The independent Lithuanian state was proclaimed under German sovereignty on February 16, 1918, and on November 11, 1918 the country gained full independence. From December 1918 to August 1919, Soviet power existed in Lithuania and there were Red Army units in the country.
During the Soviet-Polish War in July 1920, the Red Army occupied Vilnius (transferred to Lithuania in August 1920). In October 1920, Poland occupied the Vilnius region, which in March 1923, by decision of the conference of Entente ambassadors, became part of Poland.
(Military Encyclopedia. Military Publishing House. Moscow. in 8 volumes, 2004)
On August 23, 1939, a non-aggression pact and secret agreements on the division of spheres of influence (Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact) were signed between the USSR and Germany, which were then supplemented by new agreements on August 28; according to the latter, Lithuania entered the sphere of influence of the USSR.
On October 10, 1939, a Soviet-Lithuanian mutual assistance agreement was concluded. According to the agreement, the Vilnius region, occupied by the Red Army in September 1939, was transferred to Lithuania, and Soviet troops numbering 20 thousand people were stationed on its territory.
On June 14, 1940, the USSR, accusing the Lithuanian government of violating the treaty, demanded the creation of a new government. On June 15, an additional contingent of Red Army troops was introduced into the country. The People's Seimas, elections to which took place on July 14 and 15, proclaimed the establishment of Soviet power in Lithuania and appealed to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR with a request to accept the republic into the Soviet Union.
The independence of Lithuania was recognized by the Decree of the State Council of the USSR dated September 6, 1991. Diplomatic relations with Lithuania were established on October 9, 1991.
On July 29, 1991, the Treaty on the Fundamentals of Interstate Relations between the RSFSR and the Republic of Lithuania was signed in Moscow (came into force in May 1992). On October 24, 1997, the Treaty on the Russian-Lithuanian State Border and the Treaty on the Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf in the Baltic Sea were signed in Moscow (came into force in August 2003). To date, 8 interstate, 29 intergovernmental and about 15 interdepartmental treaties and agreements have been concluded and are in force.
Political contacts have been limited in recent years. The official visit of the President of Lithuania to Moscow took place in 2001. The last meeting at the level of heads of government took place in 2004.
In February 2010, Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaite met with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin on the sidelines of the Helsinki Baltic Sea Action Summit.
The basis for trade and economic cooperation between Russia and Lithuania is the agreement on trade and economic relations of 1993 (it was adapted to EU standards in 2004 in connection with the entry into force of the EU Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement for Lithuania).
The material was prepared based on information from open sources.
In the section
In big politics there is always a plan A and a plan B. It often happens that there are both “B” and “D”. In this article we will tell you how in 1939 Plan B was drawn up and implemented for the Baltic republics to join the USSR. But plan “A” worked, which gave the desired result. And they forgot about plan B.
1939 Anxious. Prewar. On August 23, 1939, a Soviet-German non-aggression treaty with a secret annex was signed. It shows the zones of influence of Germany and the USSR on a map. The Soviet zone included Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The USSR had to decide on its decisions regarding these countries. As usual, there were several plans. The main one implied that, through political pressure, Soviet military bases would be deployed in the Baltic countries - troops of the Leningrad Military District and the Baltic Fleet, and then local leftist forces would achieve elections to local parliaments, which would announce the entry of the Baltic republics into the USSR. But in case of an unforeseen event, a plan “B” was developed. It is more intricate and complex.
"Pioneer"
The Baltic Sea is rich in all kinds of accidents and disasters. Before the beginning of the autumn of 1939, we can mention cases of accidents and deaths of Soviet ships in the Gulf of Finland: the hydrographic vessel "Azimut" on 08/28/1938 in Luga Bay, the submarine "M-90" on 10/15/1938 near Oranienbaum, the cargo ship "Chelyuskinets" on 03/27/1939 near Tallinn. In principle, the situation at sea during this period could be considered calm. But since mid-summer, a new, alarming factor has appeared - reports from captains of Sovtorgflot ships (the name of the organization that operated civilian ships of the USSR in the pre-war period) about mines allegedly floating in the Gulf of Finland. At the same time, there were sometimes reports that the mines were of the “English” type. Even military sailors do not undertake to report a sample of a mine when they find it at sea, but here the report comes from civilian sailors! In the 20s and early 30s, the appearance of mines in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland was repeatedly reported. But then Russian, German or English mines from the First World War and the Civil War were discovered in a timely manner and immediately destroyed, but for some reason these could not be found. The captain of the ship “Pioneer”, Vladimir Mikhailovich Beklemishev, took the lead in the fictitious reports.
July 23, 1939 the following happened: at 22.21. The patrol ship "Typhoon" standing on patrol on the line of the Shepelevsky lighthouse received a message by semaphore and signal from the captain of the m/v "Pioneer", located in the Gulf of Finland: - "Two warships of the battleship type were spotted in the area of the Northern village of Gogland Island." (Hereinafter, extracts from the “Watch Log of the Operational Duty Headquarters of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet” [RGA Navy. F-R-92. Op-1. D-1005,1006]). At 22.30, the commander of the Typhoon asks the Pioneer: - “Tell the time and course of the battleships of unknown origin you noticed.” At 22.42. the captain of the Pioneer repeats the previous text, and the connection is interrupted. The Typhoon commander transmitted this information to fleet headquarters and, at his own peril and risk (after all, there was no command for this), organizes a search for unknown battleships near Finnish territorial waters and, of course, finds nothing. We will understand a little later why this performance was performed.
To understand the process and the people involved in it, let’s talk about the captain of the ship “Pioneer” Vladimir Mikhailovich Beklemishev. This is the son of the first Russian submariner Mikhail Nikolaevich Beklemishev, born in 1858. birth, one of the designers of the first Russian submarine “Dolphin” (1903) and its first commander. Having connected his service with submarines, he retired in 1910. with the rank of "Major General of the Fleet". Then he taught mine engineering at the St. Petersburg Polytechnic Institute and worked as a technical consultant at St. Petersburg factories. Left out of work after the October Revolution of 1917, he entered the Main Directorate of Shipbuilding, but was fired. In 1924 he became the commander of the experimental vessel Mikula, regularly commanding it between repeated arrests, and retired in 1931. In 1933, as the highest rank of the tsarist navy (general), he was deprived of his pension. The old sailor died of a heart attack in 1936. (E.A. Kovalev “Knights of the Deep”, 2005, p. 14, 363). His son Vladimir followed in his father’s footsteps and became a sailor, only in the merchant fleet. His collaboration with Soviet intelligence services is likely. In the 1930s, merchant seamen were among the few who freely and regularly visited foreign countries, and Soviet intelligence often used the services of merchant seamen.
