Alexander Evgenievich Lednev, financial director. Alexander Lednev: “Forming the “right” team for a financial director is half the success. What is the difference between the “Financial Director System” and legal reference systems

A business breakfast was held, organized by BAKER TILLY RUSAUDIT and NBJ

Representatives of the banking sector:

Deputy Chairman of the Board of Investtorgbank Sergei Lyagin; Director of the Loan Restructuring Department of UniCredit Bank Maxim Kondratenko; Vice President of the Moscow Bank for Reconstruction and Development Andrey Omelchuk; Vice President, Director of the Corporate Lending Department of B&N Bank Dmitry Zaitsev; Deputy Chairman of the Board of the Bank "BNP Paribas Vostok" Andrey Galaev; head of the legal department of Raiffeisenbank (Austria) Vladislav Kotelnikov; Vice President for Corporate Lending at Probusinessbank Natalya Zhurkina; Director of the Corporate Business Department of Rus-Bank Albert Fakhrutdinov; Deputy Chairman of the Board of CB "Agropromcredit" Irina Dovdienko; Managing Director of the Corporate Business Directorate of Sudostroitelny Bank Igor Komyagin.

Representatives of real sector companies:

Deputy General Director, Financial Director of ZAO Grain Company Razgulay Andrey Morev; Financial Director of ZAO Synterra Nikolay Zhmurenko; General Director of CARLO PAZOLINI GROUP Arnold Pasternak; Director of Economics of ZAO TPK FELIX Irina Fomicheva; President of Gallery-Alex LLC "(Coffee shop chain "Shokoladnitsa") Alexander Kolobov; Financial director of the chain of stores "Magnolia" Ekaterina Usoltseva; President of LLC "Trading house "ZIMALETTO" Irina Nikiforova; Deputy General Director for Economics and Finance of TransWoodService OJSC Alexander Lednev; Financial Director of OJSC "Modus" Alexey Novichkov; Financial Director of the Stroyrezerv company Yuri Tufanov.

Representatives of the business breakfast organizers:

Deputy General Director of Baker Tilly Rusaudit Leonid Nikitin; NBJ editor-in-chief Anastasia Skoreva.

Business breakfasts organized by Baker Tilly Rusaudit and NBJ have become not only a good tradition, but also an opportunity to “measure the average temperature” in the lending market for corporate borrowers. The last time such an event was held by an audit company and a leading banking magazine was in May 2009. In a calm market situation, three months is a short and meaningless period. But now, over the same period of time, the relationship between banks and borrowers can change dramatically. For the better, if things are getting better in the economy; for the worse if the crisis continues to deepen.

The atmosphere that prevailed at the October round table “Restructuring of loans to legal entities” suggests that the “bottom” of the crisis has indeed been passed. From the mutual accusations and reproaches characteristic of the first months of the crisis, the parties moved on to a constructive dialogue, to a discussion of what restructuring gives to the creditor and the debtor, on what conditions should refinancing be carried out, etc. We invite readers to familiarize themselves with the opinions of the event participants , publishing an abbreviated version of the round table transcript in the NBJ.

"BANK SLAVES" OR PARTNERS?

L. NIKITIN: If I may, I would like to begin our discussion with the conclusions that the Baker Tilly Rusaudit company made based on its recently conducted research. The first of them can be formulated as follows: despite some improvement in the general economic situation in Russia, money is not flowing into the real sector of the economy in the required volumes. That is, we are witnessing a paradoxical picture: macroeconomic indicators have stabilized, but liquidity continues to lie as a dead weight, “accumulating” in the financial sector. I believe that this is primarily due to a radical reassessment of risks by all participants in the process and the caution that is inherent in all banks in a crisis situation.

