed of creating their own state, but so far they have not succeeded: any attempts in this direction were severely suppressed by the governments of those states that include parts of Kurdistan.

Thus, the Kurdish problem for many decades was a mine laid under the stability of the vast Middle East region. And it must be emphasized that Britain and France laid it at the end of the First World War, when, in secret, these colonial powers divided the Middle East at their own discretion. Thus, they carefully foresaw the division of Kurdistan and its people, depriving it of the possibility of self-determination, and at the same time created a gigantic problem for the states that arose on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire.

Be that as it may, but the long-awaited chance to create a completely independent Kurdistan appeared with the beginning of the US war against Saddam's Iraq. The Kurds took an active part in it on the side of the Americans, largely ensuring their success. In return, they received a new Iraqi constitution, dictated by Washington Representative Paul Bremmer. This basic law provides for the special status of Kurdistan within Iraq to be federalized, as well as the right of the Kurds to hold a referendum on independence and secession.

Today, according to Kurdish strategists, the time has come to use this legitimate tool. Already in October-November 2017, it is possible to organize such a referendum, the outcome of which few people doubt: the population of the Kurdish provinces of Iraq will speak out for independence.

What can this lead to? Absolutely unequivocally - to the emergence in the Middle East of a new hotbed of tension, new conflicts.

First of all, because Iraq will not simply accept the decision of the Kurds. Moreover, the referendum is planned to be held not only within the borders of the now existing and officially recognized Iraqi Kurdistan, but also in the so-called disputed territories, which the Kurds consider their own. Local residents will be asked if they wish to join Kurdistan.

This move is sure to generate a strong backlash in Baghdad and throughout Iraq. It's no joke: the country withstood a ten-year war with Iran, two wars with America, was defeated, but retained territorial unity, and then suddenly a piece will be cut off from it legally. And what a piece: the richest oil-bearing provinces! Some of which have to be won back from IS, the same Kirkuk and Mosul, for example.

There is no doubt that Baghdad will turn to the Arab brothers for support and receive support. For the formation of Kurdistan from Iraqi lands will be the first example of the rejection of a part of the Arab homeland in the interests of non-Arabs after the partition of Palestine. It will be impossible for the Arabs to put up with such a shame, and Kurdistan will become for them a replica of Israel. By the way, Israel fully supports the project of an independent Kurdish state.

Other parts of Iraq may well benefit from the Kurdish precedent. Why shouldn't another oil-bearing province - Basra - also be freed from the oppression of Baghdad (there is one constitution for all)? And not go under the protectorate, for example, of Saudi Arabia, or Iran, or Kuwait? If the Kurds won't feed the corrupt Baghdad government, then why should others? As a result, the specter of the complete disintegration of Iraq will appear on the horizon, following the example of Libya. And this situation will certainly be of great interest to the strategists of the Islamic State, who may see in it the hope of the possibility of continuing their seemingly hopelessly lost cause.

The emergence of an independent Kurdistan in northern Iraq is unacceptable to Iran, which has its own Kurdistan in its hands. Tehran does not need a Kurdish stronghold on its borders, which will certainly be used by Israel and the United States as a base for active and large-scale subversive actions. And if the Kurdish scenario is realized, the Iranians will do everything to put what remains of Iraq under their full control. Even now they already feel quite at ease here. But in response to the formation of Kurdistan, Tehran may also think about the occupation of that part of the neighboring country, for which it fought with Saddam in the 80s of the last century, that is, up to the Tigris River.

Iraqi Kurdistan will also be a source of inspiration for the Syrian Kurds. They also dream of independence and also receive support from the United States (and possibly Israel). True, at present, the leadership of the Iraqi Kurds declares its commitment to the unity of Syria, refusing to support the hopes of their brothers in the SAR. But that's for now. What will happen next is unknown. But this will not come as a surprise if, after some time, the Iraqi Kurds decide to help the Syrian Kurds and thereby expand the territory of independent Kurdistan in order to gain access to the Mediterranean Sea. And then in the current borders they are completely locked.

Access to the sea is an absolute necessity for the future of Kurdistan, since the main wealth of the country - oil - cannot otherwise be delivered to the world market. Now she is being transported through Turkey, which, paradoxically, maintains the best relations with the Iraqi Kurds and is optimistic about the prospects for their independence.

Strange, isn't it? Ankara, which is fighting against the Turkish and Syrian Kurds, is friends with their Iraqi compatriots. There is, of course, a calculation here: access to Iraqi oil. But not only that.

The fact is that between the Kurds in different countries (and in fact between the various Kurdish tribes) there are deep contradictions, if not enmity. In particular, the Iraqi Kurds do not treat the Turkish people too well, and they see the Syrian as their closest allies. And the Iranians generally look down on everyone ... In a word, this is a very complicated story, but there is only one practical conclusion so far: Turkey will welcome Iraqi Kurdistan in the hope that it will become its ally in the fight against Kurdish terrorists and a base on the borders of Iran and the Arab world.

The described problems, each of which is the embryo of the conflict, are enough to understand that the creation of an independent Kurdish state in the territory of northern Iraq can lead to an even greater increase in tension in the already tense Middle East region.

However, it cannot be denied that there are positive aspects in this perspective. For example, reformatting of the entire system of Middle East conflicts, coalitions and the like will begin. And this will happen, including along the lines that have already been laid down today. In particular, the strengthening of the Kurdish factor and the growing uncertainty around it can strengthen the alliance between Russia, Syria, Iran and Turkey. It is possible that Iraq (what is left of it) will also want to join it in order to enhance the role of the Russian Federation as the main guarantor of regional stability.

Against this background, conditions can be created for achieving an effective Palestinian-Israeli settlement. This may open up new economic opportunities for Russia in the region, especially given the large projects already developed (the Levant shelf, the railway from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf), not to mention the processes of reconstruction in Syria.

But all this is just speculation. The referendum was not held, not even scheduled. So the independence of Iraqi Kurdistan remains only a project.