The “adventures” of “Pioneer” did not end there. On September 28, 1939, at about 2 a.m., when the ship entered the Narva Bay, its captain simulated the landing of the Pioneer on the rocks near Vigrund Island and gave a pre-prepared radiogram “about an attack on the ship by an unknown submarine.” The imitation of the attack served as the last trump card in the negotiations between the USSR and Estonia “On measures to ensure the safety of Soviet waters from sabotage actions by foreign submarines hiding in the Baltic waters” (Pravda newspaper, September 30, 1939, No. 133). The submarine is mentioned here for a reason. The fact is that after Germany attacked Poland, the Polish submarine ORP „Orzeł” (“Eagle”) broke into Tallinn and was interned. On September 18, 1939, the crew of the boat tied up the Estonian sentries and the Orzeł headed towards the exit of the harbor at full speed and escaped from Tallinn. Since there were two Estonian guards hostage on the boat, Estonian and German newspapers accused the Polish crew of killing both of them. However, the Poles landed the sentries near Sweden, gave them food, water and money to return to their homeland, and then left for England. The story then received wide resonance and became a clear reason for the scenario of a “torpedo attack” on the Pioneer. The fact that the attack on the ship was not real and the Pioneer was not damaged can be judged by subsequent events. The powerful rescue tug Signal, which had been expecting the SOS signal in advance, immediately went to the Pioneer, and the rescuer, the diving base ship Trefolev, left the harbor on September 29, 1939 at 03.43 on assignment and stood in the Great Kronstadt roadstead. The ship, allegedly removed from the rocks, was brought to Neva Bay. At 10.27 on September 30, 1939, “Signal” and “Pioneer” anchored in the Eastern Kronstadt roadstead. But for some this was not enough. At 06.15, the towed “Pioneer” again “discovers” (!) a floating mine in the area of the Shepelevsky lighthouse, which is reported to the patrol minesweeper T 202 “Buy”. An order was given to the Operational Duty Officer of the Water District (OVR) to warn all ships about a floating mine in the area of the Shepelevsky Lighthouse. At 09.50, the operational duty officer of the OVR reports to Fleet Headquarters that the “sea hunter” boat sent to search for the mine has returned, no mine was found. On October 2, 1939, at 20.18, the Pioneer transport began to be towed from the Eastern roadstead to Oranienbaum. If the Pioneer had really hastily thrown onto one of the stone banks near the rocky island of Vigrund, it should have received damage to at least one or two sheets of the hull's underwater part. The ship had only one large hold, and it would have immediately filled with water, causing serious damage to the ship. Only good weather, a wound plaster and pumping out water by the rescue ship could save him. Since nothing of the kind happened, it is clear that the ship was not sitting on the rocks. Since the ship was not even brought into any of the Kronstadt or Leningrad docks for inspection, we can conclude that it was only on the stones in the TASS Report. Subsequently, according to the scenario, the motor ship “Pioneer” was not required, and it worked safely in the Baltic for some time, and in 1940, “Pioneer” was handed over to the crew that arrived from Baku and sent (out of sight) along the Volga to the Caspian Sea. After the war, the ship was in operation by the Caspian Shipping Company until July 1966.
"Metalist"
The newspaper “Pravda” No. 132 dated September 28, 1939 published a TASS message: “On September 27, at about 6 o’clock in the evening, an unknown submarine in the Narva Bay area torpedoed and sunk the Soviet steamer “Metallist”, with a displacement of up to 4000 tons. From the steamship’s crew of 24 people, 19 people were selected by Soviet patrol vessels, the remaining 5 people were not found.” "Metalist" was not a merchant ship. She was a so-called “coal miner” - an auxiliary vessel of the Baltic Fleet, a military transport, and carried the flag of the Navy’s auxiliary vessels. "Metalist" was mainly assigned to two Baltic battleships "Marat" and "October Revolution" and, until both battleships were converted to liquid fuel, supplied them with coal during voyages and maneuvers. Although he also had other tasks. For example, in June 1935, Metalist provided coal for the transition of the Red Horn floating workshop from the Baltic Fleet to the Northern Fleet. By the end of the 30s, the Metalist, built in 1903 in England, was outdated and of no particular value. They decided to donate them. In September 1939, "Metalist" stood in the Leningrad commercial port, waiting for coal to support the operations of the Baltic Fleet. We must remember that this was a period when, for foreign policy reasons, the fleet was put on high alert. On September 23, the vessel that had just been placed for loading received an order from the Operational Duty Officer at the Fleet Headquarters: “Send the Metalist transport from Leningrad.” Then several days passed in confusion. The ship was driven in anticipation of something from Oranienbaum to Kronstadt and back.
To describe further events, we need to make a short digression. There are two layers in this description: the first is the actual events recorded in documents, the second is the memories of a former Finnish intelligence officer who published his memoirs in Switzerland after the war. Let's try to combine two layers. Finnish intelligence officer Jukka L. Mäkkela, fleeing the Soviet intelligence services, was forced after Finland left the war in 1944. go abroad. There he published his memoirs “Im Rücken des Feindes-der finnische Nachrichtendienst in Krieg”, They were published in German in Switzerland (publishing house Verlag Huber & Co. Frauenfeld). In them, among other things, J. L. Mäkkela recalled captain 2nd rank Arsenyev, captured in the fall of 1941 by the Finns in the Björkezund area, allegedly a former commander of the training ship “Svir”. (Not to be confused with Grigory Nikolaevich Arsenyev - Acting commander of the Island Naval Base on the island of Lavensaari, who died on May 18, 1945). The prisoner testified that in the fall of 1939 he was summoned to a meeting where he and another officer were given the task of simulating the sinking of the Metalist transport in the Narva Bay by an unknown submarine. “Unknown” was assigned to the submarine Shch-303 “Ruff”, which was being prepared for repairs and whose crew was being completed. The Metalist transport team will be “rescued” by patrol ships entering the bay. Other clarifications will be communicated before release. Sounds fantastic, doesn't it? Now let's look at what happened in Narva Bay. According to established practice in the Baltic Fleet, “Metalist” played the role of “enemy” and designated battleships and aircraft carriers. It was like that that time too. According to the terms of the exercise, "Metalist" anchored at a given point. This place was in the Narva Bay, within sight of the Estonian coast. This was an important factor. At 16.00 Moscow time, three patrol ships of the “bad weather” division appeared - “Whirlwind”, “Snow” and “Tucha”. One of them approached the transport, and a command was heard from its navigation bridge: “At Metalist, let off steam.” The crew should prepare to leave the ship." Abandoning everything, people ran to lower the boats. The patrolman who approached the board at 16.28 removed the crew. The “rescued”, except for Arsenyev, who was called to the bridge, were placed in a cockpit with the windows battened down over the armor. An orderly stood at the entrance, forbidding anyone to go out and have contact with the Red Navy. We were expecting a loud explosion, but it didn’t come.”
At 16.45, Metalist was again flown over by MBR-2 aircraft, reporting: “There is no team. A boat is flooded at the side. There's a mess on deck." Estonian observers did not record this flight of planes, and it was not reported that from 19.05 to 19.14 the “Snow” again moored to the “Metalist”. [RGA Navy. F.R-172. Op-1. D-992. L-31.]. At about 20.00, a “TASS message about the sinking of Metalist” appeared. Since Estonian observers (remember, “Metalist” was anchored in sight of the Estonian coast) did not record the same explosion, we can assume two options:
The ship was not sunk. For some reason, there was no torpedo salvo from the submarine. Not far from this place, the construction of a new naval base "Ruchi" (Kronstadt-2) was underway. Closed area, no strangers. “Metalist” could have been there for some time.
