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I. Hoffman

Hoffman Irving(Goffman Erving, 1922–1982) - American sociologist and social psychologist, professor at the University of Chicago, author of the monographs “Presentation of self in everyday life”, 1956 (Russian translation “Presentation of self to others in everyday life” / Translated from English by A. D. Kovaleva. M.: Kanon-Press-C; Kuchkovo Pole, 2000), "Asylums", 1961, "Encounters", 1961, "Interaction rituals", 1967, "Behavior in public places", 1963, "Forms of talk", 1981, etc.

The published translation of Chapter 2 of the monograph “Frame Analysis” was made by O.A. Oberemko and E.G. Avjyan.

The editors express gratitude to the publishing house of the Public Opinion Foundation for their kind permission to publish a section of the Russian translation of the monograph that is being prepared for publication.

Primary frame systems

When a person recognizes a particular event in our Western society, in all cases he invests in his perception one or more frame systems or interpretation schemes, which can be called primary. Indeed, frames are present in all perception. I speak specifically of primary frames because a person's application of a schema or perspective does not depend on or go back to any other underlying or "real" interpretation; surely the primary frame system is precisely what makes sense of features of the scene that would otherwise make no sense.

Primary interpretive schemes vary in degree of organization. Some of them represent a well-developed system of institutions, postulates and rules, others - the majority of them - do not, at first glance, have a clearly defined form and set only the most general understanding, a certain approach, and perspective. However, regardless of the degree of its structural design, the primary system of frames allows one to localize, perceive, determine an almost infinite number of individual events and assign names to them. It seems that a person is not aware of the internal structure of frames and, if asked, is unlikely to be able to describe it with more or less completeness, which does not prevent him from using frames without any restrictions.

In the everyday life of our society, if not carried out quite consistently, the difference between two broad classes of primary frame systems - let's call them natural and social - is quite clearly felt. Natural frame systems define events as directionless, purposeless, inanimate, uncontrollable—“purely physical.” It is generally accepted that uncontrollable events occur entirely, from beginning to end, due to "natural" factors, that no volition, causally or intentionally, interferes with their natural course, and that there is no one who constantly directs them towards their goal. It is impossible to imagine success or failure in relation to such events; there is no place for either negative or positive sanctions. Determinism and predestination reign here. There is some understanding that events perceived within one such frame can be reduced to other events perceived within a more "fundamental" frame system, and some generally accepted concepts, such as conservation of energy or singularity, are shared by all. Elegant versions of natural frame systems can naturally be found in the physical and biological sciences 1 . A simple example would be a weather report.

Social frames, on the contrary, provide a background understanding of events in which will, goal-setting and rationality are involved - living activity, the embodiment of which is a person. Such an active force does not have the inexorability of natural law; it can be negotiated with, it can be appeased, intimidated, it can be resisted. What she does can be called "purposeful doing." The doing itself subjects the doer to certain “standards”, a social assessment of the action based on honesty, efficiency, frugality, caution, elegance, tact, taste, etc. Constant management of the consequences of the activity is maintained, that is, continuous corrective control, especially obvious in those cases when action is unexpectedly blocked or encounters distorting influences and when considerable effort is required to compensate for them. Motives and intentions are taken into account, which helps determine which of the many social frames is applicable to understanding events. An example of “purposeful doing” is, again, a weather report. Here we are dealing with deeds, not just events. (Within the social world we make obvious fundamental distinctions, for example, between human purpose and the purposefulness of animal behavior, but we will discuss this below.) We use the same term "causality" to refer to both the blind forces of nature and the consequences deliberate actions of a person, considering the former as an endless chain of causes and consequences, and the latter as something that, one way or another, begins with a mental decision 2.

In our society it is generally accepted that a thinking being can adapt to natural processes and benefit from its determinism - for this it is only necessary to pay tribute to nature's design. Moreover, we guess that, except perhaps by pure fantasy and invention, any attempt at action will certainly encounter natural limitations, and that in order to achieve the goal it is necessary to use, and not ignore, this circumstance. Even when playing blindfold chess, players are forced to communicate moves to each other, and this exchange of information requires consideration of the physically adequate, purposeful use of the voice or hand to record moves. It follows that although natural events occur without the intervention of mental actions, they cannot be accomplished without interfering with the natural order. Therefore, any segment of socially oriented action can, to a certain extent, be analyzed on the basis of a natural scheme.

Purposeful actions can be understood in two ways. Firstly, and this applies to one degree or another to all actions, we are talking about explicit manipulations of objects of the natural world in accordance with specific possibilities and limitations; secondly, the subject of action can be included in special, specific and diverse worlds. Therefore, the game of chess contains two fundamentally different grounds: one completely belongs to the physical world, where the spatial movement of material figures occurs, the other relates directly to the social world of the opposing sides in the game, where a move can be made by voice, gesture, mail, and movement figures. In behavior at the chessboard, it is easy to distinguish between the movement of pieces and moves. It is easy to distinguish an unsuccessful move made due to an incorrect assessment of the situation on the board from a move made at random, that is, not meeting specific social standards for performing physical actions. Note, however, that players usually do not fixate their attention on the process of moving the pieces, unlike a person who, say, is just learning to use a prosthesis and is forced to consciously control physical movements. Only decisions about choosing the right move are truly problematic and important, and moving a piece when the decision has already been made is not a problem. On the other hand, there are such purposeful actions, for example, installing a sink, or sweeping the streets, in which continuous conscious effort is required to manipulate objects of the physical world, the action itself taking the form of a “practical procedure”, a specific task, a “purely utilitarian” action - it is an action whose purpose is not easily separated from the physical means used in its execution.

