Features of the political culture of modern Russian society and the ways of its development. Features of Russian political culture

The political culture of each country always includes specific political values, orientations and traditions, symbols and rituals, norms, forms and methods of political behavior inherent only to its population. It is formed under the influence of closely interrelated conditions and factors that develop in the process of formation and civilizational development of a particular society and state, reflects the state of the political system, the level of legitimacy of political power.

The initial, basic elements of Russian political culture were formed and developed under the influence of special ones that have not lost their influence in our time conditions and factors. First of all, they include geopolitical position of Russia. It is characterized by: the forest-steppe landscape of the country, the presence of a sharply continental climate in most of its territory, the large size of human-developed spaces and the weak protection of some of them, the special importance in ensuring the security and development of the country of natural geographic and raw materials sources and resources, etc. d. Influencing the lives of many generations of the Russian people, these geopolitical features determined and determine the rhythm of life of a significant part of the population, its way of life.

They play their own and very significant role in the formation and development of Russian political culture general civilizational circumstances, reflecting the most important forms of organizing the common life of the Russian people, their basic life values and guidelines, methods of organizing and organizing state-political life. Such circumstances include: the sociocultural position of Russia between East and West, the dominance of collective forms of social life, which ensure the primacy of the interests of the community, class over the interests of the individual; application of emergency methods of public administration; lack of traditions of legal statehood and sustainable mechanisms of self-government. In the twentieth century, the development of political culture in Russia was carried out under the influence of changes in the economy, socio-political structure and spiritual life of society, caused by the destruction after October 1917 of entire social strata and ethnic formations, the rejection of market regulators of economic development, the forced introduction of communist ideology, deformations of the country's intercultural ties with the world community. The state and development of political culture is particularly influenced by the radicality of socio-political changes and transformations, which are constantly repeated in the history of Russia, during which certain established forms of organization of state-political life, political traditions, and the historically always dominant position in society of the state are revolutionaryly rejected , statism as a principle of organizing social relations.

Under the influence of these circumstances, the political culture of Russian society at all stages of its historical development, as a rule, is an internally split, horizontally and vertically polarized phenomenon, in which its main components contradict each other in their basic and secondary guidelines. The country's population is almost always divided into two main parts: one gravitates towards the rational, individualistic culture of the West, the other - towards the traditionalist, collectivist culture of the East. In addition, these two main value components of the political culture of Russian society are permeated with various moral and ideological positions and approaches. Since the baptism of Rus', the opposition of individual political subcultures has led its way through the antagonism and struggle of supporters of paganism and Christianity, Slavophiles and Westerners, whites and reds, democrats and communists. In the political culture of the Russian people, emotional elements predominate over rational ones, which often leads to the anarchism of its individual groups. For these reasons, it is traditionally difficult to develop common values and guidelines in society on the problem of the country's political structure, to combine its cultural diversity with political unity, and to ensure the internal integrity of society.

Modern Russian political culture is a developing phenomenon that combines variability in content with continuity and preservation of the main basic characteristics of the past. The transitional state of Russian society also presupposes the transitional state of its political culture, the transformation of its components. The political culture of post-Soviet Russia today is influenced not only by established, traditional conditions and factors, but also by new ones that emerged at the end of the 20th - beginning of the 21st centuries, it is modernizing and developing mainly due to four main sources. Firstly, due to the revival of some elements and values of pre-revolutionary Russian political culture. They can be elements and values that were borrowed from Soviet Russia, as well as those that turned out to be unclaimed: zemstvo self-government or its analogue, jury trials, etc. Imperial Russia, as the Russian philosopher N. Lossky once noted, created values in the field of political culture that will become world famous when they are sufficiently studied and understood.

Secondly, the source of the formation of modern political culture in Russia is Soviet political culture. It was not only totalitarian-authoritarian, ideological, but also embodied many archetypal features of the “Russian character”: various forms of collectivism, loyalty to tradition, loyalty to the Fatherland, patriotism, etc. All of them are extremely necessary in modern Russian reality.

Thirdly, the enrichment and development of Russian political culture is achieved by borrowing the values and norms of foreign and, mainly, Western European and American political cultures. If civil society and the rule of law are being built in Russia, then the creation of its political culture, no matter how original it may be, is impossible without the creative development of universally significant democratic values. These are: openness and transparency in politics; respect for the law; pluralism of opinions; political and religious tolerance; competitiveness and rivalry between various political forces; non-violent resolution of social problems, etc.

And finally, the source of the formation of modern Russian political culture is today’s political practice, the political life of society.

The combination of circumstances affecting the political culture of post-Soviet Russia, the sources of its change and development determines specifics and modern features both political culture as a whole and its individual components. As a single, holistic phenomenon, the political culture of modern Russian society, as in the past, is characterized by value split and conflict, heterogeneity of attitudes and standards of political behavior. This is predominantly subservient political culture. It retains such traditional features as long-suffering, submission to authority, low self-discipline and self-organization, national self-flagellation, confidence in the availability of simple and quick solutions to complex problems. The uniqueness of the political culture of Russian society today is expressed in significant differences in the content of political subcultures, the political culture of individuals, in the absence of their stable relationships and interactions with each other.

They also have pronounced specificity individual structural components of political culture modern Russia. For political consciousness of the Russian people today are characterized by: a combination of a high level of expectations from the state with increasing distrust of the authorities; focus on a charismatic political leader; confusion of the concepts of patriotism and loyalty to the political regime; identifying love for the Fatherland with loyalty to power; a combination of futurism, i.e. aspiration to the future, with immunity to innovative ideas and transformations; inability and unwillingness to seek compromises and ways to interact with political opponents; the predominance of state rather than national self-identification of citizens; low level of ideologization, lack of a unifying and cohesive national idea; decreased interest in politics; lack of consensus on the main goals and priorities of domestic and foreign policy.

Political behavior of Russians, as a component of political culture, is characterized by inconsistency and unpredictability, legal nihilism and disregard for legal principles and norms, weakness of the general civil component, and the predominance of radical methods and forms.

IN functioning of political institutions authoritarian-administrative principles and methods of managing society prevail, there are no uniform rules of the “political game” for both those in power and opposition political forces, unprofessionalism and incompetence are manifested in making and implementing political decisions, there are elements of corruption and personnel stagnation, there is a lack of ability respond adequately and in a timely manner to the processes occurring in society; the priorities and prospects for the socio-political development of the country are poorly defined. The ruling political elite of Russia strives to completely occupy the “political space”, political pluralism in society is limited, and the legal field for competition between different political forces and ideologies is narrowed.

The current state of the political culture of Russian society testifies to its instability and fragmentation, high mobility and dynamism. In its content, general civilizational democratic segments have not yet been established; there are no basic foundations for a consensus of political forces, their coordinated actions to reorganize social life in accordance with the principles of justice, humanism and legality. In such conditions, the objective need to improve and develop the political culture of modern Russia is obvious.

Improving and optimizing the political culture of Russian society can currently be achieved in various ways. The most important of them is people’s assimilation of political knowledge, its expansion and deepening. Political knowledge is the foundation of meaningful and conscious political behavior. Without political knowledge, it is difficult to navigate the political situation in the country and the world, to choose the right line of political behavior in specific situations. A politically illiterate person is outside of politics; he becomes a bargaining chip in the game of various political demagogues and adventurers. A politically uneducated person who has power or has become a political leader is dangerous to society; his activities, as a rule, are destructive.

Today, every Russian citizen needs knowledge about the essence and content of political relations, about democratic principles and rules for organizing political life, about the alignment of political forces in society, their political goals and ideological orientation, about the structure and functions of political institutions, their powers and role in political governance society. You cannot consider yourself a politically educated citizen without knowledge of the country’s Constitution, your constitutional rights, responsibilities and freedoms, the main provisions of the programs of leading political parties operating in Russian society, political and legal documents and principles governing public life. Knowledge about the forms and methods of citizen participation in social and political life, about the goals and priorities of the state’s domestic and foreign policy, about the prospects for the political development of the country, and the problems of its security is extremely important. Of course, the volume and depth of political knowledge of an individual, depending on his social status and position, profession and other characteristics, can and should be different. But to one degree or another, everyone needs to have them, because... Without this knowledge, an individual cannot join politics, become its independent, conscious subject. An effective factor in concretizing and updating political knowledge is tracking political events and facts based on media materials, their independent comprehension, analysis and evaluation.

A special way to enhance and develop the political culture of modern Russian society is mastery by the broad masses of the rules, methods and techniques of political behavior. This is achieved through the specific and widespread participation of people in various political actions and campaigns, taking into account their political status as citizens of the country, guaranteed by the Constitution and other legal acts. Direct skills and techniques of people's political behavior are formed as a result of their participation in elections of government bodies, in the work of political parties, public councils and other formal and informal socio-political associations and institutions, in rallies, demonstrations, etc. Participation in the discussion of various state development programs of the country, programs of political parties, documents and materials of socio-political organizations and movements is important for an individual to master the rules, methods and techniques of political behavior. A special role is also played by an individual’s contacts with government authorities and the media, his communication with the political elite and political leaders, other subjects of the political process, and his mastery of the experience of political life in various countries.

And finally, among the main ways to increase and develop the political culture of modern Russia is democratization of public life. Democratization of public life constitutes the real basis of political culture, the most important prerequisite for the socio-political activity of the individual and the increasing role of the human factor. Its most important requirement is the involvement of people in political relations and political practice and the formation of the necessary legal framework for this. Democracy and law-abidingness represent the basic values of political culture, the source of its improvement.

Development and enhancement of political culture in modern Russia is ensured by the activities of various socio-political institutions, socio-political forces, social formations and groups, and individuals. The leading ones among them are the state, political parties and public organizations, the media, the church, the army and other security forces, educational and cultural institutions. Each of these subjects of socio-political life has its own impact on political culture and plays its role in its enhancement and development.

Russian state in the totality of its legislative, executive and judicial bodies largely determines the content and most important parameters of modern political culture. It adopts legislative and other normative acts regulating the political behavior of people, the activities of political institutions, and monitors their implementation. State bodies develop, improve and consolidate political symbols (flag, coat of arms, anthem, text of the military oath, etc.), form political traditions inherent in the modern stage of social development, replicate and implement certain models of political activity and political participation. History has proven and modern practice confirms that the state has always played and continues to play a leading role in the formation of political culture. And what kind of political culture is emerging in Russian society today, how it rises and develops, mainly depends on the priorities and goals of the state, on its capabilities and ability to be a consolidating force in society.

Political parties and public organizations through their activities they lay down certain forms of political thinking and behavior of people and introduce them to political practice. They form among citizens political and ideological values, ideas about the relationship of political parties, public organizations with the state, their place and role in the political life of the country, in the exercise of political power. The diversity of ideologies and orientations, and most importantly, the goals, content and nature of the activities of political parties and public organizations operating in modern Russia, has a rather ambiguous and contradictory impact on the political culture of society, social groups and entities, and individuals.

Media form mass political beliefs and attitudes, stereotypes of political consciousness and behavior. Their capabilities in Russia have increased many times over the last decade due to changes in the socio-political situation in and around the country, with the invasion of television and other means of mass communication into people’s daily lives, and the development of information technology. This sharply enhanced the emotional and visual aspects of the process of forming political culture. Thanks to the media, many abstract ideas and principles are now “transformed” into a figuratively visible, directly perceived and emotionally experienced form.

Church and other religious institutions, as subjects of development and improvement of political culture, are the main guardians of the historical traditions of the peoples inhabiting the country, the greatness of their strength and spirit. They also actively participate in everyday political life, the production of basic models of political behavior of citizens, and influence the political consciousness of people, especially at the emotional and psychological level. This role of religious institutions especially increases in the context of today's weakness of the Russian state, the low level of institutionalization and the image of political parties and public organizations in the country.

Army and other security forces are a special social environment in which an individual masters, first of all, political values and norms supported by the state, forms and methods of political behavior of the individual are formed that correspond to the official regulatory space for organizing the political life of the country. The army and other power structures of modern Russia can fulfill such a role in conditions of stability and sustainability of their functioning and development, clear organization of their life activities, and the presence of high authority and respect in society.

Educational and cultural institutions ensure the dissemination of political knowledge, preservation and transfer of political experience, encourage people to develop their own political position. A significant role in the formation and development of political culture and its enhancement belongs to famous people in various fields of public life, political leaders.

The formation, enhancement and development of the political culture of modern Russian society is a natural historical process in which both conscious and spontaneous political forces operate today, focused on various values, principles and norms. Therefore, for a democratic, civil political culture to develop in Russia, enormous efforts and time are required. Cultural self-identification of Russian society is possible, first of all, on the path of overcoming its social, political, ethnic and religious split, ensuring an organic synthesis of the civilizational uniqueness of the development of modern Russia and the democratic trends characteristic of modern world social development. It is necessary to consistently strengthen the spiritual freedom of the individual, expand the socio-economic and political-legal space for the manifestation of civil activity of people, involving them in the process of distribution of public resources, control over state power. The peaceful existence of even opposing ideologies and styles of civil behavior must be ensured, contributing to the formation of ideological and political orientations and positions that unite rather than oppose each other. Only on this basis can mass ideals of civic dignity, self-respect, and democratic forms of interaction between the individual, society and the state emerge in Russian society.

Political culture is a complex multi-level phenomenon with specific features. It includes elements of political consciousness and political behavior of people, the functioning of political institutions. Political culture comes in different types, differing from each other in certain characteristics. In social practice, all types of political culture are interconnected and interact with each other. Political culture has a significant impact on social relations and stimulates the social, political and labor activity of people.

In each society, under the influence of a combination of historical conditions and factors, a specific socio-political situation, a political culture specific in content develops. The political culture of modern Russia includes a wide range of segments that are different in nature and orientation; it is unstable and contradictory, constantly changing and developing. Currently, its development and enhancement is required, which can be ensured by the effective activities of various social and political institutions and forces. The formation of a democratic, civil political culture of Russian society is an important condition for its socio-political stability and progressive development.

Security questions

1. Highlight the main approaches to characterizing political culture as a phenomenon and define the concept of “political culture”.

2. List and characterize the structural elements of political culture and its main types.

3. What is a political subculture? What specific features are inherent in the political culture of military personnel in the modern Russian army?

4. Name and reveal the functions of political culture.

5. What is the relationship between political culture and the political system of society?

6. Highlight and analyze the features and problems of the political culture of modern Russia. What are they due to?

7. What are the ways to improve and develop the political culture of modern Russian society? What is the place and role of the Armed Forces in enhancing and developing the political culture of the individual?

Literature

Gulyaev L.N. Political culture of Russian society: theoretical and methodological aspect. – Kirov, 1999.

Rukavishnikov V.O. Political culture and social change: international comparisons. Vol. 1, 2. – M., 1998, 2000.

Cemorro S.M. General and special in the development of political and legal culture of societies of the West, East and Russia. – M., 1998.

Penkov V.F. Political process and political culture. On the issue of methodology and practice of political research in modern Russia. – M., 2000.