In his book “On the Distant Approaches” (published in 1971). Lieutenant General S.I. Kabanov (from May to October 1939, who was the Chief of Logistics of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, and who, if not him, knew about the ships subordinate to the Logistics), wrote: that in 1941 the Metalist transport brought cargo for the Hanko garrison and was damaged by enemy artillery fire. In the 70s of the 20th century, S.S. Berezhnoy and the employees of the Research and Development Group of the General Staff of the Navy, who were connected to him, worked on compiling the reference book “Ships and Auxiliary Vessels of the Soviet Navy 1917-1928” (Moscow, 1981). They did not find any other information about “Metalist” in the archives of Leningrad, Gatchina and Moscow and came to the conclusion that this transport was left at Hanko on December 2, 1941, in a submerged state.
The possibility that Metalist was sunk is unlikely. Neither the sailors from the patrol ships heard the explosion, nor did the Estonian observers on the shore see it. The version that the ship was sunk without the help of explosives is unlikely.
“Maritime Collection”, No. 7 1991, publishing the column “From the chronicle of military operations of the Navy in July 1941”, stated: “On July 26, the Metalist TR was sunk by artillery fire on Hanko.”
A fact is also a radiogram transmitted by radio at 23.30. This was the message from the commander of the TFR “Sneg” to the Chief of Staff of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet: “The place of the death of the transport “Metalist”: latitude - 59°34’, longitude - 27°21’ [RGA. F.R-92. Op-2. D-505. L-137.]
One more small nuance. Of course, he doesn’t say anything directly, but still. On the same day when the “Metalist” was “blown up” at 12.03, a staff boat of the “YAMB” type (a high-speed sea yacht) with the People’s Commissar of the Navy and the Commander of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet left Kronstadt for the Gulf of Finland. [RGA VMF.F.R-92. Op-2. D-505. L-135.]. For what? To personally control the progress of the operation?
Conclusion
Everything that is described in this article is perceived as fantasy. But there are documents from the archive. They do not reveal a political intention, they reflect the movement of ships. The fleet operational duty logs reflect all events that occurred in the area of responsibility and the movement of ships and vessels in it. And it is these movements, superimposed on political processes (reflected in the officialdom of those times - the Pravda newspaper) that allow us to draw conclusions. Our story has many unexpected twists and many secrets...
Last summer gave rise to another rampant of Russophobia in the Baltic countries. For exactly 75 years ago, in the summer of 1940, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania became part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics...
The current rulers of the Baltic states claim that this was a violent action by Moscow, which, with the help of the army, overthrew the legitimate governments of all three republics and established a strict “occupation regime” there. This version of events, unfortunately, is supported by many current Russian historians.
But the question arises: if an occupation occurred, then why did it take place without a single shot fired, without the stubborn resistance of the “proud” Balts? Why did they so meekly capitulate to the Red Army? After all, they had the example of neighboring Finland, which the day before, in the winter of 1939-1940, was able to defend its independence in fierce battles.
Does this mean that the modern Baltic rulers, to put it mildly, are being dishonest when they talk about “occupation” and do not want to admit the fact that in 1940 the Baltic states voluntarily became Soviet?
Misunderstanding on the map of Europe
The eminent Russian lawyer Pavel Kazansky wrote in 1912: “We live in an amazing time when artificial states, artificial peoples and artificial languages are being created.” This statement can fully be attributed to the Baltic peoples and their state entities.
These peoples never had their own statehood! For centuries, the Baltic states were an arena of struggle for the Swedes, Danes, Poles, Russians, and Germans. At the same time, no one took into account the local peoples. Especially the German barons, who since the times of the Crusaders were the ruling elite here, who did not see much difference between the aborigines and livestock. In the 18th century, this territory finally ceded to the Russian Empire, which actually saved the Balts from final assimilation by the German masters.
After the October Revolution of 1917, the political forces that clashed in a mortal struggle on Baltic soil also initially did not take into account the “national aspirations” of Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians. On one side the Bolsheviks fought, and on the other, the White Guards, where Russian and German officers united.
Thus, the white corps of generals Rodzianko and Yudenich operated in Estonia. In Latvia - the Russian-German division of Von der Goltz and Prince Bermond-Avalov. And Polish legions were advancing on Lithuania, laying claim to the restoration of the medieval Rzeczpospolita, in which Lithuanian statehood was completely subordinated to Poland.
But in 1919, a third force intervened in this bloody mess - the Entente, that is, the military alliance of England, France and the USA. Not wanting to strengthen either Russia or Germany in the Baltic states, the Entente, in fact, established three independent republics - Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. And to prevent “independence” from collapsing, a powerful British navy was sent to the shores of the Baltic states.
Under the muzzle of naval guns, Estonian “independence” was recognized by General Yudenich, whose soldiers fought for a united and indivisible Russia. The Poles also quickly understood the hints of the Entente and therefore left Lithuania, although leaving behind the city of Vilnius. But in Latvia, the Russian-German division refused to recognize the “sovereignty” of the Latvians - for which it was shot by naval artillery fire near Riga.
In 1921, the “independence” of the Baltic states was also recognized by the Bolsheviks...
For a long time, the Entente tried to establish democratic political regimes on the Western model in the new states. However, the lack of state traditions and elementary political culture led to the fact that corruption and political anarchy flourished in unprecedented colors in the Baltic countries, when governments changed five times a year.
In short, there was a complete mess, typical of third-rate Latin American countries. In the end, following the example of Latin America, coups d'état took place in all three republics: in 1926 in Lithuania, in 1934 in Latvia and Estonia. Dictators sat at the head of states, driving the political opposition into prisons and concentration camps...
It’s not for nothing that diplomats from Western countries contemptuously nicknamed the Baltic States "a misunderstanding on the map of Europe".
Soviet “occupation” as salvation from Hitler
Twenty years ago, the Estonian historian Magnus Ilmjärva tried to publish documents relating to the period of pre-war “independence” in his homeland. But... I was refused in a rather harsh form. Why?
Yes, because after a long work in the Moscow archives, he managed to obtain sensational information. It turns out that the dictator of Estonia Konstantin Päts, the dictator of Latvia Karl Ulmanis, the dictator of Lithuania Antanas Smetona were... Soviet spies! For the services provided by these rulers, the Soviet side in the 30s paid them 4 thousand dollars a year (at modern prices this is somewhere around 400 thousand modern dollars)!
Why did these champions of “independence” agree to work for the USSR?
Already in the early 20s, it became clear that the Baltic countries were insolvent either politically or economically. Germany began to exert increasing influence on these states. German influence especially intensified with the rise to power of the Nazi regime of Adolf Hitler.