Social frame systems include rules, but these rules are different. For example, the movements of a chess player are regulated by the rules of the game, most of which are valid throughout the entire game; on the other hand, the physical manipulations of a chess player are regulated by another frame system responsible for body movements, and this system, if of course we can talk about one frame system, can manifest itself during the game only to one degree or another. Therefore, although the rules of chess and the rules of the road can be clearly and concisely stated, there are significant differences between them. Inherent in the game of chess is the players' understanding of the underlying goal, whereas the rules of the road do not dictate where we should go or why we should want to go there, but only set limits that we must abide by in moving towards the goal.

Consequently, we perceive events in terms of primary frames, and the type of frame used determines the way the event is described. Sunrise is a natural event, when we draw the curtain so as not to see the sunrise, a purposeful action is carried out. If the investigator is interested reason death, he expects an answer formulated in physiological terms when he asks how did this happen, he expects a dramatic social description, perhaps including a description of some intentionality of what happened 3.

Thus, the category of basic frame system is of paramount importance, and I would like to expand on it in more detail. A very annoying circumstance is that at any moment of his activity an individual uses several frame systems at once. ("We waited until the rain stopped and then continued playing again.")

Of course, sometimes a particular frame system turns out to be highly relevant to the description of the situation and provides a preliminary answer to the question “What is going on here?”

The answer is: an event or action described in some basic frame system. And only then can we engage in a detailed analysis of what is meant by “we”, “it”, “here”, and how the implied consensus is achieved.

Now the following must be said. When using axes x And y we establish the location of a point, or imagine the chessboard as a matrix that defines a move pattern, the concept of a basic frame system takes on a fairly clear form, although here there is also the problem of the dependence of a particular frame on our general understanding of frames of this type. But when we observe the events of everyday life, say, a greeting in a passing encounter or a buyer's gesture indicating a question about the price of a product, the definition of the underlying frame system, as noted above, is much more dubious.

It is here that representatives of the direction that I follow suffer a complete collapse. Talking about “everyday life”, or, as A. Schutz, about the “world of open practical realities” is like shooting blindly. The implication is that an observation contains either a great many frames or none at all. To advance the study of this problem, it is necessary to accept some conjecture, a working assumption that the acts of everyday life are open to understanding due to the underlying frame system (or several systems) that imbues them with meaning, and that penetrating this system is not a trivial and, I hope, impossible task .

Until now, I have limited myself to describing those primary frame systems that are used by an individual (of sound mind and solid memory) when determining the meaning of what is happening, of course, taking into account his interests. Of course, an individual can take a “false” position in his interpretations, that is, be mistaken, not know the true state of affairs, or misunderstand something. "False" interpretations will constantly be the focus of our attention.

Here I would like to point out the common belief that in our society people often achieve success by following certain frame systems. Elements and processes that a person considers significant when recognizing behavior, often really are identical to those that are manifested in behavior itself - why not, since social life itself is often organized in such a way that people can understand it and act in it.

Thus, we accept the correspondence or isomorphism of perception to the structure of the perceived, despite the fact that there are many principles of the organization of reality that could be reflected, but are not reflected in perception. Since many in our society find this statement useful, I join them 4.

Taken together, the primary frame systems of a particular social group constitute the central element of its culture, especially to the extent that patterns of human understanding are generated, associated with the basic patterns of perception, the relationships of these types and all the possible forces and agents that are only allowed by these interpretive forms ( designs). Let's imagine a frame of social group frames - a system of beliefs, "cosmology" - this is the area of ​​​​research that narrow specialists in the problems of modern society prefer to leave to others. It is interesting that in such a vast territory as the United States, one can only very conditionally talk about the similarity of cognitive resources. People who hold many of the same beliefs may differ, for example, in opinions about the existence of clairvoyance, the intervention of supernatural forces, etc. 5 (In all likelihood, belief in God and the holiness of his representatives in this world is the broadest basis for the divergence of opinions in our society regarding supernatural forces. Sociologists are usually deterred from discussing this topic by considerations of tact.)

For all its shortcomings, the concept of the primary frame system allows us to identify five fundamental problems and evaluate their role in our understanding of the world order.

1. Firstly, the “complex of the unusual”. When something happens or is created that casts doubt on the very view of the event, it seems that in order to understand what happened it is necessary to assume the existence of unknown natural forces or fundamentally new opportunities to influence the course of events - probably, in the latter case, the participation of unknown agents is assumed. This includes cases of imaginary landing of aliens from outer space and communication with them, miraculous healings, phenomena of chthonic monsters, levitation, horses with a penchant for mathematics, fortune telling, contacts with the dead, etc. It is implied that these miraculous events involve supernatural natural forces and abilities. This includes astrological influences, clairvoyance, extrasensory perception, etc. Believe it or not books are filled with detailed descriptions of “not yet solved” events. Sometimes scientists themselves create this kind of news, as they say, “drawing serious attention” to psychics, UFOs, the influence of the phases of the Moon 6, etc. Many can remember at least one event for which they themselves have not found a reasonable explanation. Although, as a rule, when an unusual event occurs, people expect that they will soon find a “simple”, “natural” explanation for it, which will solve the mystery and return what happened to the circle of ordinary phenomena, to the logic that they usually follow when explaining the connections between natural events and targeted actions. Of course, people resist when framing frames begin to change. An event that cannot be interpreted within the framework of traditional cosmology causes confusion, or at least concern, among the public. There are many examples from the mass press.