Perov A.V. Trends and features of the formation of political subcultures in modern Russian society // Bulletin of Moscow University. Ser. 12. – 2003. – No. 2.

Sedykh N. Dynamics of political culture: social and philosophical analysis//Power. – 2003. – No. 7.

Sharan M. Political culture and socialization // Comparative political science. Part 2. – M.: Nauka, 1992.

The content and level of development of modern political culture of Russian society are significantly influenced by the following processes: radical changes in the foundations of economic, social, political and spiritual life, mass movements of various population groups from neighboring countries to Russia and the emergence as a result of this of new interethnic, demographic, territorial and other formations; changes and complication of the social structure of society, the emergence of new social groups in it, growth of property inequality, increased vertical and horizontal mobility; re-evaluation based on increased information of lessons from the past, present and future prospects.

All these processes dictate the need for serious modification of people’s ideological, evaluative and behavioral guidelines, i.e. all components of political culture. Political culture can fulfill its purpose as an instrument for the consolidation of society and its reconstruction only if it overcomes the confrontation of different directions in it, provided that they interact on the basis of a common unifying idea, the search for which is being actively undertaken by all political forces in our country today.

Until the 1980s, the monistic model dominated views on Russian political culture. The emergence and existence of a totalitarian political culture was associated with national cultural specifics, rooted in ancient times, which determined the characteristics of the Russian social structure: first absolutism, then the socialist system. The subject of the study was the interaction between the state and society, traditional attitudes towards power, and forms of protest behavior.

The formation of a new political culture is a long process. It depends on several factors: the dynamics of generational change; the nature of political socialization of youth groups; the direction and pace of development of new economic and political relations in the country; purposeful formation of a political culture corresponding to a democratic political system.

The ongoing political and cultural changes give reason to believe that in modern Russia a civil culture is being formed, which will be mixed, more or less balanced. This is due to the presence of three sources:

the first is modern domestic political practice, implemented in regulations and informal customs; the second is foreign experience and political culture, mainly Western. Today, the borrowing and development of European-American models is chaotic and unsystematic. Time will correct this process, but, most likely, the West will continue to remain a source of formation of civil culture for Russia; the third is national tradition. The political culture of Russian society, which has centuries-old traditions, develops on the basis of continuity. Despite all the visible differences between Soviet political culture and pre-revolutionary culture, the former inherited the latter. Moreover, some elements of Soviet culture were a modified form of traditional culture, adapted to the conditions of the 20th century.

Traditional and industrial societies have given the modern world two main types of political culture: totalitarian and democratic.

The totalitarian type of the Soviet period is characterized by: unification of political consciousness and behavior, rigidity of regulations from the state, discrepancy between words and deeds, both among the political elite and among ordinary citizens. Democratic political culture presupposes a pluralism of political subjects, opinions, attitudes, and types of behavior. It includes tolerance, which means not just tolerance for something or someone else, but also a willingness to interact with an opponent.

The transitional state of Russian society also determines the transitional nature of the political culture in it, the presence of elements of totalitarian and democratic culture. The term “authoritarian-collectivist” is often used in relation to the political culture of post-Soviet Russia.

In Russia there are all types of political culture and its subcultures: patriarchal, subject, activist. However, the patriarchal-subjective and subject-activist ones dominate.

As a result of the influence of many factors, both historical and modern, the political culture of modern Russian society is internally contradictory. It represents many subcultures - authoritarian and democratic, elitist (political elite, bureaucrats) and mass (ordinary citizens), liberal and conservative, socialist and bourgeois, etc. Each social group has its own subculture: youth and pensioners, entrepreneurs and marginalized people, workers and intellectuals.

Particularly noteworthy is the fact that in Russia political culture is fragmented - different groups of society develop different models of cultural development. There are four main types:

1) associated with natural and geographical differences between Russian regions, which give rise to economic differences;

2) related to linguistic and ethnic characteristics;

3) socio-economic subculture associated with differences in lifestyle along with specific interests;

4) religious subculture, which arises when religion acts as an all-pervading cultural substance.

However, the peculiarity of the modern stage of development of the political culture of Russian society lies not so much in the diversity of subcultures, but in the fact that a significant number of them are involved in a hidden or overt struggle and are in confrontation with each other. The main lines of conflict are democracy/authoritarianism, socialism/capitalism, centralism/regionalism, globalism/isolationism, anarchism/statism, etc. The diversity of such lines indicates the absence of a basic political consensus, national agreement, and ultimately a painful discord between various social groups that question the success of reforming society, social and political stability in it.

Features of the political culture of modern Russian society are:

1) lack of a stable tradition of participation of the bulk of the population in political life;

2) political infantilism of a significant part of the population, gullibility;

3) lawlessness and arbitrariness of the authorities in the center and locally during political actions;

4) weakness of political parties and movements;

5) the split of society into two hostile camps, two types of consciousness and political culture;

6) rejection of Western traditions.

Thus, the political culture of modern Russian society is in a state of its formation, experiencing serious influence from geopolitical and historical factors and radical transformations taking place in society today. The specificity, due to the uniqueness of historical development, allows us to speak about a special genotype of Russian political culture.

33. Modern political and ideological doctrines: concept, structure and role in society. + 34 also

Despite the variety of political doctrines, all modern political doctrines can be divided into:

political doctrine of socialism;
political doctrine of liberalism;
political doctrine of Marxism;
political doctrine of fascism;

The doctrines are listed in the order of their occurrence, the tone of their clear design (as worldviews they have always existed), for example, the political doctrine of liberalism is the political doctrine of the New Age.

Socialism- economic, socio-political system of social equality, characterized by the fact that the process of production and distribution of income is under the control of society; The most important category, which differs from communist ideology in that members of society retain ownership of their results of labor for all times of the development of society and there is no appropriation of the results of other people’s labor, is public ownership of territorial, intellectual space and the space of production of products (i.e. public property), but at the same time the fundamental ones are Individual property and group property (work collectives - those who produce the product) for the means of production of the product, but also natural, i.e. The social means of production are precisely rented from society. The main features that define socialism among various thinkers:

Destruction or limitation of private property;
Universal equality;

As ways to achieve justice, various thinkers have proposed, for example:

abolition of private property while maintaining personal
replacing capitalist enterprises with cooperatives
creation of communes within which everything will be common (utopian socialists)
creation of a state social security system

Liberalism - philosophical, political and economic ideology based on the fact that the rights and freedoms of the individual are the legal basis of the social and economic order. This movement is characterized by tolerance and condescension towards any legal means of disposing of oneself and one’s property. The ideal of liberalism is a society with freedom of action for everyone, the free exchange of politically relevant information, limited power of the state and church, the rule of law, private property and freedom of private enterprise. Liberalism rejected many of the principles that had been the basis of previous theories of the state, such as the divine right of monarchs to power and the role of religion as the only source of knowledge. The fundamental principles of liberalism include recognition of:

natural rights given by nature (including the rights to life, personal liberty and property), as well as other civil rights;
equality and equality before the law;
market economy;
government accountability and government transparency.

The function of state power is reduced to the minimum necessary to ensure these principles. Modern liberalism also favors an open society based on pluralism and democratic governance, while protecting the rights of minorities and individual citizens.

Some modern movements of liberalism are more tolerant of government regulation of free markets in order to ensure equality of opportunity to achieve success, universal education and reducing income disparities. Proponents of this view believe that the political system should contain elements of a welfare state, including government unemployment benefits, homeless shelters and free healthcare.

According to the views of liberals, state power exists for the benefit of the people subject to it, and the political leadership of the country should be carried out on the basis of the consent of the majority of those governed. Today, the political system that is most in tune with the beliefs of liberals is liberal democracy.

Marxism - philosophical, political and economic doctrine and movement founded by Karl Marx in the mid-19th century. There are different interpretations of Marx's teachings, associated with various political parties and movements in social thought and political practice. Political Marxism is one of the variants of socialism along with left-wing anarchism (social anarchism), Christian socialism and the non-Marxist part of democratic socialism/social democracy. It is traditionally believed that great importance in Marx's theory is 3 following provisions:

doctrine of surplus value,
materialistic understanding of history (historical materialism)
doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

It is often customary to divide:

Marxism as a philosophical doctrine (dialectical and historical materialism);
Marxism as a doctrine that influenced scientific concepts in economics, sociology, political science and other sciences;
Marxism as a political movement that affirms the inevitability of class struggle and social revolution, as well as the leading role of the proletariat in the revolution, which will lead to the destruction of commodity production and private property that form the basis of capitalist society and the establishment, on the basis of public ownership of the means of production, of a communist society aimed at comprehensive development of every member of society;

Fascism - a political science term that is a general name for specific far-right political movements, ideologies, and dictatorial-type political regimes led by them. The main characteristics of fascism are:

far-right politics - anti-communism
traditionalism,
radical nationalism,
statism,
corporatism,
elements of populism,
militarism,
often - leaderism,
declaring support for broad sections of the population not belonging to the ruling classes.

Fascist states are characterized by a strengthening of the regulatory role of the state both in the economy and in ideology: corporatization of the state through the creation of a system of mass organizations and social associations, violent methods of suppressing dissent, rejection of the principles of economic and political liberalism, open terror against the labor movement.

According to I.V. Mazurov, as a state system of government, fascism is not authoritarianism, but totalitarianism, between which there is a significant difference.

35. Historical stages of development and the current state of world politics. (very, very sparse material =()

International or world politics is the core of international relations.

World politics refers to the processes of development, adoption and implementation of decisions affecting the life of the world community.

World politics

1. As a scientific direction, it emerged in the second half of the twentieth century, mainly within the framework of the neoliberal theoretical tradition.

2. Its origins lie in the research of international organizations, international political and economic processes, political science (primarily comparative), and theoretical studies of international relations.

3. Deals with problems of the current state, as well as trends in the development of the world political system.

4. Considers not only states (which it recognizes as the main actors) and intergovernmental organizations, but also non-state actors (non-governmental organizations, TNCs, intrastate regions, etc.) as participants in international interaction.

5. Considers international problems in relation to each other and in a single global context.

6. Does not make a sharp contrast between domestic and foreign policy

In the period between the two world wars in the United States, the approach to studying international politics, designated as liberalism. Another name for this school is idealism. The starting idea of this direction is the belief that all international relations can be regulated with the help of moral, ethical and legal norms. The goal of the international policy of states should be to achieve peace. Wars and conflicts, according to this approach, can be overcome through the spread of the values of democracy, the creation of a collective security system operating on the principle of “one for all and all for one.” A major role is given to international organizations that promote the development of mutually beneficial cooperation and exchange between countries and perform peacekeeping functions. After the First World War, American President William Wilson tried to implement this model of international relations, who developed a program for the creation of the League of Nations. Later, this tradition was embodied in the activities of US Presidents D. Carter and G. Bush Sr. 2 . The idea of collective security was also present in the foreign policy doctrine of the USSR in the 70-80s.
Processes globalization revived interest in idealism in the form neoliberalism , which recognizes that, along with the state, transnational corporations, financial groups and non-governmental public organizations can be participants in world politics.
The main opponent of “liberalism” is the school political realism. It became the dominant approach during the Cold War and continues to be important today. The theoretical origins of this approach go back to the ideas of N. Machiavelli and T. Hobbes, who viewed politics as the predominance of force. But long before them, the meaning of such an understanding of the relationship between peoples was expressed by the ancient Greek historian Thucydides in the famous formula “the strong do what their power allows them, and the weak accept what they must accept.”

Political culture and intercultural communications of modern Russia are based on the peculiarities of the development of previous periods of its history, the specific characteristics of the traditional culture of Russians. Almost all researchers note that in the political culture of Russia there is a set of basic features that directly or indirectly influence the formation of the modern political culture of its inhabitants.

Just like the political culture of other countries, the political culture of Russia is formed under the influence of the sum of external and internal factors.

One of the main features of the historical and political development of Russia is the specificity of its civilizational structure. On the topic “Russia and the West*, many books have been written both in our country and abroad, convincingly proving that Russia is not the West, and there is no need to even list these works to substantiate the assertion that Russia has serious cultural and political features that distinguish it from both the West and Asia.

First of all, it is necessary to say about the pre-state, veche political culture of Russians, the features of which can be seen throughout the history of Russia. They consist in “orientation towards socio-cultural statics, towards the ideal of “peace and quiet”, towards opposition to innovations that threaten the reproduction of established culture and human relations*.

In the domestic historical and political science literature, a tradition has developed to explain the peculiarities of the formation of Russian civilization by natural, climatic and geographical factors. In Russia, there were difficult natural and climatic conditions and a permanent threat from external enemies, so Russian society had to constantly strain its strength in the struggle for survival, subordinate private interests to state ones and limit personal freedom. And the larger the threat, the “higher demands are placed on the state, on its ability to give an adequate response to the challenge, the more harshly the subjects of state administration and adherents of state interests are forced to act*. In addition, the uniqueness of Russian agriculture (short agricultural period, poor soil fertility, climate instability, crop instability) contributed to the formation of the ideal of fast (“hurried*) work with the hope of “maybe”. As a result, the legendary hero in Russian political culture is considered to be Ivanushka the Fool, who can “lie on the stove* for a long time, and then, by cunning and ingenuity, gain half the kingdom, i.e. has the ability to “get away with it*, etc.

The Byzantine tradition became one of the system-forming factors in Russia. In a certain sense, we can talk about the cultural baton that Russia took over from Byzantium at its baptism. From the Byzantine political experience, Russia adopted: a specific imperial state idea; the function of a mediator between East and West with a focus on tolerance and the desire for a synthesis of the values of Europe and Asia; a kind of cosmopolitanism, supranational character of power and statehood. And in modern Russia we can note the influence of these qualities.

The influence of Orthodoxy occupies a special place in political culture. According to researcher V.B. Iordansky, “overlaid on the rudiments of paganism, on the remnants of archaic consciousness, Orthodoxy favored dogmatism of thinking, intolerance, and spiritual arrogance. At the same time, it taught mercy, responsiveness, firmness in difficult times and the importance of an ascetic approach to life*.

This allowed the elite to create myths for society about the sacredness of government officials and the special significance of the figure of the sovereign in the sphere of power relations. In addition, Russia was not affected by either the Renaissance or the Reformation, so the distinction between religious and political values did not occur, and ideas about freedom of conscience and individualism were not formed.

Most researchers emphasize that the uniqueness of Russia lies in the fact that it has a discontinuous history, and each subsequent stage denied the previous one, that is, the old norms and values, the achievements accumulated by that time. However, no matter how sharp the breaks with the past were, at each stage, wittingly or unwittingly, the fundamental characteristics of the previous stages were integrated, with the result that Russia demonstrated the amazing stability of its basic characteristics.

The basis of the political life of Russia is strong personalism, and political ideas are based on monarchism or “leadership”, and the “monarch” himself can be hereditary or elected, lifelong or temporary, national or local. This model of political culture required a charismatic leader, and even if potentially he was not one, he was still made a kind of banner of the era. “Although the king had the possibility of unlimited rule, the system did not collapse even if the autocrat did not exercise power. The main feature of political culture was not called into question because of this,” adds G. Simon (Germany), one of the first Western researchers of Russian political culture.