The second conclusion - or rather not a conclusion, but food for thought - concerns the forecast indicators of the volume of overdue debt. According to Bank of Russia estimates, the share of bad loans in banks' portfolios could reach 12%. According to Moody's Investor Service and Fitch - 25-30%. That is, these agencies consider a third of all debts to be irrecoverable, or, to use a more pleasant term, problematic. But 30% is precisely the indicator that is incompatible with normal functioning of the banking sector. Does this mean that we should prepare for massive bankruptcy of financial and credit structures, or is the forecast of the Central Bank of Russia closer to reality?

A. Omelchuk: In my opinion, the figures cited by international rating agencies are overly pessimistic, and they arise perhaps because Moody's and Fitch adhere to too conservative methods when determining the level of "problematic" debt. They, apparently, credit non-performing loans are all problematic and potentially problematic assets, and this is not entirely true, given that the solvency of borrowers may recover over time, and the loans will then again be normally serviced and repaid.

If we talk about the Central Bank's forecasts, they seem to me to be closer to the truth. True, I would not talk about 12% at the end of the year - most likely, the real figures will be about 15-20%.

A. FAKHRUTDINOV: In principle, I agree with my colleague from the World Bank, but I would like to add that the “spread” of forecasts between 12% and 25-30% is quite understandable. 12% are truly non-performing debts, loans that most likely will not be repaid. And 13-15% on top of this are debts for which banks negotiate restructuring with borrowers. For obvious reasons, restructuring is now a very popular mechanism for both financial and credit structures and debtor companies. It gives the first the opportunity not to record losses, the second - to maintain and extend the terms of debt service, preserve the business and, most importantly, the relationship with the creditor bank, which may have developed over the years.

L. NIKITIN: Undoubtedly, what you have listed are very significant factors in favor of restructuring. But a question arises: as a result of using this mechanism, loans are “lengthened,” and bank liabilities are “shortened” due to the closure of access to “long-term” Western money. How to get out of this situation, which inevitably leads to a deterioration in the structure of banks’ balance sheets?

A. FAKHRUTDINOV: It is impossible to completely avoid it in a crisis, but banks have ways to “smooth out” its consequences. For example, by additional capitalization - increasing equity capital - or by increasing the profitability of current credit operations, that is, increasing loan rates.

By the way...

Borrowing companies must understand that a lot depends on their willingness to seek and find solutions that are acceptable to both them and the banks. There is no need for financial and credit structures to choose between a “three kopecks” return and nothing!

L. NIKITIN: But the second option is clearly not a panacea. If the borrower cannot repay you the loan at a rate of 12% per annum, then where is the confidence that he will be able to do this after restructuring, when the cost of the loan increases to 18-20% per annum? And if we are talking about new borrowers, then where to get them and how to check their creditworthiness?

A. FAKHRUTDINOV: There is no need to take them - they come on their own. Compared to the pre-crisis period, the demand for credit financing - a kind of competition for money - has increased 3-4 times. But you are, of course, right: banks now have to be more careful when choosing borrowers.

A. MOREV: This caution ultimately results in very high rates for both new borrowers and companies restructuring their debt. We are now on the path of turning “short” loans into “long” ones and we are learning all the “delights” of restructuring from our own experience. So, I can say that the impressions are not very pleasant: even creditworthy companies, due to the current level of interest rates on loans, are turning into so-called bank slaves. 100% of the entire margin that borrowers earn goes to servicing the debt to the bank, and it’s also good if it’s 100% and not 120%! And if the situation does not change next year, if there is no revision of the level of rates in the market as a whole, then real business will have a very long and very difficult time getting out of the crisis.

A. SKOGOREVA: What rates does your company borrow at now?

A. MOREV: From 16% to 20% per annum.

I. NIKIFOROVA: I agree with my colleague from Razgulay: indeed, there is a risk that, due to high rates, the economy as a whole will develop more slowly than it could and than we would like. But on the other hand, not all companies in the pre-crisis period built their business model on raising borrowed funds. And now it is precisely these market participants who receive competitive advantages both in terms of expanding their market share and in terms of attracting “fresh” loans.

