1. Causes of repression: reflections and doubts

At the very beginning, it is necessary to make one remark regarding the deliberate violation of the chronological framework of the presentation of the material. The reader will undoubtedly be struck by the fact that the chapter on the Kirov assassination follows a discussion of Stalin's general policies in the mid-1930s. Whereas the canons of chronology dictated the reverse order of the chapters. But in this case, I deliberately made this violation: it seemed logically reasonable to consider the problem of repression in one block, and here the murder of Kirov serves as a kind of starting point. It is organically connected with the deployment of large-scale repressions and purges that followed it. Therefore, while in some ways violating the requirements of chronological sequence, I tried to put at the forefront the principle of the internal interconnection of the events unfolding at that time. Which, in my opinion, is much more important than strict adherence to event chronology. In short, it is better to violate the canons of chronology than to break the internal connection of times and events.

A new sharp turn is coming in Stalin’s political biography, and all his biographers are unanimous that 1934 was the turning point for such a turn. This was the year of Kirov’s murder, which opened a period of steadily growing repressions, like a grandiose rampart. Starting to describe this period in the political fate of the leader, you experience an influx of very contradictory thoughts and feelings. They are generated both by the importance of the problematic itself and by the extreme complexity of the historical material, which must be given a certain assessment. To be completely honest, I myself have not formed a clear and precise concept, based on which I can make well-founded judgments. Everything is too shocking with its, at first glance, cruel meaninglessness and even more - with its grandiose scale - to be able to fit into the consciousness, to find its logical and historical explanation and justification. The abundance of contradictions prevents us from choosing the right path to understanding the events of that time. Sometimes it seems that everything that happened goes beyond human understanding. And yet, it took place in life, and requires its own interpretation.

A reservation should be made in advance: on the pages devoted to this period of Stalin’s political biography, the reader will encounter inconsistency, and sometimes even uncertainty, the obvious duality of the author’s judgments and conclusions. And the reason is not the sloppiness or haste of the author, but the inconsistency of the historical material itself. The thought sometimes occurred to me that the political arena of that time was more reminiscent of a madhouse than a certain historical reality accessible to objective logical and psychological analysis. And only the craziest person can figure out what happened in the madhouse. The result was a kind of vicious circle, going beyond which was tantamount to going beyond the limits of human logic. Therefore, I myself, against my will and desire, sometimes plunged into a certain pool of doubts and thoughtlessness. I was permeated by an acute sense of uncertainty when clarity and certainty was required when formulating a particular conclusion or general assessment.

At the same time, it should be noted that I became quite thoroughly familiar with a large amount of facts, and knew quite well the positions and assessments of historians who studied this period of Stalin’s activity. Terra incognita for me was not the era of repression itself, but its explanation, its inner essence, the internal logic that served as the locomotive that set this whole process in motion. In Stalinist historiography there are a huge number of concepts and simply hypotheses interpreting the period under consideration. But each of them separately and all of them together do not provide a clear answer to many, even fundamental, questions. One gets the impression that the era of repression has not yet found its truly deep, comprehensively substantiated and, in all important respects, motivated historical explanation. It has been and, apparently, will for a long time be the subject of not only scientific research, but also tough polemical battles.

Of course, the author’s efforts in this area are unlikely to become some kind of fundamental innovation, a kind of revolution in the interpretation of the events of that time. It seems to me that the time range separating us from that era is too small for us to give them an objective, generalizing assessment that meets the requirements of historical truth without outbursts of emotion. After all, to say that these were crimes and put an end to it is the same as saying only A. But you also need to say B. You need to explain the internal logic of what took place in life. It is necessary to reveal not only the motives that guided Stalin, but also why all this became possible. Understanding the internal springs that set into motion a historical process of any scale is by no means a simple matter.

Finally, it is important to always keep in mind and never lose sight of two fundamentally important points: the role of the subjective factor, i.e. the role of the leader himself, and the role of the objective factor, i.e. the totality of real conditions in which the events of that time took place. pores. Some researchers see the main reasons for the repression in the personal qualities of Stalin as a person, supplemented and multiplied by the features of his political philosophy. This is where the methodology of their approach follows, which predetermines the final conclusions and assessments. Others place emphasis on the operation of objective laws, due to which the leader, regardless of his personal plans and motives, acted exactly as it happened in life, that everything was almost predetermined by the logic of the historical process.

I believe that the first approach suffers from one-sidedness, a lack of breadth of historical vision of events, and gives the individual an importance that is disproportionate to his real role in the development and dynamics of social processes. Therefore, this approach does not open up the possibility of deeply and comprehensively explaining both the origins of repression and its scale. The second approach does not look much more convincing, due to which the individual is, as it were, excluded from the field of action of historical laws. And even if it is not completely excluded, then in any case it is very limited, acting only as some kind of obligatory extra in the arena of events.

The way to solve the problem, I believe, is to combine both of these approaches into something coherent. But connect not mechanically, but organically. True, this is easy to say, but extremely difficult to do. The internal interconnection and interaction of the first and second approaches, their interweaving can serve as a good prerequisite for avoiding the extremes of both of these approaches, taken separately. But any historical material always represents a single whole, and it is unacceptable to artificially dismember it. Although, in this case we do not mean the historical material itself, but only the methodology of its analysis.

My reasoning about the root causes of repression in Soviet Russia in the 30s bears the stamp of some kind of abstraction and ahistoricality. The reader will involuntarily think that this kind of phenomenon was unique and had no precedent in world history. But this would be a delusion: world history is so rich in events of any kind that, as they say, nothing will surprise it. In other countries and among other peoples, phenomena of a more or less similar order also occurred.