Comparing the types of political leadership in Russia and the United States,

O. Gaman believes that “just as American political culture rejects a directive leadership style, the Russian political climate dooms a weak leader to defeat. Hence the tough, frontal, directive style of political leadership." N. G. Shcherbinina explains the phenomenon of political leadership in Russia by the fact that political culture has sacred foundations, so the leader turns into a symbol, an abstractly generalized image - “this is not a symbolic reflection of a god-man, but a reflection of an archaic-anthropomorphic deity. That is why specific bearers of state power are so little revered as individuals.” We can see the result of this approach even in the names of periods of history - the era of Brezhnev, Stalin, Alexander III, etc. At the same time, during the life of the leader himself, few people criticized him for reforms or the lack thereof, but after his death there was an “overthrow of the idol” , when all the mistakes and blunders of the recently “revered” leader were recalled.

One of the main features of Russian political culture is the obedience of the majority of the population to even the most unpopular actions of government authorities. The fact of long-suffering of the Russian people is explained by various reasons: the religious-eschatological nature of Russian political consciousness (N. A. Berdyaev), apocalyptic fear of a change of power (V. B. Pastukhov), etc., therefore the most common type of political culture in Russia is considered authoritarian or subject-matter based on submission to authority. One of the important reasons for this phenomenon is explained by the fact that state power in Russia has basic characteristics that have remained virtually unchanged throughout history. First of all, it is traditionally irreplaceable (under autocracy this is natural; under Soviet power there was no hereditary principle, but, as a rule, there was no alternative to the country’s top leaders); The second property of Russian power is its indivisibility. Neither the emperors nor the Soviet “leaders” wanted to share it with anyone, and the current “democratic” government is not inclined to share its powers. The third property of power in Russia is that it is autonomous from society and uncontrollable by it; moreover, it is traditionally associated with the possession and distribution of property, which stimulated irresponsibility, abuse and corruption.

Due to a number of historical circumstances, the state invariably occupies a dominant position in the public life of Russia, as a result of which a huge role is assigned to the bureaucracy, paternalism develops (the desire to be under the protection of the state or any government entity), clientelism (the use of informal connections in power structures), and mass political passivity and inertia, legal and political nihilism.

A strong center (autocracy), standing above the political struggle and considered inviolable, is the main characteristic feature of the political culture of both the Moscow state and the Russian Empire. If the center ceases to be strong, the state becomes dysfunctional and society becomes ungovernable.

If Western democracy is based on individualism, in which the citizen strives to rely on his own strength, then a high level of expectations from the state is ingrained in the Russian national character, and very often what is expected from it is not so much good laws as concrete actions that directly affect his life. One can also note such a moment of public consciousness as legal nihilism, that is, disbelief in the effectiveness and impartiality of the judiciary. This is reflected in numerous Russian proverbs: “the law is like a drawbar: wherever you turn, that’s where it comes out*,” “where there is a law, there is an insult,” “that the laws are familiar to me when the judges are familiar,” and in the works of fiction by Russian classics - I . A. Krylov, F. M. Dostoevsky, M. E. Saltykov-Shchedrin and many others, which express the conviction that he who has power and strength is right. According to L.N. Gumilyov, this feature of the political culture of Russia is due to such a historical factor as the underdevelopment of the institutions of contractual feudalism. “The subjects of the Moscow Tsar,” he writes, “sought not to protect their rights, which they did not have, but to receive responsibilities for the performance of which the sovereign’s salary was due.” As a result, people have become accustomed to the idea that politics is above the law. The legal system is not perceived as a sphere that can exist normally provided that politicians and political interests do not interfere with it.

One of the important aspects of political culture is the style of relationship between society and the state, reflecting the relationship of the citizen to the state and the state to the citizen. In Russia, society constantly developed under the strict control of the state; rights and freedoms were not won by society in a bitter struggle, but were granted by the grace of the monarch. Even perestroika, which is called the “bourgeois revolution,” was started by the ruling elite, and not by the masses. The statist nature of political culture also leads to the fact that in the minds of citizens there is a confusion of the concepts of patriotism and loyalty to the regime; love for the Motherland does not differ from loyal love for power.

Another important feature, also recognized by most researchers of the history and culture of Russia, is the opposition in the popular consciousness of the supreme leader and the bureaucracy. If administrative power can be complexly structured, then from the “supreme” the people demand simplicity, uniformity and obviousness, which imposes certain specifics on the perception of the legitimacy of power. The supreme ruler is not required to be efficient in decision-making, and all claims are made to various intermediate authorities (“the king is good, the boyars are bad*”). His power is justified not by rational arguments, not by victory in the party struggle, but by the presence of a certain charisma and the desire for an absolute ideal.

In the political culture of Russian people, there is a duality of political consciousness - the unity and struggle of the “loyal subject complex” and the “revolutionary complex”. N. A. Berdyaev was one of the first to draw attention to this paradoxical nature of Russian political culture. He pointed out the duality and irrationalism of “the Russian soul, its antinomy and terrible inconsistency*, which extended not only to representatives of the Russian nation, but also to many other ethnic groups living on the territory of Russia.

National character occupies a special place in the characteristics of political culture. Speaking about Russian political culture, it is necessary to note the basic features of the national character of Russians, which have formed the stereotypical image of a Russian for the international community. Researchers note that it combines seemingly incompatible properties: the search for harmony, mental and vital balance - and anarchic rebellion; careless negligence, bureaucratic dryness, sometimes turning into hardness of heart - and spiritual generosity, breadth and impetuosity of nature. Anthropologists, highlighting the national character of Russians, also note the following features: the dominance of the ethical principle over the logical, the combination of the right hemisphere and relativity, which gives rise to a tendency to mythologize existence, contemplation, openness, patience, peacefulness, reliability, but at the same time: laziness, irresponsibility, impracticality.

While noting the attitude of Russians towards the state, it is necessary to pay attention to the population’s rejection of the state system of power.

According to Yu. Oleshchuk, such an attitude towards the top is a manifestation of hatred of power - a quality inherent in the Russian political worldview. He sees the reasons for the persistence of power-hatred in power itself (“its oppression, rudeness, cruelty, self-will and selfishness*), its omnipotence (“chronic deification*), as well as the “simple-mindedness” of the Russian person, removed from participation in solving public problems and confident, that all problems are solved easily and quickly, and if they are not solved, it is only because of the reluctance of the authorities.

One of the important features of Russian political consciousness is the desire for a unified perception of what is happening by all members of society. This phenomenon is based on the communal way of life of medieval and imperial Russia. Only unity of views could keep the community from disintegrating.

In conditions of shared responsibility of community members, it was extremely important to maintain trust in the common decision, to develop unconditional respect for the will of the people, and the requirement of fairness and impartiality was of great importance. As a result, collectivism becomes the main characteristic of social consciousness. That is why various collectivist speech cliches are so often found: “we”, “there is an opinion”, “many think so”, etc. The idea of conciliarity, which dominated in society, teaches social harmony, the search for solidarity between people, and the neutralization of selfishness.

Russians are characterized by a weak interest in the everyday political process, which is due to the historical detachment of the ordinary member of the community from the political struggle, as well as the traditional attitude towards politics as a special sphere of activity, the right and obligation to participate in which does not belong to everyone.

In addition, the political process in Russia has always been surrounded by an impenetrable veil of secrecy and secrecy. The limited experience of direct communication between ordinary people and the highest officials of the country gave rise to another quality of political consciousness, the “effect of looking up to a nearby superior,” that is, the people’s idea of power was based on the appearance of the closest superiors with whom they most often dealt, so citizens did not tend to take politics and its characters too seriously. Politics for them is nothing more than a kind of social game.

Today, Russian and foreign political scientists note that in the role structure of Russian political culture there is no legal opposition in the European sense. Practically the only model of opposition behavior is refusal to participate in political life. Let's try to figure out the roots of this phenomenon. First, let us remember once again that the interests of society and the interests of the state in Russia coincided. Moral condemnation of power in the Russian consciousness is associated with detachment from politics and from the manifestation of civic activity. The extreme degree of aggravation of the negative assessment of the government’s activities gives rise to two forms of manifestation of the political position characteristic of Russia: a departure from current politics towards the path of “personal salvation” or “rebellion” against the authorities. Secondly, the legitimation of power was based on a religious and communal worldview. Politics is conceived not as a space of dialogue, but as an arena for the struggle between the forces of “good” and “evil”. If the power was recognized as legitimate (i.e., divine), then to oppose it meant to go against God. If it was recognized as illegitimate (i.e., diabolical), there was no point in arguing with it, but it was necessary to demonstrate its complete denial.

If in relations with the authorities opposition is impossible, then in the sphere of political consciousness, in the struggle of political ideas, Russia always lives in an acute confrontation of opposing ideologies. The peculiarity of its political process is that ideological conflicts develop into a confrontation between radically opposing concepts. As G. Simon notes, “in Russia there is no liberal culture of disputes... conflicts tend to lead to splits, confrontation and cessation of communication*. D. V. Gudimenko calls the political consciousness of Russians “a barricade consciousness, which is characterized by the inability and unwillingness to seek common ground with political opponents, latent rejection of pluralism, the desire to defame, and, if possible, remove them from the game, crush political opponents*.

Russian political culture is characterized by conflicts not only of interests, ideas and orientations, but also of fundamental values. The concept of “schism*, which is quite difficult to translate into other languages, denotes the universal reality of Russian life (a split between the government and the people, the people and the intelligentsia, the intelligentsia and the government, between different religious movements, political forces, etc.). Political culture is characterized by the antagonistic coexistence of such ideological subcultures as Westernizer and pochvennik, radical and patriarchal-conservative, anarchist and statist, democratic and “communopatriotic”, which is one of the reasons for the lack of basic consensus and national accord.

Schism is a pathological state of society; it excludes the possibility of general agreement on the scale and direction of any significant changes in society; “The national soil is splitting, every personality is splitting.” The split mechanism turns reform into counter-reform. The danger of a split is that it destroys the moral unity of society, the absence of which opens the way to conflict, disorganization, destruction and disaster.

Many researchers are confident that the special character of Russian history was predetermined by the split in Russian culture that followed the social transformations of Peter I (however, A. S. Akhiezer believes that the appearance of the split dates back to the emergence of Russian statehood, which was formed through the forced unification of tribes) .

The most important quality of Russian political culture was the split into two main subcultures, into two worlds - the traditional mass subculture and the “Europeanized” subculture of the elite. The differences between them were not just differences between the “tops” and the “bottoms,” they were of a fundamental nature, differing in their way of thinking, stereotypes, and basic orientations. All other contradictions, splits, conflicts were superimposed on them. The political culture of Russia is characterized by an almost permanent absence of basic consensus and national accord. The differences between subcultures are so striking, the gap between them is so great, that some observers may get the impression that two nations coexist in Russia, united by nothing except a common language and territory. A split in political culture often led to mutual violence, a clash of opposing ideals up to the point of civil war, and stimulated the desire to suppress the opposing point of view by force of arms. As a result, we see that the tradition of a culture of agreement or consensus has not been established in Russia. Moreover, the collapse of the centralized Soviet state entailed a new “split” - the division of the state into local units with their own attitudes, peculiarities of worldview and habits of political judgments.

Around the time of Peter I, historians and publicists have noted the emergence of futurism in the political culture of Russia (a focus on the future with insufficient attention to the past). The image of the future changes depending on the era. Futurism is based on the rejection of the vices of a real, real society, of which there have always been more than enough in Russia. The peculiarity of looking to the future in Russia is that as soon as the futuristic potential of a particular model (Moscow - the third Rome, Empire, Communist superpower) weakens or is exhausted, it is immediately replaced by the next one. But the previous model remains in the public consciousness for a long time.

Since the Peter the Great period, traditions have been established of turning the entire people into a means of achieving powerful ideas, the use of violence throughout the country and the regulation of the life of the population.

It is characteristic that national and religious differences, which dominate politics in multinational and multireligious states, in Russia manifest themselves more in the everyday sphere and intrude much less into politics. A possible explanation for this is the cultural tolerance of Russians noted by many foreign and domestic observers. “Russians sometimes demonstrate amazing helplessness, since in interethnic conflicts it was the Russians who were often the injured party,” notes D. V. Gudimenko.

When explaining the phenomenon of national tolerance in Russian society, they often refer to the specific features of the psychology of the Russian person - peace-loving, confident in his nationality, and therefore open to foreign cultures. In addition, Russia is characterized by a specific power idea, which undergoes various changes depending on the change of regimes. Accordingly, state rather than national self-identification of a citizen prevails. In such conditions, imperial consciousness is paradoxically combined with internationalism, and patriotism, as a rule, is statist rather than national in nature. Tolerance towards foreign groups in foreign policy relations is manifested in the affirmation of the idea of messianism, altruism at the national level, and the persistent desire to show humanity the path to happiness. These ideas manifested themselves especially clearly during the existence of the USSR. The political history of the Russian state has confirmed the peculiarity of political culture - Russians are able to endure any trials and hardships, any onslaught of hostile forces, if they are united by a common idea and realize it as their historical calling.

A significant quality in the political culture of Russian citizens is the mythologization of the political consciousness of society. The main concept in the mythologized consciousness is justice. Social inequality and wealth are very painfully perceived in the Russian mentality, which is reflected in proverbs and in the attitude towards “traders” in Soviet times.

One of the main myths is the myth about the people as the bearer of absolute values and absolute truth (“the voice of the people is the voice of God”). But at the same time, from the very beginning there was the possibility of excluding some, sometimes very significant, part from it, which led to the division into “us” and “them,” “us” and “strangers,” “friends” and “enemies.”

It is necessary to especially highlight the features of Russian political culture that were formed and established during the Soviet period.

First of all, it must be said that Soviet political culture was based on the basic elements of Russian political culture of the previous stages of historical development, but gradually transformed some of them.

During the Stalinist period, Soviet political culture updated all the basic characteristics of Russian political culture.

The official leader in Soviet political culture acted as a hero, becoming “the official prophet, clairvoyant and priest* of an ideology obligatory for all. Never has the image of a people's tsar been realized with such perfection... Speaking to the people in the language of their myths, J.V. Stalin could be calm about his power. The response of the people was the reproduction of archaic forms of behavior (unanimous voting in elections)... Everyday life began to be played out like a performance, according to the laws of the crowd or community.

But unlike the autocracy, the Soviet system failed to establish a legitimate order of succession. This was one of the reasons for her death.

The totalitarian system of state power hypertrophied paternalism, the command-distribution system of relations with its strictly hierarchical management structure led to unquestioning subordination to the state and suppressed any initiative. Maryanovsky V.A. saw that peculiar features of the economic mentality had appeared - * the state artificially cultivated only those economic interests of people that fit into a value scale simplified to the point of primitivism (salary, bonus, apartment, etc.). At the same time, they had to be earned not so much by one’s own labor, but rather “earned from the owner state.”