A. FAKHRUTDINOV: For my part - as a representative of the bank - I would like to note that borrowers’ complaints about high interest rates, in my opinion, are not always justified. In fact, they are telling us: “extend” the debt service period, take on additional risks as creditors, but keep us at the pre-crisis cost of financing. It's not very clear how this is possible. On the other hand, we understand that it is difficult for the real sector to “endure” the current levels of rates. And therefore we are ready to look for the truth somewhere in the middle, in each specific case offering our own conditions for restructuring and lending. But borrowing companies must understand that a lot depends on their willingness to seek and find solutions acceptable to both them and banks. There is no need to put financial and credit structures before choosing between a “three kopecks” return and nothing!

ENTRY INTO CAPITAL - A SOLUTION TO A PROBLEM OR AN ADDITIONAL GUARANTEE?

L. NIKITIN: Well, usually, after all, we are not talking about “three kopecks”, but about increasing the collateral “mass” or about banks entering into the capital of restructured enterprises. The second way has just become very popular among the four systemically important banks, on which the state places its main hopes to support the corporate lending process. And how much is it in demand by financial and credit structures included in the “TOP-10-TOP-50”? After all, on the one hand, the bank thus receives an additional guarantee that the borrower will sooner or later return the loan to him. On the other hand, from the point of view of banking liquidity, this is hardly beneficial for the creditor: after all, banks have to “freeze” part of their capital, turning it from bank capital into private equity.

A. Omelchuk: We consider the issue of entering the borrower's business primarily as an instrument of additional control on the part of the bank over the financial and economic activities of the debtor. Banks now hold a wide range of assets from an industry perspective and require different approaches and skills to manage them. We have chosen for ourselves the path of transferring non-core assets to the management of professional companies in the relevant market segments.

L. NIKITIN: But what remains for banks other than this - in a situation when collateral depreciates? Entering into capital, in my opinion, is effective, if only because the lender thus gets the opportunity to control the activities of the borrower. This means that his chances of repaying the debt increase.

A. Omelchuk: Yes, if you approach the issue from this point of view, then you are right. However, then the bank should immediately aim to be included in the debtor’s capital for a short time - two to three years, until the borrower’s normal solvency is restored.

L. NIKITIN: But from the point of view of banking liquidity, is this still a minus?

A. Omelchuk: From the point of view of banking liquidity, the occurrence of a problem loan is a minus by definition, and when restructuring debt, we are not talking about maximizing profits, but about minimizing losses.

I. KOMYAGIN: In my opinion, entering into the capital of a borrower for a bank is, at the moment, primarily an option for managing the management of the debtor company. It is quite obvious that the effectiveness of previous management usually ends when the most problematic debt arises. Accordingly, by entering the capital, the bank gets the opportunity to remove ineffective managers and put an efficient team at the head of the company. In this case, the entry agreement is concluded on the repo principle, that is, the other owners of the company have the opportunity to return the business to themselves after a certain time. They should be given this option; it will encourage them to work better.

L. NIKITIN: That is, the agreement contains certain financial “covenants” - indicators upon achievement of which the owners have the opportunity to buy out the business?

I. KOMYAGIN: Absolutely right. First of all, such “covenants” may include either a reduction in the amount of debt to a certain amount, or a full repayment of the debt to the bank. And such a formulation of the question is quite natural: after all, the bank is interested precisely in the return of funds, and not in the possession of this or that asset. Repayment of the debt will allow him to do what has already been discussed here: reduce interest rates on loans to new borrowers and improve the conditions for debt restructuring for “old” ones.

N. ZHURKINA: I would not so unequivocally state that banks, in principle, are not interested in entering capital, because the functions of managing non-core assets are burdensome for them. The example of Probusinessbank, which I present here, indicates just the opposite. True, it may be easier for us to carry out such management, because the bank initially adhered to a “niche strategy”: we chose for ourselves five or six sectors of the economy that we wanted to deal with, studied them, and created specialized credit products for them. Accordingly, now we receive assets only from certain industries, and this fact greatly simplifies the process of managing them.