Alamasco, Colorado. An autopsy of the horse, which its owners believe was killed by the inhabitants of a flying saucer, showed that its abdominal cavity, cranium, and spinal column were empty.

A pathologist from Denver, who wished to remain anonymous, said the absence of organs in the abdominal cavity could not be explained.

Four members of the Denver chapter of the National Aerospace Research Committee were present at the autopsy, which took place Sunday evening at the ranch where the horse's hollow corpse was discovered. ...

Having opened the horse's cranial cavity, the pathologist found that it was empty. “There definitely must have been a lot of fluid in the skull,” the pathologist said...

The horse's owners expressed confidence that it was killed by aliens from a flying saucer. Several residents of the town of San Luis Wally, where, according to press reports, unidentified flying objects were seen at least eight times in the evenings a few days before the incident, agreed with this version... 7

The following conclusion is quite expected.

Moscow (Associated Press). According to Soviet newspapers, a Russian housewife who seven years ago caused a worldwide sensation by claiming that she “sees with her fingers” has been exposed as a fraud.

Five scientists who tested Roza Kuleshova concluded that she was peeping through a loose bandage.

Madame Kuleshova, a celebrity in her hometown, gained worldwide fame in 1963, when her alleged gift of finger sight was widely reported in Soviet newspapers.

The commission's report states that the confirmation of Madame Kuleshova's abilities in 1963 was a mistake. Then she was subjected to tests by Soviet scientists: they closed her eyes in different ways and directed rays of different colors onto her hands.

As the commission found, the light emitter produced a “characteristic clicking and buzzing sound,” which helped the subject determine in advance what color would be next 8 .

Let me repeat what was said above: in our society there is a widespread belief that all events without exception can be placed in some conventional system of meanings and controlled. We admit the unexplained, but we cannot accept the inexplicable.

2. Cosmological concepts, the most comprehensive of our concepts, underlie the most banal entertainment - all kinds of tricks that maintain the dominance and control of volitional action over what at first glance seems almost incredible. Everyone knows what juggling, tightrope walking, horse riding, surfing, freestyle, throwing knives, diving from great heights, stunt car driving, and now astronautics are - astronaut flights are the most daring of human acts, although they involve with faith in American technology. This also includes such exotic cases when a person learns to control his physiological processes, for example, regulate blood pressure, or suppress pain reactions. “Animal actions” play an important role in demonstrating tricks. Trained seals, tamed sea lions, dancing elephants, and hoop-jumping predators all exemplify the performance of ordinary goal-directed actions by extraordinary agents and thereby draw attention to the cosmological division that our society makes between human activity and animal behavior. Of similar importance are displays of trained animals performing utilitarian tasks, which are considered to be the exclusive prerogative of humans. For example, drivers freeze at the sight of a chimpanzee sitting behind the wheel of an open sports car while a trainer pretends to sleep in the back seat. One Australian farmer used a whole troop of monkeys to harvest his crops 9 . It can be added that the same interest underlies scientific research into goal-directed behavior, the subject of which lies precisely on the border separating animals and humans 10 .

It is worth noting that both the complex of the unusual (anomalies of the human body) and tricks are closely related to circus performance, as if the social function of circuses (and later maritime museums) really lies in clarifying for the public the structural organization and limits of action of primary frame systems 11 . Stunts are often used in nightclubs (which have now fallen in popularity) along with demonstrations of the abilities of trained dogs, acrobatic troupes, jugglers, magicians and people with unusual mental gifts. Whatever is shown to the audience, it is clear that the interest of the general public in topics related to cosmological insights is inherent in all people, and not just experimental scientists and analysts.

3. Now consider the events called "muffings", that is, cases when a body, or other object, which is supposed to be under constant control, unexpectedly leaves from under it, deviates from the trajectory, becomes uncontrollable and completely obeys natural forces - it is precisely subject to, and not simply determined by them, as a result the orderly flow of life is disrupted. This includes various kinds of “blunders”, “bummers” and - when the general logic of the conversation is still preserved to one degree or another - “nonsense”. (The extreme case of this kind is a case in which no one is to blame: an earthquake completely removes the blame from the person who spills a cup of tea.) The body here retains its ability to be a natural, causal force, rather than a social and purposeful one. Let's give an example.

Yesterday, five people were injured, two seriously, when an out-of-control car drove onto a crowded sidewalk on Haight-Ashbury Street. The driver of the car, 23-year-old Ed Hess, of 615 Cole Street, was taken to the police station in a state of near hysterics, where a report was filed for the seizure of an unregistered weapon and a powder similar to a hard drug. “I couldn’t slow down,” he shouted. “There were people all around - four, six, eight people - but, God knows, it’s not my fault.”

According to witnesses, the car was traveling westbound on Haight Street; passing the intersection of Haight Street and Masonic Avenue, drove over the curb, crashed into the window of the New Light supermarket and skidded along the sidewalk for about fifteen meters.