The conflict between Turkey and the Kurds is increasingly attracting the attention of the world community. The problem of the Kurds is gradually becoming one of the key issues of the Syrian confrontation. And the national liberation movement of the Kurds poses a threat to Turkish statehood. All this is a direct result of Turkey's erroneous policy towards the Kurds, from Mustafa Kemal Ataturk to the present day. Erdogan, only the successor of these traditions.

The threat of separation of Turkish Kurdistan from Turkey is growing. Ankara is no longer able to control the regions of the southeast. Kurds demand recognition of their rights and national identity.

Syrian Kurdistan-Rojava, the first state in the Middle East, in which the secular ideology of the Marxist type becomes a red rag for Islamism. The Democratic Union of Kurdistan serves as an interim government for the Kurds. Kurdish self-defense units and women's armed brigades are fighting Turkish nationalism and national extremism of the Arabs. Rojava has the tacit support of the Syrian leadership. Bashar al-Assad from the very beginning goes towards the Kurds.

The Kurdish question is one of the most unresolved in the Middle East, in the 20s of the last century, the Turkish army drowned numerous uprisings in the Kurdish regions in blood.
This horror continues to this day, Turkish parliamentarian Feleknas Uca blamed the military for the deaths of 150 Kurds in the province of Shirnak in southeastern Turkey. People were burned alive by the Turkish military, some bodies were beheaded. All of the victims in the region were ethnic Kurds.

In addition, the Turkish authorities announced a curfew in a number of regions inhabited by Kurds. The Turkish military claims they are killing more than 900 Kurdish fighters, and representatives of the pro-Kurdish Peoples' Democracy Party are talking about the deaths of dozens of civilians in the southeast of the country.
Things have gotten to the point where even the US has urged Turkey and Erdogan to focus their strikes on the Islamic State militants rather than the Kurds.

Although the United States recognizes Turkey's right to defend its territory, it urges not to call the Kurds terrorists, as the Turkish government indiscriminately does. The United States also calls on the Kurds to stop their actions to expand the territory in Syria.

Western military experts and analysts believe that in the future Turkey will lose its current shape, and it is Kurdish separatism that will launch the mechanism for the collapse of Turkey. The economic situation in Turkish Kurdistan is quite difficult. With high unemployment and low wages, the Turkish government is not investing anything in the development of Kurdistan. Discrimination against Kurds exists in Turkey at the household level as well.
Human rights activists call on Turkey to improve this state of affairs, to allow them to proclaim their autonomy. However, this issue is the most painful for Erdogan and his entourage, who are pursuing a militant policy of reviving the Ottoman state.

The Kurdish question is a complex problem connected with the desire of the Kurds in the countries of Western Asia - Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Syria - to achieve national self-determination. From this point of view, this issue is an important internal problem of these countries, whose governments consider the Kurds as a non-dominant ethnic group, obliged to comply with the national relations policy existing in these countries. At the same time, the Kurdish issue in Western Asia is part of a complex knot of interstate contradictions, which involves not only the forces of the internal anti-government opposition, different in their political orientation, but also international forces. This determines the international and regional significance of this problem. Zhigalina O.I. The Kurdish question as a regional and local conflict. // East. - 1995. - No. 6. - S. 91

The reasons for the conflicts of the Kurds with the regimes of their countries of residence in Western Asia should be sought in the historical past of their relationship. The geopolitical region of compact residence of Kurds in Western Asia - ethnographic Kurdistan is a vast continental region with a complex geographical relief. Kurdistan (literally, "the country of the Kurds") does not have clear, fixed borders, because there is no such state - Kurdistan. The real content of this toponym is reduced to a set of certain and unchanging physical and geographical features and to the presence of an absolute or relative majority of Kurds in the ethno-national composition of the population. If the first signs are constant, then the second are variables, confirmed by the vicissitudes of the historical process, at least from the middle of the 1st millennium BC. One of the main components of this process is the ethnogenesis of the Kurds themselves, which has not yet been completed. Another is the violent political upheavals that took place in the area of ​​settlement of the Kurdish ethnos. They were accompanied by major ethno-demographic changes as a result of wars, forced migrations and mass genocide. As a result, the configuration of the conditional borders of Kurdistan has repeatedly changed.

Kurdistan took its modern shape after the First World War, when it was divided between Turkey, Iran and Iraq and Syria, then dependent on England and France (in Turkey - over 200 thousand square kilometers, in Iran - over 160 thousand square kilometers). km., in Iraq - up to 75 thousand sq. km., in Syria - up to 15 thousand sq. km.).

The geographical coordinates of modern Kurdistan are 34-40 degrees north latitude and 38-48 degrees east longitude. In the meridional direction, it extends for about 1 thousand km, in the latitudinal direction - for 300-500 km. Lazarev M.S. Kurdistan in the geopolitical aspect. // East. - 1998. - No. 6. - P. 53 (see the map of Kurdistan in the Appendix).

Among the Kurds, there is a high natural increase - about 3% per year. Therefore, despite the predominantly mountainous terrain, thanks to the fertile valleys, Kurdistan reaches the Asian average in terms of population density (up to 45 people per sq. Km.). Its population is approximately estimated at 30 million people. Thus, the Kurds are the largest national "minority" in Western Asia and the largest nation in the world that has not received the right to national self-determination. Complete chronology of the twentieth century. M.: Veche, 1999. // www. Russ.ru

From the 8th to the 19th centuries in the Middle East, there were large Kurdish principalities, which, by the standards of that time, were states. The Kurds played a large role in the progress of the civilization of Mesopathamia, Iran, the Arab and Islamic worlds, as well as the Ottoman Empire. The Kurds ruled the Islamic world twice: under Salahaddin Eyubi and under Karim Khan Zend, who reigned over all of Iran and part of Iraq. Barzani Nechirvan. The Kurdish problem and modernity (report at a conference at the American University). // Kurdish thought. - 2001. - No. 1. // www. Kurdistan.ru

From the time of the formation of the Arab Caliphate (7th century AD) up to the present day, the Kurds at various times fought against the Arab, Turkish, Mongolian, Turkmen, Persian and other enslavers. Independent Kurdish dynasties (Shedadids, Mervanids, Rawadids, Hasanwayhids, Ayubids) ruled not only individual principalities, but also such large countries as Egypt and Syria.

