The ontological problems of economics include the following areas of research: the concept of the ontology of economic knowledge; the economic picture of the world and the change in the ontology of economic knowledge; stages of development of economic knowledge; initial concepts of economic ontology; subjects and objects in the economy; levels of economic reality; types of interactions in the economy; the specifics of space and time in the economy and their relationship; determinism and causality in economics; understanding of the economy as a system.

In this chapter, only a part of the problems of this topic will be considered, including the content and transformation of the concepts of "disciplinary ontology of economic science", "economic reality", "economic picture of the world", "ontological prerequisites of economic science", "economic space" will be disclosed. and economic time. (Chapter 9 is devoted to the problems of economic determinism and the stages of development of economic knowledge.)

In the context of philosophy, ontology is the doctrine of being as a whole, of its basic properties and structure. In modern philosophy of science, two main meanings of the concept of ontology are distinguished:

1) substantive - corresponds to the definition of ontology given by us above; 2) subject-linguistic (constructivist) - ontology is interpreted as a theoretical construction of the reality under study.

The concept of ontology came to science not so long ago: in the natural sciences, it began to be used instead of the concept of nature in the second half of the 20th century, thus showing that the scientist does not so much reflect, describes the object of knowledge, but rather constructs it. At present, in the natural and social sciences and humanities, ontology is understood both in the first (substantialist) and in the second (constructivist) sense. Both interpretations are preserved in the application to the definition of disciplinary ontology, which is understood today as a representation (and its foundations) about a certain area of ​​reality, for example, economic, social, historical. V.S. Stepin notes that in order to avoid confusion in the case of special sciences, the term “picture of the reality under study” is also used. According to O.I. Ananyin, the disciplinary ontology of economics is "a general picture of economic reality". Thus, ontology in modern science is understood both as a theoretical construction of the reality under study, and as the subject-object foundations underlying this construction.

The constructivist understanding of ontology goes back to the works of M. Heidegger and G. Gadamer; from this point of view, the study of ontological issues is understood as "an analysis of the meaning of language structures, means that describe the world" . In the aspect of disciplinary ontology, paramount attention is paid, first of all, to the analysis of texts in which this or that scientific theory has found expression, in order to interpret and construct "the meaning of the theory, and not to reconstruct the reality behind it" .

The disciplinary ontology of a particular science is built on basic categories, which, in turn, form the structures of concepts and theories. Each concept or theory in a certain way "reflects" (represents) the reality studied by science. The system of such ideal images of the real world, presented in the theory of a particular science, constitutes the disciplinary ontology of this science. Disciplinary ontologies are part of the scientific paradigm. The study of economic ontologies allows economists to: a) revise the categorical "dictionary" of science, create new categories that reflect the current state of science, its current problems; b) carry out their

figurative cleaning of the scientific language, eliminating ambiguities from it and clarifying concepts; c) determine and formulate the philosophical and methodological premises of economic theories, show the relationship of the latter with the theoretical and practical achievements and problems of other sciences.

Nevertheless, the study of disciplinary ontologies in economics today has a short history. This situation is connected mainly with the orientation of the neoclassical paradigm prevailing in economic science towards the ideal of scientific knowledge that was formed in the era of modern times. The essence of this ideal lies in the desire of scientists to understand the universal laws of reality behind individual things, processes and phenomena as the subject of science. Orientation to universal laws implies: a) registration of the most general, universal in the analyzed phenomena and processes, i.e. rejection of the principle of historicity in the study of objects of scientific knowledge; b) a predominant emphasis on the development of analytical tools, most often in mathematical form. These features are also characteristic of economic science. So, at the end of the XIX century. in the works of L. Walras (1874) and A. Marshall (1890) an instrumental understanding of the economy is formed as a set of analytical tools for analyzing various phenomena and processes. The mathematical apparatus becomes system-forming in relation to the unity of economic science; the applied methods are mainly of narrow applied value, which allows the use of economic models in other social sciences; the scientist-economist seeks not to know the ontological status of the object of knowledge, but to collect information about the object and develop ways to operate with this information. This forms the basis for the emergence of the phenomenon of economic imperialism. These processes have led to a shortage of economic theories that give a systematic view of economic reality. The paradox of modern economics lies in the fact that, while understanding economics as a process of cognition of economic reality and striving to comprehend universal economic laws, scientists at the same time abstract from the cognizable reality, sometimes even ignoring it. Hence, another characteristic feature of modern economic science is the refusal to use and analyze the premises of economic theories as non-essential elements of the theory. As a result, we see a conflict between economic theories and economic reality.

In the 1970-80s. in economic science there is a methodological revolution associated with the separation of the methodology of economic science into a separate area, which resulted in the emergence of special studies of economic ontologies. As O.I. Ananin, the methodological revolution was a response to the reorientation of methodological research in economics from normative to descriptive. On this path, economic methodology posed the problem of the foundations of economic knowledge.

The goal of a scientist studying disciplinary ontologies, including economics, is to recreate the paradigm (according to T. Kuhn) provisions of scientific research (theoretical and methodological prerequisites expressed in a conceptual form). As O.I. Ananin, these prerequisites are not always realized by the authors of certain economic theories (see:). Compared with economic disciplinary ontologies, the worldview of a scientist-economist is a wider semantic field, in which a rigorous theory borders on common sense. The latter acts as a kind of “filter”, passing through which and coming into contact with other elements of the worldview (beliefs, habits, ideals, values, etc.), the theoretical and methodological prerequisites take the form of a picture of the world. As well as disciplinary ontologies, a worldview initially (in its direct form, hidden inside a particular theory) can be unreflected; however, both worldview and disciplinary ontologies need such reflection and cannot exist without it.

Comprehending the ontological premises of a certain economic theory, we identify those key points of the worldview of a scientist (a group of scientists) that, like a certain framework, hold his entire worldview, including the economic theory created by this scientist (a group of scientists).