The second point is that we encountered the problem of a large volume of bad debt earlier than the market as a whole - back in 2006. Among our clients were many companies selling alcoholic beverages. The ban then imposed on the supply of wines from Moldova and Georgia put many of them on the brink of survival, and as a result, a significant amount of bad debts formed in our portfolio.

Every cloud has a silver lining - thanks to this, we have gained experience in managing the business of a debtor company and can now apply it in the new conditions of the global crisis. We have a specialized company that manages non-core assets, and we do not outsource this area.

A. SK0G0REVA: But isn’t there a risk that the owner of the debtor company will simply “atrophy” during the time the bank manages his asset?

N. ZHURKINA: There is such a risk, and we have encountered a similar situation. But now there is no point in discussing whether this is good or bad, whether we will have to “tinker” with problem loans for a long time or a short time. The situation on the market is such that it is clear: in the next quarter or another quarter the borrower will not repay the debt; at best, the exit point for many will be the next two or three years.

HOW TO BREAK THE VICTIZED CIRCLE

L. NIKITIN: During our discussion, I came up with a provocative question, which I hope will be answered by both representatives of banks and managers of borrowing companies. Banks, apparently, now view themselves as orderlies of the real sector. Do you agree with this assessment?

A. FAKHRUTDINOV: Although I am representing a bank at this business breakfast, I will say that your thesis is very controversial. We are not economic sanitation workers, if only because the crisis hits us just as hard as non-financial companies. For example, I have a client who literally says the following: I have money, but I will not return it to the bank because my partners and counterparties do not pay me. So what should we do? Take control of his business? But not all banks have such experience; this is not our core business. We are not businessmen, we are bankers.

L. NIKITIN: By talking about your client, you set up a very interesting topic for discussion. It seems that bankers will now have to learn to evaluate not only the quality of the asset, but also the quality of the owner managing it. But this is where many questions may arise. How much do owners value their personal reputation and how interested are they in the long-term existence of their business? When you look at the capital outflow figures in the third quarter of this year, you get a strange feeling. Capital is leaving the country - what do our businessmen want to say with this “voting with their feet”?

I. KOMYAGIN: In my opinion, this is the result of an absolute, I would say, circular mistrust of market participants towards each other. Banks have enough liquidity for lending, but we do not trust borrowers, and this is natural in a situation where collateral depreciates, personal guarantees do not work, and banks are not too interested in taking part in capital. And borrowers do not trust us and complain about too high rates, unaffordable restructuring conditions, etc. You formulated the result of this yourself - business votes with its feet. But, understanding this, we must also understand something else: such a vicious circle cannot be broken at once; we must work painstakingly to restore a normal business climate in the market.

L. NIKITIN: In the meantime, it seems that a situation may arise where by the end of the year some banks will not be able to comply with Bank of Russia standards, which will lead to the revocation of their license and, possibly, to a repetition of the events of last fall - panic among depositors and the “bleeding out” of the system.

S. LYAGIN: Analyzing the results of last year, we can say with confidence: the Central Bank will not allow a situation to arise in which there will be a need to revoke the licenses of any significant banks. The regulator has clearly demonstrated that it places the stability of the banking system above the requirement to comply with regulations at any cost. It is no secret that there are now banks living and actively working in the market, including in the field of lending to legal entities, that would have had to leave if the authorities had not provided them with support. And although Investtorgbank is all right with the standards, we know: if, God forbid, we have problems, then we will not be allowed to “fall” either, since the volume of funds raised from private individuals is more than 20 billion rubles. And the Central Bank is interested in maintaining stability in the deposit market.

A. GALAEV: We should not forget that the Russian banking system is very different from similar systems in economically developed countries. And one of its main differences is that here, with 1,100 banks, the five largest financial and credit structures choose a 50 percent market share. And the TOP-100 accounts for 85-90% of the total assets of the country's banking system. The Central Bank will not allow anyone from the TOP-100 to fall. And the revocation of licenses from smaller banks will not provoke panic among depositors.