It can be said that by 1935 the entire economy of the Baltic states passed into the hands of the Germans. For example, out of 9 thousand 146 companies operating in Latvia, 3 thousand 529 were owned by Germany. All the largest Latvian banks were controlled by German bankers. The same thing was observed in Estonia and Lithuania. At the end of the 1930s, German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop reported to Hitler that “all three Baltic states send 70 percent of their exports to Germany, with an annual value of about 200 million marks.”
Germany did not hide the fact that it plans to annex the Baltic states, just as Austria and Czechoslovakia were annexed to the Third Reich before. Moreover, the large German Baltic community was supposed to serve as the “fifth column” in this process. In all three republics, the “Union of German Youth” operated, openly calling for the establishment of a German protectorate over the Baltic states. At the beginning of 1939, the Latvian consul in Germany reported with alarm to his leadership:
“Latvian Germans attended the annual Nazi rally in Hamburg, where the entire leadership of the Reich attended. Our Germans were dressed in SS uniforms and behaved very militantly... At the congress, Reich Chancellor Adolf Hitler spoke, who reproached the German barons for the fact that during their seven-century reign in the Baltic states they made a big mistake by not destroying the Latvians and Estonians as nations. Hitler called on us not to repeat such mistakes in the future!”
The Germans also had their agents in the Baltic political elite. Especially among the military, who admired the German military school. Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian generals were ready to sacrifice the independence of their countries in order to join the ranks of the victorious German army, which began its campaigns of conquest in Europe in 1939...
The Baltic rulers were in panic! Therefore, they automatically chose the USSR as their ally, whose leadership, in turn, was not at all happy with the prospect of turning the Baltic states into a springboard for Nazism.
As historian Ilmjärva notes, Moscow began to “feed” the Baltic dictators a long time ago, approximately from the beginning of the 20s. The bribery scheme was very banal. A front company was created through which large sums of money were transferred to the needs of one dictator or another.
In Estonia, for example, in 1928 a mixed Estonian-Soviet joint stock company was created to sell petroleum products. And the legal adviser there was... the future dictator Konstantin Päts, who was given a very decent salary. Now some historians are even convinced that Moscow actually financed the coups that brought its wards to power.
In the early 30s, with the help of their spy rulers, the Soviet leadership managed to prevent the creation of a military alliance of the Baltic countries, directed under the auspices of the Entente against the USSR. And when pressure from Nazi Germany increased on the Baltic states, Joseph Stalin decided to annex it to the Soviet Union. Moreover, now, fearing Germany, the rulers of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were ready to work for Moscow even without money.
The annexation of the Baltic states became the first part of the secret Soviet Operation Thunderstorm, which included a plan to counter German aggression.
"Call me with you..."
In August 1939, Stalin concluded a non-aggression pact with Hitler. According to the annex to the treaty, the Baltic states moved into the sphere of influence of the USSR. And in the fall of the same year, Moscow signed an agreement with the Baltic countries on the deployment of Red Army troops on their territory. And no matter what the Baltic nationalists say today, the entry of Red Army units was carried out with the full consent of the local governments to the sounds of the Soviet and national anthems. Judging by the reports of our commanders, the local population greeted the Russian soldiers quite well.
The troops entered the Baltic states in the fall of 1939. And in the summer of 1940, Stalin demanded that local rulers allow the political opposition to participate in elections. The Kremlin's calculation turned out to be correct. Marxists have long enjoyed great influence in the political life of the Baltic states. It is no coincidence that during the October Revolution there were many Estonians and Latvians among the Bolshevik leadership: entire regiments of the Red Army were even formed from the latter.
Years of anti-communist repression in the independent Baltic countries only strengthened the position of the communists: when they were allowed to participate in elections in 1940, they turned out to be the most united political force - and the majority of the population gave them their votes. The Seimas of Lithuania and Latvia and the State Duma of Estonia in July 1940 came under the control of popularly elected Red deputies. They also formed new governments, which turned to Moscow with a request for reunification with the USSR.
And the spy dictators were overthrown. They were treated like used and unnecessary tools. The Estonian Päts died in a Tver psychiatric hospital, the Latvian Ulmanis perished somewhere in the Siberian camps. Only the Lithuanian Smetona managed to escape at the last moment, first to Germany and then to the USA, where he spent the rest of his days in complete silence, trying not to attract attention to himself...
Anti-Soviet sentiments arose in the Baltic states later, when Moscow, instilling the communist idea, began to carry out repressions against the local intelligentsia and promote communists of non-Baltic origin to leadership positions. This was on the eve and during the Great Patriotic War.
But that's another story. The main thing remains the fact that in 1940 the Baltic States themselves sacrificed their independence...
Igor Nevsky, especially for the “Ambassadorship Prikaz”
Hello! In the blog "Fighting Myths" we will analyze the events of our history, surrounded by myths and falsifications. These will be small reviews dedicated to the anniversary of a particular historical date. Of course, it is impossible to conduct a detailed study of events within the framework of one article, but we will try to outline the main issues and show examples of false statements and their refutations.
In the photo: Railway workers rock Weiss, a member of the plenipotentiary commission of the State Duma of Estonia, after returning from Moscow, where Estonia was admitted to the USSR. July 1940
71 years ago, on July 21-22, 1940, the parliaments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania transformed their states into Soviet socialist republics and adopted the Declaration of Accession to the USSR. Soon the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted laws that approved the decisions of the Baltic parliaments. Thus began a new page in the history of the three states of Eastern Europe. What happened over the course of several months in 1939-1940? How to evaluate these events?
Let's consider the main theses used by our opponents in discussions on this topic. Let us emphasize that these theses are not always outright lies and deliberate falsification - sometimes it is just an incorrect formulation of the problem, a shift in emphasis, or involuntary confusion in terms and dates. However, as a result of the use of these theses, a picture emerges that is far from the true meaning of events. Before you can find the truth, you need to expose the lies.
1. The decision to annex the Baltic states to the USSR was spelled out in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and/or the secret protocols to it. Moreover, Stalin planned to annex the Baltic states long before these events. In a word, these two events are interconnected, one is a consequence of the other.
Examples.
"In fact, if you do not ignore the obvious facts, then of course, it was the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact that sanctioned the occupation of the Baltic states and the occupation of the eastern territories of Poland by Soviet troops. And it’s surprising that the secret protocols to this treaty are mentioned so often here, because, strictly speaking, the role of this treaty is clear even without them.”
Link .
“As a professional, I began to study the history of the Second World War in more or less depth in the mid-80s, working on the now notorious, but then almost unstudied and classified the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the secret protocols accompanying it, which decided the fate of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia in 1939".
Afanasyev Yu.N. Another war: History and memory. // Russia, XX century. Under general ed. Yu.N. Afanasyeva. M., 1996. Book. 3. Link.
“The USSR received from Germany the possibility of freedom of action for further “territorial and political transformations” in the sphere of Soviet influence. Both aggressive powers were of the same opinion on August 23 that "sphere of interest" means the freedom to occupy and annex the territories of their respective states. The Soviet Union and Germany divided their spheres of interest on paper in order to “make the division also a reality.”<...>
"The government of the USSR, which needed treaties on mutual assistance with the Baltic states in order to destroy these states, did not think to be satisfied with the existing status quo. It took advantage of the favorable international situation created by Germany's attack on France, Holland and Belgium to completely occupy the Baltic states in June 1940."