From the beginning of the XVI century. Kurdistan has become the scene of ongoing wars. Two Muslim powers - Iran and the Ottoman Empire - argued for possession of it. The result of these wars was the Zohab Treaty of 1639, which divided Kurdistan into Turkish and Iranian parts. The governments of the Ottoman Empire and Iran tried to weaken and then liquidate the Kurdish principalities for the purpose of economic and political enslavement. This division did not put an end to civil strife, but, on the contrary, further strengthened the feudal fragmentation of the country. In modern times, the liberation struggle of the Kurds continued.

In the 19th century, according to the terms of the Gulistan Peace Treaty of 1813, the Turkmanchay Treaty of 1828 and the Berlin Congress of 1878, part of historical Kurdistan went to Russia and the Kurds who lived there became its subjects. In the first decades of the 20th century, it became the object of economic and political claims by France and the United States.

So, in the era of the late Middle Ages and modern times, the geopolitical position of Kurdistan was determined, on the one hand, by Turkish-Iranian relations, on the other hand, by the colonial aspirations of Russia and the Western powers, their struggle for hegemony in the Middle East, where the Kurdish region occupied a strategically central position.

The last partition of Kurdistan was carried out after the First World War, when the country of the Kurds was fragmented between four states of Western Asia: Iran, Turkey, Iraq and Syria. As a result, parts of ethnographic Kurdistan turned out to be territorially different in size, different in size of the Kurdish population. In each of these parts, the Kurds had a different nature of socio-political experience, different degrees of external influences. The general trends were socio-economic backwardness, political and economic dependence on the states between which they were divided, as well as the passionate desire of all Kurds to protect their area of ​​​​residence from outside encroachments.

The Kurds seek to legitimize the right to dispose of the territory of their original habitat, necessary for the flourishing of their national, spiritual and material culture. The Kurds are also characterized by high social and political activity. The idea of ​​protecting the area of ​​their compact residence - Kurdistan - was realized in the slogans of "independent" or autonomous Kurdistan. It was most clearly comprehended by the Kurdish sheikhs and passed on by their ancestors from generation to generation, it was the generator of many Kurdish uprisings, which were often led by sheikhs. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the traditional leaders repeatedly tried to unite the Kurds with the help of the idea of ​​an "independent Kurdistan" and encourage them to create their own statehood. But every time these efforts were unsuccessful, because the Kurds, due to their political inexperience, became the object of political manipulation by interested political forces.

In the last quarter of the 19th century, the Kurdish issue was designated as a regional conflict, when elements of nationalism began to form in Kurdish society. In 1880, Sheikh Obeidullah attempted to unite the Turkish and Iranian Kurds into one nation-state under his rule. The uprising was put down. Jalile J. Kurdish uprising of 1880. M., 1966. - S. 76 The main reason. What determined the defeat of the Kurds at that time was the lack of socio-political and economic prerequisites for their unification around a common national idea. A well-known role in the failure of Sheikh Obedullah was played by the positions of Great Britain and Russia. The British tried to use the Kurdish uprising to put pressure on Russia and weaken its position in Iran. The Russian government was interested in maintaining its influence in Iran and helped the Shah's government to organize a defense against Oidullah. Russia has put strong pressure on Turkey to force it to stop pandering to and covertly supporting the Kurds. Lazarev M.S. Kurdistan and the Kurdish problem. M.. 1964. - S. 31

The geopolitical significance of the problem of Kurdish statehood was especially clearly defined after the First World War, when a change in the domestic and foreign political conditions of existence itself gave the Kurds the prospect of national liberation. By Sevres treaty on the initiative of England, there was talk of creating an Independent Kurdistan (arts. 62 and 64). But not a single state that signed it took into account these articles, and none of the countries, except Italy, ratified it. The proposed project of statehood was taken as a joke, as the idea of ​​an ephemeral state, meaning simply the mastery of Mosul and Kirkuk by England. Since England was then inclined towards the idea of ​​forming nations from various ethnic substrates, the Kurds, as an extremely unsuitable substrate in this case, were thrown away, and instead the British undertook to form a nation of Iraqis from part of the Arabs in their mandated territory in northern Iraq. This project seemed more realistic to them. Lurie S. New Mussel? // Russian Spetsnaz. - 2003. - № 4. But at the same time, this policy gave rise to new shades of conflict. Interested in political stability, the regimes of the Kurdish countries in Western Asia resorted to forceful methods of solving the problem, sought to “decapitate” the Kurdish movement, deprive it of leaders who came from the Kurdish elite. The position of England and France was very ambiguous. Britain did not, in fact, prevent the promotion of Kurdish nationalism in one part of Kurdistan and the suppression of it in others. This position of the British was especially strengthened after the demarcation of the Turkish-Iraqi border, when Mosul, which previously belonged to Turkey, went to Iraq, and the signing of the Lausanne Peace Treaty in 1924. France, supporting the Kurdish nationalist organization Hoybun, based at that time in Damascus, sought primarily to ensure its interests in Turkey and Syria, and not to provide real assistance to the Kurdish people. The result of this policy was the signing, with the assistance of Great Britain, between the two world wars by the governments of Iran, Iraq, Turkey, an agreement according to which none of the signatories encouraged Kurdish nationalism in any of these countries. Zhigalina O.I. The Kurdish question as a regional and local conflict. // East. - 1995. - No. 6. - S. 93