In general, in my opinion, when discussing various issues, it should be taken into account that in Russia there are several groups of banks. Structures with state participation, private banks and subsidiaries of foreign financial and credit groups - they all have different approaches to different issues. For example, a lot has been said here today about the pros and cons of a bank entering into the capital of a problem borrower. In principle, our bank does not face such a question - the parent “group” prohibits us from doing this, most likely out of reluctance to take on image risks in the event of creating an opaque asset management system.

S. LYAGIN: I agree that the approach of the subsidiaries to solving the problem of “bad” debts is very different from the approach followed by Russian banks. As far as we could see, after 90 days after the first day of delay, the “Westerners” declare the debt problematic and believe that the likelihood of its repayment is extremely low. That is, you need to take all possible actions to repay this debt within the required 90 days - to achieve a return of at least 1-2% of the debt amount. And then, regardless of whether it was successful or not, move forward without looking back and working off the “bad” debt with a new good loan. But they can afford such a strategy because the parent group will recapitalize them if necessary. In this case, Russian banks have a more difficult time, so they behave differently.

L. NIKITIN: It turns out that foreign banks are more banks than Russian ones. They recognize the “bad” debt as bad, record the loss and move on. The Russian bank, instead of doing the same, makes the debt long-term, as a result prolonging the difficult situation both for itself and, possibly, for the borrower’s business.

M. KONDRATENKO: I do not entirely agree with this assessment and with the very statement that Russian financial and credit structures and I adhere to completely different principles in working with problem debts. We have different shareholders, that’s true, but the borrowers are the same. Accordingly, much in our approaches coincides by definition.

If we talk about how our work is carried out, then one should not think that foreign banks stop dealing with problem debt after 90 days. On the contrary, without wasting time, we develop various options for working with a problem borrower in each specific case. And we see our task not as “switching off” a problem debt and recording losses, but to fully respect the interests of shareholders and either support a conscientious and completely open bank borrower who finds himself in an objectively difficult situation, or minimize losses as much as possible. clearly and promptly carrying out a set of measures related to debt collection, if the borrower does not agree to a constructive conversation or has become de facto insolvent. Debt cancellation is an exceptional measure. Banks record a loss after exhausting all possible collection measures. I assure you, the interests of shareholders and clients force banks to scrupulously deal with all problem debts.

A. Omelchuk: I think that in this case the approach of Russian banks and foreign subsidiaries largely coincides. Everyone understands that writing off a loan after 90 days from the date of arrears is possible if we are talking about a loan issued to an individual, but not a corporate loan. If the bank, having studied the situation, sees that the borrower is inclined to dialogue, that he is solvent in the medium term, then why would he suddenly record a loss? Another question is if the bank understands that either the borrower is inadequate, or the market in which the company operates is in a state of prolonged stagnation. Then the seizure of collateral and going to court can be used.

THE MAIN THING IS TO ALL AGREE

L. NIKITIN: Seizing collateral and banks filing lawsuits against debtors is now almost the norm. No less common is the situation when the debtor has not one creditor, but several. It is clear that banks in such a situation begin to get nervous and imagine the most negative scenarios for the development of events. Maybe someone from the real sector will tell you how the debt restructuring process is going under such conditions?

A. SKOGOREVA: But these letters you are talking about are just a gesture of goodwill. What prevents the bank that signed it from withdrawing from the agreement and starting to “pressure” the borrower?

A. Omelchuk: There is such an opportunity, and that is precisely why, in our opinion, it is necessary not to negotiate individually with each creditor, but to gather all the banks that provided loans to the company at a round table. We just offered one of our borrowers this option for dealing with problem debt. And I must say that our meeting - or rather, a whole series of meetings - were very effective. A joint protocol was signed, which stipulated the terms of the restructuring, and the fear of many members of the credit club passed. And accordingly, the desire to quickly run away, grab the borrower and shake the debt out of him has passed.