According to O.I. Ananyin, the following historical and economic options for describing economic ontologies can be distinguished: 1) the concept of prejudices in the theory of T. Veblen; 2) the theory of vision by J. Schumpeter; 3) research programs of I. Lakatos; 4) the concept of prerequisites in M. Friedman; 5) the concept of socio-economic machines N. Cartwright.

Any economic ontology is based on a certain idea of ​​economic reality as a specific form of being. Economic reality is “the sphere of human activity within which the

making and implementing decisions related to the creation and use of goods that satisfy human needs. O.I. Ananin understands economic reality as a cycle in which conditions, decisions and products interact. In our opinion, this definition is too narrow, since it focuses on a person and his needs, only indirectly including the primary (nature) and secondary (society) environment surrounding a person in the sphere of economic reality. More multifaceted and at the same time intersecting in content with the concept of economic reality is the concept of the economic picture of the world, which gives an idea of ​​the totality of views on the subject and object of the economy, their place and methods of interaction, forms of management and types of economic activity. Nevertheless, it is the definition presented by O.I. Ananin, is dominant in modern economic theory (mainstream). We single out the following types of disciplinary ontologies in economics (Table 8.1 (according to:)).

Table 8.1

Types of disciplinary ontologies in economics

The end of the table. 8.1

At the moment, we can state the struggle between two ontologies - behavioral and institutional. If we analyze the definition of economic reality given above, it becomes clear that it is built within the boundaries of a certain - behavioral - ontology and, therefore, can be expanded by involving elements of two other ontologies. One

of the features of behavioral ontology, according to O.B. Koshovets and I.E. Frolov, is the presence of a kind of filter between the scientist-economist and the actual economic reality; this filter is mathematical reality (formal ontology). As a result, the process of scientific knowledge in economics appears as a process of constructing (modeling) "logically possible worlds", i.e. goes almost entirely into the realm of the ideal, cutting off ties with the real. As a result, the ability of economic theories to give a general picture of economic reality is reduced: economic science paradoxically becomes a space of particular theories considering very specific circumstances that may contradict each other. The paradox of this situation lies in the fact that the economy still declares as its goal the search and formulation of universal laws of economic reality.

Such isolation of economic science within itself leads to a logical thought about the need to develop interdisciplinary cooperation between the economy, especially with other social sciences (sociology, psychology, philosophy), in order to resolve the systemic crisis in which the economy finds itself today both as a theoretical and as Practical activities.

Today, the problems of economic ontology are being developed in the following directions.

1. Critical realism - a trend in European and American philosophy that developed in the second half of the 19th - first half of the 20th centuries. and continuing today.

Representatives of this trend are: A. Riehl, O. Kulpe, E. Becher, A. Pringle-Pattinson, R. Adamson, J.D. Hicks, R. Bashkar, J. Urry, R. Keith, E. Collier, T. Lawson, W. Myaki, D. Houseman. and others. Research in the field of economic ontologies unfolded within the framework of the discussion about the status of the "social" in the social sciences. This discussion, in turn, goes back to one of the fundamental philosophical problems - the problem of the subject and object of knowledge. From the point of view of critical realism, social sciences cognize the essence of social reality as “structures, mechanisms, laws immanently inherent in it and unobservable by the subject”, the unchanging foundation of social phenomena. These premises allow representatives of this trend to criticize the orthodox economic theory (mainstream). So, T. Lawson objects to the reduction of ontological

scientific research in economics to epistemology, when the analysis is aimed only at identifying the ontological premises of economic theories. The scientist believes that economic ontology should be part of a complete picture of social reality, created on the basis of the study of social systems. However, in Lawson's theory, the relationship of such an ontology with specific economic theories remains unclear.

2. Research by J. Hodgson and R. Sugden.

The ontological problems of economic theory are studied by these scientists in the aspect of the problem of the realism of economic models. J. Hodgson believes that the realism of the model is not a paramount requirement, since it is much more important that the model (or heuristic, in Hodgson's terminology) successfully reveals a certain causal relationship in the study area. R. Sugden, agreeing with Hodgson, specifies that such heuristics (in Sugden's terminology - plausible worlds) can be a kind of bridge from the model to reality. However, within the framework of this approach, the connection between the model and reality is predominantly formal and is based only on the simple plausibility of the model.

3. Constructivism R. Lucas.

The American economist R. Lucas defends the mainstream and proposes to solve the problem of the realism of economic theories based on the fact that the model should not correspond to reality, but, on the contrary, reality - models. The disadvantage of this approach lies in the fact that its application in the field of economic policy is carried out without taking into account the socio-historical originality of various economic communities, based on the principles of methodological universalism.

In general, the following main trends in the field of ontological analysis of economic theories can be identified:

Various modifications of the product ontology;

Substantiation and development of behavioral ontology;

Concepts Proposing Special Social Ontologies for Economic Theory;

Attempts to form a new, purely economic ontology.

The most generalized result of the scientific knowledge of being is the scientific picture of the world. Despite the large number of publications devoted to this form of knowledge, the understanding of its nature is far from unambiguous. In our opinion, the difficulty of determining the scientific picture of the world is due to the fact that it appears at the intersection of three fundamental modes of existence of the human "spirit" - worldview, philosophy and science - and carries the signs of each of them. A characteristic feature of many studies devoted to the problems of the picture of the world is the statement about the ideological nature of this form of knowledge.

We believe that the picture of the world is the most important component of the worldview, but is only part of it. The picture of the world is the subject side of the worldview, that is, that part of it in which the world is presented in the form of objects and relations between them. It consists of visual images of the most significant for the subject of things and their connections. As for the scientific picture of the world, it is part of the subject side of the worldview, in which the scientific beliefs of the subject are concentrated, and consists of visual-figurative representations of objects and connections between them, formed in the field of science. As noted by V. S. Stepin and L. F. Kuznetsova, the scientific picture of the world “fixes only one block in the worldview - knowledge about the structure of the world, obtained at one stage or another of the historical development of science.”