Link .
Comment.
The conclusion of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and its significance in international politics of the 30s. XX century - a very complex topic that requires separate analysis. Nevertheless, we note that most often the assessment of this event is unprofessional in nature, coming not from historians and lawyers, but sometimes from people who have not read this historical document and do not know the realities of international relations of that time.
The realities of the time are that the conclusion of non-aggression treaties was a common practice of those years, which did not imply allied relations (and this pact is often called the “alliance treaty” of the USSR and Germany). The conclusion of secret protocols was also not an extraordinary diplomatic move: for example, the British guarantees to Poland in 1939 contained a secret protocol according to which Great Britain would provide military assistance to Poland only in the event of an attack by Germany, but not by any other country. The principle of dividing a region into spheres of influence between two or more states, again, was very widespread: it is enough to recall the delimitation of spheres of influence between the countries of the Anti-Hitler coalition at the final stage of the Second World War. So it would be wrong to call the conclusion of the agreement on August 23, 1939 criminal, immoral, and even more so illegal.
Another question is what was meant by the sphere of influence in the text of the pact. If you look at Germany’s actions in Eastern Europe, you will notice that its political expansion did not always involve occupation or annexation (for example, as in the case of Romania). It is difficult to say that the processes in the same region in the mid-40s, when Romania came into the sphere of influence of the USSR, and Greece into the sphere of influence of Great Britain, led to the occupation of their territory or forced annexation.
In a word, the sphere of influence implied a territory in which the opposite side, in accordance with its obligations, was not supposed to pursue an active foreign policy, economic expansion, or support for certain political forces beneficial to it. (See: Makarchuk V.S. Sovereign-territorial status of the Western Ukrainian lands during the period of the Other World War (1939 - 1945): historical and legal research. Kiev, 2007. P. 101.) This, for example, happened after the Second World War, when Stalin, according to agreements with Churchill, did not support the Greek communists, who had a great chance of winning the political struggle.
Relations between Soviet Russia and independent Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania began to develop in 1918, when these states gained independence. However, the Bolsheviks' hopes for victory in these countries by communist forces, including with the help of the Red Army, did not materialize. In 1920, the Soviet government concluded peace treaties with the three republics and recognized them as independent states.
Over the next twenty years, Moscow gradually built a “Baltic direction” of its foreign policy, the main goals of which were to ensure the security of Leningrad and prevent a possible military enemy from blockading the Baltic Fleet. This explains the turn in relations with the Baltic states that occurred in the mid-30s. If in the 20s. The USSR was convinced that the creation of a single bloc of three states (the so-called Baltic Entente) was not beneficial for it, because this military-political alliance can be used by the countries of Western Europe for a new invasion of Russia, then after the Nazis came to power in Germany, the USSR insists on creating a system of collective security in Eastern Europe. One of the projects proposed by Moscow was a Soviet-Polish declaration on the Baltic states, in which both states would guarantee the independence of the three Baltic countries. However, Poland rejected these proposals. (See Zubkova E.Yu. The Baltics and the Kremlin. 1940-1953. M., 2008. P. 18-28.)
The Kremlin also tried to achieve guarantees of independence of the Baltic countries from Germany. Berlin was asked to sign a protocol in which the governments of Germany and the USSR would promise to “constantly take into account in their foreign policy the imperative of maintaining the independence and inviolability” of the Baltic states. However, Germany also refused to meet the Soviet Union halfway. The next attempt to reliably ensure the security of the Baltic countries was the Soviet-French project of the Eastern Pact, but it was not destined to come to fruition. These attempts continued until the spring of 1939, when it became obvious that Great Britain and France did not want to change their tactics of “appeasement” of Hitler, embodied by that time in the form of the Munich Agreements.
The change in the attitude of the USSR towards the Baltic countries was very well described by the head of the Bureau of International Information of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party /b/ Karl Radek. He stated the following in 1934: “The Baltic states created by the Entente, which served as a cordon or bridgehead against us, today are for us the most important wall of protection from the West.” So, to talk about the goal of “returning territories”, “restoring the rights of the Russian Empire” is only possible by resorting to speculation - the Soviet Union has been seeking neutrality and independence of the Baltic states for quite a long time for the sake of its security. The arguments presented as arguments about the “imperial”, “power” turn in Stalinist ideology that occurred in the mid-30s can hardly be transferred to the sphere of foreign policy; there is no documentary evidence of this.
By the way, this is not the first time in Russian history when a security issue was not resolved by joining neighbors. The “divide and conquer” recipe, despite its apparent simplicity, could sometimes be extremely inconvenient and unprofitable. For example, in the middle of the 18th century. representatives of the Ossetian tribes sought a decision from St. Petersburg on their inclusion in the empire, because Ossetians were subjected to pressure and raids from the Kabardian princes for a long time. However, the Russian authorities did not want a possible conflict with Turkey, and therefore did not accept such a tempting offer. (For more details, see Degoev V.V. Rapprochement along a complex trajectory: Russia and Ossetia in the middle of the 18th century. // Russia XXI. 2011. No. 1-2.)
Let's return to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, or rather, to the text of paragraph 1 of the secret protocol: “In the event of territorial and political transformations in the areas belonging to the Baltic states (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern border of Lithuania will be the line dividing the spheres of influence Germany and the USSR. In this regard, Lithuania’s interest in the Vilna region is recognized by both parties.” (Link.) On September 28, 1939, by an additional agreement, Germany and the USSR will adjust the border of their spheres of influence, and in exchange for the Lublin and part of the Warsaw Voivodeship of Poland, Germany will not lay claim to Lithuania. So, we are not talking about any annexation, we are talking about spheres of influence.
By the way, on these same days (namely September 27), Ribbentrop, the head of the German foreign policy department, in a conversation with Stalin asked: “Does the conclusion of a pact with Estonia mean that the USSR intends to slowly penetrate into Estonia, and then into Latvia?” Stalin replied: “Yes, that means. But temporarily the existing state system, etc., will be preserved there.” (Link.)
This is one of the few pieces of evidence that suggests that the Soviet leadership has intentions to “Sovietize” the Baltic states. As a rule, these intentions were expressed in specific phrases by Stalin or representatives of the diplomatic corps, but intentions are not plans, especially when it comes to words thrown out during diplomatic negotiations. There is no evidence in archival documents of a connection between the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and plans to change the political status or “Sovietization” of the Baltic republics. Moreover, Moscow prohibits plenipotentiaries in the Baltic states not only from using the word “Sovietization”, but also from communicating with left-wing forces in general.
2. The Baltic states pursued a policy of neutrality; they would not fight on the side of Germany.
Examples.
"Leonid Mlechin, writer: Please tell me, witness, there is a feeling that the fate of your country, as well as Estonia and Latvia, was sealed in 1939-40. Either you become part of the Soviet Union, or part of Germany. And there wasn’t even a third option. Do you agree with this point of view?
