The First World War became the largest military conflict of the first third of the twentieth century and all the wars that took place before that. So when did World War I start and what year did it end? The date July 28, 1914 is the beginning of the war, and its end is November 11, 1918.

When did the first world war start?

The beginning of the First World War was the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary on Serbia. The reason for the war was the murder of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian crown by the nationalist Gavrilo Princip.

Speaking briefly about the First World War, it should be noted that the main reason for the hostilities that arose was the conquest of a place in the sun, the desire to rule the world with the emerging balance of power, the emergence of Anglo-German trade barriers, the absolute phenomenon in the development of the state as economic imperialism and territorial claims one state to another.

On June 28, 1914, Bosnian Serb Gavrilo Princip assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary in Sarajevo. On July 28, 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, beginning the main war of the first third of the 20th century.

Rice. 1. Gavrilo Princip.

Russia in the First World War

Russia announced mobilization, preparing to defend the fraternal people, which brought upon itself an ultimatum from Germany to stop the formation of new divisions. On August 1, 1914, Germany declared an official declaration of war on Russia.

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In 1914, military operations on the Eastern Front took place in Prussia, where the rapid advance of Russian troops was driven back by a German counteroffensive and the defeat of Samsonov's army. The offensive in Galicia was more effective. On the Western Front, the course of military operations was more pragmatic. The Germans invaded France through Belgium and moved at an accelerated pace to Paris. Only at the Battle of the Marne was the offensive stopped by Allied forces and the parties moved on to a long trench war that lasted until 1915.

In 1915, Germany's former ally, Italy, entered the war on the side of the Entente. This is how the southwestern front was formed. The fighting took place in the Alps, giving rise to a mountain war.

On April 22, 1915, during the Battle of Ypres, German soldiers used chlorine poison gas against Entente forces, which became the first gas attack in history.

A similar meat grinder happened on the Eastern Front. The defenders of the Osovets fortress in 1916 covered themselves with unfading glory. The German forces, several times superior to the Russian garrison, were unable to take the fortress after mortar and artillery fire and several assaults. After this, a chemical attack was used. When the Germans, walking in gas masks through the smoke, believed that there were no survivors left in the fortress, Russian soldiers ran out at them, coughing blood and wrapped in various rags. The bayonet attack was unexpected. The enemy, many times superior in number, was finally driven back.

Rice. 2. Defenders of Osovets.

At the Battle of the Somme in 1916, tanks were used for the first time by the British during an attack. Despite frequent breakdowns and low accuracy, the attack had a more psychological effect.

Rice. 3. Tanks on the Somme.

In order to distract the Germans from the breakthrough and pull forces away from Verdun, Russian troops planned an offensive in Galicia, the result of which was to be the surrender of Austria-Hungary. This is how the “Brusilovsky breakthrough” occurred, which, although it moved the front line tens of kilometers to the west, did not solve the main problem.

At sea, a major battle took place between the British and Germans near the Jutland Peninsula in 1916. The German fleet intended to break the naval blockade. More than 200 ships took part in the battle, with the British outnumbering them, but during the course of the battle there was no winner, and the blockade continued.

The United States joined the Entente in 1917, for which entering a world war on the winning side at the very last moment became a classic. The German command erected a reinforced concrete “Hindenburg Line” from Lens to the Aisne River, behind which the Germans retreated and switched to a defensive war.

French General Nivelle developed a plan for a counteroffensive on the Western Front. Massive artillery bombardment and attacks on different sectors of the front did not produce the desired effect.

In 1917, in Russia, during two revolutions, the Bolsheviks came to power and concluded the shameful separate Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. On March 3, 1918, Russia left the war.
In the spring of 1918, the Germans launched their last, “spring offensive.” They intended to break through the front and take France out of the war, however, the numerical superiority of the Allies prevented them from doing this.

Economic exhaustion and growing dissatisfaction with the war forced Germany to the negotiating table, during which a peace treaty was concluded at Versailles.

What have we learned?

Regardless of who fought whom and who won, history has shown that the end of the First World War did not solve all of humanity's problems. The battle for the redivision of the world did not end; the allies did not finish off Germany and its allies completely, but only depleted them economically, which led to the signing of peace. The Second World War was only a matter of time.

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During the hostilities of 1915, it became clear that the First World War was dragging on. Germany moved the main front from the Western to the Eastern, and Russia's allies did not take active action. They focused on an economic blockade of Germany and on amassing forces for future battles. Already at the beginning of the year, they had a numerical superiority over Germany and were ahead of their opponents in the quality of armament of the troops.

The German commanders-in-chief, having learned about the decision taken by the Entente countries to launch an offensive in June-July 1916, decided to take the initiative into their own hands. On February 21, 1916, the offensive began at Verdun (France); the fall of the Verdun fortifications would have opened a direct path for the Germans to attack Paris. The attack on the Verdun fortifications was unsuccessful. Bloody battles went on with varying degrees of success.

In early March, Russian troops, in response to a request from the French government for help, launched an offensive in the area of ​​Lake Navoch and Dvinsk. The German command weakened the onslaught at Verdun, but the attack at Verdun was not completely stopped. The offensive on the Dvina-Naroch front continued until mid-March. During the fighting, Russian troops suffered heavy losses, but were able to help France by drawing on a significant number of German reserves. The fighting at the Verdun fortifications continued for almost ten months. Over ten months, the losses of both sides amounted to approximately 1 million people, with German losses exceeding French losses by almost twice. The Verdun operation ended on December 18. The Germans were unable to break through the French fortifications.

Brusilov breakthrough - in the first days of June there was a new request from the command of the Entente troops, this time Italy needed help. In May 1916, the 400,000-strong Austro-Hungarian army went on the offensive in the Trentino region and inflicted a heavy defeat on the Italian army. The Russian command was forced to postpone the early date set for the start of the offensive in the southwestern direction from June 15 to June 4.

According to the plan developed by the commander-in-chief of the Southwestern Front, Alexei Alekseevich Brusilov, the main blow was delivered by the 8th Ground Army under the command of General Alexei Maksimovich Kaledin towards the city of Lutsk. Troops under the command of General Brusilov, having broken through the enemy’s defensive fortifications on an almost 300-kilometer front, began to advance into Eastern Galicia and Bukovina.

After Russian troops inflicted the first major defeat on the Austro-Hungarian forces, Romania entered the war, apparently deciding that the opportune moment had come to take the side of the winners. Earlier, the opinions of England, France and Russia differed regarding Romania's entry into the Entente. Russia was against it, but France and England, on the contrary, supported the entry of Romania. On August 17, Romania began military operations in the Transylvania region and initially they were quite successful, but after the cessation of fighting in the Somme direction, the Austro-German military forces were able to easily defeat the Romanian army and occupy almost all of Romania. The capture of Romania was an important strategic victory; the Triple Alliance received an additional source of food and oil. Russia once again had to save the situation; 35 infantry and 11 cavalry divisions were transferred to Romania to prevent the enemy from building on their success and completely capturing Romania.

At the same time, in the midst of the Russian offensive in the South-Western direction, despite the general's requests for reinforcements, the high command refused to send reserves and ammunition. And the beginning, as previously planned, of an offensive in the North-Western direction, under the command of General Evert. But the attack on Baranovichi did not produce positive results, and it was decided to postpone it until the beginning of July. At the same time, the troops of General Brusilov continued the offensive and by the end of June advanced deep into Galicia and Bukovina.

On the first of July, as previously planned by the Entente command, an offensive began on the Somme River. During the operation, the Entente captured a huge territory. The losses of both sides during the operation amounted to more than 1 million 300 thousand people.

On the third of July, General Evert resumed the offensive; attacks by Russian forces in this direction were again unsuccessful. And only after the complete failure of General Evert’s offensive in the North-Western direction did the command of the Russian troops recognize General Brusilov’s offensive on the South-Western Front as the main one. But the key moment was missed; the Austrian command was able to regroup its troops and bring up reserves: part of the forces were transferred from the Austro-Italian front, part was transferred by the German command from the Verdun and Somme directions. The advance of the Russian troops was stopped. But it is worth noting that Russian troops advanced far into Bukovina and Eastern Galicia, capturing an area of ​​25 thousand square kilometers. Over 400 thousand soldiers were captured by Russian troops. But due to the inept distribution of forces by the Russian command and the poor supply of ammunition to the troops, the operation did not bring crushing success. This operation helped to seize the initiative and did not allow the enemy to deal with Italy and France.