The scientific picture of the world consists of two types of knowledge: knowledge about the most significant objects of the studied sphere (world) that have come to the attention of science, and knowledge about the relationships between these objects, the connections between them. The first type of knowledge is the elemental content of the scientific picture of the world, the second - sets its structure. Subject knowledge exists in the picture of the world in an ontologized form - in the form of especially capacious visual images, and knowledge about connections - in a conceptual form, expressed in the form of philosophical and scientific principles, laws and ideas.

A worldview in which the scientific picture of the world occupies a dominant place is called scientific. But even the scientific worldview includes, in addition to scientific and non-scientific knowledge, views and beliefs (ethical and legal norms that have become internal regulators of behavior, aesthetic views, political convictions, and even some norms of "common sense"). Therefore, the scientific picture of the world does not cover the entire scientific worldview with its content, but is its defining component, which is fixed with the help of the adjective "scientific" before the word "worldview".

Sometimes the picture of the world is called an ontology. For example, V. N. Kostyuk writes that the scientific picture of the world is essentially an ontology of scientific theory. L. F. Kuznetsova and V. S. Stepin call private scientific pictures of the world disciplinary ontologies. In our opinion, the picture of the world is not an ontology, but is only its subject of study. Ontology is a philosophical reflection on the picture of the world as the subject content of the worldview. The above definition, it would seem, contradicts the generally accepted understanding of ontology as a doctrine of being. By being, as already mentioned, in the substantive ontology one understands either the objective reality itself, or the presence of this reality. But does an ontologist really deal with objective reality or only with its representation in his mind? In functional ontology, as is known, it is believed that the researcher is not dealing with being itself, but only with its picture, which depends on the subject, changes as the subject of knowledge changes. I think this is correct.

Thus, the most important part of any worldview is the picture of the world, in which the results of a subject reflection by a person of the most significant objects for him and their connections of being are concentrated. To act as a subject area of ​​the worldview is the main purpose of any, including the scientific picture of the world. Ontology is a philosophical reflection on the picture of the world, accepted by a person as an objective being.

Stepin V.S., Kuznetsova L.F. Scientific picture of the world in the culture of technogenic civilization. M., 1994. S. 16.

Kostyuk VN Ontology of changing scientific knowledge // Philosophical sciences. 1982. No. 1. S. 39.

Stepin V.S., Kuznetsova L.F. Scientific picture of the world in the culture of technogenic civilization. M., 1994.

Being as a subject of rational reflection. Ontology as a doctrine of universal forms and patterns of being. Types of ontology - mythological, religious, philosophical, scientific, existential-personal. The main question of philosophy and philosophical ontology. The place of ontology in the structure of philosophical knowledge and the development of ontological problems in the history of philosophy. Ways and forms of being in rational thinking. Specificity of material, ideal, human, social and cultural existence. Western and Eastern traditions of philosophical ontology.

Ideas about the world as a universal system and model of the unity of the world. The concept of "substance". The search for the substantial basis of the world: matter and spirit. Monistic and pluralistic concepts of being.

Concretization of life. The concept of matter. Two approaches to the definition of matter: philosophical-epistemological and philosophical-ontological. Matter as an objective reality that exists before and independently of our consciousness and is reflected by it. Matter as a substrate.

Matter and its properties: consistency, structure, movement, space, time. Systemic existence. Structural levels of being: inorganic, organic, social. The specifics of the organization of the levels of being. System-structural approach, its possibilities and limitations in understanding the world.

Matter and motion. The absoluteness of motion and the relativity of rest. The main types of movement: movement with the preservation of the qualities of the system, movement associated with a qualitative change in the system. The concept of development. Development as a directed, irreversible, progressive qualitative change in the system.

Forms of movement and modern science. Principles of classification of forms of motion of matter. Classification of the forms of motion of matter by F. Engels: mechanical, physical, chemical, biological, social. Correction of this classification in accordance with modern scientific discoveries.

Concepts of space and time. Substantial and relational concepts of space and time. The role of A. Einstein's theory of relativity in understanding the essence of space and time. Properties of space: extension, three-dimensionality, homogeneity, isotropy. Properties of time: duration, one-dimensionality, irreversibility, homogeneity. The problem of the dimension of space and time. Qualitative variety of forms of space and time in inanimate nature. biological space and time. social space and time. Features of psychological time.

Lecture 9 Dialectics and Synergetics

Dialectics of being. Dialectics as an art about universal connections and the development of the world. Historical and philosophical evolution of the understanding of dialectics. Ancient Dialectics: Dialectical Ideas in the Works of Heraclitus and Socrates. Dialectical ideas of the philosophy of the Renaissance. Dialectical ideas in German classical philosophy. Dialectic of K. Marx. Modern concepts of dialectics.

Dialectics as a doctrine of development. Universal connections of being. Categories of dialectics. Singular and general. Phenomenon and essence: types of phenomena (appearances, intra- and inter-essential appearances). Dialectical patterns. Structural connections. Part and whole. The principle of integrity: the whole is something more than the sum of its parts; the properties of a whole cannot be reduced to the sum of the properties of its constituent things. Form and content. Elements and structure. The concept of a system. System objects. The principle of system. Determinism and indeterminism. Connections of determination. The principle of determinism. Causal connections. Causality principle. chance and necessity. Possibility and reality: types of possibilities (reversible and irreversible, abstract and concrete, real and formal).

Laws of dialectical development. The law of transformation of quantity into quality. Dialectics of quantitative and qualitative changes. quality and properties. Quality and quantity. Measure. Transition to a new quality. Horse racing. Types of jumps.

The law of dialectical synthesis. dialectical negations. Types of denials. Dialectical negations and syntheses.