Since the second quarter of the XX century. The regionalization of the Kurdish issue is gradually being replaced by its localization in the countries of residence of the Kurds in Western Asia, where the Kurds were among the non-dominant ethnic groups. Representatives of a single ethnic group - the Kurds - became citizens not of one state, but of a whole group of the mentioned states. In this regard, one part of it had to be connected to the ethnic system of the Turkish superethnos, the other - Iranian, and the third - Arab (Syrian or Iraqi). A complex process of adaptation of the Kurdish ethnic group to the conditions of existence within the boundaries of this or that state formation began, with specific legislative, administrative-territorial and other systems for each of them. This contributed to the process of disintegration of the Kurds in social and political terms. At the same time, the division of the Kurds did not allow any of the interested countries or political forces to seize advantages in ethnographic Kurdistan. This region not only in the past, but also now attracts the attention of both the countries of the Western Asia region and a number of developed countries in Europe, Asia and America. It is, as it were, a buffer connecting transport, trade and other routes from West to East, which determines its geostrategic significance. This partly explains the fact that none of the Kurdish countries in Western Asia is willing to allow the divided parts of the Kurdish socio-cultural system to be united into one whole. The ruling circles of these countries have traditionally been guided in the Kurdish issue by nationalist ideology, which did not recognize the right of the Kurds to free ethnic development. They were denied the right to use their native language in the education system, and Kurdish rituals and symbols were banned. This is due, on the one hand, to the fact that in the Kurdish countries in Western Asia, the policy of integration of “small” peoples is based on the concept of a “single nation” (for example, Turkish, Iranian, etc.), based on the priority the most active in the social and political structures of the ethnic group. Models of social development in these states do not leave room for the national development of the Kurds. Therefore, a clash of fundamentally different norms and foundations of public life, ideas of prestige and duty is inevitable, emanating in one case from the principles of civil society, economic relations of the states of residence of the Kurds, their ethno-national orientation and religious ethics, and in the other from the peculiarities of the Kurdish socio-cultural system. .

Subjected to national discrimination, Kurds cannot freely change their social status. This is possible only if they transfer to the socio-cultural system of the dominant ethnic group, which is not encouraged, but condemned in Kurdish society, especially by the functionaries of some Kurdish political organizations, because such a transition is seen as detrimental to the preservation of the Kurdish gene pool. For example, in Turkey, in the absence of "equality of opportunity", Kurds feel alienated in society. They are forced to leave the country in search of a place where they could fully realize their intellectual and other abilities. Along with this, the impossibility of overcoming the barrier of public prejudice strengthens the desire of the Kurds to find new protective forces and restore traditional forms of struggle against legal discrimination. These actions are intensifying not so much because the Kurds cannot fit into the social, economic, political and other institutions existing in their countries of residence, but because of the conscious resistance to this process in order to protect the right of the Kurds to an independent path of national development.

For a long period, the Kurds continued their attempts to acquire their own statehood (see Appendix). This motive stimulates integration processes within the Kurdish ethnic community. The Kurdish community, which has not yet freed itself from traditional social ties, is trying to create a new type of sociality based on a socio-political community.

The Kurdish national movement gained its greatest scope in Iraq, where from 1961 to 1975 there was an uprising led by Mustafa Barzani (he created the Iraqi branch of the Kurdistan Democratic Party in 1946). All liberation actions in South Kurdistan from the early 30s to the mid 70s are associated with his name. He put forward the task of achieving autonomous rights for the Kurds, primarily within the boundaries of the Iraqi state. His position was that the Kurdish people have the right to realize the age-old dream of an independent and united homeland. Not without reason, Barzani is considered a folk hero of the Kurds, inspiring them in the struggle for a just cause.

Since the formation of the Iraqi state in 1920 up to the present day, there have been constant armed clashes between the Iraqi ruling regimes and the Kurdish national forces. During this long period, four agreements were concluded (in 1944, 1964, 1966, 1970), which provided for a peaceful (albeit only partial) solution to problems related to the status and rights of the Kurds. But the Iraqi government used every respite to orchestrate new violence against the Kurds. Mgoi Sh. Mustafa Barzani. // Asia and Africa today. - 1998. - No. 2. - S. 11

After the Iraqi revolution of 1958, when various factions of Arab nationalists succeeding each other turned out to be in power in Baghdad, until the most extreme of them, the Baath, won in 1968, relations between Arab and Kurdish nationalists sharply escalated, which escalated into armed struggle in 1961 . One of the most important points of disagreement between Barzani and the central government was the borders of Kurdistan, in particular Barzani's demand to include Kirkuk and its environs, where most of Iraqi oil was produced, into the Kurdish Autonomous Region.

As a result of a stubborn and bloody struggle, the Kurds managed to achieve the right to national autonomy within the framework of the Iraqi state. March 11, 1970 ("March Manifesto") between the Kurdish autonomists and the Iraqi government signed an agreement called "Declaration of Kurdish Autonomy". This document summed up a nine-year armed epic. Its significance, in brief, boils down to the fact that for the first time in the history of the Kurds in one part of their divided homeland, the government of Iraq recognized their right to national autonomy, which was also recorded in the country's constitution. But the Baathist regime, when finalizing Law No. 33 on Kurdish autonomy of March 11, 1974, narrowed it down to meager self-government. However, the autonomous status of the Kurds was fixed in the constitution of the Iraqi Republic. Mgoi Sh. Thorny path to freedom. // Asia and Africa today. - 1998. - No. 8. - S. 28

In March 1975, an Iran-Iraq agreement was signed in Algeria (participants: US Secretary of State, Iran, Iraq), according to which the Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, undertook the obligation not to provide further assistance to Barzani and not to allow the rearmament or regrouping of Kurdish forces in the territory Iran. In response, Iraq agreed to move its border with Iran along the river. Shatt al-Arab in the section below Basra from the left (eastern) bank to the middle line of the channel.

In 1979, after the overthrow of the Shah's regime, the KDP (Democratic Party of Kurdistan), led by the sons of Barzani - Idris and Massoud, relying on the new Shiite regime in Iran, again took up arms against Baghdad.