“I didn’t want to shoot them down,” Hess sobbed, “but they were everywhere around me - left, right, all around” 12.

Note that the trick takes place where we know that we can lose control over events and even contribute a little to this, and mistakes and troubles occur when everything seems to be going smoothly and there is no need to try to maintain control, but, nevertheless, control is lost 13.

The corresponding locus of control, expressed in the control of action, also provides for possible failures, and also contains an assumption about the difference in types of action. In some actions we see only the work of the body's organs, for example, when we rub an eye, light a match, lace up our shoes, or carry a tray. Other actions seem to continue the actions of our organs, for example, driving a car, leveling the lawn with a rake, or using a screwdriver. Finally, there are actions that begin with bodily actions or their “extensions” and end with a very tangible result beyond the initial control, for example, when a ball, chewing gum, or a rocket ends its flight where it was aimed. It is assumed that in the process of early socialization skills of the first type are developed, secondary socialization - especially vocational training - ensures the formation of the second and third types of action. Note that one of the consequences of this training program is the transformation of the world into a place that can be directly controlled and that can be understood in terms of a system of social frames. In fact, adult city dwellers may never lose control of their bodies for a long time, never encounter an unexpected change in the environment; the natural world is completely subject to public and private control. Citizens begin to engage in various sports, skating, skiing, surfing, horse riding, which allow children and adults to regain control over the body through rather difficult continuation of bodily actions. Repeating early achievements in adulthood, accompanied by constant failures, already in a special, playful context, helps to overcome the fear inherent in the leisure classes. The intent of Laurel and Hardy's comedies is quite clear, it is precisely to show mass worthlessness and helplessness, where even the dizzying rides in the parks allow visitors to lose control of themselves in a completely controlled situation.

4. Let us consider such a factor in the organization of experience as “fortuitousness,” which in this case means that the event begins to be considered as having occurred unintentionally. A person who carefully plans his actions encounters the natural course of events that he could not foresee, and receives corresponding results. Two people or more than two people, independent and not oriented towards each other, have complete control of their actions alone, but their joint actions lead to an unforeseen event - they get this result, despite the fact that each of them has complete control over his personal contribution into a common cause. We are talking here about accidents, coincidences, good and bad luck, accidents, etc. Since in this case responsibility is not assigned to anyone, everyone is guided by their natural system of frames, while socially controlled actions are influenced by natural forces. Note that random consequences can be perceived as desirable or undesirable. Let me give you an example of undesirable consequences:

Amman, Jordan. - The fireworks ceremony ended tragically yesterday for one of the Palestinian fighters. He was killed by a stray bullet when his unit fired a volley of machine gun fire during the funeral of those killed in the Israeli bombing on Sunday 14.

The concept of a random connection is rather vague; at least those who use it for calculation purposes usually doubt their decisions, or at least allow such doubts on the part of others. This uncertainty becomes especially obvious when the coincidence of circumstances associated with the same object, person or category of people is repeated two or three times 15. For the same reason, it is difficult not to attach meaning to the case when luck or failure constantly falls to the lot of that notorious category of people that consists of one member.

The concepts of "miss" and "chance" have important cosmological meaning. If we believe that the entire world can be perceived either as natural events or as purposeful actions, and that every event can be easily classified into one category or the other, it becomes clear that we must seek means of overcoming uncertainties. The culturally developed concepts of “blunder” and “accident” are needed in order to comprehend events that would otherwise present serious difficulties for analysis.

“I proceed from the fact that when people find themselves in any situation, they always ask the question: “What is going on here?” It does not matter whether the question is asked explicitly (in cases of confusion or doubt) or arises by default (in habitual situations), the answer depends on the way of behavior in a given situation.” Goffman I. Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Everyday Experience. M.: Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2004. pp. 11 -12. So, answering the question “what’s going on here?”, we use one or another frame system.

I. Goffman rejects the widespread opinion that everyday life cannot be structured, since interaction is spontaneous. For him, any social interaction occurs according to certain rules and within certain limits - this is the “organization of experience” according to Goffman. The flow of social interaction can be analyzed not simply as consisting of individual events, but as “framed”, organized into an accessible study of structure. “Frame structure,” unlike “situation,” is stable and not influenced by everyday events. It is similar to the syntax rules.

Goffman's appeal to the metaphor of syntax is not accidental. The “structuralist revolution” that occurred in the 60s and 70s. (largely due to the rapidly developing cognitive sciences), fascinated communication researchers with the idea of ​​​​searching for a “meta-code”, a certain scheme for ordering interactions that exists regardless of the content of these interactions. In artificial intelligence research during the same period, the idea of ​​studying the structures of information representation began to bear fruit. See: Vakhshtain V. Sociology of everyday life: from “Practice” to “Frame” Erving Goffman. Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Everyday Experience. M.: Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2003 // Sociological Review Vol. 5. No. 1. 2006. P.69-74.

Preface to Goffman's book "Presenting Oneself to Others in Everyday Life." This is his first book, written in 1965. From this came the theory of frames. “The approach developed in this work is the approach of theatrical performance, and the principles that follow from it are dramaturgical principles. It examines the ways in which an individual, in the most ordinary work situations, presents himself and his activities to other people, the ways in which he directs and controls the formation of their impressions of himself, and also patterns of what he can and cannot do when presenting himself. in front of them." Hoffman I. Presenting oneself to others in everyday life / Transl. from English and entry article by A.D. Kovaleva. M.: Kanon-Press-C, Kuchkovo Pole, 2000. P. 29-30.