Dialectics and logical contradictions. The law of dialectical inconsistency. dialectical opposites. Unity and struggle of opposites. dialectical contradiction. "The negation of the negation". Cyclicity and progression of changes. Types of unity and types of contradictions.

Development and progress. The concept of development. Development models: logical-rationalistic (represented in German transcendental philosophy), gradualist (H. Spencer), naturalist (C. Darwin), emergent, or the concept of creative evolution (A. Bergson), anthropological (existentialism), equilibrium theory, conflict theory , dialectical-materialistic, dialectic of theoxmic unity, negative dialectic, dialectic of epistemological reflection, paradoxical dialectic, antinomic dialectic.

the principle of historicism. Progress and regress. Progress is a problem. Criteria of progress at different structural levels of the organization of being. Social dialectics. Dialectics of the process of cognition.

Synergetics as a general theory of self-organization. Russian and American synergetic schools. The specifics of their research. Consistency and self-organization as integral properties of matter. Subject and object of synergetics. The history of the emergence and development of the synergetic paradigm. Synergetic principles: the principle of considering systems as dynamic, the principle of permanent complication, the principle of indeterminism.

Self-organization processes in open non-equilibrium systems. Stages of system evolution: period of relative equilibrium, transition to a dissipative stage, transition to a bifurcation stage, attractr regime, formation of a new system structure.

Dissipative structures are structures formed during significant fluctuations of external gradients, destroying the bonds between the elements of the system and bringing the system into a state of strong disequilibrium with an uncontrollably increasing entropy. Reasons for the formation of dissipative structures.

The concept of entropy and chaos. Increasing the level of entropy. Transition of the system to the bifurcation stage. The ratio of chaos and structure. Problematization of the existence of chaos.

Concept of bifurcation and bifurcation point. bifurcation mechanism. When moving away from equilibrium (in a highly non-equilibrium state), at a certain value of the variable parameter, the system reaches the threshold of stability, beyond which several (more than one) possible branches of development open up for the system. Bifurcation as a condition for the system to choose a further path of self-organization.

The concept of an attractor: a regime to which a system gravitates at a given stage of its development.

The concept of co-evolution as a joint self-consistent development of all systems that make up the world.

Formation of a synergetic picture of the world. Application of a synergistic approach to the study of animate and inanimate nature. Features of the application of the synergetic approach in the study of man and social phenomena and processes.

A synergistic view of the development of human life. The role of synergetic ideas in medical practice: pharmacy, surgery, psychiatry.

Synergetic principles in the philosophy of language. Synergetic aspects of creativity.

Rejection of the idea of ​​the externality of the object. A turn from praxeologically oriented activism to the laying of axiological foundations for a culture of a new (dialogical) type. The ideal of a global civilization as based on anthropo-natural harmony and harmonious ethno-cultural polycentrism.

SCIENTIFIC PICTURE OF THE WORLD- a holistic image of the subject of scientific research in its main systemic and structural characteristics, formed by means of fundamental concepts, ideas and principles of science at every stage of its historical development.

There are main varieties (forms) of the scientific picture of the world: 1) general scientific as a generalized idea of ​​the Universe, wildlife, society and man, formed on the basis of a synthesis of knowledge obtained in various scientific disciplines; 2) social and natural science pictures of the world as ideas about society and nature, generalizing the achievements of the social, humanitarian and natural sciences, respectively; 3) special scientific pictures of the world (disciplinary ontologies) - ideas about the subjects of individual sciences (physical, chemical, biological, etc. pictures of the world). In the latter case, the term "world" is used in a specific sense, denoting not the world as a whole, but the subject area of ​​a separate science (the physical world, the biological world, the world of chemical processes). To avoid terminological problems, the term “picture of the reality under study” is also used to designate disciplinary ontologies. Its most studied example is the physical picture of the world. But such pictures exist in any science as soon as it is constituted as an independent branch of scientific knowledge. A generalized system-structural image of the subject of research is introduced into a special scientific picture of the world through representations 1) about fundamental objects, from which all other objects studied by the corresponding science are supposed to be built; 2) about the typology of the studied objects; 3) about the general features of their interaction; 4) about the space-time structure of reality. All these representations can be described in a system of ontological principles that serve as the basis for the scientific theories of the relevant discipline. For example, principles - the world consists of indivisible corpuscles; their interaction is strictly determined and is carried out as an instantaneous transfer of forces in a straight line; corpuscles and the bodies formed from them move in absolute space over the course of absolute time - they describe the picture of the physical world that has developed in the 2nd floor. 17th century and later called the mechanical picture of the world.

The transition from mechanical to electrodynamic (at the end of the 19th century) and then to the quantum-relativistic picture of physical reality (first half of the 20th century) was accompanied by a change in the system of ontological principles of physics. It was most radical during the formation of quantum-relativistic physics (revision of the principles of the indivisibility of atoms, the existence of absolute space-time, the Laplacian determination of physical processes).

By analogy with the physical picture of the world, pictures of the studied reality are distinguished in other sciences (chemistry, astronomy, biology, etc.). Among them there are also historically replacing each other types of pictures of the world. For example, in the history of biology - the transition from pre-Darwinian ideas about the living to the picture of the biological world proposed by Darwin, to the subsequent inclusion in the picture of wildlife of ideas about genes as carriers of heredity, to modern ideas about the levels of systemic organization of living things - populations, biogeocenosis, biosphere and their evolution.

Each of the specific historical forms of the special scientific picture of the world can be realized in a number of modifications. Among them there are succession lines (for example, the development of Newtonian ideas about the physical world by Euler, the development of the electrodynamic picture of the world by Faraday, Maxwell, Hertz, Lorentz, each of which introduced new elements into this picture). But situations are possible when the same type of picture of the world is realized in the form of competing and alternative ideas about the reality under study (for example, the struggle between the Newtonian and Cartesian concepts of nature as alternative options for the mechanical picture of the world; competition between two main directions in the development of the electrodynamic picture of the world - the Ampère-Weber programs, on the one hand, and the Faraday-Maxwell programs, on the other).