During the period of “building socialism,” loyalty to the state and its institutions was a necessary condition for satisfying material needs and increasing socio-economic status. Thus, access to material goods was directly linked to political loyalty. That is why, in the modern period, trust in political institutions and political activity do not bring the desired results, hence the feeling of disappointment, especially acutely experienced by older citizens.

In addition, the totalitarian system replaced social inequality of people with stratification on political and ideological grounds, creating the illusion of equality. In the minds of the majority of Soviet people, as well as the inhabitants of pre-revolutionary Russia, equality was placed above freedom, and justice above the rule of law. The legal nihilism of the pre-revolutionary stage was successfully preserved in the Soviet period. Soviet citizens sought to resolve and protect socio-economic and other disputes and even violated rights in any way, but not in court. When a person went to court, often among the people, and sometimes in the press, he was called the derogatory word “squabbler”, which had successfully passed from the pre-revolutionary language.

The communist state presented itself as an ideological state that claimed not only to regulate all social relations, it also prescribed beliefs and values, it instilled the meaning of life.

In Soviet culture, the myth of the people was replaced by the myth of the proletariat, and subsequently by the myth of the Soviet people. There was a kind of identification of the Russian people with the proletariat, Russian messianism with proletarian messianism.

The attitude towards truth changed - the state “word” became the truth, and politicians and parties fought not so much for recognition of their truth as the only true one, but for the powers of power, the possession of which allows them to forcibly impose their own vision of the truth on others.

Soviet political culture became the standard of human behavior, established at the subconscious level, in the form of habits, established stereotypes of thinking and behavior. The fact is that the totalitarian system, as I. Ilyin wrote, “imposes on people a number of sick deviations and skills that... eat into the fabric of the soul. These include: political denunciation, pretense and lies, loss of self-esteem and grounded patriotism, thinking with other people's thoughts, flattering servility, eternal fear. ... Long-term moral depravity will be overcome slowly, because people lose the habit of loyalty, integrity, courage, independence, independent convictions, truthfulness, mutual persuasion and trust.”

Under the communist regime, first of all, the system of power itself changed. A layer of nomenklatura was formed - a closed, privileged elite, which became an independent force and lived a different way of life from the people. Management was carried out not on the basis of formal rules and procedures, but through personal relationships. Nepotism and corruption have become an integral feature of political power. The growing contradictions between the nomenklatura and the bulk of the people not only undermined the totalitarian mechanisms for harmonizing interests in communist society, but also discredited the values on which it was based. Seeing this, the people lost confidence both in the personalities of the leaders and in the political system and ideology. In such conditions, enthusiasm and the willingness of people to work hard and unselfishly, to sacrifice everything for the sake of abstract ideals, inexorably dried up. The long-term separation of the people from property and the decision-making process inevitably gave rise to the spread of “lumpen-proletarian” consciousness among literally all segments of the population, which, in turn, created extreme instability of public sentiment, a penchant for promises, and an increased susceptibility to demagoguery.

Determining the features of political behavior in the USSR, it can be stated that political participation was not only subordinate to ideology, but also very massive and active. Such a norm of behavior as interest in politics is a product of the significant influence of the Soviet state on the private life of citizens through a verified process of political socialization, expressed in the system of upbringing and education from the very initial stages of personal development. This is also reflected in the continued high level of interest in politics at the present stage among representatives of older and, partly, middle age.

A fairly large number of researchers have noticed another feature of Soviet political culture - “doublethink”. This was “internal” disobedience, hidden behind the unquestioning execution of all the instructions of the party state. Soviet political activism was largely based on coercion: refusal to express loyalty to the state was frowned upon and punished. Regardless of whether each citizen shared the ideology of the system or not, political passivity was not safe.

Scientists note that totalitarian doublethink, the fundamental “duality of Soviet man as a socio-anthropological type” also persists in Russian man. Author of the fundamental sociological study “From opinions to understanding. Sociological essays” Yuri Levada notes that “the official (demonstrative) and everyday (practical) consciousness of a typical Soviet person have always been interdependent and adapted to each other. The incredibly quick and easy overthrow of the entire system of official slogans, prohibitions, social masks and other things did not at all mean the liberation of a “normal” person from the shackles that bound him. Formed by the era of forced unanimity, the “Soviet man” remains and will remain ambivalent for a long time, adapted to paternal care from the authorities and ready rather for “unanimous* approval (or denial) than for responsible action and independent thought.”

The process of decomposition of the communist idea was taking place, and any strong push was enough for it to collapse. This impetus was reforms and political changes in the structure of power, called “perestroika,” as a result of which, to this day, there is a transformation of the old and the formation of a new type, style, model, combination of political culture.

Currently, serious changes are being observed in Russian political culture. We see the emergence of new political traditions, values, beliefs, symbols, and various forms of non-traditional political behavior. But at the same time, a lot remains from the past. The previously listed features of the political culture of Russian society, realized in the history of Russia, are also manifested in modern politics.

When considering the characteristic features of the modern political culture of Russians, it is advisable to apply the scheme of subject-object relations already described in Chapter 1. (See Diagram 1 on With. 24 of this manual). It is necessary to highlight the complex of relations of citizens to the political system as a whole and its main elements - the government, the president, parliament, parties, etc. etc., and also take into account the relationship of political associations to the electorate (opportunities for mobilization, methods of agitation and propaganda). And another set of ideas of Russians is self-identification and attitude towards “in” and “out” groups. In addition, the foreign policy aspect should be taken into account, i.e. the attitude towards the international community, unions and alliances of countries, and individual states.

First of all, it should be noted that there was no official symbolism in the Russian state for almost a decade. The coat of arms, flag and anthem were adopted by the State Duma only in December 2000. And in these symbols we see elements of historical continuity, a continuation not only of the Soviet period, but also of the pre-revolutionary imperial era. The double-headed eagle of the coat of arms originally symbolized the Byzantine line of Orthodox Christianity, the melody of the “new old” anthem was the melody of the state anthem of the Soviet Union, the white-blue-red flag was established under Peter I as the flag of the merchant fleet (the only symbol of the new Russia that arose “spontaneously” in August 1991). Thus, we observe how symbols of the past carrying an authoritarian imperial load are transferred as an image of the desired future. The official interpretation of state symbols was presented by the authorities as “a comprehensive program for the consolidation of Russian society around the historical continuity of generations expressed through patriotic rhetoric.” In fact, there was a heraldic decoration of the existing split in society. This is reflected, for example, in the fact that the majority of respondents to questions about the origin of official symbols (August 2003) answered “I don’t know” (38%), more than half have a positive attitude towards them (up to 62%), but even more The mass consciousness unanimously accepted the revival of the red flag in the army (up to 80%). This suggests that two flags, symbolizing different periods of history, coexist peacefully in the hearts of our fellow citizens.

The collapse of the Soviet Union reverberated in Russia with a severe identity crisis, especially painful for Russians, whose self-awareness was focused less on ethnicity and more on belonging to a great power. During the post-Soviet period, the majority of the population of the Russian Federation transformed their identity from nationality to citizenship. In 1992, the majority of respondents (over 42%) admitted that they themselves would not understand who they were now. Surveys in subsequent years showed an increase in the proportion of those who identify themselves as citizens of Russia (from 38% in 1992 to 65% in 2001). Today we can consider that the concept “Russians” has received public recognition and has become widely used. Moreover, Russians of different nationalities perceive current events almost identically in many respects and assess the reasons for what is happening.”

As sociological polls show, the basic value orientations of Russians are stable. In the modern period (1991-2004), not a single one of the basic values has disappeared from the consciousness of citizens; changes have occurred with some of them in the overall scale of significance. Over the past years, their hierarchy has remained virtually unchanged: the leaders include values associated with social order, the comfort of a person’s inner world, his family and friends, as well as interesting work. Outsider values include: power, recognition, success.

The set of attitudes of Russians towards power structures is characterized by recognition of the extreme importance of management activities, which is expressed in the high activity of ordinary citizens when deciding on the distribution of supreme power. Both in Soviet times and today, the overwhelming majority of voters participate in the national vote. Moreover, the majority of Russians believe that by participating in the vote they will be able to change something in the country. Public opinion polls show that basic democratic values and institutions have fairly broad support among the Russian population. Support for liberal values (freedom, independence, initiative) has increased by 10-15% since 1990 and amounted to 48-57% in 2002. Every second person surveyed in 1995, 1997 and 2001 continued to believe that without democratic institutions and procedures, normal life in the country is impossible. But at the same time, 67% of respondents believe that democratic procedures are a mere appearance, and the country is ruled by those who have more wealth and power. This can be explained by the fact that the Russian version of democracy does not yet provide a normal standard of living for the population and the implementation of human rights in all spheres of life.

Interest in politics has remained, although it has decreased somewhat compared to the early 1990s. The Russian citizen continues to think and act according to the principles established during the Soviet period, supplemented by the concept of “rational choice.” That is, if socio-political activity does not promise anything (material or career benefits), then people’s vital energy is directed into other areas (work, family, education, leisure, creativity, etc.). At the same time, the level of awareness about politics remains consistently high.

The population's readiness to participate in politics, including elections, is combined with a stable orientation towards a strong state, order and power. Most polls show that among the Russian population, basic democratic values and institutions have fairly broad support, but at the same time, people are almost sure that only a strong, tough government can restore order. Thus, dreaming of a non-authoritarian order, Russians believe that it can only be established in an authoritarian way - through the actions of a “strong” government. About half of the Russian population supports normative democracy, a market economy, and the building of a civil society and at the same time welcomes the idea of a “strong hand.” This paradox can be explained by the fact that in such a short period of time (just over 10 years) democratic values could not replace the foundations of the traditional worldview about the essence of power and become a basic element of the emerging political culture, and also by the fact that the “powerless” Russian democracy cannot resolve pressing problems facing society. Currently, Russians are aware of the difference between democracy as it exists in Russia and the ideal that they would like to achieve.

It can be noted that the most common negative feelings of the last decade were: a feeling of shame for the current state of one’s country; a feeling of injustice of everything that is happening around, complemented by the mood that one cannot live like this; a feeling of fear of rampant crime; feeling of aggressiveness and loneliness; feeling of psychological fatigue from continuous change. And the most prosperous, middle and poor segments of the population approximately equally negatively assess the decline in the standard of living of the population, the collapse of industry, the decline in morality, the decline in Russia's authority in the world, the loss of stability, security and lack of order in the country. For the main part of the reform period, Russian society lived in conditions of constant “socio-psychological discomfort”, with a feeling of timelessness and even an approaching catastrophe. Fears are widely present in people's minds, associated, for example, with the possibility of civil war (in 1994, 45% of respondents feared war, in 2001 the figure was already 54%). One explanation can be given for this - the presence of military operations in Chechnya and the terrorist attacks that swept across the country created a serious threat to the safety of life of the population.

The focus on state paternalism continues to play a significant role in modern political culture. If in 1990 20% of respondents believed that the majority of people in the country could “live without constant care, guardianship from the state,” then in 1997 - only 17%, while the share of supporters of the opposite point of view over these years increased from 63% to 72% . This allows us to talk about paternalism as an essential and stable element of political culture. The situation that has developed in the post-Soviet period again demonstrates the people’s need for care from the state, for guarantees of social assistance and protection, which they consider as an obligatory function of power in society. Many researchers note that for a significant part of society, the main goal of activity has become not the desire for self-expression, comprehension of meaning, but simple survival. Family orientation and everyday problems come first. A person who is unable to satisfy basic needs on his own actively seeks an object to which he could transfer this task. For a significant part of the population, such an object is traditionally the state. By voluntarily transferring all their rights to the state, part of the population considers the state responsible even for those problems that arose as a result of their own actions. (Typical in this sense are the speeches of “deceived investors”).

A rather interesting concept for explaining the phenomenon of sustainability of paternalism in Russia was proposed by T. F. Ermolenko. She believes that paternalism is a phenomenon characteristic of all nations, but in Russia it has taken on the pronounced character of a social game of “daughters and mothers,” where the state acts as the mother (Tsar-Father, Queen-Mother, Father of the People, etc. .). The passing of “such relatives” causes among the people a complex of orphanhood, insecurity and the need to find a new “mother”. Political scientist A. Panarin adds that in the face of global danger, economic poverty, etc., the population simply has no other choice but to “re-love the stern Father and understand that state paternalism, despite all its costs, is better than the fatherlessness that threatens direct death."

Due to the fact that paternalism has become entrenched as an archetype of the Russian cultural tradition, we can say with confidence that at the moment the fight against it is doomed to defeat or a protracted conflict.

Analysis of sociological data shows that a significant part of society in the post-Soviet and all previous periods has become so accustomed to constant violation of laws and various illegal patterns of behavior that many today not only do not consider it necessary to give up this, but do not even see this as a deviation from the norm. The contradiction between the desire to live in a strong state that can ensure law and order, and the reluctance to follow existing laws and condone illegal actions is one of the most important manifestations of the moral crisis in Russian society.

Russian people, in the context of a totalitarian political culture that has not yet been eliminated, often try to adapt to new power games, while remaining completely “loyal.” After all, it is safer to be “loyal” to the state. This self-preservation reflex developed by the Soviet system is still in effect. A significant part of the country's residents, as surveys show, believe that the authorities are constantly playing a dishonest game with them, failing to fulfill their own obligations and promises, imposing unfair taxes on people, and dishonestly informing them. However, this behavior of the authorities does not cause indignation and protest, but rather a desire to adapt to the situation: to evade fulfilling their own duties (today, first of all, from paying taxes), to hide income, and the like. The idea that in our country “one cannot live without breaking the law” is interpreted in public opinion as the admissibility and even necessity of constantly “deceiving deceivers,” that is, the authorities. In other words, dual consciousness is alive and well in society. The most obvious manifestation of doublethink is the general and dominant hypocrisy, which is considered by the majority as a necessity: one cannot live without breaking the law, without expressing ostentatious loyalty to the authorities, without acting contrary to conscience.

At the same time, as we have already noted, Russians are accustomed to a fundamental condemnation of state power (remember the factor of hatred of power). It is based on a complex of social impotence, the belief that the state of society is entirely determined by the actions of the authorities, and, above all, by the central government, which is responsible for everything that happens in the country, both at the macro and micro levels.

According to VTsIOM polls (1993-2000), more than 80% of respondents are confident that respect for power has decreased over the last decade, since politicians of all ranks are concerned only with their selfish interests, the desire not to lose power, etc. A stereotype is being formed “ demonization” of politics, since it is dominated mainly by corrupt and clever politicians.

The lack of positive genuine changes in the standard of living and the mechanism of power is the root cause of the widespread widespread feeling of “alienation” - alienation from power, detachment from political life and the deep conviction of the majority of the population that ordinary citizens can hardly influence the policies pursued by the authorities, even by participating in collective protests (which are becoming fewer and fewer every year).

Attitudes towards enhancing the role of the individual in the political process are practically absent in the worldview of the population. According to V. O. Rukavishnikov, this means the dominance of “passive” types of political culture among Russians (“most citizens, in relation to what is happening on the political stage, behave like spectators in a theater”). There are on average 2-2.5 times more people interested in politics in Russia than in European countries, but we are talking about passive participation - receiving information and discussing political issues with friends.