Goffman I. Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Everyday Experience. M.: Institute of Sociology RAS, 2004. P. 98.

The main question of frame analysis is: how is the participants' definition of the current social interaction related to the external, observable characteristics of the interaction? Everyone, when performing goal-setting actions, frames them in a certain way. This makes interaction unproblematic. If it falls out of its own frame, the question arises: “What is going on here?” Then what is happening is usually subject to correction in order to make it understandable again. It is the observer who “cuts out” the event, using some interpretation scheme, and gives it certainty. Therefore, an event has no duration, since meaning cannot have an extension in time and space.

It is worth thinking about how a person distinguishes between absolutely identical physical actions. People will almost certainly distinguish a friendly greeting from a signal to a taxi driver, or a gesture to ward off insects. This ability is due to the fact that any single event is part of a whole stream of events; each stream is part of a special system of frames. 2 Behind the primary or basic frame systems there is no other “real” interpretation hidden - this is the “real reality”.

When a person recognizes a particular event, he invests in his perception one or more frame systems or interpretation schemes, which can be called primary. Without this, events would have no meaning.

Primary frame systems differ in the degree of their organization. Some contain a well-developed system of rules, while most do not have a clearly defined form and set a very general understanding. However, this does not prevent people from finding, perceiving, “stitching” together with meaning and assigning names to frames in an infinite number of individual events. It seems that the person is poorly aware of the internal structure of frames, which does not prevent them from being used without any restrictions. Ibid. P. 81.

All primary frame systems can be divided into two large groups: natural and social. The first include undirected, aimless, inanimate, uncontrollable - “purely physical”. Completely uncontrollable events occur only due to “natural” factors, without the participation of will and purpose.

Social frames are the opposite of natural ones; they provide a background understanding of events in which will and goal setting are involved - activities embodied by a person. Such an active force does not have the inexorability of natural law; it can be negotiated with or resisted. The action subjects the one who produces it to a social assessment of the action, based on various motivations: efficiency, caution, taste, etc. Constant corrective control is maintained, especially in cases where the action seems distorted. Right there. P. 82.

Since people are part of the material world, almost any human action is accompanied by an event from the natural world. Therefore, any segment of socially oriented action can be separately interpreted on the basis of a natural scheme. Hence the dual understanding of purposeful actions. Firstly, it is the manipulation of objects of the natural world in accordance with capabilities and limitations. For example, in the game of chess, pieces move around the board. Secondly, the action takes place in a specific world, which includes chess rules. It is easy for a person to distinguish between the movement of pieces and moves, or an unsuccessful move made due to poorly thought out combinations, from a move made at random, that is, a move that does not correspond to specific social standards for performing physical actions. Right there. P. 84

Sociologist O. I. Goryainova defines the primary system of frames as cultural invariants, basic patterns of experience of a social group that are stable over time. They "...constitute the central element of culture...give rise to patterns of human understanding...". The primary frame is correlated with the cultural concept of “cultural picture of the world”, since it organizes the experience of a group over long periods of time.

However, Goffman's focus was not on primary frame systems. He is much more fascinated by the ability to transform “real reality” into something parodic, having only external similarities with that reality. He calls this transformation switching or transposition. Material objects, episodes of activity, messages and events can be transposed. At the same time, the transported activity is better amenable to further transposition. Goffman makes a completely postmodern conclusion that it is not the substance that has “sovereign being”, but the relationship. “The priceless author’s watercolor, stored for security reasons in a folder with reproductions, turns out in this case to be only a reproduction.” Goffman I. Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Everyday Experience. M.: Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2004. P. 677. This conclusion destroys the distinction between systems of primary and secondary frames.

Based on the basic patterns of experience, their transformation occurs, which is called the secondary frame system. The mechanism of such transformation is the “key”, i.e. a set of rules by which one activity is transformed or switched into another. “Key” is one of the central concepts in frame theory. Goffman correlates it with a set of conventions through which a certain activity, already conceptualized in some basic frame system, is transformed into a different type of activity, from the point of view of the participants. This process can be called switching or tuning.

Frame systems are not fixed as algorithms of perception, but are always in the process of formation; there is a constant “framing” of reality. “Keys” and “keyings” of frames - the correlation of a perceived event with its ideal semantic pattern. The key denotes the tonality of interpersonal communication, switching is its transposition from one tonality to another, as well as setting up the recognition of the situation. To understand the real world, we need many worlds, which we create using “keys.” The whole variety of life situations is represented by a variety of sample situations - switchings.

Goffman outlines several important considerations for switching. When switching, a systematic transformation of subjects, actions, objects, already comprehended in some scheme of interpretation, occurs; if there is no original circuit, then there is nothing to switch.

There is much more in common between those who pretend to fight or those who play chess than between those who pretend to fight and do it for real. Therefore, switching can only slightly transform the external form of activity, but it will radically change what actually happens. Switching therefore plays a fundamental role in determining what we accept as reality in general. Right there. P. 106.

To switch primary frame systems, Goffman suggests five main keys: make-believe, contest, ceremonial, technical redoing and regrounding.