The picture of the world is a special type of theoretical knowledge. It can be considered as some theoretical model of the studied reality, different from the models (theoretical schemes) underlying specific theories. First, they differ in the degree of generality. Many theories can be based on the same picture of the world, incl. and fundamental. For example, the mechanics of Newton-Euler, thermodynamics and electrodynamics of Ampère-Weber were connected with the mechanical picture of the world. Not only the foundations of Maxwellian electrodynamics, but also the foundations of Hertzian mechanics are connected with the electrodynamic picture of the world. Secondly, a special picture of the world can be distinguished from theoretical schemes by analyzing the abstractions that form them (ideal objects). So, in the mechanical picture of the world, the processes of nature were characterized by means of abstractions - "an indivisible corpuscle", "body", "the interaction of bodies, transmitted instantly in a straight line and changing the state of movement of bodies", "absolute space" and "absolute time". As for the theoretical scheme underlying Newtonian mechanics (taken in its Euler presentation), the essence of mechanical processes is characterized in it by means of other abstractions - “material point”, “force”, “inertial space-time frame of reference”.

Ideal objects that form a picture of the world, in contrast to the idealization of specific theoretical models, always have an ontological status. Any physicist understands that a "material point" does not exist in nature itself, because in nature there are no bodies devoid of dimensions. But the follower of Newton, who accepted the mechanical picture of the world, considered indivisible atoms to be really existing "first bricks" of matter. He identified with nature simplifying and schematizing abstractions, in the system of which a physical picture of the world is created. In what particular signs these abstractions do not correspond to reality - the researcher finds out most often only when his science enters a period of breaking the old picture of the world and replacing it with a new one. Being different from the picture of the world, the theoretical schemes that make up the core of the theory are always associated with it. The establishment of this connection is one of the obligatory conditions for constructing a theory. The procedure for mapping theoretical models (schemes) onto the picture of the world provides that kind of interpretation of equations expressing theoretical laws, which in logic is called the conceptual (or semantic) interpretation and which is mandatory for constructing a theory. Outside the picture of the world, a theory cannot be built in a complete form.

Scientific pictures of the world perform three main interrelated functions in the research process: 1) systematize scientific knowledge, combining them into complex integrity; 2) act as research programs that determine the strategy of scientific knowledge; 3) ensure the objectification of scientific knowledge, their attribution to the object under study and their inclusion in culture.

A special scientific picture of the world integrates knowledge within individual scientific disciplines. The natural-science and social picture of the world, and then the general scientific picture of the world, set broader horizons for the systematization of knowledge. They integrate the achievements of various disciplines, highlighting stable empirically and theoretically substantiated content in disciplinary ontologies. For example, the ideas of the modern general scientific picture of the world about the non-stationary Universe and the Big Bang, about quarks and synergetic processes, about genes, ecosystems and the biosphere, about society as an integral system, about formations and civilizations, etc. were developed within the framework of the corresponding disciplinary ontologies of physics, biology, social sciences and then included in the general scientific picture of the world.

Carrying out a systematizing function, scientific pictures of the world at the same time play the role of research programs. Special scientific pictures of the world set the strategy for empirical and theoretical research within the relevant fields of science. In relation to empirical research, the goal-directing role of special pictures of the world is most clearly manifested when science begins to study objects for which no theory has yet been created and which are studied by empirical methods (typical examples are the role of the electrodynamic picture of the world in the experimental study of cathode and x-rays). Representations about the reality under study, introduced in the picture of the world, provide hypotheses about the nature of the phenomena found in the experiment. According to these hypotheses, experimental tasks are formulated and plans for experiments are developed, through which new characteristics of the objects studied in the experiment are discovered.

In theoretical studies, the role of a special scientific picture of the world as a research program is manifested in the fact that it determines the range of permissible tasks and the formulation of problems at the initial stage of theoretical search, as well as the choice of theoretical means for solving them. For example, during the construction of generalizing theories of electromagnetism, two physical pictures of the world and, accordingly, two research programs competed: Ampère-Weber, on the one hand, and Faraday-Maxwell, on the other. They posed different problems and determined different means of constructing a general theory of electromagnetism. The Ampère-Weber program proceeded from the principle of long-range action and focused on the use of mathematical means of point mechanics, the Faraday-Maxwell program was based on the principle of short-range action and borrowed mathematical structures from continuum mechanics.

In interdisciplinary interactions based on the transfer of ideas from one field of knowledge to another, the role of the research program is played by the general scientific picture of the world. It reveals similar features of disciplinary ontologies, thereby forming the basis for the translation of ideas, concepts and methods from one science to another. The exchange processes between quantum physics and chemistry, biology and cybernetics, which gave rise to a number of discoveries in the 20th century, were purposefully directed and regulated by the general scientific picture of the world.

Facts and theories created under the goal-directing influence of a special scientific picture of the world are again correlated with it, which leads to two variants of its changes. If the representations of the picture of the world express the essential characteristics of the objects under study, these representations are refined and concretized. But if research encounters fundamentally new types of objects, a radical restructuring of the picture of the world takes place. Such restructuring is a necessary component of scientific revolutions. It involves the active use of philosophical ideas and the substantiation of new ideas by the accumulated empirical and theoretical material. Initially, a new picture of the reality under study is put forward as a hypothesis. Its empirical and theoretical substantiation may take a long period, when it competes as a new research program with the previously accepted special scientific picture of the world. The approval of new ideas about reality as a disciplinary ontology is ensured not only by the fact that they are confirmed by experience and serve as the basis for new fundamental theories, but also by their philosophical and ideological justification (see. Philosophical foundations of science ).