I. KOMYAGIN: I will support my colleague from the World Bank: indeed, it is very important to neutralize this fear as soon as possible. Because because of it, situations sometimes arise that are completely unnecessary and negative for everyone. But at the same time, it is also important that the club of creditors develop an agreement quickly enough. And this is precisely where problems arise: state banks, from which everyone usually expects delays, make decisions promptly, but foreign “subsidiaries” sometimes “slow down”. Most likely, because they need to get “okay” from the mother’s structure.

A. SKOGOREVA: Well, we are hardly talking about long delays.

I. KOMYAGIN: And it is not necessary that the delay be long. The process of negotiations on restructuring is always tense, and some of the banks may lose their nerves. And then problems will arise for all members of the creditors club.

N. ZHURKINA: This is true. I’ll share the experience of our bank: two other colleagues and I were resolving the issue of restructuring the debt of one borrower. It took us a long time to decide, we spent six months planning, we considered all possible options. Meanwhile, the company continued to generate operating losses and “eat up” itself more and more. As a result, we buried her “for three”, and, what’s a shame, all three of us got a much smaller “inheritance” than if we had immediately agreed on the bankruptcy of the debtor. The only plus is that all three banks participating in the negotiations became friends. One might say - over the debtor's grave.

Speaking seriously, of course, we always try to participate in such negotiations. And, I won’t hide, we are striving to become an “inconvenient creditor” whose debt will be bought by other banks. Because if you “leave” in anticipation of repayment, you risk incurring more significant losses than if the debt you own is redeemed immediately, albeit at a discount.

A. Omelchuk: It is very good when a bank that owns a relatively small debt takes such a constructive position. Unfortunately, this does not always happen.

Nowadays, “skunk” behavior is quite common, when the smallest lender refuses to sign an agreement, threatens the borrower with court, or even sues him. Thus, he tries to blackmail other creditors and seeks to force them to repurchase his debt on economically unfavorable terms. Our position here is clear: we do not buy back such debts. And, as far as we know, many banks, including Sberbank, adhere to the same position.

A. FAKHRUTDINOV: In our experience, skunk behavior is still not typical for most banks. And we don’t know any precedents for refusing signed restructuring agreements. And in this sense, we can say that it is the banks - no offense to enterprises in the real sector - who keep their word. And this, by the way, is an indicator of a certain maturity of our banking system.

SHORT LOANS AND "SOLID" COLLATERALS

A. KOLOBOV: Perhaps banks have something to be proud of, but, in my opinion, there is also something to think about. For example, on the question of why we don’t have long-term loans. In the West, large companies and projects with a yield of 19% are provided with 70-year loans! In our country, before the crisis, people were forced to take out a maximum of three-year loans for development and reassure themselves with the thought that shortly before the end of this period, either the same bank would refinance them, or they would go and take a loan from another representative of the banking sector. By the way, it’s probably no secret to anyone that before the crisis, financial and credit structures themselves actively offered companies their lending services. But these were also “short” loans. Because, unfortunately, we don’t have “long ones” in principle.

A. GALAEV: I think this is a question not for the banks, but for the economic authorities of the country. If we talk about Russia, then we need to lend “long” in Russian rubles, and there is nowhere to get “long” ruble liquidity on the market. Banks cannot create it out of nothing. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that our lending terms are several times shorter than in the West.

L. NIKITIN: Perhaps you shouldn’t be surprised, but you should be upset. Alexander Kolobov represents a very interesting segment of the real sector here: he runs the Shokoladnitsa coffee shop chain. This is a very promising business, very fast growing and profitable. But he, like other Russian enterprises, faces problems with attracting loans, with the fact that he can only count on “short-term” borrowed funds. And Starbucks, which recently came to us, will, by definition, develop its business using “long-term” loans. It turns out that we are handing over this segment of the market - and not only this one - to foreigners.