Fiction is an imitation of activity, entertainment without practical results. By inventing, people turn the serious into the frivolous, and also create fictional worlds, therefore forms of fiction are playful pretense (game) and fantasy. Competitions transform dangerous, aggressive activities into a form of play where there are rules of “fair” competition.

Ceremonies are a certain type of social rituals, which include weddings, funerals, conferring titles and titles. The ceremony takes place according to a pre-developed scenario. Through the ceremony an event is accomplished that determines their subsequent relationships with their immediate environment and the world. Right there. P. 119. A person is transformed into his future “role”.

With technical retooling, certain “segments” of everyday activity, taken independently of their usual context, can be expressed in forms that correspond to utilitarian goals, thereby fundamentally different from genuine ideas, where the result has no special significance. Right there. P. 120. Technical retooling includes various kinds of demonstrations, performances, presentations and exhibitions.

A transplant can leave an activity unchanged, while radically changing its motives. Thus, the concept of “transplantation” is based on the assumption that some motives keep the performer in the circle of usual activities, while others, especially stable and institutionalized ones, take him beyond the usual. A typical example of transplantation is the charity of royal or aristocratic persons. The activity being performed is taken outside of its everyday context, which, as it were, purifies it. Right there. P. 136.

Switching and fabrication destroy frames and, accordingly, people’s confidence in the correctness of their accepted definitions of reality, but they also support the reproduction of social experience and pictures of the world. Goffman associates overcoming uncertainty with the procedures of anchoring frames, or the routinization of everyday experience. Certain guarantees are needed that the stated meaning of the frame and its real background practically coincide. In reality, most everyday activities are carried out almost mechanically, people habitually recognize what is what and who is who through the following "fixations": bracketing devices, roles, resource continuity, unconnectedness ) and the generally accepted idea of ​​a person (what we all like). Right there. P. 47.

Each subsequent switching creates a kind of lamination of one frame onto another, while leaving a reduced part of the previous activity. At the same time, the deep layer of the activity is so fascinating that it can completely absorb the participant’s attention. In addition, external layers are created, forming a kind of rim of the frame, which marks the real status of this type of activity, regardless of the complexity of its internal stratification. For an Activity that is completely defined in terms of the primary frame system, the shell completely coincides with the core. And if a person does not behave seriously, then he perceives the activity, regardless of its multi-layered nature, in a playful way.

So, according to the logic of frame theory, a person analyzes the entire stream of events passing before his eyes, each time answering for himself the question: “what is happening here?” The answer does not lie in the action itself, it is in its context, so the event occurring can be interpreted as part of a long past, and be of indefinite duration in time. The reason lies in two general schemes of interpretation: natural and social, which presupposes a non-random nature, the presence of will, reason and purpose. Therefore, in Hoffmann's understanding, a frame is both a matrix of possible events and an interpretation scheme. People tend to adjust their activities according to this matrix and trim reality (highlighting the unimportant and ignoring the irrelevant) according to the interpretation scheme they apply.

Frames can transform, acquiring new meaning through keys. Keys are a set of rules by which changes occur. Any switched or transposed activity has many layers that can be used to determine which frames have been changed. So, with the help of frame analysis in our study, we will be able to determine what transposed activities are behind the frame of charity for the Society for Visiting the Poor.