The ideas about the world that are introduced in the pictures of the reality under study always experience a certain impact of analogies and associations drawn from various areas of cultural creativity, including everyday consciousness and the production experience of a certain historical era. For example, the concepts of electric fluid and caloric, included in the mechanical picture of the world in the 18th century, were formed largely under the influence of objective images drawn from the sphere of everyday experience and technology of the corresponding era. Common sense 18th century it was easier to agree with the existence of non-mechanical forces, representing them in the image and likeness of mechanical ones, for example. representing the flow of heat as a flow of a weightless fluid - caloric, falling like a water jet from one level to another and doing work due to this in the same way as water does this work in hydraulic devices. But at the same time, the introduction of ideas about various substances - carriers of forces - into the mechanical picture of the world also contained an element of objective knowledge. The concept of qualitatively different types of forces was the first step towards the recognition of the irreducibility of all types of interaction to mechanical. It contributed to the formation of special, different from mechanical, ideas about the structure of each of these types of interactions.

The ontological status of scientific pictures of the world is a necessary condition for the objectification of specific empirical and theoretical knowledge of a scientific discipline and their inclusion in culture.

Through reference to the scientific picture of the world, special achievements of science acquire a general cultural meaning and ideological significance. For example, the basic physical idea of ​​the general theory of relativity, taken in its special theoretical form (the components of the fundamental metric tensor, which determines the metric of four-dimensional space-time, at the same time act as potentials of the gravitational field), is little understood by those who are not involved in theoretical physics. But when this idea is formulated in the language of the picture of the world (the nature of the geometry of space-time is mutually determined by the nature of the gravitational field), it gives it a status of scientific truth that is understandable to non-specialists and has an ideological meaning. This truth modifies the idea of ​​a homogeneous Euclidean space and quasi-Euclidean time, which through the system of education and upbringing since the time of Galileo and Newton have become a worldview postulate of everyday consciousness. This is the case with many discoveries of science, which were included in the scientific picture of the world and through it influence the ideological orientations of human life. The historical development of the scientific picture of the world is expressed not only in a change in its content. Its forms are historical. In the 17th century, in the era of the emergence of natural science, the mechanical picture of the world was simultaneously a physical, natural-science, and general scientific picture of the world. With the advent of discipline-organized science (end of the 18th century - first half of the 19th century), a spectrum of specially scientific pictures of the world emerged. They become special, autonomous forms of knowledge, organizing the facts and theories of each scientific discipline into a system of observation. There are problems of building a general scientific picture of the world, synthesizing the achievements of individual sciences. The unity of scientific knowledge becomes the key philosophical problem of science 19 - 1st floor. 20th century Strengthening of interdisciplinary interactions in science of the 20th century. leads to a decrease in the level of autonomy of special scientific pictures of the world. They are integrated into special blocks of natural-scientific and social pictures of the world, the basic representations of which are included in the general scientific picture of the world. In the 2nd floor. 20th century the general scientific picture of the world begins to develop on the basis of the ideas of universal (global) evolutionism, which combines the principles of evolution and a systematic approach. Genetic links between the inorganic world, living nature and society are revealed, as a result, a sharp opposition between the natural and social scientific pictures of the world is eliminated. Accordingly, the integrative connections of disciplinary ontologies are strengthened, which are increasingly acting as fragments or aspects of a single general scientific picture of the world.

Literature:

1. Alekseev I.S. The unity of the physical picture of the World as a methodological principle. - In the book: Methodological principles of physics. M., 1975;

2. Vernadsky V.I. Reflections of a naturalist, book. 1, 1975, book. 2, 1977;

3. Dyshlevy P.S. Natural science picture of the world as a form of synthesis of scientific knowledge. - In the book: Synthesis of modern scientific knowledge. M., 1973;