Defense fortifications of the First World War. Baranovichi operation

The main event of the 1916 campaign was the Battle of Verdun. It is considered the longest battle of the First World War (lasted from February 21 to December 18, 1916) and was very bloody. Therefore, it received another name: “Verdun meat grinder.”

At Verdun, the German strategic plan collapsed. What was this plan?

In the 1915 campaign, Germany did not achieve significant success on the Eastern Front, so the German command decided in 1916 to withdraw France from the war, delivering the main blow in the west. It was planned to cut off the Verdun ledge with powerful flank attacks, encircle the entire enemy Verdun group, create a gap in the Allied defenses, and through it strike the flank and rear of the central French armies and defeat the entire Allied front.

But after the Verdun operation, as well as after the Battle of the Somme, it became clear that Germany’s military potential began to deplete, and the forces of the Entente began to strengthen.

Battle of Verdun

Map of the Battle of Verdun

From the history of the Verdun fortress

After Germany annexed Alsace and part of Lorraine in 1871, Verdun turned into a border military fortress. During the First World War, the Germans failed to capture Verdun, but the city was almost completely destroyed by artillery fire. In the vicinity of the city, where the main battles took place, Germany used a powerful artillery strike using flamethrowers and poisonous gases, as a result of which 9 French villages were wiped off the face of the earth. The battles of Verdun and its environs made the city a household name for senseless slaughter.

Verdun underground citadel

Back in the 17th century. The Verdun underground citadel of Suterren was planned. Its construction was completed in 1838. One kilometer of its underground galleries was turned in 1916 into an invulnerable command center housing 10 thousand French soldiers. Now in part of the galleries there is a museum exhibition that, using light and sound, reproduces the Verdun massacre of 1916. Infrared glasses are required to view part of the exhibition. There are exhibits related to the history of these places during the First World War.

German observation post at Verdun

The front section was small, only 15 km. But Germany concentrated 6.5 divisions on it against 2 French divisions. There was also a struggle for advantage in the airspace: at first only German bombers and fire spotters operated in it, but by May France was able to deploy a squadron of Nieuport fighters.

"Nieuport 17 °C.1" - fighter aircraft from the First World War

Before the First World War, this company produced racing aircraft, but during and after the war it began to produce fighter aircraft. Many Entente pilots flew on the company's fighters, including the French ace Georges Guynemer.

Georges Guynemer

Progress of the battle

After a massive 8-hour artillery preparation, German troops went on the offensive on the right bank of the Meuse River. The German infantry from the strike force was formed in one echelon. The divisions consisted of two regiments in the first line and one regiment in the second. The battalions were formed in echelons deep. Each battalion created three chains, advancing at a distance of 80-100 m. Ahead of the first chain moved scouts and assault groups, consisting of two or three infantry squads, reinforced with grenade launchers, machine guns and flamethrowers.

German flamethrower

Despite the powerful performance, German troops met stubborn resistance. During the first day of the offensive, German troops advanced 2 km, occupying the first French position. Then Germany conducted an offensive according to the same pattern: first, during the day, artillery destroyed the next position, and by the evening the infantry occupied it. By February 25, the French had lost almost all of their forts, and the important fort of Douamont was taken. But the French desperately resisted: along the only highway connecting Verdun with the rear, they transported troops from other sectors of the front in 6,000 vehicles, delivering about 190 thousand soldiers and 25 thousand tons of military cargo by March 6. Thus, the French superiority in manpower was formed here by almost one and a half times. France was greatly helped by the actions of Russian troops on the Eastern Front: the Naroch operation eased the position of the French troops.

Naroch operation

After the start of the German offensive near Verdun, the commander-in-chief of the French army, Joffre, turned to the Russian command with a request to deliver a diversionary blow to the Germans. The general offensive of the Entente was planned for May 1916, but the Russian headquarters complied with the ally's request and decided to conduct an offensive operation on the northern wing of the Western Front in March. On February 24, a meeting at Headquarters decided to deliver a strong blow to the German armies, gathering the largest possible forces for this. The commander-in-chief of the armies of the Western Front at that time was the Russian adjutant general Alexei Ermolaevich Evert.

Alexey Ermolaevich Evert

After artillery preparation, which lasted two days, Russian troops went on the offensive. The 2nd Army south of Lake Naroch wedged itself into the defenses of the 10th German Army at 2-9 km.

The enemy had difficulty holding back the fierce attacks of the Russian troops. But the Germans pulled up significant forces to the offensive area and repulsed the Russian offensive.

During the Naroch operation, 17-year-old Evgenia Vorontsova, a volunteer of the 3rd Siberian Rifle Regiment, accomplished her feat. She inspired the entire regiment with her example and led it, infecting it with her enthusiasm, into the attack. She died during this attack. The Russian and German armies suffered heavy losses.

The German command decided that the Russians had launched a general offensive and were ready to break through the German defenses, and stopped attacks on Verdun for two weeks. In essence, this operation was a diversionary operation; in the summer, the German command expected the main blow on its front, and the Russian carried out the Brusilov breakthrough on the Austrian front, which brought colossal success and brought Austria-Hungary to the brink of military defeat.

But first there was the Baranovichi operation, which was also led by A.E. Evert.

Baranovichi operation

This offensive operation of the troops of the Russian Western Front took place from June 20 to July 12, 1916.

The area of ​​the city of Baranovichi was occupied by German troops in mid-September 1915. It was considered one of the most important sectors of the German Eastern Front in the Warsaw-Moscow direction. The Russian command assessed this section of the front as a springboard for a breakthrough to Vilna and further to Warsaw. Therefore, the Russian command strengthened units of the Western Front, which outnumbered the troops of the Southwestern Front. The Western Front was entrusted with delivering the main blow.

The operation plan of the Russian command was to break through the fortified zone with the main attack by two corps (9th and 35th) in an 8-km sector. But the Russians were unable to break through the fortified German positional front; they captured only the first fortified line in certain sectors of the offensive. With a powerful short counterattack, the German units were able to partially restore the original position.

The losses of the Russian army amounted to 80,000 people against 13,000 enemy losses, of which 4,000 were prisoners.

Defense fortifications. Baranovichi operation

The main reasons for the defeat: poor artillery preparation, weak concentration of artillery in the breakthrough area. Poor reconnaissance of the fortified line: the overwhelming majority of the fortifications of the first line of defense were not identified, and the second and third lines of defense generally remained unknown to the Russian command before the start of the battle. The command staff was not prepared to organize a breakthrough of the fortified zones. Numerical superiority was not used.

None of the objectives of the operation were completed. Russian troops were unable to improve their position, did not create conditions for a future offensive, and did not distract the attention of the enemy command from the actions of the Southwestern Front. This defeat had a negative impact on the morale of the Russian troops, in which anti-war sentiment began to intensify. And in 1917, fertile ground was created for revolutionary propaganda among the troops, which made parts of the Western Front most susceptible to the influence of the Bolsheviks.

After the failure of the Baranovichi strike, the armies of the Western Front no longer undertook large-scale operations.

Brusilovsky breakthrough

The Brusilov breakthrough was at that time a new type of front-line offensive operation of the Southwestern Front of the Russian Army under the command of General A. A. Brusilov.

General Alexey Alekseevich Brusilov

This operation was carried out from June 3 to August 22, 1916, and during it a heavy defeat was inflicted on the armies of Austria-Hungary and Germany, Bukovina and Eastern Galicia were occupied.

Brusilovsky breakthrough

On the southern flank of the Eastern Front, the Austro-German allies created a powerful, deeply echeloned defense against Brusilov's armies. The strongest was the first of 2-3 lines of trenches with a total length of 1.5-2 km. Its basis was support units, in the gaps there were continuous trenches, the approaches to which were shot from the flanks, and pillboxes at all heights. The trenches had canopies, dugouts, shelters dug deep into the ground, with reinforced concrete vaults or ceilings made of logs and earth up to 2 m thick, capable of withstanding any shells. Concrete caps were installed for machine gunners. There were wire barriers in front of the trenches; in some areas, electricity was passed through them, bombs were hung, and mines were laid. Between the stripes and lines of trenches, artificial obstacles were installed: abatis, wolf pits, slingshots.