The next milestone in the geopolitical development of Kurdistan was the bloody Iran-Iraq war. Representatives of the national movement of the Kurds believe that the first factor in unleashing the war was the unilateral cancellation of the Algiers Agreement by the Iraqi government. Ihssan M. The Kurdish Issue and the Ruling Problem in Iraq (paper from Denmark conference). // www.kurdistan.ru This skirmish (war) was the longest regional war of the 20th century, resulting in huge casualties (the number of killed was from 0.5 to 1 million people, approximately the same number of wounded; about a million people from both countries became refugees), the complete depletion of financial and material resources, the destruction of the main industries of opponents, without giving any acquisitions or benefits to either Baghdad or Tehran. Seyranyan B. Star and life of a dictator.//Asia and Africa today. - 1994. - No. 4. - S. 8

The aggressive policy of Saddam Hussein also manifested itself in the Kuwaiti adventure of 1990-1991, which directly affected the Kurds. Ultimately, all the acts of the Iraqi dictator on the external borders of the country led to results that are directly opposite to those expected. Excesses such as the gas attack on Halabadzha and the surrounding villages, undertaken in March 1988 as an act of revenge against allegedly disloyal Kurds, the extermination of Kurds near Sulaymaniyah - supporters of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, led by Jalal al-Talabani near Sulaymaniyah, caused great indignation in everything Kurdistan and abroad, contributing to the new rise of the Kurdish national movement. The main thing is that these events, like no other, led to the internationalization of the Kurdish question. Zgersky D. Torn Nation. // New time. - 1991. - No. 47. - S. 22

S. Hussein's Kuwaiti adventure led to an acute international crisis, which ended with the defeat of the Iraqi army during Operation Desert Storm in 1991, when the United States and the leading powers of the anti-Iraq coalition announced the protection of Iraqi Kurds opposed to Baghdad, as well as Shiites in southern Iraq from possible air and artillery attacks.

The development of the situation in Iraqi Kurdistan was influenced by the events associated with the truce concluded between Iran and Iraq, with the defeat of Iraq in the war against the US-led coalition, as well as with the changes that took place in Eastern Europe. During this period, the Kurdish question again took the form of a regional conflict.

The Iraqi Kurds tried to use the events unfolding in the Middle East in order to restore the autonomy lost in 1974. They were very active in the initial period of the Middle East crisis, outlining a plan according to which, with the help of the United States, it was supposed to overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein and thus regain autonomy. Obviously, the Kurdish opposition in Iraq itself did not pose a real threat to the ruling regime. But this project was apparently not consistent with the interests of the United States, since President Bush, having provided Turkey with various economic and trade benefits and concessions, obtained permission from Turgut Ozal (President of Turkey) to use the Turkish base to accommodate American aircraft that carried out the bombing of Iraq . During the invasion of Iraqi troops in Kuwait, Bush even tried to obtain the consent of Congress to the introduction of troops into Iraq. It was no accident. After all, Turkey pursued its own goals in northern Iraq. She was interested in returning the area of ​​Kirkuk - Mosul, which had been ceded to Iraq back in the 1920s and previously belonged to Turkey. Even during the Iran-Iraq war, the issue of Turkey's claims in Iraq was discussed in the foreign press. Now the question of their practical implementation could arise. Therefore, Ozal began to flirt with the Iraqi Kurds. If before the Iraqi aggression in Kuwait Ankara and Baghdad cooperated in suppressing the political activity of the Kurds in both countries, then during the war T. Ozal said that he was not against the federal structure of Iraq and granting autonomies to the Kurds, Arabs and Turkmens. As for the Kurds of Turkey, he noted that two-thirds of them are dispersed throughout the country, while the rest are integrated into Turkish society. In this regard, the problem of the Kurds in Turkey allegedly does not exist.

The favorable prospect outlined in the speeches of the Turkish leader, however, interested the leaders of the Kurdish organizations in Iraq, who expressed their readiness to discuss the Kurdish issue with him. From 1961 to 1988, Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) officials controlled the Turkish-Iraqi border with Ankara's approval. The latter, meanwhile, expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that the KDP (M. Barzani) did not prevent the PKK (A. Ocalan) from using the part of the road it controlled to communicate with the outside world. The reaction of the PKK to the establishment of relations between the KDP and Ankara was naturally negative, since, according to its leader, the Kurdish problem in Iraq could be solved at the expense of the PKK. Indeed, Ankara's promises forced the Iraqi Kurds to declare that they would not allow Iraqi Kurdistan to be used for the deployment of military operations in Turkey. And the fears of the PKK were justified, since special Turkish units were deployed in Iraq to suppress its activities.

The Iraqi Kurds were not involved in the war, although they were ready for it. On March 18, 1991, they launched an uprising that engulfed 95% of the territory of Iraqi Kurdistan they controlled. The situation has reached a critical point. Kurdish leaders have already begun to develop plans to overthrow Saddam Hussein's regime. At the same time, they did not exclude the possibility that the Iraqi army would destroy the Kurds with the help of chemical weapons. Therefore, the Kurdish leader J. Talabani, who was in Damascus at that time, said that if Iraq takes this step, the Kurds will blow up the dam and flood Baghdad. The US efforts eliminated the possibility of opening a "second front" in Iraq. Thus, political tension was removed, but the settlement was carried out at the expense of the interests of the Kurds. The Iraqi forces defeated the guerrillas who left Kirkuk. The Kurds have turned to the West and the United Nations for help, but US President Bush has said the Kurdish issue is an "internal conflict". The so-called "Shia factor" influenced the escalation of violence. At the height of events in Iraqi Kurdistan, Iraqi Shiites, with the active support of Iran, launched wide-ranging protests against Saddam. Then in Baghdad they began to exaggerate the idea of ​​a "threat" of the establishment of Islamic fundamentalism in the country. Alarmed by this nature of events, the US and its Western allies, in order to prevent the strengthening of Shiite fundamentalism in Iraq, contrary to their recent promises to protect against Saddam's raids, left them face to face with Hussein's army armed to the teeth. The latter was eager to take revenge for the fiasco in Kuwait through the massacre of the defenseless Kurds. Saddam's reprisal against the Kurds was extremely brutal. More than 2.5 million Kurds were bombed and shelled. Mgoi Sh. Thorny path to freedom. // Asia and Africa today. - 1998. - No. 8. - P. 29 Hussein's army used the tactics of "scorched earth". Iraqi troops wiped out many Kurdish towns and cities from the face of the earth, and a genocide was unleashed against the civilian population. Saddam's soldiers broke into hospitals, killing the wounded and sick, and staged public executions. According to eyewitnesses, the atrocities of the Iraqi regular army surpassed even the horrors of the gas attack against the Kurds from the city of Halabadzhi. Borovoy Ya., Chudodeev A. Looking into the eyes of death.// New time. - 1991. - No. 15. - P. 25 The Kurds found themselves in a difficult situation: people were starving, many were dying from the cold. However, in order to rehabilitate themselves in the eyes of the Kurds, the Americans began to drop humanitarian aid from the air. In addition, Bush ordered Baghdad not to interfere in the affairs of the Kurds.