4. Mostepanenko M.V. Philosophy and physical theory. L., 1969;

5. Scientific picture of the world: logical and epistemological aspect. K., 1983;

6. Plank M. Articles and speeches. - In the book: Plank M. Fav. scientific works. M., 1975;

7. Prigogine I.,Stengers I. Order out of chaos. M., 1986;

8. The nature of scientific knowledge. Minsk, 1979;

9. Stenin V.S. theoretical knowledge. M., 2000;

10. Stepin V.S.,Kuznetsova L.F. Scientific picture of the world in the culture of technogenic civilization. M., 1994;

11. Holton J. What is "anti-science"? - "VF", 1992, No. 2;

12. Einstein A. Sobr. scientific Proceedings, vol. 4. M., 1967.

The second block of the foundations of science is the scientific picture of the world. In the development of modern scientific disciplines, a special role is played by generalized schemes - images of the subject of research, through which the main systemic characteristics of the reality under study are fixed. These images are often called special pictures of the world. The term "world" is used here in a specific sense - as a designation of a certain sphere of reality studied in a given science ("the world of physics", "the world of biology", etc.). To avoid terminological discussions, it makes sense to use a different name - a picture of the reality under study. Its most studied example is the physical picture of the world. But such pictures exist in any science as soon as it is constituted as an independent branch of scientific knowledge.
A generalized characteristic of the subject of research is introduced into the picture of reality through representations: 1) about the fundamental objects from which all other objects studied by the corresponding science are supposed to be built; 2) about the typology of the studied objects; 3) about the general patterns of their interaction; 4) about the space-time structure of reality. All these representations can be described in the system of ontological principles, through which the picture of the studied reality is explicated and which act as the basis of scientific theories of the corresponding discipline. For example, principles: the world consists of indivisible corpuscles; their interaction is carried out as an instantaneous transfer of forces in a straight line; corpuscles and bodies formed from them move in absolute space with the passage of absolute time - they describe the picture of the physical world that developed in the second half of the 17th century. and later called the mechanical picture of the world.
The transition from mechanical to electrodynamic (the last quarter of the 19th century), and then to the quantum-relativistic picture of physical reality (the first half of the 20th century) was accompanied by a change in the system of ontological principles of physics. It was especially radical during the formation of quantum-relativistic physics (revision of the principles of the indivisibility of atoms, the existence of absolute space-time, the Laplace determination of physical processes).
By analogy with the physical picture of the world, one can single out pictures of reality in other sciences (chemistry, biology, astronomy, etc.). Among them there are also historically replacing each other types of pictures of the world, which is found in the analysis of the history of science. For example, the image of the world of chemical processes adopted by chemists in the time of Lavoisier had little resemblance to the modern one. Only some of the currently known chemical elements were assumed to be fundamental objects. A number of complex compounds (for example, lime) were added to them, which at that time were classified as “simple chemical substances”. After the work of Lavoisier, phlogiston was excluded from the number of such substances, but caloric was still listed in this series. It was believed that the interaction of all these "simple substances" and elements, unfolding in absolute space and time, gives rise to all known types of complex chemical compounds.
This kind of picture of the reality under study at a certain stage in the history of science seemed true to most chemists. She purposefully directed both the search for new facts and the construction of theoretical models that explain these facts.
Each of the specific historical forms of the picture of the reality under study can be realized in a number of modifications, expressing the main stages in the development of scientific knowledge. Among such modifications there may be lines of succession in the development of one or another type of picture of reality (for example, the development of Newtonian ideas about the physical world by Euler, the development of the electrodynamic picture of the world by Faraday, Maxwell, Hertz, Lorentz, each of which introduced new elements into this picture). But other situations are also possible when the same type of picture of the world is realized in the form of competing and alternative ideas about the physical world, and when one of them ultimately wins as the “true” physical picture of the world (examples are the struggle between Newtonian and Cartesian concepts of nature as alternative versions of the mechanical picture of the world, as well as the competition of the two main directions in the development of the electrodynamic picture of the world - the Ampère-Weber program, on the one hand, and the Faraday-Maxwell program, on the other).
The picture of reality ensures the systematization of knowledge within the framework of the relevant science. Associated with it are various types of theories of a scientific discipline (fundamental and private), as well as experimental facts on which the principles of the picture of reality are based and with which the principles of the picture of reality must be coordinated. At the same time, it functions as a research program that aims to set tasks for both empirical and theoretical search and the choice of means for solving them.
The connection of the picture of the world with situations of real experience is especially clearly manifested when science begins to study objects for which no theory has yet been created and which are studied by empirical methods. One of the typical situations is the role of the electrodynamic picture of the world in the experimental study of cathode rays. Their accidental discovery in an experiment raised the question of the nature of an open physical agent. The electrodynamic picture of the world demanded that all processes of nature be considered as the interaction of "radiant matter" (oscillations of the ether) and particles of matter, which can be electrically charged or electrically neutral. From this arose hypotheses about the nature of cathode rays: one of them assumed that the new physical agents were a stream of particles, the other considered these agents as a kind of radiation. According to these hypotheses, experimental problems were set and plans for experiments were developed, by means of which the nature of cathode and x-rays was clarified. The physical picture of the world directed these experiments, the latter, in turn, had a reverse effect on the picture of the world, stimulating its refinement and development (for example, elucidation of the nature of cathode rays in the experiments of Crookes, Perrin, Thomson was one of the reasons due to which the world introduced the concept of electrons as "atoms of electricity", not reducible to "atoms of matter").
In addition to direct connection with experience, the picture of the world has indirect connections with it through the foundations of theories that form theoretical schemes and the laws formulated in relation to them.
The picture of the world can be considered as some theoretical model of the reality under study. But this is a special model, different from the models that underlie specific theories.
First, they differ in the degree of generality. One and the same picture of the world can be based on many theories, including fundamental ones. For example, the mechanics of Newton - Euler, thermodynamics and electrodynamics of Ampère - Weber were associated with the mechanical picture of the world. Not only the foundations of Maxwellian electrodynamics, but also the foundations of Hertzian mechanics are connected with the electrodynamic picture of the world.
Secondly, a special picture of the world can be distinguished from theoretical schemes by analyzing the abstractions that form them (ideal objects). So, in the mechanical picture of the world, the processes of nature were characterized by means of such abstractions as: "indivisible corpuscle", "body", "interaction of bodies, transmitted instantly in a straight line and changing the state of movement of bodies", "absolute space" and "absolute time". As for the theoretical scheme underlying Newtonian mechanics (taken in its Euler presentation), the essence of mechanical processes is characterized in it by means of other abstractions such as “material point”, “force”, “inertial space-time frame of reference”.
Similarly, one can reveal the difference between the constructs of theoretical schemes and the constructs of the picture of the world, referring to modern models of theoretical knowledge. Thus, within the framework of the fundamental theoretical scheme of quantum mechanics, the processes of the microcosm are characterized in terms of the ratio of the particle state vector to the device state vector. But these same processes can be described in a “less rigorous” way, for example, in terms of the corpuscular-wave properties of particles, the interaction of particles with measuring instruments of a certain type, correlations of the properties of micro-objects to macro conditions, etc. And this is no longer the language of a theoretical description proper, but the language of the physical picture of the world that complements it and is associated with it.