The Austro-German command believed that the Russian armies could not break through such a defense without significant reinforcement, and therefore Brusilov’s offensive was a complete surprise to them.

Russian infantry

As a result of the Brusilov breakthrough, the Southwestern Front defeated the Austro-Hungarian army, the fronts advanced from 80 to 120 km deep into enemy territory.

Austria-Hungary and Germany lost more than 1.5 million killed, wounded and missing. The Russians captured 581 guns, 1,795 machine guns, 448 bomb launchers and mortars. Huge losses undermined the combat effectiveness of the Austro-Hungarian army.

The troops of the Southwestern Front lost about 500,000 soldiers and officers killed, wounded and missing in action.

To repel the Russian offensive, the Central Powers transferred 31 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions (more than 400 thousand bayonets and sabers) from the Western, Italian and Thessaloniki fronts, which eased the position of the Allies in the Battle of the Somme and saved the defeated Italian army from defeat. Under the influence of the Russian victory, Romania decided to enter the war on the side of the Entente.

The result of the Brusilov breakthrough and the operation on the Somme: the final transition of the strategic initiative from the Central Powers to the Entente. The Allies managed to achieve such cooperation that for two months (July-August) Germany had to send its limited strategic reserves to both the Western and Eastern Fronts simultaneously.

From the point of view of military art, this was a new form of breaking through the front simultaneously in several sectors, which was developed in the last years of the First World War, especially in the 1918 campaign in the Western European Theater of Operations

Results of the Verdun operation

By December 1916, the front line had moved to the lines occupied by both armies on February 25, 1916. But at Verdun, the German strategic plan for the 1916 campaign, which was to take France out of the war with one strong and short blow, collapsed. After the Verdun operation, the military potential of the German Empire began to decline.

The "wounds" of the Battle of Verdun are still visible

But both sides lost about a million people. At Verdun, light machine guns, rifle grenade launchers, flamethrowers and chemical shells began to be used for the first time. The importance of aviation has increased. For the first time, troop regroupings were carried out using road transport.

Other battles of the 1916 military campaign

In June 1916, the Battle of the Somme began and lasted until November. During this battle, tanks were used for the first time.

Battle of the Somme

It was an offensive operation of the Anglo-French armies in the French theater of the First World War. The results of the battle have not been definitively determined to this day: formally, the Allies achieved victory over the Germans with limited results, but the German side believed that it was they who won.

The operation was one of the elements of the agreed Entente plan for 1916. According to the decision of the inter-allied conference in Chantilly, the Russian and Italian armies were to go on the offensive on June 15, and the French and British armies on July 1, 1916.

The operation was to be carried out by three French and two British armies with the aim of defeating the German armies in northern France. But dozens of French divisions were killed in the “Verdun meat grinder,” which led to a significant correction of the plan in May. The breakthrough front was reduced from 70 to 40 km, the main role was assigned to the English 4th Army of General Rawlinson, the French 6th Army of General Fayol carried out an auxiliary attack, and the English 3rd Army of General Allenby allocated one corps (2 divisions) for the offensive. The overall leadership of the operation was entrusted to the French General Foch.

General Ferdinand Foch

The operation was planned as a difficult and lengthy battle, in which artillery was supposed to reach 3,500 guns, aviation - over 300 aircraft. All divisions underwent tactical training, practicing attacks on the ground under the protection of a barrage of fire.

The scope of preparations for the operation was enormous, which did not allow it to be carried out secretly, but the Germans believed that the British were not capable of conducting a large-scale offensive, and the French were too bled dry at Verdun.

Artillery preparation began on June 24 and lasted 7 days. It assumed the nature of the methodical destruction of the German defense. The first defensive position was destroyed to a large extent. On July 1, the British and French went on the offensive and occupied the first position of the German defense, but four other corps suffered huge losses from machine-gun fire and were repulsed. On the first day, the British lost 21 thousand soldiers killed and missing and more than 35 thousand wounded. The French 6th Army captured two German defense positions. But such a rapid movement was not included in the offensive schedule, and by the decision of General Fayol they were withdrawn. The French resumed their offensive on July 5, but the Germans had already strengthened their defenses. The French were never able to take Barleu.

By the end of July, the British brought 4 new divisions into battle, and the French - 5. But Germany also transferred many troops to the Somme, including from near Verdun. But in connection with the Brusilov breakthrough, the German army could no longer conduct two major operations simultaneously, and on September 2 the offensive near Verdun was stopped.

German soldiers in September 1916

After almost two months of attrition, the Allies launched a new large-scale offensive on September 3. After a powerful artillery bombardment in 1900 with only heavy guns, two British and two French armies went on the offensive against the three German armies commanded by Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria.

Over 10 days of fierce fighting, the Anglo-French troops only penetrated 2-4 km into the German defense. On September 15, the British used tanks in an attack for the first time. And although there were only 18 tanks, their psychological impact on the German infantry was enormous. As a result, the British were able to advance 5 km in 5 hours of attack.

During the attacks on September 25-27, Anglo-French troops took the ridge of the dominant heights between the Somme and Ancre rivers. But by mid-November, the fighting on the Somme stopped due to the extreme exhaustion of the sides.

The Somme demonstrated the complete military and economic superiority of the Entente. After the Somme, Verdun and the Brusilov breakthrough, the Central Powers ceded the strategic initiative to the Entente.

At the same time, the Somme operation clearly demonstrated the shortcomings of the approach to breaking through fortified defenses that prevailed in the general staffs of France, Great Britain and Russia.

The tactical preparation of the French units at the beginning of the operation turned out to be more appropriate to the conditions of the offensive than that of the British. French soldiers followed the artillery fire light, and the British soldiers, each carrying a load of 29.94 kg, moved slowly, and their chains were successively mowed down by machine-gun fire.

British soldiers

Battle of Erzurum

In January-February 1916, the Battle of Erzurum took place on the Caucasian front, in which Russian troops completely defeated the Turkish army and captured the city of Erzurum. The Russian army was commanded by General N.N. Yudenich.

Nikolai Nikolaevich Yudenich

It was impossible to capture the fortifications of Erzurum on the move, so Yudenich suspended the offensive and began preparations for the assault on Erzurum. He personally supervised the work of his air squad. The soldiers were trained for upcoming actions on the heights in their rear. Clear interaction between different types of troops was thought out and worked out. To do this, the commander applied an innovation, creating assault detachments - in the most important directions, infantry regiments were given guns, additional machine guns and sapper units to destroy the enemy's long-term fortifications.

Yudenich's plan: to break through the front on the northern right flank and, bypassing the most powerful defensive positions of the Turks, strike at Erzurum from the western, inner side of the Deve-Boynu ridge to the flank and rear of the 3rd Turkish Army. To prevent the enemy from strengthening some areas at the expense of others, he had to be attacked simultaneously along the entire line of fortifications, in ten columns, without respite, around the clock. Yudenich distributed his forces unevenly, and the advancing columns were unequal. The blows were delivered as if with a “stepwise” build-up and mutual reinforcement towards the right wing.

As a result, the Caucasian army of General Yudenich advanced 150 km. The Turkish 3rd Army was completely defeated. It lost more than half of its members. 13 thousand were captured. 9 banners and 323 guns were taken. The Russian army lost 2339 killed and 6 thousand wounded. The capture of Erzurum opened the way for the Russians to Trebizond (Trabzon), which was taken in April.

Trebizond operation

The operation took place from February 5 to April 15, 1916. Russian troops and the Black Sea Fleet acted jointly against the Turkish army. The Russian naval landing landed in Rize. The operation ended with the victory of Russian troops and the capture of the Turkish Black Sea port of Trebizond.

The operation was commanded by N.N. Yudenich.

In July, Erzincan was taken, then Mush. The Russian army advanced deeply into the territory of Turkish Armenia.

Battle of Jutland

The Battle of Jutland was the largest naval battle of the First World War between the German and British navies. It occurred in the North Sea near the Danish Jutland Peninsula in the Skagerrak Strait.

Explosion on the battlecruiser HMS Queen Mary

At the beginning of the war, the British fleet blocked the exit from the North Sea, which interrupted sea deliveries of raw materials and food to Germany. The German fleet attempted to break the blockade, but the English fleet prevented such a breakthrough. Before the Battle of Jutland there were the Battle of Heligoland Bight (1914) and the Battle of Dogger Bank (1915). The British prevailed in both battles.