After a rather long delay, the governments of the United States, England, France, and the UN developed a series of measures, including humanitarian assistance and the creation of a “safety zone” (or “liberated zone”) in northern Iraq, where Iraqi army aircraft are prohibited from flying. The "liberated zone", however, excludes the oil-producing areas of Kirkuk. President Ozal also agreed with this decision. Demchenko P. Kurds are hostages of big politics. //Echo of the planet. - 1993. - No. 15. - S. 6

Thus, after the completion of the operation "Desert Storm" north of the 36th parallel, in the areas of compact residence of Kurds in Iraq, a "free region" ("Free Kurdistan" with a center in Erbil) was created in accordance with UN Resolution No. 688 under the tutelage of the US armed forces located at a military base in Turkey. Elements of Kurdish statehood began to form in it: on May 19, 1992, elections were held to the Kurdish parliament (National Assembly), where two authorities - M. Barzani and J. Talabani - divided power, a cabinet of ministers was elected, and the "experiment de -mocracy" on Kurdish soil. "Free Kurdistan" has become not only an object, but to a certain extent the subject of modern international relations. As such, it is recognized by the UN and the Security Council. UN agencies directly entered into political and economic contacts in Erbil, provide security and economic assistance to the Kurds under their control. Shahbazyan G. In the minefield. // Asia and Africa today. - 1998. - No. 2. - S. 22

The existence of independence in Iraqi Kurdistan instilled optimistic faith in the future of the Kurdish people, who viewed the "liberated zone" as a center of Kurdish statehood. But until now, it depends on the annual humanitarian aid provided by the US and the West, estimated at $145 million. It was protected from Saddam's army by US, British and French warplanes starting from the NATO military base in Turkey. But Kurdish independence is being exercised under a tough economic blockade. The borders with the rest of Iraq, Iran and Syria are closed. The only supply corridor remains the Turkish border, which is under the vigilant control of the Ankara authorities. Despite economic difficulties and severe social deprivation, the Kurds managed to do a lot in the development of national culture, education, the media, to establish the work of 24 hospitals and small clinics, despite the lack of medicines, medical care and equipment.

Domestic political life and all the events that took place in South Kurdistan were under the close attention of the special services not only of Iraq, but also of Turkey, Iran and Syria. Not being able to openly interrupt the ongoing processes in South Kurdistan, these countries actively used their special services, which could not be resisted by the weak and ineffective security agencies of South Kurdistan. These forces spurred the already tense contradictions between internal political forces. The confrontation between the KDP and the PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) resulted in an open armed clash that began in May 1994. The leaders of the Kurdish movement in South Kurdistan were caught in the inter-party struggle. Mutual hatred and distrust blocked them from seeing the real situation and, moreover, from the prospects of the national movement. Outbursts of hostility between them almost derailed the experiment, which had just begun. On the one hand, the Turkish authorities, who are fighting against the PKK guerrillas, who are more radical than the Kurdish parties in Iraq, are trying to use these divisions and foment hostility among the Iraqi Kurds. On the other hand, the PKK's maximalism often causes clashes between Iraqi Kurds, since in order to maintain the “Turkish channel”, Kurdish leaders in Iraq have to adhere to positions that contradict the tasks and goals of the Kurdish movement in Turkey and Iran. Although the aggravation of these contradictions prevented the May 1995 local self-government elections in Iraqi Kurdistan, the leading organizations of the Kurdish national democratic movement of the Iraqi Kurds - the KDP and the PUK - found the courage to sign in 1995 an agreement on peace and cooperation .

All this testifies to the fact that the Kurdish movement in Iraq does not always succeed in overcoming the tendency of the traditional split in the political leadership, which is characteristic of the entire Kurdish movement in Western Asia. The reasons for the stability of this trend lie, obviously, in the still low political culture of the Kurds, in the personification of political activity and a number of other factors.

The existence of a "liberated zone" in Iraqi Kurdistan reveals unresolved contradictions that have been preserved in the system of interstate relations in the Western Asian region from the past. As in the historical past, the Kurdish countries in West Asia oppose the existence of any form of Kurdish self-government, regardless of their relationship to the US and the West. Apart from Turkey, none of them has such favorable relations with the latter. Therefore, it is unlikely that the Kurdish states will welcome the line of the US and Europe to support Kurdish independence in Iraq.

On October 13, 1997, after some lull and at the moment when the next meeting between the KDP and PUK delegations was expected, new armed clashes began between the KDP and PUK detachments. After the exchange of messages between the Chairman of the KDP Massoud Barzani and the Secretary General of the PUK Jalal Talabani and in December 1997, with the mediation of the authoritative Kurdish political figure Aziz Mohammed, a negotiation process began on a peaceful solution to the conflict between the warring parties. During the negotiations, the principles of creating a government of national unity, the conditions and principles for holding new parliamentary elections and the formation of a legitimate government, a program to transfer sources of income into the hands of the newly formed government were discussed.