Algimantas Kasparavičius, historian, political scientist, researcher at the Institute of History of Lithuania: Of course I don't agree, because before the Soviet occupation, until 1940, all three Baltic countries, including Lithuania, professed a policy of neutrality. And they tried to defend their interests and their statehood in just such a neutral way during the war that began.”
Judgment of time: The accession of the Baltic states to the USSR - loss or gain? Part 1. // Channel Five. 08/09/2010. Link .
Comment.
In the spring of 1939, Germany finally occupied Czechoslovakia. Despite the obvious contradiction to the Munich agreements, Great Britain and France limited themselves to diplomatic protests. However, these countries, together with the USSR, Poland, Romania and other states of Eastern Europe, continued to discuss the possibility of creating a collective security system in this region. The most interested party was, naturally, the Soviet Union. Its fundamental condition was the neutrality of Poland and the Baltic states. However, these countries were against guarantees from the USSR.
This is how Winston Churchill wrote about it in his work “The Second World War”: “The negotiations seemed to have reached a hopeless dead end. Accepting the English guarantee (for assistance in case of war - Note), the governments of Poland and Romania did not want to accept a similar commitment in the same form from the Russian government. The same position was adhered to in another important strategic region - in the Baltic states. The Soviet government clarified that it would accede to the mutual guarantee pact only if Finland and the Baltic states were included in the general guarantee.
All four of these countries have now refused such a condition and, out of horror, would probably refuse to agree to it for a long time. Finland and Estonia even argued that they would consider as an act of aggression a guarantee that was given to them without their consent. On the same day, May 31, Estonia and Latvia signed non-aggression pacts with Germany. Thus, Hitler was able to easily penetrate into the depths of the weak defenses of the belated and indecisive coalition directed against him." (Link.)
Thus, one of the last opportunities for collective resistance to Hitler’s expansion to the East was destroyed. At the same time, the governments of the Baltic states willingly cooperated with Germany, never ceasing to talk about their neutrality. But isn't this an obvious indicator of a policy of double standards? Let's look once again at the facts of cooperation between Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania with Germany in 1939.
At the end of March this year, Germany demanded that Lithuania transfer the Klaipeda region to it. Just two or three days later, the German-Lithuanian agreement on the transfer of Klaipeda was signed, according to which the parties assumed an obligation not to use force against each other. At the same time, rumors appeared about the conclusion of a German-Estonian treaty, according to which German troops received the right of passage through Estonian territory. It was unknown how true these rumors were, but subsequent events increased the Kremlin’s suspicions.
On April 20, 1939, the chief of staff of the Latvian army M. Hartmanis and the commander of the Kurzeme division O. Dankers arrived in Berlin to participate in the celebrations dedicated to the 50th anniversary of Hitler, and were personally received by the Fuhrer, who presented them with awards. The Chief of the Estonian General Staff, Lieutenant General Nikolai Reek, also arrived for Hitler's anniversary. Following this, Estonia was visited by the head of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, Lieutenant General Franz Halder, and the head of the Abwehr, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris. This was a clear step towards military cooperation between the countries.
And on June 19, the Estonian Ambassador to Moscow August Ray, at a meeting with British diplomats, said that USSR assistance would force Estonia to take the side of Germany. What is this? Blind faith in the sincerity of treaties with Germany after the annexation of Austria and Czechoslovakia, and even more so after the annexation of a small part of the Baltic lands (i.e. the Klaipeda region)? The reluctance to cooperate (and at that time we were talking only about cooperation) with the Soviet Union, apparently, was much stronger than the fear of losing one’s own sovereignty. Or, perhaps, the reluctance to cooperate was so strong that their own sovereignty was not a value for part of the political elite.
On March 28, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR Litvinov presented statements to the Estonian and Latvian envoys in Moscow. In them, Moscow warned Tallinn and Riga that allowing “political, economic or other domination of a third state, granting it any exclusive rights or privileges” could be considered by Moscow as a violation of previously concluded agreements between the USSR, Estonia and Latvia. (Link.) Sometimes some researchers view these statements as an example of Moscow’s expansionist aspirations. However, if you pay attention to the foreign policy of the Baltic countries, this statement was a completely natural action of a state concerned about its security.
At the same time, in Berlin on April 11, Hitler approved the “Directive on the uniform preparation of the armed forces for war for 1939-1940.” It stated that after the defeat of Poland, Germany should take control of Latvia and Lithuania: “The position of the limitrophe states will be determined solely by the military needs of Germany. As events develop, it may become necessary to occupy the limitrophe states to the border of old Courland and include these territories in the empire.” . (Link.)
In addition to the above facts, modern historians make assumptions about the existence of secret treaties between Germany and the Baltic states. This is not just guesswork. For example, the German researcher Rolf Amann discovered in the German archives an internal memorandum from the chief of the German Foreign News Service Dörtinger dated June 8, 1939, which states that Estonia and Latvia agreed to a secret article requiring both countries to coordinate with Germany all defensive measures against the USSR. The memorandum also stated that Estonia and Latvia were warned of the need to intelligently apply their policy of neutrality, which required the deployment of all defensive forces against the “Soviet threat.” (See Ilmjärv M. Hääletu alistumine. Eesti, Läti ja Leedu välispoliitilise orientatsioni kujunemine ja iseseisvuse kaotus 1920. aastate keskpaigast anneksioonini. Tallinn, 2004. lk. 558.)
All this suggests that the “neutrality” of the Baltic states was only a cover for cooperation with Germany. And these countries deliberately cooperated, hoping with the help of a powerful ally to protect themselves from the “communist threat.” It is hardly necessary to say that the threat from this ally was much more terrible, because threatened real genocide against the Baltic peoples and the loss of all sovereignty.
3. The annexation of the Baltic states was violent, it was accompanied by mass repressions (genocide) and military intervention by the USSR. These events can be considered "annexation", "forced incorporation", "illegal incorporation".
Examples.
“Because - yes, indeed, there was a formal invitation, or rather, there were three formal invitations, if we talk about the Baltic states. But the point is that these invitations were made already when Soviet troops were stationed in these countries, when all three Baltic countries were flooded with NKVD agents, when in fact repressions against the local population were already being carried out... And, of course, it must be said that this action was prepared well by the Soviet leadership, because in fact everything was completed by the year 1940, and governments were created already in July 1940.”
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Interview with historian Alexey Pimenov. // Russian service of the Voice of America. 05/08/2005. Link .
"We did not support forced incorporation of the Baltic countries into the USSR", US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told the three Baltic foreign ministers yesterday."
Eldarov E. The USA does not recognize the occupation?! // News today. 06/16/2007. Link .