The losses on both sides in this battle were significant, but both sides declared victory. Germany believed that the English fleet had suffered significant losses and should therefore be considered defeated. Great Britain considered Germany the losing side, because The German fleet was never able to break the British blockade.

In fact, British losses were almost 2 times higher than German losses. The British lost 6,784 people killed and captured, the Germans lost 3,039 people killed.

Of the 25 ships lost in the Battle of Jutland, 17 were sunk by artillery and 8 by torpedoes.

But the British fleet retained dominance at sea, and the German battle fleet ceased to take active action. This had a significant impact on the course of the war as a whole: the German fleet remained at bases until the end of the war, and, under the terms of the Versailles Peace, was interned in Great Britain.

Germany switched to unrestricted submarine warfare, which led to the United States entering the war on the side of the Entente.

The continuation of the naval blockade of Germany led to the undermining of German industrial potential and an acute shortage of food in the cities, which forced the German government to conclude peace.

The death of the cruiser "Indefetigable"

Results of the 1916 campaign

All the events of the First World War of 1916 showed the superiority of the Entente. By the end of 1916, both sides lost 6 million people killed, about 10 million were wounded. In November-December 1916, Germany and its allies offered peace, but the Entente rejected the offer. The main argument was formulated as follows: peace is impossible “until the restoration of violated rights and freedoms, recognition of the principle of nationalities and the free existence of small states is ensured.”

The army retreats to the island of Corfu.

Notes:

* To compare events that took place in Russia and Western Europe, in all chronological tables, starting from 1582 (the year of the introduction of the Gregorian calendar in eight European countries) and ending with 1918 (the year of the transition of Soviet Russia from the Julian to the Gregorian calendar), in the column DATES indicated date only according to the Gregorian calendar , and the Julian date is indicated in brackets along with a description of the event. In chronological tables describing the periods before the introduction of the new style by Pope Gregory XIII (in the DATES column) Dates are based on the Julian calendar only. . At the same time, no translation is made to the Gregorian calendar, because it did not exist.

Read about the events of the year:

Spiridovich A.I. "The Great War and the February Revolution of 1914-1917" All-Slavic Publishing House, New York. 1-3 books. 1960, 1962

Vel. book Gabriel Konstantinovich. In the marble palace. From the chronicle of our family. NY. 1955:

Chapter thirty-four. Autumn 1915 - winter 1916. Trip to Crimea - Bad things at the front - Nicholas II assumes the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

Chapter thirty-five. Summer-autumn 1916. Arrival of my cousin, Prince Nicholas of Greece, in Russia - I enter the Military Academy and become a colonel at the age of 29 - Housewarming party for Grand Duke Dmitry Pavlovich.

Chapter thirty-six. December 1916. Murder of Rasputin - Our attempts to ease the fate of Dmitry Pavlovich.

22. Verdun operation. The year 1915, lost by Germany for the offensive against the French and British armies, was a year of German successes on the Russian and secondary fronts. The severe crisis that Germany had to endure in 1916 shows that these successes not only did not bring Germany closer to final triumph, but were significant stages in the process of her losing the war.

Repelling a German attack near Mart Ommon

In 1916, Falkenhayn had no more excuses to delay active action on the Anglo-French front. However, an analysis of the free forces and means at his disposal showed that a major breakthrough on the French front with the aim of capturing Paris and solving the war with a continuous onslaught was beyond Germany’s strength. For the German offensive in the west, it was necessary to set a limited goal. This goal, after some hesitation towards Belfort, was chosen to capture the right bank of the river. Meuse in the area of ​​the Verdun fortress, which would shorten and strengthen the line of the German front and would improve and ensure communications between the German armies and their homeland, would deprive the French of their starting positions for the most dangerous breakthrough of the German front - from Verdun down the Meuse, would deal a heavy moral blow to the French . It could be expected that the French would hastily concentrate all their forces on the defense of Verdun, large forces would be drawn into the battle, the initiative would remain with the Germans, who would warn the French here in the deployment of artillery and technical means; The French will use up their existing human and material reserves at Verdun, and the battle at Verdun will be a lightning rod for other parts of the German western front, since the enemy will be powerless to make a major breakthrough against them (see. scheme No. 6).

Scheme No. 6. Western Front

The operation was to lead to a frontal attack on the strongest section of the world's strongest fortress, Verdun. If the basis for the decision of the German High Command - to choose a battlefield for a long fight with the French in the area where the best enemy long-term fortifications were located - was a skepticism about the value of long-term fortification, then, on the other hand, the German High Command nevertheless underestimated the power of modern artillery fire and tried narrow the offensive front to the limits possible; the infantry had to attack on the minimum front in order to receive maximum support from the artillery. Apart from the auxiliary attack, directed from the west, from Etienne, along the Vevre plain, the area of ​​the main attack was limited to an 8-10-kilometer front, from the river. Meuse approximately to the Azan - Orne - Danlou road. Approximately along this road, the heights of the right bank of the Meuse (Cates Lorraines) dropped steeply; to the west began the plain of Vevre.

Promotion of a French soldier as an officer

Falkenhayn's choice of such a narrow front of attack was based on a pessimistic view of the success of the offensive and the expectation of fierce resistance from the French on the strongest and most important sector of their front. There was also an opposite view (Bauer), which was based on the rapid successes that until now the Germans had always achieved in the area of ​​​​enemy fortresses; if it was possible to penetrate Russian troops on a wider front and achieve quick results against Russian fortifications, then the same methods should have been applied to Verdun, and an attack should have been immediately organized so that this fortress could be captured within one or two weeks. To this end, the attack from the north had to not be limited to the right bank of the Meuse, but to develop it simultaneously at a front of 22 kilometers on both banks of the Meuse. These considerations did not immediately prevail, which determined the course of events.

Quite unexpectedly, both for the German and French commands, the German attack began to develop at a frantic pace. In the afternoon of February 21, the shelling of the French positions began, which turned out to be so effective that the next day the German infantry began to move forward. By February 25, the Germans not only overcame the 8-kilometer-deep zone on which the French had built fortifications in front of the fort belt during 18 months of war, but also captured the most important and strongest northern fort of Verdun, Douommont. The fortified villages held out longer than the forts: the village of Douommont was taken only on May 2, and the village of Vaux on May 6.

The French transport reinforcements to Verdun

The slowdown in the German offensive is explained mainly by the fact that the French deployed on the left bank of the river. The Meuse had very strong artillery and brutally shelled the area of ​​the German offensive from the flank and rear. The narrowness of the front of the attack made itself felt - the quickly advancing Germans were overwhelmed.

To be able to continue the operation, the Germans had to extend the attack to the left bank of the Meuse, now heavily occupied by French infantry and artillery. This auxiliary operation required 5 weeks of time (March 6 - April 9) to advance 6 kilometers to the villages. Avokur - height Mortom - sat down. Cumières and protect the main attack from flanking.

This time was enough for the French to concentrate the necessary forces and means. The delay in the German offensive weakened him. As the German infantry advanced, it found itself in a field of craters dug by German and French shells: the troops at the front communicated with the rear along communication passages that stretched for many kilometers. In April and May, the French launched vigorous counterattacks with fresh forces. The exhausted German offensive gave them some more successes in June (the capture of Fort Vaux and part of the village of Fleury), but the German successes stopped there. The Russian front, and then the Battle of the Somme, drew upon free forces and resources. Nevertheless, with insufficient forces, the Germans continued to mark time at Verdun until the declaration of war by Romania (August 27, 1916), when operational leadership passed from Falkenhayn into the hands of Ludendorff; the latter immediately stopped the offensive and ordered the German infantry to be gradually withdrawn from the most advanced and difficult to defend positions. The latter was not carried out consistently enough, which allowed the French, who launched a counterattack, to achieve a number of partial successes. On October 24, the French recaptured the remains of Fort Douommont. On November 1, the Germans themselves abandoned Fort Vaux. On December 15, the French, with a general attack, inflicted a strong defeat on the Germans, who retreated to the front of the heights north of Luvemont - Bezonvaux.