Hoffmann's world is the world of everyday life, i.e. a world of familiar and regular face-to-face interactions. It is obvious that we spend most of our lives in this world (we also, according to Alfred Schutz, have worlds artistic imagination, religious faith, science and mental illness).
Whenever a situation arises of the physical presence of two or more persons in one place, its participants inevitably must solve three main tasks: 1) understand what is happening here, i.e. determine the current situation; 2) take on a certain role; 3) support the format of the current situation or reconfigure it in a different way, as an option - interrupt the development of the situation (disperse).
How does a person understand what is happening here? Usually the situation is read and determined automatically. It happens that a person does not immediately understand where he has ended up. It happens that, having defined the situation as A, after a while a person realizes that he was simply fooled - what happens here is IN, but not at all A. Hoffman simply adores situations of the second and third types, since they are the ones who make visible the usually imperceptible work of our consciousness in scanning and identifying the current situation, more precisely, the formal structure of the current situation or, to use a dramatic metaphor, the genre of the scene being performed. This clarification is very important, since, according to Goffman, the meaning of a situation is determined not by its content, but by the formal structure of the situation. In other words, it doesn’t matter what is done, what matters is how it is done, or more precisely, how it is presented. If one person shoots another with a pistol and he falls dead, but the stage lights are burning in front of both of them, the audience applauds for both of them and then the curtain closes both of them, then this is not murder, this is a theatrical act (most likely after the intermission it turns out that the villain used the performance as a cover for his crime, the performance of the play will be stopped, the audience will turn into witnesses, but this will be a different situation). In short, recognizing the formal structures of the current situation allows us to understand what exactly is happening here.
Goffman uses the term frame to denote the formal structure of a situation. The concept of the frame (in its sociological version) dates back to Gregory Bateson's work in communication theory. Bateson's basic idea can be expressed as follows: every communication consists of two planes - literal and metacommunicative. A metacommunicative message is a message about a message, otherwise it is a set of signals marking a literal action. Bateson observed animals (some say otters, others say monkeys). He noticed that a literal action (for example, a bite) is always preceded and accompanied by special signs, through which one individual informs the other that he is going to bite her for fun (a game situation) or for real (a fight situation). A frame is a metacommunicative shell of a literal action.
In the process of socialization, a person learns to recognize metacommunicative messages, the typical everyday situations they form, their inherent role positions and the rules of the game. Thus, frames are rooted equally in the consciousness of the individual and in his activities. The question of which frames are primary from this point of view makes no more sense than the question of the chicken and the egg.
"My goal is- wrote I. Hoffman, - is to highlight somebasic frame systems that are used in our society to understand what is happening, and to analyze the difficulties of using frames.” Indeed, living in a world of frames is not easy. Danger of getting into trouble if the frame of the current situation is incorrectly recognized (not understanding a joke or hint, becoming the object of an innocent or, even worse, malicious prank, etc.) keeps the individual in constant tension.“Suspicion and doubt in this case should be considered as two main emotions that arise in the process of choosing a frame for interpreting what is happening. Just as it is difficult to imagine citizens without suspicion or doubt, it is also difficult to imagine life experience that is not organized in a system of frames.” Reality turns out to be only such an understanding of things that dominates all other interpretations of them. In conditions of eternal conflict of interpretations, “guardians of cognitive order” acquire the greatest importance for maintaining social order.- authorities that act, in a certain sense, as guarantors of reality. “Friends and lovers, representatives of justice, to a certain extent doctors and priests - they all symbolize public support for truth and justice. The highest political office in the state seems to place its holder in a special relationship to reality. He is perceived as a representative of reality. Being deceived or deceiving himself, he damages not only his own reputation - the “reputation” of reality itself suffers.”
On the other hand, it is precisely thanks to the concatenation of framesworld coherence is achieved. According to Goffman, it is ensured by such properties of frames as representativeness (each frame is connected by representational relations with other frames)and switchability (the main method of transforming activity, a model of step-by-step transition from one frame to another).Frames are not created consciously. On the contrary, they are unconsciously used and/or developed by the participants in the interaction process in the communication process.Current situations are constantly (re)defined by their participants (framed), activities switch in a descending (the literal plan is strengthened) or ascending (the metacommunicative plan is strengthened) key, the role positions of the participants in the event change. In everyday life, we most often find ourselves involved in switched (i.e., transferred to a different, initially unusual context) communications. Switched activity is another subject of Goffman's close attention - it is always a parody, i.e. imitation of some well-known model,« but in such a way that imitation concerns only the external side of the “model” - its rhythm, syntax, plot points, etc. - having a completely different internal orientation».
In a synchronic cross-section of any event, one can almost always observe the overlapping of various frames on each other, either in the form of layers of interaction contexts, which results in a complication of the structural contextualization of the event, or in the form of interference of interaction zones, leading to misframing - a loss of certainty and clarity of the situation, when the participants , and observers of the event are unable to answer the question: “What is happening here?” (misframing is always fleeting; it ends with the restoration of the previous order of communication or the emergence of a new one).In short, everyday situations are subject to constant transformation (which, as Goffman notes, justifies the existence of frame analysis).
Hoffmann's world is like a kaleidoscope, in which frame patterns are formed and destroyed every second. It is similar to the Buddhist universe of dharmas that constantly arise and disappear. Both flows (continuous transformation of frames and dharmas) are continuous and discrete at the same time. Both processes can best be compared to film: it consists of individual frames, which, however, we do not see when we watch the film, and perceive it as a pure continuum. Film and a single frame are a key metaphor for microsociology, which studies the smallest events of everyday life, because“even the slightest episode of everyday experience is rooted in the surrounding world and, therefore, reveals the nature of this world. The central idea here is that the true state of affairs can be established on the basis of careful tracing of more or less long periods of activity.”

Literature:
Goffman I. Frame analysis. An essay on the organization of everyday experience. M., 2004.

Vakhshtain V.S. Sociology of everyday life and frame theory. St. Petersburg, 2011.
Giddens E. The Structure of Society: An Essay on the Theory of Structuration. M., 2005
Zundelovich Y. Parody // Literary Encyclopedia: Dictionary of Literary Terms: In 2 volumes. M.-L., 1925.
Torchinov E.A.Introduction to Buddhology. Course of lectures. St. Petersburg, 2000

Some quotes from Frame Analysis

When playing a role, a person, in all likelihood, allows himself small liberties when he temporarily goes beyond its boundaries, allowing some abuses or making excuses. These fleeting digressions are not the actions themselves, but only shadows of actions that are easily overlooked - which is why sociology has managed to ignore them for a long time. The fact that the theatrical performer is obliged to avoid such lapses in presenting a character (except when deviations are prescribed by the script) should only sharpen our interest in them and lead us to a clearer understanding of the fact that, although the social world is built on roles, behind which there are people, these people have (and should be considered as “having the right” to have) a wider sphere of being than any of the current roles allows. The small deviations discussed raise very big questions.

The central sociological problem concerns man's right to be indecisive and wavering, and the role he plays in doing so.

Note that my arguments coincide with the common opinion: everyday life is one thing, but fiction is another. Nevertheless, terms have been proposed that lift the curtain of uncertainty on how to study this division.

Subordinating all sociological concerns to the problem of frame definition seems a bit redundant. It is methodologically useful to assume that social research is not concerned with the physical or biological event “in itself” but with what members of society make of it. It is also necessary to raise the question of what event causes society to do something with a physical or biological event and how it can influence social life beyond the consciousness of people.