“The Soviet side also confirmed its aggressive position and decision not to comply with international law and to use force at the Moscow negotiations with representatives of Latvia during the conclusion of a mutual assistance agreement, which began on October 2, 1939. The next day, Latvian Foreign Minister V. Munters informed government: J. Stalin told him that “because of the Germans we can occupy you,” and also threateningly pointed out the possibility of the USSR taking “territory with a Russian national minority.” The Latvian government decided to capitulate and agree to the demands of the Soviet Union, allowing its troops into its territory."<...>
“Given the aspects of international law, treaties that were concluded on mutual assistance between such unequally powerful parties (power and small and weak states) are difficult to evaluate as legitimate. Several opinions have been expressed in the historical and legal literature on how one could characterize concluded basic agreements between the USSR and the Baltic states. Some authors believe that these agreements, in accordance with international law, are not valid from the moment of their signing, because they were simply imposed on the Baltic states by force".
Feldmanis I. Occupation of Latvia - historical and international legal aspects. // Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia. Link .
Comment.
"Annexation is the forcible annexation of the territory of another state (all or part) to a state. Before the Second World War, not every annexation was considered illegal and invalid. This is due to the fact that the principle prohibiting the use of force or the threat of its use, which became one of the main principles of modern international law, was first enshrined in 1945 in the UN Charter,” writes Doctor of Law S.V. Chernichenko.
Thus, speaking about the “annexation” of the Baltic states, we are again faced with a situation where modern international law does not work in relation to historical events. After all, the expansion of the British Empire, the USA, Spain and many other states that at one time annexed territory that belonged to other countries can just as easily be called annexation. So even if we call the process of annexation of the Baltic states annexation, then considering it illegal and invalid (which is what a number of researchers, journalists and politicians want to achieve) is legally incorrect, because the corresponding laws simply did not exist.
The same can be said about specific mutual assistance pacts concluded between the USSR and the Baltic countries in September - October 1939: September 28 with Estonia, October 5 with Latvia, October 10 with Lithuania. They were concluded, of course, under strong diplomatic pressure from the USSR, but strong diplomatic pressure, very often applied in conditions of constant military threat, does not make these pacts illegal. Their content was almost the same: the USSR had the right to lease military bases, ports and airfields agreed upon with the states and introduce a limited contingent of troops into their territory (20-25 thousand people for each country).
Can we consider that the presence of NATO troops on the territories of European countries limits their sovereignty? Of course you can. One can also say that the United States, as the leader of NATO, is going to use these troops to put pressure on the political forces of these countries and change the political course there. However, you must admit that this would be a very dubious assumption. The statement about treaties between the USSR and the Baltic states as the first step towards the “Sovietization” of the Baltic states seems to us to be the same dubious assumption.
Soviet troops stationed in the Baltic states were given the strictest instructions regarding behavior towards the local population and authorities. Contacts of the Red Army soldiers with local residents were limited. And Stalin, in a confidential conversation with the General Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Comintern G. Dimitrov, said that the USSR needed to “strictly observe them (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania - Note) internal mode and independence. We will not seek their Sovietization." (See USSR and Lithuania during the Second World War. Vilnius, 2006. Vol. 1. P. 305.) This suggests that the factor of military presence was not decisive in relations between states, and therefore, the process was not annexation and military takeover. It was precisely the agreed entry of a limited number of troops.
By the way, sending troops into the territory of a foreign state in order to prevent it from going over to the enemy’s side was used more than once during the Second World War. The joint Soviet-British occupation of Iran began in August 1941. And in May 1942, Great Britain occupied Madagascar to prevent the Japanese from capturing the island, although Madagascar belonged to Vichy France, which maintained neutrality. In the same way, the Americans occupied French (i.e. Vichy) Morocco and Algeria in November 1942. (Link.)
However, not everyone was happy with the current situation. The left forces in the Baltic states clearly counted on the help of the USSR. For example, demonstrations in support of the mutual assistance pact in Lithuania in October 1939 turned into clashes with the police. However, Molotov telegraphed to the plenipotentiary and the military attaché: “I categorically forbid interfering in inter-party affairs in Lithuania, supporting any opposition movements, etc.” (See Zubkova E.Yu. The Baltics and the Kremlin. P. 60-61.) The thesis about the fear of world public opinion is very doubtful: Germany, on the one hand, France and Great Britain, on the other, at that time entered the Second World War, and it is unlikely that any of them wanted the USSR to join the other side of the front. The Soviet leadership believed that by sending in troops it had secured the northwestern border, and only strict compliance with the terms of the agreements would ensure, in turn, compliance with these agreements on the part of the Baltic neighbors. It was simply unprofitable to destabilize the situation by military takeover.
We also add that Lithuania, as a result of the mutual assistance pact, significantly expanded its territory, including Vilna and the Vilna region. But despite the impeccable behavior of the Soviet troops noted by the Baltic authorities, in the meantime they continued cooperation with Germany and (during the “Winter War”) with Finland. In particular, the radio intelligence department of the Latvian army provided practical assistance to the Finnish side, forwarding intercepted radiograms from Soviet military units. (See Latvijas arhivi. 1999. Nr. 1. 121., 122. lpp.)
The allegations about mass repressions carried out in 1939-1941 also look unfounded. in the Baltic states and began, according to a number of researchers, in the fall of 1939, i.e. before the Baltic states joined the USSR. The facts are that in June 1941, in accordance with the May resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR "On measures to cleanse the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian SSRs from anti-Soviet, criminal and socially dangerous elements", the deportation of approx. 30 thousand people from the three Baltic republics. It is often forgotten that only some of them were deported as “anti-Soviet elements,” while others were banal criminals. It must also be taken into account that this action was carried out on the eve of the war.
However, more often the mythical NKVD order No. 001223 “On operational measures against anti-Soviet and socially hostile elements”, which wanders from one publication to another, is cited as evidence. It was first mentioned... in the book "Die Sowjetunion und die baltische Staaten" ("The Soviet Union and the Baltic States"), published in 1941 in Kaunas. It is not difficult to guess that it was written not by painstaking researchers, but by employees of Goebbels’ department. Naturally, no one was able to find this NKVD order in the archives, but its mention can be found in the books “These Names Are Accused” (1951) and “The Baltic States, 1940-1972” (1972), published in Stockholm, as well as in numerous modern literature up to the study of E.Yu. Zubkova “The Baltics and the Kremlin” (see this edition, p. 126).
By the way, in this study, the author, considering Moscow’s policy in the annexed Baltic lands for one pre-war year (from the summer of 1940 to June 1941), over the course of 27 pages of the corresponding chapter, writes only two paragraphs (!) about repressions, one of which is a retelling of the myth mentioned above. This shows how significant the repressive policies of the new government were. Of course, it brought fundamental changes in political and economic life, the nationalization of industry and large property, the elimination of capitalist exchange, etc. Part of the population, shocked by these changes, switched to resistance: this was expressed in protests, attacks on the police and even sabotage (arson of warehouses, etc.). What did the new government need to do so that this territory, taking into account the not overwhelming but still existing social resistance, would not become easy “prey” for the German occupiers, who were planning to start a war soon? Of course, to fight “anti-Soviet” sentiments. That is why, on the eve of the war, a resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR appeared on the deportation of unreliable elements.
4. Before the inclusion of the Baltic states into the USSR, communists came to power in them, and the elections were rigged.
Examples.