The negotiation process is accompanied by peaceful reactions from the Kurds, because. there are no fundamental differences between the KDP and the PUK, and most importantly, the position of the broad masses on a pan-Kurdish scale plays a significant role, demanding the achievement of popular unity in the struggle for full-fledged autonomy. Mgoi Sh. Thorny path to freedom. // Asia and Africa today. - 1998. - No. 8. - S. 31

In November 2003, the Kurdish parliament approved two fundamental documents - the constitution of the Kurdish region and the constitution of the future federal Iraq. The latter means that the actions of the Kurds are again becoming offensive. "Iraqi Kurds are becoming key players in Iraqi and regional politics," said Kurdish Prime Minister Barham Saleh. Yes, and many independent experts believe that the Kurds have the right to expect that their role in the new leadership will be more significant than their share in the population of Iraq. Lurie S. New Mussel? // Russian special forces. - 2003. - No. 4

It is most likely that the Kurdish problem will not be solved on a global or regional scale, but differentially and step by step, within the framework of those states where Kurds live compactly and are national minorities. The threat of a possible disintegration of these states along ethnic lines or the separation of Kurdish areas from them is unlikely. Hence the creation of a new state - Greater Kurdistan - a project rather from the distant future. Of course, the Kurds themselves, at the level of an age-old dream or idea, will never abandon such a scenario, but the prerequisites for it have not yet been created.

Kurds are a people with more than a thousand years of history, which is a collection of numerous tribal groups settled mainly in the regions of the mountains of the middle and northern Zagros and in the upper reaches of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers - in a region conventionally called Kurdistan, which is currently divided between Turkey, Iran , Iraq and Syria . There is no single Kurdish language yet, its dialects belong to the northwestern subgroup of Iranian languages. Most Kurds profess Sunni Islam, some - Shiite Islam, also Alevism, Yezidism and Christianity. There have been no official censuses of Kurds. According to very rough estimates, their total number is about 40 million people living in Turkey (18-20 million), Iran (8-9 million), Iraq (5-6 million), Syria (about 3 million), countries of Europe and Asia (over 2 million). Several hundred thousand Kurds also live in the post-Soviet space, including Russia.

Ethnic Kurdistan for a long time was in a state of instability, wars and armed conflicts and was completely dependent on the imperial ambitions of the conquerors (Arabs, Persians, Tatar-Mongols, Ottomans and others). Throughout a long historical period, the Kurds waged a national liberation struggle, but to date they have not managed to create an independent state.

There are quite a few internal and external factors hindering the creation of a Kurdish state today. The main ones include: geographical and tribal fragmentation and disunity of the Kurds, different levels of their political and socio-economic development in each of the countries of residence, the absence of a single Kurdish language, a common political platform (party, movement, front), a common national leader; there are no external supporters of the disintegration of existing countries and the creation of a Kurdish state (the only exception can be considered the readiness of the United States to use any opposition forces in the fight against the Iranian regime, including nationalist movements, to which Washington includes the Kurds).

What are the options for solving the Kurdish problem within the existing states?

The Iraqi Kurds have achieved the greatest success in their self-determination and socio-economic status, having legally received the status of a subject of the federation with the widest rights and powers. The authorities of Iraqi Kurdistan independently manage the region, have all the attributes of a state, carry out foreign policy and foreign economic activity, have their own law enforcement agencies and armed forces, receive 17% of the income from Iraqi hydrocarbon exports in proportion to their population, the Kurdish language (its dialects) is recognized as the second state language in country. Along with this, the region is adequately represented in the federal authorities (Iraqi President D. Talabani, 6 ministerial posts, including the Foreign Ministry, an influential faction in parliament, etc.). Iraqi Kurdistan compares favorably with other parts of the country in terms of security and a favorable investment climate, success in rebuilding the war-torn economy, infrastructure, livelihoods, healthcare and education. The remaining disagreements and contradictions with the central government of the authorities of Iraqi Kurdistan, as a rule, are resolved through negotiations and discussions. Moreover, Iraqi Kurdish leaders have repeatedly acted as mediators between Iraqi Shia Arabs and Sunni Arabs and, in doing so, have contributed to overcoming serious government crises. The region has become, as it were, an oasis of stability and prosperity in Iraq, which is teetering on the brink of civil war. Iraqi Kurds emphasize that they stand for the preservation of a single Iraqi state and do not intend to initiate its disintegration along ethno-confessional lines. In addition, the issue of the so-called "disputed territories" on the administrative border of Iraqi Kurdistan, where the Kurds historically lived, has not yet been resolved. If Iraq disintegrates today, then about a million Kurds will remain in the Arab part of the country. Therefore, President M. Barzani is seeking the implementation by the government of Nuri al-Maliki of the relevant article of the constitution on the preparation and holding of referendums among the population of "disputed areas", where the Kurds are in the majority. Under the current conditions, only extraordinary circumstances (military coup in Baghdad, the beginning of a civil war between the Arabs, an armed attack on the region from outside) can provoke the secession of Iraqi Kurdistan from Iraq.

The leaders of the Iraqi Kurds, M. Barzani and D. Talabani, made significant mediation efforts to peacefully resolve the Kurdish problem in neighboring Turkey. Not without their active participation, the Turkish authorities entered into negotiations with the leader of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), Abdullah Öcalan, who is serving a life sentence, who in March 2013 appealed to his supporters to stop hostilities and move on to a peaceful, phased solution of the Kurdish issue in Turkey. The plan for the peaceful settlement of the Kurdish problem agreed with the Turkish authorities provides for: the withdrawal of PKK militants to neighboring regions of Iraq within a few months, the implementation of legislative reform, up to the introduction of amendments to the country's constitution, recognizing the national rights and freedoms of the Kurdish minority, the exclusion of the PKK from the list of terrorist organizations, the release of all political Kurdish prisoners, including A. Ocalan. The final stage provides for the voluntary disarmament of Kurdish militants and their safe return to their homeland (amnesty). On May 8, 2013, the first groups of Kurdish guerrillas crossed the Turkish-Iraqi border.