First of all, we can note that at the moment there is no political institution that is trusted by more than half of the population.

The army and the church enjoy stable trust throughout the perestroika and post-perestroika times. In general, the rapid change from Soviet atheism to a religious worldview among Russians surprises many foreign and domestic researchers. We can try to explain this phenomenon by the traditionalism of Russian consciousness: here the desire for a common idea, uniformity is manifested, without affecting the established conviction. If we try to identify those who call themselves believers who attend church, communicate with the priest, and observe religious norms and rituals, then the number will become much smaller. That is, we can talk about the superficial level of religiosity of the overwhelming majority who declare themselves to be believers. But this is at the same time an indicator of conformism, the introduction of a new “morality” into the consciousness: being considered an unbeliever, an atheist in the new Russia is becoming bad form - especially among politicians or people aimed at achieving career success. But at the same time, we can note that the church was not able to fill the ideological vacuum, much less become the spiritual vanguard of society.

Let us note that representative power, designed to reflect the interests of the population, does not enjoy special trust; The same situation of mistrust exists among political parties. It is significant that the level of participation of Russian citizens in the activities of political parties was low in the early 90s. and over the past decade there has been no significant growth in this indicator. The mass political consciousness of modern Russia reproduces the passivity and lack of understanding traditional for Russian political culture of how and why people should control power in their country. Therefore, if the need to control power is not considered a natural need and right of people, then the institution of a multi-party system itself is perceived as an incomprehensible and even unnecessary innovation.

There is also a low level of trust in the judiciary, which also does not yet fulfill the role of “protector of the interests of citizens*. both due to unsettled legislation and low legal literacy of the population.

In general, we clearly see that there is a decline in the level of trust in the main institutions of power and an increase in the popularity of the key figure in the value system of the political culture of Russians - the President. However, the growth of public trust in the president also has its downside - the entire political system focuses on the image of V. Putin’s personality. And, as a result, the influence of the federal center is growing, while most state and public structures - parliament, trade unions, government, parties - are in a crisis of confidence.

This characteristic of public consciousness comes from an established feature of the traditional political culture of Russians - to contrast the top leadership and its entourage according to the principle: “the tsar is good, the boyars are bad *, and in case of disappointment in the personality of the leader, instead of structural changes in the organization, the authorities prefer to look for the next leader . For example, the president is credited with increasing payments to the population, while citizens place the blame for rising prices mainly on the government.

The image of the political leader has changed somewhat. Today's leader is not a hero-savior (“B.N. Yeltsin on a tank*), but rather a “master” (“mayor in a cap*), capable of providing guarantees of existence, if not on the scale of the entire state, then at least in a specific city or region. Indeed, of all power structures, the population enjoys the greatest trust in governors and presidents of republics. Power is increasingly moving to the regions, since the population cannot understand the meaning of what is happening at the federal level, and at the same time, trust in the regional authorities, which have retained the traditional “understandable” appearance and methods of functioning, is growing. This has led to the fact that power in the regions is characterized by a high degree of stability and authoritarianism.

The preservation of traditional views on a political leader is demonstrated by the results of surveys of Russians about which periods and leaders in the country's history evoke the most sense of pride. The era and the very personality of Peter I arouse the admiration of most respondents even in the early 1990s. and in the 2000s. This fact can be explained by the fact that the majority of the population assesses the current situation in the country as an emergency and is convinced that its solution requires the emergence of a new “father-transformer,” a “second Stalin.” If in the early 90s. While the majority considered it extremely dangerous to grant full power to the president, today over 60% of respondents believe that “the problems facing Russia can only be solved by concentrating power in one hand*.

In the conditions of the social and economic crisis of the post-Soviet state, the process of updating the mythological foundations of political culture is taking place in the mass consciousness of the population.

The need for group identification, a mythological merger with the group, comes to the fore. Moreover, ethnic identification is complemented by regional identification, where the region acts as a specially identified subject “we”, a mystical unity of the community with the territory.

The process of mythologization of mass consciousness and behavior today can also be seen in the creation of regional myths based on “local patriotism.” An example is the creation of the idea of the “Ural Republic”, “independent Siberia”, “Far Eastern Republic*, etc. The media emphasizes the peculiarity of the region: “The Astrakhan region is an outpost of Russia on the Caspian Sea”, “Stavropol is the gateway of the Caucasus”, “ The Tver region is the soul of Russia*, etc. The strengthening of the regional element in Russian identity can be considered as one of the consequences of the identity crisis that Russia faced at the end of the 20th century.

As research shows, a very common reaction to a crisis is a passive and fatalistic position, a feeling of one’s own helplessness, despair or timid hope for some “objective” positive changes. In this environment, the craving for socialist and collectivist values and nostalgia for the past are most pronounced.

Changes in society have given rise to all sorts of mythologies generated by social memory. But if in past periods of Russian history the source of mythologies was the future, then in the present decade it is the past. The nostalgia for socialism manifested in the mass public consciousness (most often for the Brezhnev “fed” times) is nostalgia for social security and a stable standard of living, and not for the monopoly power of the party nomenklatura. It is precisely the feeling of a stable situation that for the majority of the population is the advantage of socialist orders over modern ones. At the same time, the most acceptable periods of Soviet history in public opinion are not the heroic or warlike years, but those that seem to be the most calm. The ceremonial destruction of idol monuments and the renaming of streets and cities is also an element of mythological consciousness. The destruction of the symbols of the past creates the illusion of “time management,” which is one of the signs of power in the mythological consciousness.

In the modern consciousness of Russians, there is a transformation of attitudes in the procedure of political elections. Bribery of voters, public relations campaigns and much more have led to voter passivity, distrust of the election procedure and a negative attitude towards politics in general. As a result, we see a fairly large and constant percentage of “protest” voting. Researchers of electoral behavior have noted the stereotypes of Russian voting that have become established in the last decade: the higher the economic status of an individual, the less inclined he is to participate in elections... the higher the share of the rural population, the higher the turnout for elections there... The greater the share of urban Russians in the region working age population and the higher the welfare of the residents there, the lower the turnout for elections will be. At the same time, there is no complete abandonment of elections, the public consciousness has already learned the value of the right to vote, and any attempt by the authorities or “dishonest candidates” to deprive citizens of this right may in response cause a sharp protest reaction (either the disruption of elections by non-attendance, or a high percentage of those who voted “against all "). An example is the removal from elections of popular candidates in the regions, which happened in the Rostov, Kursk regions, Primorsky Krai and other regions, where a record number of voters voted “against everyone” in local elections.

It is obvious that the level of democracy that exists in post-Soviet Russia (more precisely, liberal tolerance, which allows for the existence of certain democratic values and institutions) was more a forced and by-product of the disintegration of the totalitarian party-state system than the result of any special democratic movement. Therefore, no influential and independent democratic forces or parties have been formed in the country.

As world experience shows, the creation and constitutional consolidation of new institutions and structures of a democratic state depended, first of all, on the political and, in particular, legal culture of the political elite and the general public. And if the procedures and norms of a democratic constitutional state were adopted at least by political players (president, parliamentarians, governors, mayors), consolidated democracies usually emerged at the regional level. If these norms and procedures were not adopted, “quasi-democratic” and, in fact, authoritarian regimes were established instead of democracy. The current political regime in Russia is characterized by monocentrism, when the resolution of political issues is confined to the Kremlin. According to the majority of the population, as a result of changes in the political system over more than a decade, it has not become democratic.

Ideological and political polarization and the absence of traditions of compromise contributed to the fact that the accelerated modernization from above that began at the end of 1991 not only did not reduce, but to a certain extent increased the conflict potential of society. This is partly due to the fact that reforms of the economy and political system are accompanied by significant socio-economic losses for the majority of the population, which are superimposed on the disintegration of the country, the economic crisis, the redistribution of property and power, the explosion of ethnic conflicts, an unprecedented increase in crime, corruption of officials and other negative aspects reality. As a result of these phenomena, significant social changes have occurred, which are reflected in the mass consciousness of Russians in such a way that today “85% of respondents consider themselves to be part of the disadvantaged part of society, but at the same time 75% of them are convinced that, in fairness, they should belong to his prosperous part." During the period of reforms, there was, as it were, a massive descent of the entire society down the social ladder. Therefore, the attitude towards power quite naturally finds expression in a feeling of distrust, which develops into a feeling of protest among the bulk of the population, as it becomes even poorer, and trust and approval among a small part, which becomes richer or, at least, does not worsen its material position.

In the post-Soviet period, a new type of behavior appeared for Russian life - individualism (the emergence of individual initiative, courage, personal responsibility for one’s own actions, fate), the basis of which researchers believe is the forced struggle for survival in the process of establishing market relations.

Over the past decades, processes of spiritual devastation have also been observed in the country. In the national consciousness of Russian citizens, spiritual and moral values almost always prevailed over material values. For example, the attitude towards private property and wealth was most often associated with such negative qualities of its owners as greed, greed, cruelty, a tendency to deceive, etc. Most citizens were characterized by a feeling of deep hostility towards those who accumulated wealth, especially illegally , criminally. The process of transformation of the Russian Federation (or the “third wave of Westernization”) led to the emergence of a “consumer* society. Conducted public opinion polls show that if in 1990-1995. the majority of Russians were still inclined towards traditional values of national consciousness, calling the most significant such as “clear conscience”, “good friends”, “family”, “love”, then in 1995-2004. values of a material, pragmatic nature (“money”, “wealth”, “apartment”, etc.) began to clearly prevail over spiritual and moral ones. Moreover, recently there has been a serious erosion of spiritual and moral values.

In relation to the problem of international relations, Russian voters tend to think in traditional categories of messianism and the ideological struggle of world political forces. Foreign policy problems are the most important component of the political programs of electoral associations.

The attitude towards the outside world and Russia's role in the world order is one of the main points of the election campaign. Currently, for a significant part of the population, the main values are the ideas of a strong state and the return of Russia to the ranks of world powers.

A significant portion of surveys show that the idea of great power, the revival of Russia as a great country, is gaining the highest ratings. At the same time, the idea of greatness, national uniqueness, and the special historical mission of the Russian people* (the idea of nationalism) is gaining a small percentage of votes.

At the same time, the concept of “great country” has somewhat changed its content over the past ten years. Greatness today is associated in the mind not so much with military power and territorial expansion, but with economic efficiency, advanced science, and developed democracy. Almost 85% of respondents believe that “only by boosting the economy and establishing democracy will we force the world to respect us.”

In relation to other nations, Russians demonstrate a traditional attitude towards significant goodwill and thereby preserve and pass on from generation to generation a large resource of national tolerance.

The protracted period of modernization affected the mass consciousness of Russians with a crisis of traditional political culture and the emergence of new qualities.

The fact that the features of the new political culture have not yet been established and the features of the traditional one have not disappeared is evidenced by the paradoxes of public opinion. On the one hand, we see a longing for the Soviet past (about half of the population is ready to approve a return to the Soviet system), on the other hand, more than half of the population claim that they have “already adapted” or will soon adapt* to the changes that have taken place. People speak in favor of continuing reforms more often than in favor of stopping them.

On the one hand, there is universal recognition of freedom of speech, approval of the independence of the media and the right to criticize the authorities, on the other hand, the willingness to recognize state control over the media and the introduction of “moral censorship.” In the mass consciousness, a high level of hopes for the current president, the opportunity with his help to restore order in the country, raise well-being, etc., is combined with rather restrained and even negative assessments of the president’s activities in various areas; the desire to join the community of developed countries on equal terms is intertwined with the great power complex.

It is no coincidence that the most common feelings among Russians in recent years have been: fatigue and indifference, anger and aggressiveness, confusion and fear, etc. In Russian society, the “Weimar syndrome” is very common - a complex of ideas, feelings and moods reflecting disappointment in democracy, national humiliation due to the collapse of a great power. Hence the nostalgia for a firm hand, strong power, and order. There is no empire, but imperial thinking remains.

One of the important positive results of the past decade has been the tendency towards rationalization of political behavior, expressed in liberation from characteristic mythological elements and inflated expectations from power. In political culture, attitudes toward the need for effective and capable government have emerged. (Over the past 10 years, the number of supporters of Russia as a rule of law state has increased.)

One of the noticeable features of the current consciousness of citizens is an all-encompassing focus on stability. But this does not mean satisfaction with the existing situation. Social discontent persists, fears have arisen of the loss of the existing stability, a new round of inflation, political crises, etc.

Particular mention should be made of the existing youth political subculture, within which elements of the country’s new political culture are being formed. It is the youth who have benefited in recent years from an economic point of view; they have quickly adapted to the new rules of the political game and know what is more profitable socially and professionally. As sociological surveys show, the majority of young people are satisfied with their lives and consider themselves to be in the middle stratum, confident in their own abilities, and have a pronounced focus on realizing personal interests and goals. They are distinguished by a stronger and more significant focus on achievement and success than older generations. The younger generation is more characterized by a clear manifestation of the values of individualism, personal initiative, and independence. It is confident that it can change its life for the better.

In general, young people are characterized by an attitude towards fairly active participation in elections, although socio-political activity is extremely low (the vast majority do not take part in the activities of any public or political organizations and movements).

At the same time, Russian youth, as well as society as a whole, have not yet overcome the basic characteristics of imperial and Soviet political culture. For example, the population of Russia in general, and young people in particular, are characterized by significant stability of state-paternalistic stereotypes (for providing work, education, etc.), trust and distrust are caused by the same political institutions (high level of trust in the president, distrust in political parties, government, etc.).

According to the figurative expression of A.I. Solovyov, the traditional political culture of Russia “swung* towards the “world political culture” and is gradually transforming into a transitional one.

Most scientists highlight a synthesis of traditional features that characterize the political culture of Russia and new social relations that have formed over the past more than ten years. Taking this into account, we can call it transforming or transitional.