Since the frame includes both the perception of reality and the perceived reality itself, any sober look at events must certainly contain reflection.

It would be too presumptuous to talk about right and wrong frames or to distinguish between illusion and self-deception without special reservations.

The prologue is simultaneously part of the dramatic world that follows it and an external commentary on it

One of the relationships we have to our immediate environment is that some of its elements have nothing to do with us.

Upon closer examination, it becomes clear that with a sufficiently complex organization, disorganization can arise on its own.

The creative act always operates on several mental planes.

[We often see] the transformation of political or tragic facts into the raw material for scenarios, whereby replaying the realities of life provides the audience with an easy opportunity to participate in them. Events that add nothing to our current life or are not that important to it at all can easily be used as material for new stories. Apparently, in order to shroud real events in fog, it is necessary to include them in a live television broadcast.

I do not think that we have all become passive observers, demanding from the world a spectacle that captivates us, behind which stand advertisers and politicians, busy profitably supplying the market with fictitious experiences, so to speak, second-hand experiences. I believe that we ourselves are ready to get carried away by anything. All this happens because [in everyday life] there is something similar to those intense hours we spend watching TV. This is the time we are willing to spend talking about our own experiences or waiting for the right moment to tell such a story. True, now we, apparently, have partially abandoned such a hobby, having entrusted ourselves to the work of professionals. But by doing so, we did not abandon the world, but only the more traditional way of connecting with it.

Men often view women as maladjusted in terms of some "normal" ability to perform physical activities. Women often respond by confirming men’s attitude towards them. Both sides hold an unshakable belief [in the correctness of this distribution of abilities] and retain the ability to act in accordance with this scheme without any pretense or self-reflection. Nevertheless, is it not possible to raise the question of where are the “real” abilities here, and where is just an institutionally supported prejudice?

ERVING GOFFMANFRAME ANALYSIS

AN ESSAY ON

Northeastern University Press Boston

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; , . , . , 1 . , . . 1949-1951 , . , . , . : , . , () . , . , . : . , . . , 1

Goffman E. The service station dealer: The man and his work. Chicago: Social Research Institute, 1953 P. 37-39.

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Goffman E. The presentation of self in everyday life. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1959. P. 14.

Ibid. . 81. Ibid. P. 229.

: 17 . . , . 1964 . , 2 . , . 1960- : . (1961) (1970) , . . . . , 3. , . , . . . , . , . , . , . 1 2:)

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Ibid. P. 244. ..: . . .

Goffman E. Asylums: Harmondswotrh: Penguin, 1961. P. 56. Goffman E. Stigma. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1964. Neumann J. von, Morgenstern O. Theory of games and economic behavior. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944.

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(1998) http://www.ucm.es/info/isa/books/vt/Bkv_OOO.htm Maclntyre A. After virtue. Brighton: Duckworth, 1981. P. 30-31, 109. : . : . .: ; : , 2000. Sennet R. The fall of public man. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977. P. 36.

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Burns. Erving Goffman. London: Routledge, 1992. P. 6. Manning Ph. Erving Goffman and modern sociology. London: Polity Press, 1992. P. 2

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The sociology of Georg Simmel / Trans, by K. Wolff. New York: The Free Press, 1950. P. 9.

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1. , : , . . (doing friendship, doing knowledge, doing conversation). , . , . , . . ", .

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Garfinkcl 1 1 . On elhnometliodology // Ethnomcthodology / Ed. by R. Turner. Middlesex: Penguin, 1974. Williams R. Understanding Goffman's methods // Erving GofTman: Exploring the interaction order/ Ed. by P. Drew, A. Watton. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988.

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. // . . . 8 . . 3. .: - , 1994. . 158, 159.

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"arsons T. A revised analytical approach to the theory of social stratification // iiixons T. Essays in sociological theory. New York: The Free Press, 1954. 1 393-394. iollmun E. The presentation of self in everyday life. Harmondsworth : Penguin, ")V). P. 26.

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1. . .: , 1974. . 265, 268-269. Goffman E. Frame analysis: An essay in the organization of experience. New York: Harper and Row, 1974. P. 124.

.. . .: , 2000. . 259.:! Goffman E. Frame analysis: An essay in the organization of experience. New York: Harper and Row, 1974. P. 5732 - 9312

Ibid. . 127.

1. , 2, (dramatic realization). , . , . , . , : . , . , . . , . . , . . , . . . , 3. . 1 2 3

, - (all-too-human selves) , . , . (teams) , . , 1. , .- (front regions) , . . , (back regions), . . , . . , . : (dark secrets) , ; , ; , ; , Ibid. P. 75-76.

Goffman E. The presentation of self in everyday life. P. 28. Ibid. P. 37. Ibid. P. 66-70.

: 37, . , . , . 1950-, . , . , . , . , . . (encounter), (,), (occasion), . - , . (social gatherings), . "^ . jBce . (involvement) (,)1." GofFman E. Behavior in public places: Notes on the social organization of gathering. New York: The Free Press, 1963. P. 43.

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Ibid. P. 141-143.

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Goffman E. Asylums. Harmondswotrh: Penguin, 1961. P. 72.

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Goffman E. Stigma. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1964. P. 84.

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