In the French trenches. Old man's advice

Thus, the struggle for Verdun, which cost both sides a quarter of a million soldiers and absorbed large amounts of material resources, began with a major success for the Germans, ended with a high morale of the French and did not produce any tangible results. Its progress shows that in 1915 the Germans could easily capture this pillar of the French defense. This task was feasible in 1916, but an overly cautious and pessimistic approach to its solution negated the decisive superiority of the Germans in the first weeks of the fight for Verdun.

23. Battle of the Somme. According to Joffre, the defense of Verdun was to be carried out exclusively by the French. The forces of the British troops, reinforced by the French army of General Foch, were to systematically carry out the plan for a major breakthrough of the German front on both banks of the Somme River, which represented that share of the active actions of the Anglo-French that was promised to Russia for 1916.

Western Front. View of the battlefield underground

Circumstances were extremely favorable to the Entente. Already a month before the start of the offensive, the German headquarters clearly defined the front of the upcoming offensive, and yet the German armies located here did not receive any support. Falkenhayn did not value the English troops highly and was not afraid of them, and in order to weaken the French, he directed all his attention to ensuring that the fight to attrition, which began at Verdun, would draw in as much of the French forces and assets as possible. In addition, the offensive of the Russian southwestern front - the Russian breakthrough at Lutsk and south of the Dniester - was growing into a formidable danger and required sending German divisions and artillery from the western front to the Kovel direction.

On June 22, 1916, shelling of the breakthrough site planned on the 45-kilometer front began and continued for 10 days. On the tenth day, July 1, the assault began. The main role was to be played by the English troops, attacking on both banks of the river. Ankre, but the British attack was completely unsuccessful, and only on their right wing, next to the French, did the British capture several advanced trenches. But the French succeeded on both banks of the river. Somme, mainly along the southern bank, break through at a front of 10 kilometers and advance 2–3 kilometers. The next day, the French managed to deepen their breakthrough to 6–8 kilometers on the southern bank of the Somme. French flanking fire from the southern bank of the Somme forced the Germans to withdraw ahead of the French on July 5 and on the northern bank to the Morena-Clery front. Gradually, the British flank adjacent to the French front began to move forward.

British attack on Thieval

The Somme operation, initially conceived as a decisive blow, quickly began to degenerate into a gradual erosion of the German front. The struggle to attrition here took place under conditions that were especially favorable for the Entente. Double superiority in artillery, superiority in air force, superiority in quickly replacing tired infantry with fresh units - all this made it possible to inflict heavy losses on the Germans and push the front line forward.

The entire burden of the struggle fell on the shoulders of the German infantry, which tenaciously defended every inch of land. The Germans managed to repel attempts by large masses of the Anglo-French to break through, but given the superiority of the latter's equipment, the German infantry was powerless to delay their gradual advance. The town of Combles was defended by the Germans for over a month, and the Germans held out for 13 days, when the enemy ring around Combles was almost completely closed; For 24 hours straight the French strangled Comble with gas shells. On September 25, the ruins of this village were finally taken. The British had to spend even more time taking possession of the Thieval group of trenches. The British, less constrained than the French by replenishing losses, continued to press energetically in the fall. However, after the Verdun attack ceased by October, the Germans were able to significantly strengthen their artillery. The crisis that developed on the Romanian front forced the Entente to drag out the fight on the Somme until mid-November, although in the last month and a half the Anglo-French had already become noticeably exhausted.

Anglo-Indian machine gun team on the French front

In general, the fighting on the Somme consumed about half a million soldiers on each side; tangible results were quite modest - the German front was besieged by 5–15 kilometers in a 50-kilometer area. The battle dragged on for 4 1/2 months, but after a month and a half (August 18), the Anglo-French completely abandoned their broad plans and moved from the idea of ​​​​a breakthrough to gouging on a large scale. The idea of ​​ending the war with the defeat of the Germans in 1916, which was the basis of this operation, failed; However, the unsuccessful defensive tactics of the Germans, expressed in defending every inch of land, regardless of losses, and the untimely concentration of sufficient forces in the attacked area brought the Entente a certain moral success and significant trophies.

24. Fight on the Russian front. The calculations of the German command that after the failures of 1915 the Russian army would be doomed to inaction in 1916 did not come true. Allied supply assistance, late for the 1915 campaign, began to show up in 1916, although on a relatively modest scale. Much more important for the rise of the army were the efforts of Russian industry, which, a year and a half after the start of the war, managed to begin to rebuild itself in accordance with the demands of the war. At the same time, however, the general interests of the national economy were severely violated. The balance between city and countryside was lost; villages were devastated by continuous mobilizations and the departure of men to the cities, where work for the war industry exempted them from conscription. The population of large urban centers grew by 50–100%, while agriculture was left without workers. The crisis was somewhat mitigated by millions of Austrian prisoners.

Cavalry General A. A. Brusilov

General Alekseev, having assumed the post of chief of staff of the tsar and taking control into his own hands, sought to go on the offensive as quickly as possible. Already in September 1915, aimless, weak attacks were carried out in various parts of the front by troops that had not yet recovered from the retreat. From December 27, 1915 to January 7, 1916, the Russian southwestern front general. Ivanov led major attacks on the front of the 7th Army, General. Shcherbachev and the 9th Army General. Lechitsky. This blow was conceived to help the Serbs at a time when the crisis on the Serbian front had not yet been resolved, but was carried out three weeks after the final conquest of Serbia. The aimlessness of these attacks was fully consistent with their complete ineffectiveness. Russian losses were estimated at 45 thousand killed and wounded; entire corps, which were in the open field for two weeks in winter against the Austrian fortifications, suffered severely. The deprivations of the Russian troops were rewarded with the dismissal of the general. Ivanov and the appointment in his place as Commander-in-Chief of the Southwestern Front, General. Brusilova. The offensive was prepared in the most outrageous way; Thus, the 11th Army was initially provided with not even thousands, but only hundreds of heavy shells to break through the fortified front, and the general. Ivanov was guided by the scale of shell consumption during our summer retreat of 1915, during a shell famine; the troops were brought to the attack points already in an exhausted state; the attack was carried out from a distance of several miles, and the soldiers walked at a quiet pace, falling knee-deep into the soggy black earth plow.

Before the attack

At the heart of this senseless offensive was the desire to maintain our prestige, undermined by the events of 1915 on the Russian and Serbian fronts. The result was the opposite, to our great benefit: having brilliantly repulsed our offensive, the Austrian high command received the illusion of the invulnerability of the Austrian front for the Russian army and transferred the best infantry units and many heavy batteries from the Russian front to Tyrol, where an offensive against the Italians was being prepared. Thus, the latest Russian failures were the best preparation for the summer breakthroughs near Lutsk and Bukovina - the so-called Brusilov offensive.

The offensive launched by the western and northwestern fronts in March 1916 turned out to be more disastrous. At a meeting of representatives of the Allied powers in Chantilly, chaired by Joffre, it was decided to launch a general offensive no later than March. However, the Anglo-French, forced to expend forces on the defense of Verdun, received an excuse to postpone their transition to the offensive for 3 months, until July 1. The Italians indicated their loyalty to the agreement with weak, ineffective attacks on March 13–19 (fifth battle of the Isonzo River). Only the Russians took the implementation of the all-Allied plan, adopted contrary to the opinion of the Russian command (General Alekseev sought to shift the center of gravity of the active actions of the Anglo-French to the Balkans), seriously, although due to the great trials that befell the Russian troops in 1915 and the later onset of spring , the early opening of the campaign on the Russian front was disadvantageous for us. The inaction of the British and French due to the German offensive on Verdun not only did not force the Russian command to abandon the offensive, but, on the contrary, pushed it to attack it as soon as possible in order to help the French, whose affairs near Verdun in early March were going very badly. In order not to be delayed by the mud, we tried to launch attacks before the end of winter.

Distribution of gifts at the forefront.