Literature

1. Akhiezer A. S. Specifics of Russian political culture and the subject of political science (Historical and cultural research) // “Pro et contra*. T. 7. Summer 2002 // Access mode: http:pubs.carnegier.ru/p&c/russian
2. Fonotov A. G. Russia: from a mobilization society to an innovative one. M., 1993. 271 p.
3. Jordansky V. Russians, what are we like? // Free thought. 1998. No. 2. P. 51-60.
4. Simon G. The dead grab the living. Fundamentals of Russian political culture // Social sciences and modernity. 1996. N° 6. P. 29-43.
5. Gaman O. Political culture of Russia and the USA in the mirror of comparative analysis // Power. 1996. N° 7. P. 60-63.
6. Shcherbinina N. G. Archaic in Russian political culture // Polis. 1997. N° 2. P. 127-139.
7. Gumilev L.N. Ancient Rus' and the Great Steppe. M., 2002. 764 p.
8. Oleshchuk Yu. Hatred of power // World Economy and International Relations. 1999. N° 4. P. 68-74.
9. Gudimenko D.V. Political culture of Russia / Political culture: theory and national models. M., 1994. pp. 313-349.
10. Maryanovsky A. A. Russian economic mentality // State and law. 1999. N° 6. pp. 11-16.
11. Ilyin I. A. Our tasks. M., 1992. 272 p.
12. Levada Yu. From opinions to understanding. Sociological essays. 1993-2000. M., 2000. 256 p.
13. Poetry of the tricolor // Access mode: http:www. monitoring.ru/press-center/press/article_1686.htrnl
14. Platkovsky V.V. Ten years of Russian reforms through the eyes of Russians // Socis. 2002. N° 10. P. 22-37.
15. Lapin N.I. How do Russian citizens feel and what do they strive for? // Socis. 2003. No. 6. P. 78-87.
16. Kertman G. L. Catastrophism in the context of Russian political culture // Polis. 2000. N° 4. P. 6-18.
17. Ermolenko T. F. Paternalistic traditions of Russian political culture // Power. 2001. N° 1. P. 66-69.
18. Panarin A. The Death and Resurrection of the Father in the mass political culture of our time // Power. 2003. N° 3. P. 3-15.
19. Rukavishnikov V. O. How Russia is seen from the inside and from afar // Social and humanitarian knowledge. 2003. N° 3. P. 3-22.
20. Gudkov L., Dubin B. The end of the 90s: attenuation of samples // Monitoring of public opinion. Economic and social changes. 2001. N° 1. P. 15-30.
21. Russia at the turn of the century. M., 2000. 448 p.
22. Solovyov A.I. Communication and culture: a contradiction in the field of politics // Polis. 2002. N° 6. P. 31-41.

As a result of mastering this topic, the student should:

know

– the concept and content of political culture and political socialization;
– main stages and factors of socialization;
– the main types of political culture and the structure of political orientations;
– value aspects of political science culture of modern Russian society;

be able to

– analyze general problems of political culture and ways of positive socialization;
– highlight significant phenomena of political culture and information that promotes socialization;
– highlight the specifics of regional political cultures and features of the socialization process;

own

– basic skills of civil political culture;
– a problematic field of political socialization in modern Russia.

Political culture: concept, structure, functions

Political culture is one of the central themes of both Russian and world political science. The word "culture" comes from the Latin "to cultivate", and in this sense ("the art of agriculture") it was used until the beginning of the 18th century. Later he began to be referred to both human society and people distinguished by elegant manners, erudition, and musicality. The modern scientific definition of culture is much broader. Culture refers to the beliefs, values, and expressions that are common to a group of people and serve to organize the experiences and regulate the behavior of members of that group. It is no coincidence that P. Sorokin perceives as an inextricable unity the triad, which includes: Personality – Society – Culture. “Culture is not just a conglomerate of various phenomena, it is a unity or individuality, all of whose constituent parts are permeated with one fundamental principle and express one main value.” The term “political culture” was introduced into scientific circulation by the German philosopher-educator I. Herder. He did not imagine that the concept of political culture would have such a huge impact on political science and practice. From the standpoint of culture, it is possible to explain a person’s predisposition to political participation and action, and to understand the mechanisms of political change in all spheres of society.

The term “political culture” was introduced into political science by the American political scientist G. Almond. Developing a model of the political system, the author highlighted not only its formal structure, but also the subjective orientation towards the political system. The latter was called political culture. “Political culture” is the most important concept in political science; the categorical apparatus of science and the problem field of politics are associated with it. A great contribution to its development was made by American scientists G. Almond, S. Verba, L. Pye, W. Rosenbaum, the British R. Rose and D. Kavanagh, the German theorist K. von Boime, the French M. Duverger and R. J. Schwarzsenberg , Dutchman I. Inglehart and others. Despite the fact that almost all scientists associated political culture with the presence of value motivation, ideals and beliefs on the basis of which a person is involved in political life, nevertheless, for many of these authors it became a symbol of a generalized characteristic of the subjective context of politics.

Political culture is a value-normative system that society adheres to. It includes not only political ideals, values and attitudes, but also the current norms of political life.

The most clear definition of political culture belongs to the American scientist L. Pye. For him political culture is the sum of fundamental values, feelings and knowledge that give both form and content to the political process.

In the classic work of G. Almond and S. Verba, “Civic Culture,” a detailed definition of the components of the concept “political culture” is given. From their point of view, it is called “political” because “it refers exclusively to political orientations - attitudes to the political system and its various components and attitudes to the individual’s own role in this system...”. These individual orientations, according to American scientists, include several structural elements: a) cognitive orientation - true or false knowledge about political objects and ideas; b) affective orientation - a feeling of connection, engagement, opposition, etc. in relation to political objects; c) evaluative orientation – judgments and opinions about political objects, which usually involve the use of evaluative criteria in relation to political objects and events.

In the above definition, two characteristic features can be distinguished. Firstly, political culture appears as a set of orientations towards political activity. It is not the activity itself, but only a subjective attitude towards it that sets the individual a certain type of behavior necessary to achieve the set goals, but predetermines the choice of direction of activity. Secondly, political culture appears as a structure of orientation, which includes: knowledge about the political system, its roles, functions, decisions and actions, opportunities and ways of influencing political decision-making (cognitive orientations); feelings regarding the political system, its structures, roles, functions and the politicians performing them (emotional orientations); judgments, opinions and ideas about the political system, its roles, functions, consisting of a combination of value standards and criteria, information and emotions (evaluative orientations).

As G. Almond himself admitted, the concept he introduced was an attempt to classify, using one term, what “previously appeared as an attitude to politics, political values, ideology, national character, cultural environment, etc.” It also made it possible to highlight the qualitative side of the political system, to overcome the limitations of the institutional approach in political research, to explain the differences in the functioning and results of the activities of outwardly similar political systems, to combine the study of the formal and informal components of political systems with the analysis of national political psychology, political ideology, and the fundamental values of society.

There are three main approaches to the interpretation of political culture in science. Some scientists identify it with the subjective content of politics, meaning by it the entire set of spiritual phenomena (G. Almond, S. Verba, D. Devine, Yu. Krasnov, etc.) and symbols (L. Dittmer). It is not surprising that the concept of political culture is regarded by some of them as a term that generally characterizes the subjective context of the entire set of power-political relations.

Another group of scientists sees in political culture a manifestation of normative requirements (S. Byte) or a set of typical patterns of behavior (J. Plano), i.e. political culture acts as a regulator of behavior.

The third group of scientists understand political culture as a method, style of political activity (I. Shapiro, P. Sharan, V. Rosenbaum), they believe that this is a special, specific subjective perspective of politics. This direction of research reveals the practical forms of human interaction with the state and other political institutions, as a unique expression of their deep ideas about power, political goals and priorities, preferred and individually mastered norms and rules of practical activity. Characterizing the most stable ideas of a person and the most typical forms of his relationship with the authorities, the style of his political activity demonstrates how generally recognized norms and traditions of state life are perceived and assimilated by him, how creative and stereotypical methods of realizing his rights and freedoms are combined in everyday activity, etc. d. The same gap (contradiction) that develops between the norms of the political game, the standards of civil behavior, mastered and those not mastered by man, is the most important internal source of the evolution and development of political culture.

The study of the structure of political orientations was continued by researcher W. Rosenbaum, who identified three types of orientation regarding political objects.

First type constitute orientations regarding the institutions of public administration. It includes: a) the individual’s assessments of state authorities, their norms, symbols and persons performing political functions, his reaction to them - orientation regarding the regime; 6) assessment of various demands on the political system and reactions to them - orientation regarding the “input”, assessment of decisions made by the political authorities and reactions to them – orientation regarding the “exit”.

Second type includes orientations regarding “others” in the political system: a) political identification – the individual’s sense of belonging to a certain social group, party, feelings of belonging and loyalty to them; b) political beliefs (beliefs), reflecting attitudes towards other political groups in the interval “good – bad”; c) ideas about the basic rules and norms that should regulate the activities of the political system - about the “rules of the game.”

IN third type includes orientations regarding one’s own activities, including: a) political competence - an individual’s assessment of his own political “resources” that allow him to participate in political life, and ideas about the influence of politics on a person; b) political effectiveness - ideas about the influence of an individual’s political actions on the policy being developed and about the possibilities of such influence through civil actions. In a generalized form, the content and structure of political orientations are presented in Table. 11.1.

Table 11.1

Orientation	Operational Definitions
Political identification	Nation of citizens: political entities and groups towards which the individual has a positive or negative attitude; political entities and groups in which the individual is most deeply involved
Political faith	Willingness to collaborate with various groups in various social activities; group membership; assessing the activities of groups in terms of whether they are trustworthy, what their motives are, etc.
Orientations relative to the mode	Belief in the legitimacy of the regime; feelings (about) and evaluation of the regime's major political institutions and symbols; involvement in political activities to support or oppose the regime
"Rules of the game"	How does an individual feel about expressed political opinions; concepts of political obligations to oneself and to others; concepts of political decision-making by authorities; attitude towards political deviants and dissidents
Political effectiveness	The belief that authorities are responsible for their actions; belief in the importance of civic engagement and political participation; belief in the possibility of political change
Political competence
Input=Output – orientation	Satisfaction with government policies; knowledge of how political demands reach decision-making centers; belief in the effectiveness of the “inputs” and “outputs” of the political system

Political culture performs certain functions in society:

1) identification, realizing a person’s need to understand group membership and determine acceptable ways to participate in expressing and defending the interests of a given community;
2) orientation, explaining the meaning of political phenomena and one’s own capabilities in the implementation of rights and freedoms in a specific political system;
3) adaptation and socialization. The first expresses a person’s need to adapt to the changing political environment and the conditions for the exercise of his rights and powers. The second characterizes the acquisition by a person of certain skills and properties that allow him to realize his civil rights, political functions and interests in a particular system of power - through familiarization with the skills of political behavior;
4) integration aimed at preserving values and uniting various groups around them;
5) communications, carrying out the interaction of subjects and institutions based on stereotypes, myths and symbols.

The subject of political culture can be an individual with his attitudes, values, preferences, as well as various social groups: classes, nations, nationalities, etc.

Political culture is capable of exerting a certain influence on political processes and institutions. Firstly, under its influence traditional forms of political life can be reproduced. This possibility remains even if external circumstances and the nature of the ruling regime change. For example, in traditional societies (agrarian, built on simple reproduction and natural ties), political culture, even during the period of reformation, as a rule, maintains the previous archaic structure of power, counteracting the goals of modernization and democratization of the political system. This ability of political culture well explains the fact that most revolutions (i.e., rapid, landslide changes) most often end either in a return to the previous order (meaning the inability of the population to adapt new goals and values for themselves), or in terror (the only thing capable of coercing people to the implementation of new principles of political development for them). Secondly, political culture is capable of generating new, non-traditional forms of social and political life for society, as well as combining various elements of the previous and new, more progressive political system.

The concept of political culture, proposed and formulated by G. Almond and G. Powell, has been repeatedly clarified and supplemented by numerous researchers of this phenomenon. Along with the above orientations, political culture includes: political experience, stereotypes, political myths, models of both political behavior of individuals and groups, and the functioning of political institutions, ideology, political symbols, political socialization.

Let us consider such components of political culture as stereotypes, myths and symbols.

A political stereotype is a simplified, schematic, deformed and value-oriented idea of political objects. The distinctive features of a stereotype are: 1) personification of events (the cause of certain phenomena is associated with the activities of a specific person or a specific group); 2) strong emotional coloring in the perception and interpretation of events (usually a sharply negative or strongly positive attitude towards something or someone); 3) irrationality (usually facts that contradict the stereotype are not noticed or are indignantly rejected); 4) stability (the stereotype is static, durable, it is not subject to change and is capable of self-preservation even in a radically changing situation).

As a rule, political stereotypes summarize the experience of a group in a simplified and deformed form. In everyday consciousness, stereotypes can replace knowledge about political objects, significantly simplifying the process of orientation, development and decision-making in a complex and contradictory world. Stereotypes contribute to the formation of political identity, dividing the social and political world along the axis “us” - “them”, “us” - “strangers”, “friends” - “enemies”.

A political myth is a static image, based on beliefs, that allows one to organize and interpret disconcerting facts and events, and to structure a vision of the collective present and future. Numerous studies devoted to the political myth reveal the social and psychological prerequisites for its emergence. Mythology, including political mythology, arises when a group or a large part of society is faced with new, incomprehensible and beyond its control phenomena that carry an obvious or secret threat to its existence. That is why myth-making flourishes during periods of social catastrophes, deep-seated crises of society, wars, revolutions, etc. From a psychological point of view, the creation of a myth is associated with the impossibility of logically explaining the radical changes taking place and the resulting protective return of the individual to early life experience of perceiving the world around him and interacting with it. Mythological methods of understanding are extremely tenacious, diverse and always claim to be an “unconditionally realistic reflection of life.”

Of significant interest is also the interpretation of myth by the analytical psychology of C. G. Jung, according to which myth is a projection of the collective unconscious (archetypes) onto certain real objects. Defining the collective unconscious as a part of the psyche, which differs from the personal unconscious by the fact that, unlike the latter, it does not owe its existence to personal experience, C. Jung studies the genesis of archetypal images, their “polishing” and transformation into symbols “ever more beautiful in form - universal in content." In certain critical situations, it is possible to activate and revive archetypes, and then their transfer to social and political objects becomes a source of collective myths.

The main properties of any myth, including a political myth, are: 1) polymorphism - the same set of symbols can be present in different myths, and the same theme of a myth can have different directions and different emotional perceptions; 2) limitation - the myth uses a limited number of symbols, but in myths their numerous combinations are possible; 3) abstraction - the myth does not correlate with empirical reality; 4) fundamentality of faith - myth is based on assumptions that do not require verification and regardless of their truth; 5) static - myth does not correlate with historical and social time, it lives in its own time dimension.

Of all the possible plots of a political myth, four main themes can be distinguished: a conspiracy, a golden age, a hero-savior, and unity. The conspiracy myth interprets negatively perceived phenomena as the result of the secret action of the forces of darkness. These could be “enemies of the people”, agents of secret intelligence services and sects. The secretive actions of representatives of these insidious organizations are necessarily aimed at conquering or destroying a group, society, or state. Since the conspiracy is created by demonic forces, you can resist them using any means of struggle. The myth of the golden age either calls for a return to the “origins” of the bright past, where love, equality, brotherhood reigned, where the world was simple and understandable, or calls for a bright future, considering previous periods as “prehistory”, the existence of which is justified only in that the extent to which she prepared this ideal future. The myth of the hero-savior endows specific characters with charismatic traits. The hero must have the gift of a prophet, unsurpassed talent as a military leader, the highest moral qualities, etc. The myth of unity is based on the opposition between “friends” and “enemies”, “friends” and “strangers”, “us” and “them”. They, or, in other words, enemies, are the cause of all our disasters and misfortunes. “They” seek to take away “our” values, and therefore salvation lies in unity and opposition to “them.”