Ideal objects that form a picture of the world and abstract objects that form a theoretical scheme in their connections have a different status. The latter are idealizations, and their non-identity with real objects is obvious. Any physicist understands that a "material point" does not exist in nature itself, because in nature there are no bodies devoid of dimensions. But the follower of Newton, who accepted the mechanical picture of the world, considered indivisible atoms to be really existing "first bricks" of matter. He identified with nature simplifying and schematizing abstractions, in the system of which a physical picture of the world is created. In what particular signs these abstractions do not correspond to reality - the researcher finds out this most often only when his science enters a period of breaking the old picture of the world and replacing it with a new one.
Being different from the picture of the world, theoretical schemes are always associated with it. The establishment of this connection is one of the obligatory conditions for constructing a theory.
Due to the connection with the picture of the world, theoretical schemes are objectified. The system of abstract objects that compose them appears as an expression of the essence of the processes under study “in its pure form”. The importance of this procedure can be illustrated by a specific example. When a theoretical scheme of mechanical processes is introduced into Hertzian mechanics, within which they are depicted only as a change in time of the configuration of material points, and force is presented as an auxiliary concept characterizing the type of such a configuration, then all this is perceived at first as a very artificial image of mechanical motion. But the mechanics of Hertz contains an explanation that all bodies of nature interact through the world ether, and the transfer of forces is a change in the spatial relations between the particles of the ether. As a result, the theoretical scheme underlying Hertzian mechanics already appears as an expression of the deep essence of natural processes.
The procedure for mapping theoretical schemes onto the picture of the world provides that kind of interpretation of equations expressing theoretical laws, which in logic is called the conceptual (or semantic) interpretation and which is obligatory for the construction of a theory. Thus, outside the picture of the world, the theory cannot be built in a complete form.
The pictures of reality developed in separate scientific disciplines are not isolated from each other. They interact with each other. In this regard, the question arises: are there wider horizons of knowledge systematization, forms of their systematization, integrative in relation to special pictures of reality (disciplinary ontologies)? In methodological studies, such forms have already been recorded and described. These include the general scientific picture of the world, which is a special form of theoretical knowledge. It integrates the most important achievements of the natural, humanitarian and technical sciences - these are achievements such as ideas about the non-stationary Universe and the Big Bang, about quarks and synergistic processes, about genes, ecosystems and the biosphere, about society as an integral system, about formations and civilizations, etc. First, they develop as fundamental ideas and representations of the corresponding disciplinary ontologies, and then they are included in the general scientific picture of the world.
And if disciplinary ontologies (special scientific pictures of the world) represent the subjects of each individual science (physics, biology, social sciences, etc.), then in the general scientific picture of the world the most important system-structural characteristics of the subject area of ​​scientific knowledge as a whole, taken at a certain stage of its historical development.
Revolutions in individual sciences (physics, chemistry, biology, etc.), changing the vision of the subject area of ​​the corresponding science, constantly give rise to mutations in the natural-scientific and general scientific pictures of the world, and lead to a revision of the ideas about reality previously established in science. However, the connection between changes in the pictures of reality and a radical restructuring of the natural-scientific and general scientific pictures of the world is not unambiguous. It should be borne in mind that new pictures of reality are first put forward as hypotheses. The hypothetical picture goes through the stage of substantiation and can coexist for a very long time next to the previous picture of reality. Most often, it is affirmed not only as a result of prolonged testing of its principles by experience, but also due to the fact that these principles serve as the basis for new fundamental theories.
The entry of new ideas about the world, developed in a particular branch of knowledge, into the general scientific picture of the world does not exclude, but implies competition between different ideas about the reality under study.
The picture of the world is built correlatively to the scheme of the method expressed in the ideals and norms of science. This applies to the greatest extent to the ideals and norms of explanation, in accordance with which the ontological postulates of science are introduced. The method of explanation and description expressed in them includes, in a removed form, all those social determinations that determine the emergence and functioning of the corresponding ideals and norms of scientific character. At the same time, the postulates of the scientific picture of the world are also directly influenced by worldview attitudes that dominate the culture of a certain era.
Take, for example, the idea of ​​the absolute space of the mechanical picture of the world. They arose on the basis of the idea of ​​the homogeneity of space. Recall that this idea simultaneously served as one of the prerequisites for the formation of the ideal of experimental substantiation of scientific knowledge, since it allowed the principle of experimental reproducibility to be established. The formation of this idea and its establishment in science was historically connected with the transformation of the worldview meanings of the category of space at the turn from the Middle Ages to the New Age. The restructuring of all these meanings, which began in the Renaissance, was associated with a new understanding of man, his place in the world and his relationship to nature. Moreover, the modernization of the meanings of the category of space took place not only in science, but also in various spheres of culture. In this regard, it is significant that the formation of the concept of a homogeneous, Euclidean space in physics resonated with the processes of formation of new ideas in the fine arts of the Renaissance, when painting began to use the linear perspective of Euclidean space, perceived as a real sensual authenticity of nature.
The ideas about the world that are introduced in the pictures of the reality under study always experience a certain influence of analogies and associations drawn from various areas of cultural creativity, including everyday consciousness and production experience of a certain historical era.
It is not difficult, for example, to discover that the ideas about the electric fluid and caloric, included in the mechanical picture of the world in the 18th century, were formed largely under the influence of objective images drawn from the sphere of everyday experience and production of the corresponding era. It was easier for the common sense of the 18th century to agree with the existence of non-mechanical forces, representing them in the image and likeness of mechanical ones, for example, representing the flow of heat as a flow of a weightless liquid - caloric, falling like a water jet from one level to another and producing work due to this in the same way, how water does this work in hydraulic devices. But at the same time, the introduction of ideas about various substances - carriers of forces - into the mechanical picture of the world also contained an element of objective knowledge. The concept of qualitatively different types of forces was the first step towards the recognition of the irreducibility of all types of interaction to mechanical. It contributed to the formation of special, different from mechanical, ideas about the structure of each of these types of interaction.
The formation of pictures of the reality under study in each branch of science always proceeds not only as a process of an intrascientific nature, but also as the interaction of science with other areas of culture.
At the same time, since the picture of reality should express the main essential characteristics of the subject area under study, it is formed and developed under the direct influence of facts and special theoretical models of science that explain the facts. Due to this, new elements of content constantly appear in it, which may even require a radical revision of previously accepted ontological principles. Developed science gives a lot of evidence of precisely such, mainly intrascientific, impulses for the evolution of the picture of the world. The concepts of antiparticles, quarks, a non-stationary Universe, etc., were the result of completely unexpected interpretations of the mathematical conclusions of physical theories and then included as fundamental concepts in the scientific picture of the world.