A. PASTERNAK: Unfortunately, this is exactly the situation, and moreover, it is many times easier for our companies to agree on a loan with a foreign bank than with a “compatriot” from the financial sector. My typical conversation with a Russian banker looks like this: you have excellent financial indicators, we will provide you with a loan, but what do you have as collateral? Are the goods in circulation? No, we will not lend to you, we need “hard” collateral. Gentlemen, but where will I get them from? We are a chain of shoe stores, and we have no real estate on our balance sheet. Just today I met with an American banker - he approved a loan for me. And the presence of shoes and boots as collateral did not bother him.

What's the problem? I think the reason is that during the lean pre-crisis years, Russian banks became accustomed to a model where they attracted cheap funds in the West and sold them here at high prices to end borrowers. It was wonderful. But when this blessed period ended, many financial and credit structures were at a dead end: what should they do in the new conditions? And one gets the impression that their leaders have never read economics textbooks, which say that business, by definition, cannot always be profitable. He suffers losses from time to time. But for some reason Russian banks do not want to admit this - perhaps because bankers, as one of the participants in our event said, do not consider themselves businessmen.

I. KONYAGIN: I would like to stand up for my colleagues. Experience and research show that over a long period of time - 20-25 years - the profitability of the banking business tends to zero. So we just know that high profitability is possible only over a short period of time.

A. Omelchuk: In turn, I would like to note that when analyzing credit risks, the primary focus is the borrower’s business, not the collateral. The pledge of goods in circulation, of course, cannot be considered as full security. At the same time, if the borrower’s business is stable and the repayment of loans is calculable, then for the bank this is a sufficient basis for providing a loan, despite the possible lack of firm collateral.

A. MOREV: Nevertheless, the fact remains: foreign banks lend against goods in circulation, and the cost of these loans is half as much as the cost of similar loans provided by Russian banks.

E. USOLTSEVA: Although we have gotten into business well, we also have problems attracting loans. And these problems stem from the collateral requirements of banks. They demand real estate as collateral - good, we have just that, we were quite actively buying it before the crisis, and when the crisis began, it was to our benefit. But we have to mortgage it at large discounts, although real estate prices on the market have remained virtually unchanged.

A. FAKHRUTDINOV: Discounts, in my opinion, are quite understandable, given the market situation. Calculate the costs that banks may incur in the event of repossession of this property - and in the current conditions this is a more than realistic scenario. Here's a discount for you!

And the fact that banks are now, in principle, more picky about borrowers from the real sector is also true. Let me give you a very illustrative example, in my opinion: the general director of one of our borrowers greatly improved his well-being before the crisis - bought a new apartment, changed a car, etc. When his company started having problems, we asked if he wanted to somehow then help her with your own means, by changing, for example, your Bentley to a Zhiguli. The answer was amazing and at the same time very characteristic of Russia: I earned this money! That is, in the West, when a company attracts a loan for, say, 20 rubles, top managers invest this money in business development and, if the business is successful, take part of the profit as a bonus. With us, everything is exactly the opposite: company managers first skim off the cream of the loan, and then invest the rest in business development.

So what do we want? I would like borrowers to provide a personal guarantee. At least so that you can look into the eyes of such a leader in difficult moments of life and ask him if he still wants to help his company “float.”

L. NIKITIN: As a result of our conversation, I found another reason to love the crisis - I raised exactly this topic in my September issue of the National Bank of Journalism. Thanks to him, you and I - representatives of both the real sector and the banking system - understood that the main condition for providing a loan is the quality of the borrower, and not the quality of the assets that belong to him. Because banks are not faced with the task of taking away assets from an enterprise, but with the task of issuing a loan to someone who will return it. And this is, perhaps, one of the most important lessons of the crisis, which the Russian banking system, I hope, will take into account for its further development.

By the way...