A feature of modern political myth has become, in the words of the German philosopher E. Cassirer, the creation of “technique” and “production” of new myths. Not only the unconscious, but also the masters of myth-making create new and new myths. E. Cassirer pays special attention to the difference between science and mythology: instead of a hierarchy of causes and effects - a hierarchy of forces and gods, instead of laws - specific unified images. “If you compare the empirical-scientific and mythological picture of the world, it will immediately become clear that their opposition is not based on the fact that when considering and interpreting reality they use completely different categories. Not in properties, not in the quality of these categories - in their modalities, This is where myth and empirical-scientific knowledge differ." In R. Barth's interpretation, myths are presented as natural phenomena of nature, but in fact they are the product of ideology. The function of myth comes down to "raising historically transitory facts to the rank of eternal." In his works A. F. Losev pays special attention to the study of modal phenomena in language. For example, the expression “demonic obsession” is used in speech, although the person pronouncing it often does not believe in demons and obsession. But the modality expressed in it “merges into an indivisible whole.” words and individual sentences, transforms a set of separate words into a single and integral continuum of phrases and speech as a whole.

A political symbol is a sign that performs a communicative function between the individual and the government. If we proceed from the concept of T. Parsons, according to which culture is an ordered system of symbols, then we can say that political culture is an organized system of symbols. In order for a symbol to perform a communicative function, it must have a similar meaning for many individuals; its meaning must at least be intuitively clear to a certain circle of people. Political symbols include the flag, coat of arms and anthem of the state, slogans, memorable dates, political rituals (demonstrations, rallies, ceremonial meetings, etc.). In addition to the communicative function, the symbol has an integrative function - it is able to unite, unite people, groups, and provide a sense of unity.

In political science there are numerous typologizations of political culture. The first in-depth study of the types of political culture was carried out by G. Almond and S. Verba. From 1958 to 1962 they undertook a large-scale comparative study of the political cultures of Great Britain, West Germany, Italy, Mexico and the United States. The results obtained during the study and the concept formulated on their basis were presented in the work “Civic Culture”. It distinguished three types of political culture: patriarchal, subservient and activist.

The patriarchal type is characterized by citizens' orientation towards local values - community, clan, clan, village, tribe, etc. Thus, an individual with a patriarchal culture is focused on specific individuals - leaders, shamans. Members of the community completely lack knowledge about the political system; political orientations are not separated from economic and religious ones. People of such a political culture tend to have a more emotional and normative-evaluative attitude towards politics than a cognitive-cognitive one. In such societies, independent political roles have not yet been identified, and the political orientations of the population are inseparable from social and economic ones. Therefore, individuals with a patriarchal culture have no expectations associated with the political system.

The submissive type of culture is characterized by a passive attitude of citizens towards the political system. Here the person is already oriented towards the political system, associates his expectations with it, but at the same time is afraid to evaluate this system and make legal demands on it due to sanctions from the system.

The activist type or political culture of participation is characterized by the active inclusion of individuals in political life. Citizens skillfully articulate their interests and, through elections, interest groups, and parties, influence the policy-making process. At the same time, they demonstrate loyalty to the political system, law-abidingness and respect for decisions made.

However, in real political life, notes G. Almond, the political culture of any society is a combination, a “mixture” of several types of political cultures. He paid special attention to three types of such combinations. A democratic industrial political system is characterized by the following combination: 60% representatives of an activist culture, 30% - a subject culture, 10% - a patriarchal one; for an authoritarian transitional system, respectively – 30, 40 and 30%; for democratic pre-industrial – 20, 20 and 60%. These proportions, of course, are quite arbitrary and can fluctuate, but they express the nature of the relationship between different types of political cultures in different societies.

According to G. Almond, the democratic industrial political system corresponds to a civil political culture, which is mixed. The author of the concept of civil culture claims that it is based on the ancient tradition of “mixed government,” whose representatives were Aristotle, Polybius, and Cicero. This type of culture presupposes, firstly, the presence of three fragments of political culture in society (patriarchal, subject and activist), and secondly, the presence of qualities of subjects and patriarchs even among active participants. G. Almond and S. Verba emphasized that patriarchal and subservient orientations balance the activity and political participation of the individual, thereby ensuring the sustainability and stability of the democratic political system. Thus, the “ideal citizen” must simultaneously: strive to influence the government and at the same time maintain loyalty to it; be potentially active, but not constantly active. The main features of civil political culture are: consensus regarding the legitimacy of political institutions; tolerance towards other values and interests; competence. Of course, these are features of the normative model of political culture. However, despite the idealization of the concept of civic culture, many political scientists recognize that it is “civic culture” that is the solid foundation of democratic political regimes. Historical experience shows that the “transplantation” of democratic models into countries of “non-Western” civilization most often ends in failure: either a direct return to authoritarianism, or a gradual “hybridization” of the regime. That is why one of the most important conditions for a successful transition to democracy is the formation of a civil political culture. Naturally, direct copying of the political culture of Western countries is impossible. In each country, the emerging civil political culture will be complemented by its own specific national features, which embody the historical and political experience of previous generations.

A significant contribution to the study of political culture was made by the American political scientist R. Inglehart, who developed the concept of the “silent revolution.” According to its main provisions, the most stable value orientations and moods of the mass strata of society are the most important elements of political culture. Specific combinations of these orientations and sentiments determine the stability and viability of democracy. R. Inglehart suggested that in industrialized countries, under the influence of socio-economic development, there is a transition from material to post-material values, which are beginning to play a leading role in people's lives. A number of these values - satisfaction with life (work, leisure, family life) and the tendency to trust others - are directly included, according to R. Inglehart, in the structure of civic culture. “Trust in others” is an element of culture that predetermines the possibility of uniting citizens into associations and interest groups, without whose activity, in turn, democracy becomes impossible. The sentiments expressed by the formula “life satisfaction” have a strong influence on the attitude of citizens towards the political system as a whole. Social mood as a sociological phenomenon is largely determined by individual and group mood, confidence and self-confidence in oneself, in like-minded people, self-assessments of one’s internal spiritual and moral state, the direction of social actions and the forms of their manifestation in the public environment, the level of consciousness as a subjective reflection of the living environment, including the field of education, etc.

Social mood is the emotional background of a person’s entire life activity, especially his social perception of understanding, assessment of himself and others, and is defined as relatively long-lasting, stable mental states of moderate or weak intensity, manifesting as a positive or negative background of an individual’s mental life. The emotional background is determined by the level of manifestation of emotional processes (deep, superficial, etc.). Through emotional processes, a person experiences joy or sorrow, anger or mercy, vigor or lethargy, activity or passivity, confidence or self-doubt, satisfaction or dissatisfaction with various aspects of his life, in a certain ratio of which the mood is formed.

Comparative studies conducted by R. Inglehart revealed that the Italians and the French were the least satisfied with life in Western Europe (the share of those satisfied with life did not exceed 15 and 17%, respectively). The Danes and Dutch were in the lead in this indicator (47 and 36%). The Germans occupied an intermediate position. A similar picture emerged when studying such an indicator as “the degree of trust in others.” For example, the largest percentage of those inclined to trust was found in Denmark, Great Britain, and the Benelux countries (from 85 to 95%), with Italians again in last place. Analysis of the results obtained led to the conclusion that there is a close connection between the level of socio-economic development and the degree of life satisfaction, as well as the degree of trust. The higher the level of socio-economic development, the greater the proportion of the population is satisfied with life and inclined to trust. Let us recall that these indicators are the most important features of civic culture. Thus, socio-economic development influences changes in civil culture and determines the strengthening of democracy.

A few years later, in the early 1990s, repeated similar studies were carried out in most countries of Europe, the USA and Canada, and three years later, domestic scientists joined them and included Russia in the international study. As a result, it was found that residents of Denmark, Iceland, the Netherlands, Sweden, Canada, and the USA are the most satisfied with life (from 80.6% in the USA to 85.7% in Denmark); Belgium (78.4%), Great Britain (71.5%), Germany (West Germany) (71.5%) were somewhat behind; the lowest levels of life satisfaction in Western Europe were recorded in Italy (71.1%), Portugal (63.4%), Spain (77.0%) and France (58.9%). In Eastern European countries, this level was even lower: 57.9% in East Germany and Slovakia, 52% in Poland, 43.9% in Hungary. Russia closes the list of countries. Here the lowest level of life satisfaction is 20%, i.e. only 1/5 of Russians are satisfied with their current state.

The level of interpersonal trust turned out to be the highest in Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, the USA, Canada (from 61.1% in Sweden to 51.5% in the USA); a little lower - in Ireland, Iceland, Great Britain. The lowest levels of trust in Western Europe were observed in France (22.8%) and Portugal (21.4%). It turns out to be somewhat higher in Eastern European countries: in Slovakia - 21.6%, Hungary - 24.6%, Czech Republic - 26.1%. Unexpectedly, it turned out that the level of interpersonal trust in Russia is 57% (in terms of this indicator, Russia is comparable to the most developed industrial countries and occupies a position even higher than Canada, the USA, and the Netherlands).

In a study conducted on the basis of St. Petersburg State Pedagogical University (2005–2006) (Value orientations of student youth, scientific director I.E. Timermanis), one of the tasks was to study public mood, i.e. studying the state of feelings and mindsets among modern students. What is the mood of respondents lately? The following answers were received to this question: “In general, I am quite optimistic” – 52.6%, “From time to time I experience disappointment and bitterness” – 36.6%, “I am often worried, depressed” – 10.8%.

As a result of the study, it was revealed that the satisfaction of survey participants with various aspects of their lives depends on their mood. A completely optimistic mood corresponds to high satisfaction with the following areas of life: relationships with others - 82.5%, family relationships - 76.4%, one's life in general - 71.4%, one's position in society - 67.6%.

Respondents who from time to time experience disappointment and bitterness are not completely satisfied with areas of life, especially with their health - 53.3%, physical fitness - 52.5%, their work, study - 51.8%, their financial situation - 51. 0%.

Young people who are characterized by a preoccupied, depressed mood are not satisfied with such aspects of their lives as leisure time - 25.0%, health - 19.8%, position in society - 17.5%. For example, despite a completely optimistic mood, only 5.3% of young people are not satisfied with their leisure time.

In a completely optimistic mood, 64.0% of respondents rated their health as “mostly healthy,” but in the mood of “I’m often anxious and depressed,” only 6.0% of survey participants rated their health as “mostly healthy.” Young people, who are characterized by a preoccupied, depressed mood, rated their health as “I get sick often, I don’t have enough strength” – 51.4%.

The social mood of student youth largely depends on the formed social values (in descending order of importance): sincerity, kindness, trust, loyalty, understanding, intelligence, decency, honesty, competence, etc.

The nature of the state of the social environment contributes to the manifestation of aggressiveness in young people towards other people (48.0% of respondents).

The resulting social indicators determine the range of public sentiment, in particular, the optimum in relation to their future (Fig. 11.1).

Rice. 11.1.

During the study, it was noted that boys are more likely to be in an optimistic mood - 56.3% (compared to girls - 43.7%). Concern and depression are more characteristic of girls - 66.7% (compared to boys - 33.3%).

More specific characteristics of looking into the future are as follows:

– believe in the “lucky star of Russia” – 41.0%;
– believe that they will find a good job – 27.0%;
– believe that they will find like-minded people at work – 32.0%;
– believe that they will live better than now – 18.0%.

Between socio-professional groups also

differences are noted. The most optimistic mood is characteristic of cadets - 66.5% (compare, for example, among students of colleges and secondary specialized educational institutions - 44.0%). A preoccupied, depressed mood characterizes working youth to a greater extent - 15.0% (compare with the same cadets of military universities - 4.7%).

The overall assessment of social health also depends on mood. Thus, with an optimistic mood, the assessment of social health is quite high – 60.2%. With a preoccupied, depressed, depressed mood, the assessment of social health is significantly reduced - 4.0%.

A relationship was identified between the nature of mood and the feeling with which modern young people look to the future (Table 11.2).

Table 11.2

Mood and feeling towards the future (%)

Respondents who are characterized by a quite optimistic mood look into the future with confidence and optimism - 69.8%. In the group of young people with a preoccupied, depressed mood, only 4.8% of respondents are optimistic about the future. More survey participants who from time to time experience disappointment and bitterness turned out to have feelings of anxiety and fear - 48.2%.

Self-confidence, a sense of self-confidence, and self-esteem also relate to socio-psychological indicators of social health. According to the overwhelming majority of respondents, their self-respect and self-confidence have recently increased - 85.4% (comparison, they have not increased - 14.6%).

Those respondents who believe that confidence has recently increased rate their health as “mostly healthy” – 86.5%. Survey participants who assessed their health as “I get sick often and lack strength” noted that self-esteem and self-confidence did not increase – 37.4%.

The way young people feel about the future and their self-confidence are closely linked (Figure 11.2).

Rice. 11.2.

The more confident boys and girls are, the higher their self-esteem, the more confident and optimistic they look into the future - 91.8%.

Any manifestation of aggressiveness or anger affects the state of social health. Aggressive behavior manifests itself as a technique or means when personal contradictions arise, as well as when there is a blockage or barriers to the goal. The manifestation of aggressiveness, cruelty, and negative feelings towards other people cannot but affect social well-being.

How often do our survey participants experience aggression towards other people? The following answers were received to this question: “always” – 3.0%, “from time to time” – 53.7%, “almost never” – 43.3%. With such indicators, of course, one cannot talk about a positive assessment of the state of social health, since this is associated with spiritual, moral, social, moral and other prophets existing in society.

Young people currently cite the increase in the level of aggressiveness in the country – 32.0% – as one of the reasons for the disunity between people. The presence of aggressiveness in interactions between people leads to a greater extent to problematic social health – 73.0%. The state of social health was assessed as positive by only 10.5% of respondents. 16.5% of young people assessed the state of social health of modern Russian youth as unsatisfactory.

The results of self-assessment show that it has a certain significance for diagnosing moral motives, social needs, formed individual opinions and attitudes. All of these factors are correlates of social health. Adequate self-esteem forms a person’s sense of well-being, which has a positive impact on his personal and social health.

If we evaluate social moods as the comfortable position of young people in society, then the problem of “their future” comes to the fore in the assessment system. These data give rise to optimistic conclusions from sociologists and political scientists that in Russian political culture there are prerequisites for its democratization and the formation of a civil culture.

As part of similar studies conducted abroad, efforts have been made to identify certain models of political behavior and their prevalence in the mass consciousness. The attention of scientists was drawn to the degree of readiness of the population of various countries to participate in various forms of mass actions in defense of their rights. In countries such as Iceland, Norway, Sweden, the most common models were actions of civil disobedience, as well as rallies and strikes. For example, in Sweden, 61.6% of the population are ready to participate in acts of civil disobedience and 58.9% in rallies and strikes, defending their rights. In Norway the corresponding figures are 51.7 and 55.5%, in Iceland – 52.7 and 52.5%. A less common model of participation was signing petitions. The last place was taken by such models as occupation of premises (19.4%), blockade of communication routes (10.2%), etc. A similar picture was observed in other countries. In Russia, 37% of the population expresses their readiness to take part in demonstrations, 32% in acts of civil disobedience, 23% in strikes, 60% in signing petitions, and 8% in seizing premises and blocking communications routes. As can be seen from the above data, in Russian political culture there are ideas about peaceful and democratic methods of political participation of the masses. The most common model (and this is the specificity of Russian political culture) turned out to be participation in signing petitions and, conversely, the share of those who expressed a willingness to take part in radical forms of protest is much lower than, say, in the USA, Canada, Belgium, France. According to VTsIOM, during the crisis, the protest sentiments of Russians from October 2008 to April 2009 “grew approximately twice. But so far, it is not so much the protest sentiments themselves that are growing, but the approval of those forces that come out with protests. Sympathy for the protests has risen to approximately 67%, and the willingness to protest still remains at the same not very high level."