"Illegal and illegal change of government occurred on June 20, 1940. Instead of the cabinet of K. Ulmanis, a Soviet puppet government headed by A. Kirchenstein came, which was officially called the government of the Latvian people.”<...>
“In the elections held on July 14 and 15, 1940, only one list of candidates nominated by the “Bloc of Working People” was allowed. All other alternative lists were rejected. It was officially reported that 97.5% of the votes were cast for the mentioned list. The election results were falsified and did not reflect the will of the people. In Moscow, the Soviet news agency TASS gave information about the mentioned election results twelve hours before the start of the vote count in Latvia."
Feldmanis I. Occupation of Latvia - historical and international legal aspects. // Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia. Link .
"July 1940 In the elections in the Baltics, the Communists received: Lithuania - 99.2%, Latvia - 97.8%, Estonia - 92.8%."
Surov V. Icebreaker-2. Mn., 2004. Ch. 6.
July 21-22 marks the next 72nd anniversary of the formation of the Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian SSR. And the fact of this kind of education, as is known, causes a huge amount of controversy. Since the moment Vilnius, Riga and Tallinn became the capitals of independent states in the early 90s, debates have not ceased on the territory of these same states about what actually happened in the Baltic states in 1939-40: peaceful and voluntary entry part of the USSR, or was it still Soviet aggression, which resulted in a 50-year occupation.
Riga. The Soviet Army enters Latvia
The words that the Soviet authorities in 1939 agreed with the authorities of Nazi Germany (the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact) that the Baltic states should become Soviet territory have been circulating in the Baltic states for several years now and often allow certain forces to celebrate their victory in the elections. The Soviet “occupation” theme seems to have been worn out to nothing, however, turning to historical documents, one can understand that the theme of occupation is a big soap bubble, which is brought to enormous proportions by certain forces. But, as you know, any, even the most beautiful soap bubble, will sooner or later burst, spraying the person blowing it with small cold drops.
So, Baltic political scientists who adhere to the view that the annexation of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia to the USSR in 1940 is considered an occupation, declare that if it were not for the Soviet troops that entered the Baltic states, then these states would have remained not only independent, but also declared their neutrality. It is difficult to call such an opinion anything other than a deep misconception. Neither Lithuania, nor Latvia, nor Estonia simply could afford to declare neutrality during the Second World War as, for example, Switzerland did, because the Baltic states clearly did not have the financial instruments that Swiss banks possessed. Moreover, the economic indicators of the Baltic states in 1938-1939 show that their authorities had no opportunity to dispose of their sovereignty as they pleased. Let's give a few examples.
Welcoming Soviet ships in Riga
The volume of industrial production in Latvia in 1938 was no more than 56.5% of the production volume in 1913, when Latvia was part of the Russian Empire. The percentage of the illiterate population of the Baltic states by 1940 is shocking. This percentage was about 31% of the population. More than 30% of children aged 6-11 did not attend school, but instead were forced to work in agricultural work in order to participate, so to speak, in the economic support of the family. During the period from 1930 to 1940, in Latvia alone, over 4,700 peasant farms were closed due to the colossal debts into which their “independent” owners were driven. Another eloquent figure for the “development” of the Baltic states during the period of independence (1918-1940) is the number of workers employed in the construction of factories and, as they would now say, housing stock. This number by 1930 in Latvia amounted to 815 people... Dozens of multi-storey buildings and plants and factories stretching out into the horizon, which were erected by these tireless 815 builders, appear before your eyes...
And given such and such economic indicators of the Baltic states by 1940, someone sincerely believes that these countries could dictate their terms to Nazi Germany, declaring that it would leave them alone because of their declared neutrality.
If we consider the aspect that Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were going to remain independent after July 1940, then we can cite data from a document that is not uninteresting for supporters of the “Soviet occupation” idea. July 16, 1941 Adolf Hitler holds a meeting about the future of the three Baltic republics. As a result, a decision was made: instead of 3 independent states (which Baltic nationalists are trying to trumpet today), to create a territorial entity that is part of Nazi Germany, called Ostland. Riga was chosen as the administrative center of this entity. At the same time, a document was approved on the official language of the Ostland - German (this refers to the question that the German “liberators” would allow the three republics to develop along the path of independence and authenticity). On the territory of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, higher educational institutions were to be closed, and only vocational schools were allowed to remain. German policy towards the population of the Ostland is described in an eloquent memorandum by the Minister for the Eastern Territories of the Third Reich. This memorandum, noteworthy, was adopted on April 2, 1941 - before the creation of Ostland itself. The memorandum contains words that the majority of the population of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia is not suitable for Germanization, and therefore must be resettled in Eastern Siberia. In June 1943, when Hitler still harbored illusions about the successful completion of the war against the Soviet Union, a directive was adopted that the Ostland lands would become the fiefdoms of those military personnel who had particularly distinguished themselves on the Eastern Front. At the same time, the owners of these lands from among the Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians should either be resettled to other areas or used as cheap labor for their new masters. A principle that was used back in the Middle Ages, when knights received lands in conquered territories along with the former owners of these lands.
After reading such documents, one can only guess where the current Baltic ultra-rightists got the idea that Hitler’s Germany would give their countries independence.
The next argument of supporters of the idea of “Soviet occupation” of the Baltic states is that, they say, the entry of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia into the Soviet Union set these countries back several decades in their socio-economic development. And it’s difficult to call these words anything other than a delusion. During the period from 1940 to 1960, more than two dozen large industrial enterprises were built in Latvia alone, which was not the case here throughout its entire history. By 1965, industrial production volumes on average in the Baltic republics had increased more than 15 times compared to the 1939 level. According to Western economic studies, the level of Soviet investment in Latvia by the early 1980s amounted to about 35 billion US dollars. If we translate all this into the language of percentages, it turns out that direct investments from Moscow amounted to almost 900% of the amount of goods produced by Latvia itself for the needs of both its domestic economy and the needs of the union economy. This is how occupation is, when the “occupiers” themselves hand out huge amounts of money to those they “occupy.” Perhaps, many countries could only dream of such an occupation even today. Greece would love for Mrs. Merkel, with her billions of dollars in investments, to “occupy” it, as they say, until the second coming of the Savior to Earth.
The Seimas of Latvia welcomes the demonstrators
Another “occupation” argument: referendums on the accession of the Baltic states to the USSR were held illegitimately. They say that the communists specifically put forward only their lists, and the people of the Baltic states voted for them almost unanimously under pressure. However, if this is so, then it becomes completely incomprehensible why tens of thousands of people on the streets of the Baltic cities joyfully greeted the news that their republics were becoming part of the Soviet Union. The wild joy of Estonian parliamentarians when, in July 1940, they learned that Estonia had become the new Soviet Republic is completely incomprehensible. And if the Baltic states really did not want to come under Moscow’s protectorate, then it is also unclear why the authorities of the three countries did not follow the Finnish example and showed Moscow the real Baltic fig.
In general, the epic with the “Soviet occupation” of the Baltic states, which interested parties continue to write, is very similar to one of the sections of the book called “Untrue Tales of the Peoples of the World.”