It is still difficult to judge how effective and realistic the plan agreed between the PKK and Ankara will be, since both sides have not only its supporters, but also opponents. Traditionally, the army elite, representatives of the Turkish security forces, radical Islamist and nationalist groups are in favor of a forceful solution to the Kurdish problem. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), headed by him, are taking a more pragmatic course towards the Kurds and other national minorities. R. Erdogan understands that the solution of the Kurdish problem can remove a number of issues that impede Turkey's accession to the EU. In addition, the votes of the Kurdish voters are very important for the continuation of the constitutional reform and the planned nomination of R. Erdogan for the presidency of the country.

There is also no unity among Turkish Kurds. Most of them are in favor of a peaceful solution to the Kurdish issue and support the latest agreements between A. Ocalan and Ankara. However, among the numerous Kurdish anti-government groups, there are also supporters of the continuation of the guerrilla war. These are, first of all, extremist, nationalist groups, including those that broke away from the PKK, some of them are associated with foreign intelligence services, emigrant centers in Europe, others with organized crime at the junction of the state borders of Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran (smuggling trade in weapons, drugs, people). Today it can be stated that only the first step has been taken in overcoming the Kurdish-Turkish conflict, however, the ceasefire reached with such difficulty can be easily violated as a result of provocations from both sides.

The ongoing civil war in Syria does not contribute to reducing tension in the Kurdish regions of Turkey. Syrian refugee camps are located along the Turkish-Syrian border, detachments of the Syrian armed opposition are formed here, where, along with defectors from the Syrian army, there are so-called Muslim volunteers (“warriors of Allah”, “jihadists”), mercenaries from all over the Middle East, militants of the terrorist groups Al-Qaeda, Jabga al-Nusra and dozens of others.

It is difficult to predict how the outlined variant of a peaceful settlement in Turkey will develop further. Most likely, it will drag on for an indefinite period of time and may at any time again turn into a phase of open military confrontation.

The Syrian Kurds found themselves in an even more difficult situation. On the one hand, they were harassed and discriminated against in every possible way on the basis of nationality during the years of the Syrian Baathist regime and, naturally, cannot act in support of it in the ongoing fierce civil war. On the other hand, the disparate detachments of the armed opposition fighting against the B. Assad regime also do not guarantee the Kurds their national rights and freedoms. Moreover, the Kurds are justifiably afraid that if the rebels win, Islamist radical groups of the Salafi or Wahhabi persuasion, which will be guided by the monarchies of the Persian Gulf, may come to power in Damascus. In this case, the Syrian Kurds are unlikely to be able to count on positive changes in their situation.

In view of the foregoing, the Syrian Kurds continue to adhere to strict neutrality in the intra-Arab conflict. B. Assad was forced to withdraw government troops from areas densely populated by Kurds in order to concentrate them on the main directions of the offensive of the opposition detachments. Taking advantage of this situation, the Kurds began to create local authorities and self-defense units everywhere in order to prevent the strengthening of militants in these territories. Despite the clashes that took place with them (the town of Ras al-Ain on the Turkish border and the city of Aleppo), the Kurds generally manage to control their places of compact residence. These areas have suffered the least from the civil war, although the outflow of Kurdish refugees from Syria to neighboring Iraq does take place. The further fate of the Syrian Kurds can become clear only after the end of the civil war. Their leaders do not advocate the separation of Syrian Kurdistan from other parts of Syria and do not even demand full autonomy, since, unlike Iraq, Syrian Kurds live in enclaves in large cities (Damascus, Aleppo, others), as well as in three different provinces of Syria, between which there are areas with an Arab population. The Syrian Kurds would be satisfied with equal rights and freedoms with the Arab population of the country, proportional representation in the new authorities and the so-called cultural autonomy (Kurdish language, their own media, national clothes, observance of national customs and rituals, the opportunity to communicate with their fellow tribesmen in Turkey and Iraq, etc.).

Given the severity of the ongoing civil war in Syria, it is too early to talk about real options for resolving the Kurdish issue in this country.

The situation of the Iranian Kurds is completely dependent on the policy of the ruling regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran. As long as Iranian Kurdish areas remain the most backward in socio-economic situation, their political parties and movements are persecuted, activists are thrown into jail or face the death penalty. Periodically, the authorities promise some concessions to the Kurds and the allocation of budgetary funds for the accelerated development of the region, but, as a rule, they forget about this after election campaigns. The situation is aggravated by the fact that among the Kurdish parties themselves in Iran there is no unity, there is no single platform. While the Kurdish issue in Iran is sort of dormant, but the turbulent events to restore the national rights of the Kurds in Iraq, Turkey and Syria, of course, affect the growth of the national identity of the Iranian Kurds. Tehran is also forced to take into account the ongoing changes in the Kurdish enclaves of neighboring countries and take preventive measures to reduce tensions between the Kurds and the authorities.

The situation in the Kurdish regions of Iran may change radically in the event of an aggravation of Iran's military confrontation with the United States and Israel, for example, in the case of missile and bomb attacks on nuclear and other strategic facilities of Iran. In this case, a “no-fly zone” could be established over the Kurdish areas, as was the case in Iraq, and the Iranian Kurds could be granted autonomy status under the American “umbrella”.

The struggle of Iraqi, Syrian, Turkish and Iranian Kurds for their national rights and freedoms is one of the internal problems of these states and does not directly affect the interests of Russia. As the legalization of Kurdish parties and movements in these countries, Russia could establish contacts with them through the chambers of parliament, parties, subjects of the federation and municipal authorities, non-governmental and public organizations. Undoubtedly, in Russian foreign policy and in the work of Russian foreign policy departments, it is necessary to constantly take into account the increasing role and importance of the 40 million Kurdish people and dynamically developing Kurdish minorities in each of their countries of compact residence.

Ivanov Stanislav Mikhailovich, Candidate of Historical Sciences, leading researcher at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, an expert on the problems of the Near and Middle East, especially for the New Eastern Outlook online magazine.