In modern political science, there are two opposing points of view regarding Russian political culture. According to one of them The political culture of Russian society is authoritarian and autarkic in nature. It is practically not subject to any changes, and therefore any reforms are doomed to failure.

The English ethnologist J. Gorer explains the peculiarities of the Russian national character, including the respectful attitude towards authority characteristic of Russian political culture, by the tradition of Russian families of tightly swaddling babies. It is with the help of tight swaddling that parents, often unconsciously, convey to their children a feeling of the need for strong power and powerlessness before it.

American ethnopsychologists E. Crankshaw and W. Miller seek to establish a connection between Russian climatic conditions and Russian national character. “Long winter periods... long autumn and spring gave rise in the Russian national character to an alternation of long lethargy with violent activity.” D. Peabody also emphasizes that “the endless Russian plains have led to the emergence in the Russian national character of tendencies towards immoderation, a desire for extreme situations and truly cosmic emotionality.”

According to another approach Russian political culture is gradually changing. The nature of its changes was influenced by industrialization, urbanization, the growth of education, changes in the structure of employment, the development of communication technologies, etc. Ultimately, Russian political culture will be forced to borrow and integrate most Western values.

In domestic and foreign political science, Western and Eastern political cultures are often contrasted (Table 11.3).

Table 11.3

Comparative analysis of the positions and orientations of Western and Eastern political cultures

Values and orientations of Western political culture	Values and orientations of the political culture of the East
Orientation in politics towards rational goals and interests	Orientation in politics to ethical values and traditions
The supremacy of character and personal freedoms. Autonomy of the individual	The supremacy of public, group interests over personal
Focus on conflict and coordination of different interests. Recognition of the rights of the opposition. Tolerance	Focus on a conflict-free society. Negative attitude towards opposition and dissent
Focus on horizontal connections. The value of civil society	Focus on patron-client relationships. The value of family, clan, community, corporation
Focus on Innovation Dominance	Orientation towards the dominance of traditions
Focus on ensuring law and order on the part of the state, guaranteeing human rights and freedoms	Orientation towards state patronage

Any political culture consists of subcultures. sub- under). In political science, their different types are distinguished: religious, ethnolinguistic, regional, demographic. G. Almond divided subcultures into vertical and horizontal. The first of them are distinguished by their division into subcultures of “mass” and “elite”. The second are regional, religious and ethnic. Depending on the nature of the relationship between subcultures, U. Rosenbaum identifies integrated and fragmented types of political cultures. The integrated type presupposes the agreement of the majority of society on basic values (regarding the main goals of the development of society, the functions of the political system and political norms). Fragmented political cultures are characterized by acute conflict between subcultures; the predominance of patriarchal and subject orientations over national ones; deep suspicion of representatives of different subcultures towards each other. Ultimately, a fragmented culture causes the instability of the political system and the instability of its political institutions. This type of political culture is characteristic of developing countries, as well as Canada, Northern Ireland, and modern Russia.

A more detailed typology of political cultures was proposed by the English researcher D. Kavanagh. He distinguishes homogeneous, fragmented, mixed and artificially homogeneous political cultures. A homogeneous political culture is characterized by the unity of society according to fundamental values and tolerance. Fragmentary - conflicting opposition of various subcultures. Mixed political culture - the presence of value orientations that differ from the norms and values of the existing regime. Artificially homogeneous - apathy (subservient character), combined with mobilized participation.

The current state and development of domestic political culture cannot be understood without referring to its origins, the historical diversity of its features and their evolution. For a long time in Rus' there was a patriarchal political culture, characterized by a local worldview, orientation towards clan and community. One can, obviously, talk about the fragmentation of ancient Russian culture, because each community, each local community developed and professed its own values, while the values and norms of the “other” world were perceived as a lie, something alien and hostile. This type of political culture, in essence, does not differ from similar types of archaic communities. The originality of Russian political culture is formed under the influence of Byzantine-Orthodox civilization.

The adoption of the eastern branch of Christianity, and many Russian thinkers and Western political scientists agree on this, predetermined the future paths and destinies of Russian political culture. In this regard, the thought of the Russian philosopher G. Florovsky is interesting, who emphasized that with the adoption of Christianity in Rus', paganism did not die, it only went deep underground, and Christian culture initially became the property of only the most educated and cultural minority. As a result, a “day culture” is formed - a culture of mind and spirit, and a “night culture” - a culture of dreams, imagination, based on pagan mythology. Essentially, what the Russian thinker writes about can be characterized as a further fragmentation of Russian political culture, its division into two dominant subcultures: the subculture of the elite - the “tops” and the subculture of the masses - the “bottoms”.

The conflict-fragmented nature of Russian political culture and the lack of common values acceptable to society led to the destabilization of society and the weakening of the state. That is why the problem of integrating society has been solved since the time of Ivan the Terrible by administrative-authoritarian methods. Autarky sharp Ivan IV opened the period of formation of a subject culture, which lasted until Peter I. Moreover, the patriarchal culture did not disappear, but continued to predetermine the orientations of a significant part of society (“the king is not the same,” “the king is good, but the boyars are bad,” etc.) . The penetration of Westernizing ideas into Russia led to a spiritual and then a political split within the elite. The uprising on Senate Square in December 1825 made this split obvious. As a result, in the 19th century. In Russia there were at least three subcultures: the liberal and “protective”-conservative culture of the elite and the patriarchal-subject culture of the masses. There is a point of view according to which the conflict between these three subcultures largely predetermined the 1917 revolution.

The political culture of the Soviet period can be characterized as artificially homogeneous. At the same time, it retained many features of Russian culture: the communal character was transformed into Soviet collectivism; orientation towards the dominant nature of power - into statism and paternalism; passivity – apathy, lack of orientation towards “entering” the political system; patriarchy - into a personalized perception of politics; belief in the “truth” of social values – intolerance of dissent; religiosity - in endowing leaders with charismatic traits; mythologized consciousness – in the belief of building a “bright future”; faith in Russia's messianic calling - in its orientation towards leadership in the world revolution, and later towards the status of a superpower.

Industrialization, profound changes in the social structure, and an increase in the level of education of the population predetermined shifts in the value orientations of Soviet society. Since the mid-1960s. a dissident subculture was formed and developed, within which values such as personal autonomy, freedom of choice, human rights, etc. were preached. In the 1970s a significant part of society, contrary to official ideological norms, begins to focus on the values of personal life: family, work, leisure, material well-being. Such a reorientation from the public to the individual was branded by propaganda as “philistinism” and “philistinism.” At the same time, the policy of greater openness and development of contacts with Western countries contributed to the penetration of new standards of living and consumption into society. As the political system responded poorly to growing demands, apathy and alienation of the masses from politics increased, undermining the legitimacy of the government.

The profound changes that have occurred in Russian society over the past decade could not but have an impact on its political culture. The main feature of its current state is fragmentation. In modern political culture it is quite easy to detect traditional and modern modernist and postmodernist values and attitudes. In Russian political culture there has been a transition from a subservient culture to an activist one. For all the unstructuredness of socio-political views, for all the transitional nature of Russian political culture, it is distinguished by its non-antagonism and high proportion of consensus attitudes.

Despite the fragmentation of Russian political culture, many authors document the emergence of new modernized values, which, being recognized by the majority, do not divide, but unite society. These include: the life of an individual; legality and equality; inviolability of private property; the welfare of citizens as the basis of a strong state; respect for human rights.

Theory of politics: textbook, manual / ed. B. A. Isaeva. St. Petersburg, 2008. P. 311.

Cashirer E. Philosophy of symbolic forms. St. Petersburg, 2002.

Rukavishnikov V. O., Halman L. and others. Russia between past and future. Comparison of indicators of political culture of the population of 22 countries in Europe and North America // Socis. 1995. No. 5.

VTsIOM: Sociologists: Russians’ savings may end in six months // URL: wciom/ru.

Zevina O. G., Makarenko B. I. On the peculiarities of the political culture of modern Russia // Polis. 2010. No. 3. P. 122.

With all the diverse socio-economic, political-ideological and spiritual changes in the development of Russian society throughout the pre-Soviet, Soviet and post-Soviet periods, the type of relationship between the population and the government demonstrates amazing constancy and continuity. It is based on a subservient political culture, characterized by relations of unilateral dependence of the individual on power, and expectations of receiving various benefits from it. In Russia, the subject political culture has a number of specific features, which is due to the influence of civilizational, geographical, and historical features of its development:

* in Russia, political culture is dualistic and represents an inorganic interaction (sometimes violent confrontation) of two sociocultural flows, oriented towards the value systems of the East and West. The dominant sociocultural flow, covering the majority of the population, has always been oriented towards the values of corporatism (the values of collectivism, conciliarity), justice, equality; he was distinguished by his adherence to patriarchal traditions (the habit of submitting to authority, the need for leadership, etc.). Another stream, other subcultures contained the values of freedom, individualism, human rights, pluralism, etc.;
* the fragmentation and heterogeneity of Russian political culture determined the confrontational nature of relations between its bearers. Opposing ideas and images of the desired fair society that exist among various social groups, given the low general culture of the Russian population, constantly collided, forming the basis of an acute, sometimes brutal, political struggle. This explains why Russia throughout its history has been rocked by endless riots, civil wars, and revolutions;
* concentration of political dominance in the hands of the ruling class, starting from the early Middle Ages. It was caused by the fact that the development of vast Russian expanses and the protection of long borders from militant neighbors were possible (in the absence of a developed technological, material and communication infrastructure) only with the help of a strong government. Therefore, it was political factors (the political will of the monarch, a strong state, an extensive bureaucratic apparatus, a developed repressive system) that ensured the progressive development of Russian society;
* the absence of a free individual and a mature civil society, which always lead to the fact that political life is concentrated in the hands of the ruling class. The preservation of subject political orientations as generally accepted standards of political behavior in Soviet times, despite the new government’s assertions about the broad participation of the population in politics, was due to a number of reasons:
* overcoming the socio-economic and cultural backwardness of Russia could be ensured by strengthening the integrating and mobilizing role of the state;
* the concentration of economic, political and ideological power in the hands of the new ruling class formed in Soviet times - the party nomenklatura, which began to personify the state, led to the absorption of the individual into society;
* legitimation of party and state power, the establishment of an aura of its sanctity, highest and undeniable value compared to any other form of loyalty are characteristic of countries with a significant proportion of marginal groups. They became the social base of the Soviet totalitarian regime.

The features of the Soviet-type subject political culture are revealed through the characteristics of stable features, elements of political consciousness (political thinking, attitudes, values and standards of political behavior), which is defined as bureaucratic in content. The features of Soviet political culture include Salmin, A.M. Political development of Russia and current problems of political science // Polis. - 2001. - No. 3. - P. 16.:

* hierarchy as the most essential feature of any bureaucratic consciousness. The highest layer of the bureaucratic hierarchy (no matter whether it was the local nobility or the party nomenklatura) has a monopoly on the ultimate truth and moral assessments; the dependent population is left with thoughtless acceptance and adherence to authoritarian formulas;
* authority as the basic principle of bureaucratic consciousness (in this case, the CPSU), and the sacralization of authority has become the essence of totalitarian political thinking. In such a consciousness, the world is presented holistically and without contradictions. The overconcentration of all types of power in totalitarian societies not only alienates a person from property and power, but also absorbs him and deprives him of individuality;
* closeness, consisting in the absolutization of the political values of the working class and the complete denial of such achievements of Western democracy that have universal significance, such as the rule of law, the principles of separation of powers, Human rights, civil society, etc.;
* absolutization of revolutionary methods of transforming society and ignoring evolutionary methods. Political radicalism is due to the fact that the subject of politics has a simplified picture of the world and inflated social expectations. The low level of general culture of social subjects causes a state of impatience, a desire for quick fulfillment of one’s own social expectations. Revolutions are, in their opinion, the fastest and most radical way to solve all problems. The political culture of post-Soviet Russia is a synthesis of heterogeneous political values, attitudes and standards of political activity. The type of political culture of modern Russian society can be called fragmented, which means:
* political culture does not represent a single whole, but combines elements of heterogeneous subcultures and reflects the situation of a split in society, a state of transition;
* the lack of agreement between representatives of different subcultures regarding the basic values, ideals and goals of society gives rise to increased conflict and social tension in society, pushing the majority of the population to recognize the priority of local or regional interests.

Under the dominance of such a political culture, the balance of interests and values can be maintained exclusively by a strong government. In the future, as a result of the process of democratization, a fragmented political culture should be transformed into a pluralistic culture based on the simultaneous coexistence and dialogue of various subcultures.

The political culture of modern Russia is a complex and contradictory phenomenon. Today, with varying success, there is a struggle between multidirectional political trends (democracy-authoritarianism, centralization-regionalization, globalization-isolationism), a clash of various political subcultures (radical-liberal, national-patriotic, communist), whose representatives use different political vocabulary and resort to different systems political argumentation. All this determines the need to form a political culture and its individual subcultures of a multinational, Eurasian Russian society.

The problem of forming a political culture is most relevant in relation to the younger generation, since young people are in the decisive stage of personality development, they are most susceptible to all influences, trends, and are most receptive to everything they see and hear. The youth of our country now live in an environment of freedom of choice, which was not the case before, including the choice of political values, passions and ideals. This choice is not easy to make. Many ideas have been broken, legends and old stereotypes have collapsed. In these conditions, it is necessary to solve the difficult tasks of forming the political culture of the younger generation.

Firstly, political culture can be formed only on the basis of deep knowledge about politics. At the same time, it is important to determine what amount of knowledge and what content of knowledge are necessary in order to become a politically culturally active person. Secondly, political culture can only be formed on the basis of a pluralistic approach. When communicating with young people, you need to show the diversity of existing opinions, views, theories, points of view on the most important issues of social life. This is the only way to develop in her such qualities as respect for other people’s opinions, tolerance, readiness for dialogue and compromise. Thirdly, young people strive for associations, formal and informal organizations. This is quite natural and such initiatives should be supported. Fourthly, the formation of political culture is closely related to civic culture, which includes the individual’s level of awareness of social tasks, social problems, and the degree of his activity. Therefore, the formation of civil and political culture should be carried out as a single process.

One of the urgent tasks facing the political and intellectual elite of society today is the formation of common values and norms that could unite society and overcome its split. In other words, the formation of a new political culture presupposes the formation of a new, unifying ideology.