Fears for the capitals forced the Russian command to group reserves predominantly (13 out of 16 corps) north of Polesie, on the routes to Petrograd and Moscow. On the northern and western fronts, Russian troops were most densely located. Naturally, they were given the task of going on the offensive. The Northern Front decided to strike from the Jacobstadt fortified area, where we had an extensive bridgehead position on the left bank of the Dvina, in the direction of Ponevezh. However, gen. Kuropatkin, the commander-in-chief of the front, little capable of energetic active actions, did not develop the offensive beyond the limits of a strong demonstration. The Western Front, instead of choosing the most advantageous area for a strike in the name of interaction with the northern front, decided to attack with its right wing, bordering the northern front, from the area of ​​Lake Naroch to Vilkomir. But since the junction between the fronts lay in a roadless swampy area, this direction made the successful development of active operations extremely difficult. The group that attacked here was Gen. Balueva (V Arm., II Siberian and XXXVI Arm. Corps) had minor successes between March 18–28: on a front of about 6 kilometers, the enemy was pushed back 2–3 kilometers. The attack was carried out, according to the French model, on a narrow front, in significant masses; The Germans easily caught the advancing units under crossfire and, with suitable reinforcements, easily fed the short attacked area. A thaw and thaw began, rivers opened up, fields and roads turned into a solid swamp, and the offensive was drowned in mud. Two weeks later, the Germans counterattacked us and threw us back to our original position.

Distribution of letters and newspapers at the forefront

The losses, which reached 50% in some parts, did not in themselves represent a formidable phenomenon. What was worse was that the Germans, having won a number of successes in offensive operations in the previous year, now, on their relatively weak western front, completely repulsed a frivolously prepared, ill-timed, but major offensive operation of Russian troops. In the already morally shaken troops, the positions occupied by the German infantry began to be regarded as impregnable. Rest, education, and proper training can overcome such prejudice among soldiers and junior officers. But the highest command staff, headed by General. Evert, commander-in-chief of the western front.

Under these conditions, the spring failure of 1916 doomed the bulk of the Russian troops to powerlessness throughout the year. To the north of Polesie we had double superiority in forces - 1220 thousand against 620 thousand, and to the south of Polesie insignificant - 512 thousand against 441 thousand (according to data by February 1, 1916), and with these groupings of forces active actions, and very energetic ones, were developed by us only to the south of Polesie, and the northern and western front played only the role of a reservoir from which forces were drawn to reinforce the southwestern front. The Western Front made only two breakthrough attempts, both in the area north of the Aleksandrovskaya railway. roads to the front occupied by the German-Austrian troops of Woyrsch. The first attack, successfully launched on June 13 with a surprise attack by the grenadier corps, cost him 8,000 people, and the second, in which the entire 4th Army took part and which dragged on for 7 days, July 2–8, caused losses of 80 thousand people . The enemy brought all his forces into the battle to the last man; There was a little more unity and energy on our part - and instead of a painful failure, great success was possible. This offensive coincided with the beginning of the Battle of the Somme and was intended to reaffirm solidarity between the Allies. Its consequence was the cessation of the German counterattack near Lutsk, since it was necessary to send part of the reserves from Kovel to support the weakening units of the Voirsha front, north of Baranovichi (Skrobovo).

Near Przemysl. Funnel from the Austrian "suitcase"

If such was the modest fate that befell the plans of our high command in the main attack, then a completely unexpected success fell on the side of the secondary southwestern front, which was supposed to demonstrate south of Polesie. The beginning of Brusilov's demonstration was accelerated by the crisis that was caused by the Austrian offensive from the Tyrol on the flank and rear of the Italian main forces on the river. Isonzo. The Austrian offensive began on May 15 and was accompanied by major successes (40 thousand prisoners, 300 guns in the first three weeks). The Italian government turned to the Russians with the most persistent requests for help. On June 5, the Russian offensive began, and already on the fourth day of the offensive, the Austrians were forced to begin transferring divisions from the Tyrol to Galicia. On June 17, the Austrian command, in view of the terrible turn that events on the Russian front took, was forced to liquidate an offensive that was so dangerous for the Italians. Gradually, all the best Austrian units migrated back from the Italian front to the Russian, which allowed even the Italians to achieve some success in the “sixth” battle on the Isonzo (August 6–12) - to capture the bridgehead at Hertz; this success, right up to the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian army, represents almost the only, albeit modest, “victory” of the Italians.

"Got the Germans"

The Russian southwestern front had almost equal enemy forces against it; but since during the Serbian campaign major misunderstandings occurred between the Austrian and German commands, the German command pulled the German troops located there from the Austrian front; By the time of the Russian attack, only two German divisions remained among the Austrians. Since the Russians had seized the initiative, they could concentrate larger forces at the attack points. Gene. Brusilov decided to organize an offensive in sectors of all four armies of his front; but while the central armies - the 11th (Sakharov), 7th (Shcherbachev) each attacked with only one corps, the left-flank - Lechitsky's 9th Army - attacked with two corps, and the right-flank - Kaledin's 8th Army, which received the largest reinforcements, attacked with 4 corps. Here, on the right wing of the attack, Gillenschmidt's cavalry corps was assembled for a raid behind enemy lines.

On June 4, artillery preparation began, which had to be carried out on a very modest scale. The 8th Army, which delivered the main blow and was better equipped than the others, had only 506 field guns and 74 heavy ones. The entire southwestern front had only 155 heavy troops. guns, i.e. 12 times less than the Anglo-French during their offensive in the fall of 1915 in Artois and Champagne, with a double length of attacked areas of enemy fortifications. The Austrian front was strengthened very thoroughly. On June 5 the attack began. After stubborn fighting, the attacks of the 7th and 11th armies, as well as Gillenschmidt, were repulsed. But in the 8th and 9th armies, Russian successes received a development that was completely unexpected for both sides (see. scheme No. 7).

Scheme No. 7. South-West offensive. front in the summer of 1916

The Lutsk area was defended by the Austrian 4th Army under the command of the incompetent Archduke Joseph Ferdinand. Broken through on a wide front, the army completely lost all the divisions located on the attacked front during the first day, and during June 6 and 7, Archduke Joseph Ferdinand allowed his reserves to be completely destroyed. Lutsk was covered by strong fortifications, but the remnants of the entire army fled there in complete disorder; It was not possible to establish any order among them. On the evening of June 7, the Russians took Lutsk. There was no enemy in front of our 8th Army - the 1st Austrian Army was destroyed and scattered.

The disappearance of an army of 200 thousand (according to Falkenhain - 300 thousand) came as a grave surprise to the German command. A gaping hole appeared between the Austrian and German fronts. If gen. Brusilov now directed his efforts to develop success along the line of least resistance, energetically enveloping the remaining Austrian armies from the north, then, very likely, within the next two weeks all Austrian troops in Galicia would have been exterminated. Having set up a barrier in the Kovel direction, it was necessary to rush to Lvov and further south. However, gen. Brusilov, despite his unprecedented success, sought to remain in the background compared to the western front, which, according to the initial thought of Headquarters, was supposed to lead the main attack. Gene. Brusilov not only did not ask for reinforcements, which were now heading towards him from all sides, but refused them; his main desire was to force an attack on the western front, which was morally incapable of a major offensive, and instead of concentrating his attention to the left, on defeating the Austrians, he directed all his efforts to the right, towards the Kovel direction. If successful in the latter, Brusilov would threaten the flank and rear of the Germans facing the western front and force them to retreat; but, undoubtedly, Brusilov was dominated by the idea that now he would have to pay for his victory over the Austrians, as in the fall of 1915, by dealing with German reserves that would approach from Kovel, and he was preparing to meet their blow.

The transfer of our efforts to the Kovel direction was a salvation for the enemy. The swampy and wooded southern outskirts of Polesie did not represent a convenient area for the development of active operations of Russian troops; Styr and Stokhod formed convenient lines at which the Germans could gather reserves hastily brought from France and Lithuania. The Pripyat River quite reliably covered the German front from the development of a Russian breakthrough.

All German efforts were aimed at organizing a counterattack against our 8th Army as quickly as possible. From June 16 to July 5, the front formed here by general. Linsingen, from the army groups of Marwitz, Falkenhain, and Bernhardi concentrated here, tried to overthrow the 8th Russian Army with a concentric attack from the southwest, northwest and north. But the Russians withstood this onslaught in stubborn battles and launched energetic counterattacks. The desperate situation of the Woyrsch front, attacked north of Baranovichi by the Russian 4th Army (western front), forced Linsingen to send a brigade of the X Corps to its aid. The 3rd Russian Army broke through the German front south of Polesie, on lower Styr, and in the battles of June 4–9 forced the Germans to withdraw with heavy losses beyond Stokhod.

German forces, quite significant, had to be brought into battle by Linsingen at different times and, despite extreme efforts, could not achieve success; from June 5, Linsingen thought only about defense, which he later succeeded in thanks to the ever-new influx of forces.