The bank is interested precisely in the return of funds, and not in the possession of one or another

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“CFO System” is a huge systematized database of solutions for all tasks arising in the process of managing a company’s finances. You ask a question in the search bar and get a clear answer to it, and at the same time you can be sure of its relevance.

And the Financial Director magazine, including its electronic version, contains articles that were the most interesting at the time of publication. With its help, it is convenient to learn about changes in work and the latest trends. In addition, in the “CFO System” it is much easier to choose an answer that fully corresponds to your question - the System is designed for exactly this.

But please note: the electronic version of the “Financial Director” magazine is part of the “Financial Director System” (section “Library”), and all users have access to the articles of the latest issue and the archive.

Do you need special hardware or software to work with the CFO System?

No, it's not necessary. You don't have to download and install anything on your computer, contact your system administrator, or wait for updates. All you need to work with the CFO System is a computer and Internet access.

Is it possible to work with the “Financial Director System” from home, from an Internet cafe?

Can. Just open the site and enter your username and password.

Why should you trust the decisions of the CFO System?

The authors of the solutions collected in the “Financial Director System” are current financial directors of Russian companies with extensive experience. Their recommendations will allow you to solve the problems set by management and business owners in the shortest possible time and at the same time avoid many annoying mistakes. Using the solutions of the CFO System, you are guaranteed to save time and money.

How often are materials in the CFO System updated?

Materials are updated daily and fully automatically. Using the “CFO System”, you are guaranteed to work only with current solutions and the legal framework.

How can you quickly find the right solution in the CFO System?

Just enter your question into the search bar. For example, “how to draw up a budget for income and expenses,” “what management reporting to prepare for the general director.” In addition, there are convenient categories in which all the materials are sorted into shelves and finding what you need won’t be difficult.

21.01.2016

Financial Director of the company NPF " Welfare"and the speaker sh, told CFO-Russia.ru about expanding the sphere of influence of the CFO in the company and establishing effective interaction with the CEO and his team.

What are the basic rules for effective interaction between CEO and CFO?

The effectiveness of interaction between the CEO and CFO lies in achieving the company’s strategic and tactical plans without harming the psychophysical state of the financial director. Such interaction is possible if several basic conditions are met:

  • The CEO and CFO should be very congenial people, with the same core values ​​and vision for the development of the organization. This is largely due to the approximately equal age of the managers and similar education;
  • the biological rhythms of the CEO and CFO must coincide, otherwise the CFO works less productively and his job satisfaction decreases;
  • methods of personnel management and internal communications should be largely similar, which is achieved by fulfilling the first point.

What is the CFO's role in building a high-performing team?

Forming the “right” team for a financial director is half the success in his professional activities. It is the quality of work of such a team that will determine the possibility of further growth of the financial director and expansion of his sphere of influence. A high level of trust and a sufficient level of professionalism of team members allow the CFO to pay less attention to established processes and to a greater extent to engage in development and new areas of activity.

When selecting members of the CFO team, at least deputies and direct reporting managers, it is necessary to be guided by the rules for effective interaction between the CEO and CFO indicated above. Another, very important in my opinion, aspect that must be taken into account when forming a team is simple human sympathy. The CFO must like his employees and vice versa.

What work tools does an effective CFO use? How exactly do they help him in his work?

Over the years of his professional activity, each financial director has developed a whole list of personal tools for organizing his work: from the use of paper diaries to tablets and various gadgets. In any case, an effective CFO needs to be able to highlight and be sure to record valuable information in writing. This fully applies to both instructions from senior management and tasks for subordinates. In order to always have this information at hand, you can use organizer programs designed for tablets with information storage in the cloud and the ability to edit it on a desktop computer. Taking into account modern capabilities for storing and accessing your information, you will be able to find and provide the necessary information anywhere and in a timely manner, satisfying management’s requests.

You can learn more about the experience of NPF Blagosostoyanie and ask your own questions to Alexander at our, which will take place September 13-15, 2017.

Exarcho Irina