While events were developing like this on Brusilov's right wing, attracting attention and reinforcements from both sides, the Russian 9th Army systematically developed its successes. The Austrian army of Pflanzer-Baltin, which opposed Lechitsky, had its right flank adjacent to the northwestern ledge of Romanian territory. Lechitsky's initial successes were modest - he managed to capture three lines of trenches in some sectors of the enemy front, where for two days he repelled Austrian counterattacks; Only on the fifth day of the battle (June 10) was a significant breakthrough along the right bank of the Dniester possible. The Austrian army broke away from the Romanian border, and the flank of the Austrian front hung in the air. Brilliant prospects opened up for our 9th Army - in a stubborn battle, the enemy was defeated, and since the fight near Lutsk attracted all the reinforcements transferred by the enemy for a long time, a free field of action opened up before the 9th Army. Subsequently, it was pointed out that if our 9th Army had moved concentratedly in a northwestern direction between the Dniester and the Prut, bypassing the surviving part of the Austrian front from the south, enormous results could have been achieved. But centrifugal forces took over on the southwestern front: instead of embracing the entire Austrian front on the right with the 8th armies, on the left with the 9th armies, Brusilov moved the 8th army in a divergent direction to Kovel, and the 9th The army was allowed to spread throughout the entire space between the Romanian border, the Carpathians and the Dniester. The capture of large cities (Chernivtsi) and space, huge trophies, hundreds of thousands of prisoners resulted from such use of the success of the 9th Army, but a major operation - to destroy the entire Austrian front - did not take place. The crossing of the Prut by the XI and XII Corps and the capture of Chernivtsi on June 8 yielded a lot of trophies; strategically, the successes were much less than they could have been.

Capture of a German gun

Volunteer Margarita Kokovtseva among the wounded in the infirmary

In connection with the successes of the flank armies of the southwestern front, step by step the central armies of the front began to succumb, gradually catching up with them. Between July 10 and July 24, there was some break in the development of active operations: the German-Austrians decisively went on the defensive, and the Russians had greatly expended their forces and were waiting for reinforcements to arrive. In the first 35 days of energetic, victorious battles, the losses of the southwestern front reached a record figure of half a million soldiers; This calculation did not include large losses in July on the western (only 7 days of battle north of Baranovichi - 80 thousand) and northern (July 3–9 near Riga - 15 thousand) fronts. While making such sacrifices, the front command still sought to achieve secondary, rather than decisive, objectives. Our consolation was the fact that the enemy’s losses, thanks to hundreds of thousands of prisoners, were even greater than ours. On July 15, Romania's decision to enter the war was already known. It seemed extremely advantageous for us to wait with our offensive, so that in August, simultaneously with the Romanian armies, we could carry out a crushing onslaught on Austria. Undoubtedly, we could have already achieved the general collapse of Austria in 1916, which would probably have quickly affected the combat effectiveness of Germany. However, the ability to put points at the right time after achieving success requires high art. Gene. Alekseev decided to conduct an offensive on the Russian front regardless of the actions of the Romanians. On July 25, a new offensive of the southwestern front began, marked by incomparably less success. On July 28, the battle took place along the entire front of the southwestern front: on August 1–5, due to inconsistency and unpreparedness of the offensive, a break had to be taken. On August 8–10, the attack of the 3rd and 8th armies and the guard was repulsed with huge losses in the Kovel direction; the crossing of Stokhod was decidedly unsuccessful. Now there is a new break; The Russian army, bleeding to death, decided to wait for Romania to enter the war. On August 27, the latter officially began mobilization, and on August 31, the southwestern front made a new, already much declining, effort: in the center and on the right wing it turned out to be absolutely fruitless; With heavy losses, only the southernmost armies, the 7th and 9th, managed to advance somewhat. By September 3, the southwestern front was completely exhausted. An attempt to resume the offensive on September 30 - October 2 led to several scattered attacks and had to be eliminated due to united resistance to the further development of active actions on the part of commanders and troops. And starting from October, reserves to help Romania had to be drawn widely from all Russian fronts.

25. Entry of Romania into the war. If the summer campaign of 1915 had not been so difficult for the Russian army, Romania would probably have entered the war soon after Italy. At the end of the German-Austro-Bulgarian campaign against the Serbs at the end of November 1915, it could very easily have happened that Germany would present Romania with an ultimatum demand - to join the Central Powers, under the threat of occupation. However, by this point the Russians had assembled significant reserves (7th Army) behind Romanian lines; Germany's violation of Romania's neutrality would further exacerbate the world excitement caused by the violation of Belgium's neutrality; There were major tensions between Austria-Hungary and the German command. Therefore, the Central Powers decided to use the temporary presence of large forces in the Balkans only to exert strong diplomatic pressure on Romania in order to resume the export of Romanian grain and oil to the Central States. The Romanians made concessions; but this pressure greatly strengthened the position of the Bratianu Ministry, which was friendly to the Entente, which had further evidence of the impossibility of maintaining neutrality. Already on January 22, 1916, in case of a threat to Germany, Bratianu hurried to secure Russian help and turned to the general. Alekseev with a question - what kind of help from the Russian side can he count on in this case, to which he received the answer that the Russians are ready to continue their front to Northern Moldova. The transfer of German and Austrian troops from the Balkan Peninsula to France and Tyrol calmed Bratianu.

France showed direct interest in involving Romania in the war. During the last week of February, the German attacks that struck Verdun threatened to develop catastrophically, and the thought of Gen. Joffra immediately focused on diverting the attention of the German command to the east again. On the likelihood of a breakthrough of the German front by Russian armies, Gen. Joffre could not count firmly. But, undoubtedly, in the event of an extension of the Russian front by 600 kilometers of the Romanian border and the appearance of 250 thousand Romanian army, things could take a completely different turn. Starting from February 28, proposals have been pouring in on the Russian Headquarters - to take over the provision of Romania from the rear, for which purpose to deploy a 200,000-strong army in Dobruja; under such conditions, Romania, which does not at all want to fight with Bulgaria, agrees to launch an invasion of Transylvania. Gene. Alekseev, who considered himself obliged to keep the center of gravity of Russian forces north of Polesie, decisively rejected this combination. In the performance of Romania, which would have to be helped by our military reserves and reinforced all the time by our troops, he saw rather a minus than a plus for Russia's conduct of the war, and refused to buy help from Romania at the cost of allocating such large forces to the secondary theater of Dobruja.

The successes achieved near Lutsk and Bukovina, which showed off the power of the Russian troops in great splendor, the collapse of Austria-Hungary and the weakening of Germany, made it much easier for Romania to make the decision to enter the war. At the same time, due to the fact that events, against the will of Alekseev, shifted the center of gravity of the Russian offensive to the south of Polesie, the performance of Romania acquired much greater value for us, since it led to deep coverage of the Austrian front that we attacked. On the eve of the start of the offensive on the Somme, Joffre also now sought to give events the most decisive turn, and on June 28 he again turned to Alekseev with a request to come to an agreement with Romania. The Romanians now hoped that the threatening situation for the Central Powers would force Bulgaria to maintain neutrality, and decided to be satisfied with insurance from Dobruja in the amount of 2 infantry. and 1 Cossack Russian divisions. These forces, plus 150 thousand Romanian poorly organized third-line units on the Danube, were supposed to guard the rear of Romania. General Alekseev approached the issue of Bulgaria much more cautiously; at first he agreed to the joint offensive of the Thessaloniki Army of Sarail and the Romanians into Bulgaria, designed by Joffre, then, when the Romanians decisively refused active action against Bulgaria, and the strengthening of Sarail’s armies moved very slowly, Alekseev wanted to start separate negotiations with Bulgaria, but at the insistence of Joffre from 5 August had to refuse them too.

Negotiations with Romania continued; Bratianu, apparently, wanted to delay entry into the war until the harvest, but according to the categorical demand of England, he had to agree to act no later than August 27. On August 17, a military convention was signed in Bucharest. On August 27, a declaration of war and mobilization followed, which had only an additional character, since the Romanian army was gradually mobilized during the war. The very next day after the declaration of war, which took the Central Powers by surprise, the Romanian army invaded Transylvania (see. scheme No. 8).

Scheme No. 8. Romanian Front in 1916

General Alekseev, who carefully rejected any initiative to involve Romania in the war, saw in the Romanian offensive not the possibility of a decisive embrace of the entire Austro-German front, but an extension of the front of enemy positions by 600 versts, which was supposed to significantly relieve the Russian front and allow action to be taken on it more decisive character. In this assessment, he was deeply mistaken: the impulse of the southwestern front was already exhausted, it was necessary to start a new operation, and not strain one’s strength by trying to revive an already completed offensive; the Russian front was not only not supported by Romania, but was weakened by the need to stretch an extra 400 kilometers to the Danube; it was necessary to allocate a total of 10 army and three cavalry corps to help Romania. If at least a third of these forces had been sent to Romania in time, the latter’s performance could have received the most decisive significance; but Russian troops took a serious part only in eliminating the disaster.

The Germans needed a month to concentrate an army in Transylvania to repel the Romanian invasion. But in Northern Bulgaria, within a week they had assembled Mackensen’s army from Bulgarian, Turkish and small German forces, which went on the offensive. The demonstration on Tatar-Bazardzhik (Dobrik) attracted the attention of Zayonchkovsky’s 47th Russian Corps, which was composed of very weak units, and Mackensen’s main forces attacked the bridgeheads at Turtukai on September 6, at Silistria on September 9, and on September 18 forced the withdrawal of Zayonchkovsky’s corps. The Romanians stood with their rear against the Bulgarians; their best units were advancing into Transylvania, and on the Danube there were militia troops, poorly supplied; Entire divisions surrendered in bridgehead positions on the Danube. This failure forced the Romanians to pull 4 divisions from the armies advancing into Transylvania to the Danube front. Alekseev, for his part, considered it possible to strengthen Zayonchkovsky with only one (115th) third division.

Between September 26 and October 10, the 9th German Army of Falkenhayn, who was replaced as Chief of the General Staff by Hindenburg and Ludendorff, eliminated all Romanian successes in Transylvania; The Romanians along the entire front were driven back to the Carpathian passes. The Russian 9th Army continued its slow advance on its front; The Russian command did not at all take advantage of the opportunities that opened up for it to bypass the part of the Carpathian ridge occupied by the Austrians through Moldova.

These failures were followed by a pogrom in Dobruja of Zajonchkovsky's Danube Army, formed from the Russian 47th Corps and weak Romanian divisions. On October 19, having received one German division as reinforcement, Mackensen went on the offensive; by October 23, Mackensen captured the Chernovody-Constanza line and began to fortify north of it. The Danube Russian-Romanian Army was gathering in northern Dobruja.

These unfortunate events, the continued concentration of German and Austrian forces, the requests of Joffre, the insistence of the Romanians, and finally the unsuccessful attempt of the latter to cross the Danube in Mackensen’s rear in order to relieve the latter’s pressure in Dobruja, all this finally forced them to send to Dobruja to support those who were there 3 infantry and 1 cavalry 5 more infantry divisions. and 1 cavalry divisions. But the arrival of these reinforcements could only take place at the end of November. They were appointed for Dobruja. At the same time, in order to allow the Romanians to more reliably cover the most dangerous direction of the German attack - Kronstadt - Brailov, the 9th Army was ordered to stretch to the left and take over the defense of Northern Moldavia with 2 corps; On October 10, instructions were given; only on November 3 did the arrival of Russian troops begin.

Agreeing to these sacrifices, Gen. In October, Alekseev presented to the allies an energetic counter-demand to significantly strengthen the Sarail army and begin active operations in the Balkans. On October 20, the French agreed to send another one and a half divisions to Thessaloniki. The Chief of the Italian General Staff, General Cadorna, initially surrendered on November 9 to the energetic exhortations of the Allies, but a week later he resolutely refused to increase the expenditure of Italian army forces in the Balkans. Under these conditions, gene. Sarail, with an army of 140 thousand bayonets, managed, thanks to the energy of the Serbian units, to inflict a significant defeat on the Bulgarians and occupy the Monastery on November 18; However, the difficulties presented by the Macedonian theater in winter, the paucity of communications and lack of forces did not allow the Allies to develop this success.

Thus, already in October, all the dangers arising for Austria-Hungary from Romania’s entry into the war were eliminated by the successes of Falkenhayn and Mackensen. However, the gradual lull established on other fronts, the apparent reluctance with which the Russians sent reinforcements to Romania, and the obvious exhaustion of the Romanian troops put before Ludendorff the positive task of inflicting a decisive blow on Romania and seizing its territory to use its rich resources. At the beginning of November, thanks to energetic efforts, sufficient forces were assembled for the invasion of Romania.

A Russian soldier quenches the thirst of a wounded Austrian

With the loss of most of Dobruja, Wallachia represented a long tongue invading between Hungary and Bulgaria, conditionally secured from the north by the Carpathians, from the south by the Danube. Gene. Alekseev was especially afraid that the Germans would cut off this tongue at the base; our Danube Army (General Sakharov) and partly the left wing of the 9th Army could counteract such an operation, which threatened the complete encirclement of all Romanian troops. But Ludendorff outlined an operation that did not promise such brilliant results, but was directed along the line of least resistance. The blow was planned against the most advanced, western tip of Wallachia, where it was most difficult for the Romanians to gather the necessary forces to repel. On November 11, an invasion of units of Falkenhayn's army began through the Vulcan Pass, which soon spread to the entire western section of the Carpathians from Orsova to Rotenturm. The Romanians managed to delay the Germans on the Olta River within a week (November 21–27). But Mackensen’s shot began to develop towards Falkenhayn. The latter, leaving the 3rd Bulgarian army in Dobruja, assembled a new “Danube” army on the Danube near Sistov, 220 kilometers to the west, and on November 23, crossing to the left bank, began an attack on Bucharest; on December 1–3, Russian-Romanian troops launched a vigorous counterattack. The Danube Army was in danger of complete defeat. The approaching Turkish division allowed Mackensen to hold out until Falkenhain's left wing approached. On December 1, the German offensive resumed, and on the night of December 6, Bucharest was occupied. The capital of Romania was provided with completely outdated and weak long-term fortifications; due to the complete breakdown of the Romanian army, it was left without a fight.

Transporting troops in vehicles to positions

In mid-November, under pressure from allies who were extremely dissatisfied with the gene. Alekseev, the latter went to Crimea to improve his really bad health, temporarily transferring his position to the general. Gurko. At the end of November, Poincaré's extremely urgent proposals for direct assistance to Romania followed. From November 28, when the inevitability of a catastrophe on the Romanian front had already become clear, the frantic dispatch of reinforcements and, first of all, cavalry began, since the Romanian railways worked disgustingly, and moving in marching order gave the fastest results.

On November 30, it was decided to concentrate the new 4th Army of General on the Romanian front. Ragosa, from 3 Armenian. and 1 cavalry buildings. On December 7, after the loss of Bucharest, a new southern front was formed, which was controlled under the nominal leadership of the Romanian king, General. Sakharov. Russian reinforcements began to gather only in the second half of December. Meanwhile, by December 16, the Romanian army had decreased to 70 thousand people; Of the 23 Romanian divisions that had completely lost their combat capability, it turned out to be possible to leave only 6 at the front; the rest were sent to the rear for reorganization.

Russian troops, who were in the gathering period, defended Romanian territory step by step. On December 18, Denikin’s detachment was driven out of Buzeo; In order to advance 80 kilometers and capture Focsani (January 8), the Germans had to spend 25 days and bring in the 3rd Bulgarian Army from Dobrudja for help. The Russian “Danube” (renamed the 6th) army had earlier been pulled out from Dobrudzha to protect the river. Sereta. At the beginning of January, the Russian armies stood firmly on Seret; The German offensive stopped, Moldavia was saved, Wallachia with its oil fields, completely destroyed by the British, was occupied by the Germans.

26. Actions in Turkey. In 1915, when an extreme effort was required to overcome the forces in the main theaters, the British tried to take Mesopotamia and Iran, trying to seize the Mosul oil into their hands. The English General Townshend, advancing up the Tigris, the waterway of which was the only artery of his supply, approached Baghdad on November 23, 1915, but here he suffered a significant setback and retreated to his nearest warehouses on the Tigris at Kut-El-Amara, where he was surrounded by the Turks under the leadership of the famous German general (author of the work “The Armed People”), the old man von der Goltz.

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