But there is no point in delving into the depths of the history of other countries and making any comparisons and comparisons in order to prove some uniqueness of the repressions undertaken by Stalin in the 30s. Although, of course, they have their own unique features and characteristics. The main thing is to try to understand their origins, purposeful motives and consequences, which have left a deep imprint on the minds of many millions of people.

First of all, of course, we should start with the director and main performer of the grandiose political action, which so deeply affected the entire Soviet society and ultimately had far-reaching international political consequences. Stalin, as the undisputed leader of the country, no doubt had his own reasons for launching a grandiose purge that continued with varying intensity for almost four years. And as such, the purge, in fact, never stopped. Therefore, there is reason to assert that purges and repressions were a permanent phenomenon during the reign of Stalin. And this was one of the characteristic features of the entire Stalin era.

Before moving on to the motivation that underlay Stalin’s course on repression, one should not lose sight of the personal traits of his character, which were discussed in some detail in the first volume. Here I do not want to repeat myself, although repetition is sometimes dictated by necessity: after all, the very personality of the leader is dynamics in its most real expression. The Stalin of the 20s is not adequate to the Stalin of the 30s, much less the subsequent decades. He was in continuous development, acquiring new features and new experiences, abandoning some of his previous views and ideas. It must be judged taking into account the time factor. It is difficult to imagine Stalin in a static state, as a kind of political leader that is unchanged in his manifestations. His political activities bear the indelible stamp of pragmatism. But he himself was not a pragmatist in the usual sense of the word. His political philosophy was distinguished by his breadth of outlook and ability to recognize the deep tendencies of the historical process and take them into account in his practical activities. Moreover, he was not as simple as he seemed and as he liked to portray himself in the eyes of public opinion in his country and abroad. There are many statements by Stalin that characterize his attitude to assessments of his personality abroad. Here is one of them, dating back to 1931, when he was not yet at the zenith of his fame. In a conversation with E. Ludwig, he stated: “I know that the gentlemen from the hostile camp consider me anything. I consider it beneath my dignity to dissuade these gentlemen. They’ll also think that I’m looking for popularity.”. By the way, this passage from the recording of the conversation was not made public during Stalin’s lifetime for reasons that can only be guessed at.

To an even lesser extent he corresponded to the image painted by his political opponents. Although, it must be said that they were able to discern many negative traits of his character and personality as a whole almost from the very beginning of his ascent to the heights of power. Trotsky was especially successful in this, portraying his mortal enemy as a man who combined almost all the vices inherent in a politician. But Trotsky was never able to discern Stalin’s main advantages. Despite a certain insight, he was unable to see in Stalin a personality of historical proportions. Either a feeling of ineradicable fiery hatred of the Secretary General interfered, or an exorbitantly high conceit, which deprived him of the ability to objectively evaluate people, including his rivals. For all the thoroughness of Trotsky’s works on Stalin (and they, even taking into account their undeniable tendentiousness, undoubtedly occupy the first place in Stalin’s historiography), they clearly lack not so much flight of thought as insight into the essence of historical events, a fixation on the desire to imagine his opponent as a gray personality who made his way onto the historical stage only thanks to his cunning, unscrupulousness and unsurpassed acting. True, it is simply impossible to play such a role in the history of the country, and in world history as a whole, on these qualities alone (in the absence of others - more significant ones).

To be fair, it should be noted that derogatory assessments of Trotsky are contained in his public speeches and publications. In his diary, left alone with himself, the leader’s main opponent was much more perspicacious and more objective in his assessments. In the mid-30s he wrote: “The victory... of Stalin was predetermined. The result that onlookers and fools attribute to Stalin’s personal strength, at least to his extraordinary cunning, was embedded deep in the dynamics of historical forces... Stalin was only a half-conscious expression of the second chapter of the revolution, its hangover.”.

In other words, Trotsky is forced to admit that the victory of Stalin’s strategic course was predetermined by the logic and laws of the historical process. In the future, I will also touch on the question of how historically inevitable and natural were the events that filled the Stalin era with pages of brutal repression and persecution. Now I will only touch on the personal qualities of the leader and how they influenced the turn of Russian history during that period.

Reflecting on Stalin and how his personal human qualities affected his activities and his fate in general, I would like to quote lines from D. Byron. They, it seems to me, help to understand at least some of the features of this historical figure. D. Byron wrote in his “Child Harold”:

“All his life he created enemies for himself,

He drove away his friends, rejecting their love,

He was ready to suspect the whole world.

On those closest to him, his revenge is blind

It collapsed, burning with poison, -

So the bright mind was darkened by darkness.

But is grief a fault, is it a fatal disease?

Insight itself cannot

To comprehend madness under the guise of intelligence..."

These lines seem to paint not the image of the hero of Byron’s creation, but the personality of Stalin - they so faithfully and accurately convey his general appearance and even the somewhat tragic nature of his entire fate. After all, the political triumph of Stalin, the leader, was always, like a shadow, accompanied by some kind of personal doom, which he himself was not aware of.

In the context of the problem under consideration, Stalin's personal qualities undoubtedly played an extremely important role - they determined the entire style and methods of implementing the great purge (or great repressions - whoever prefers which name is more!). The imprint of the leader’s inherent suspicion, mistrust, vindictiveness and even treachery is clearly visible through all the pages of the terrible epic, which went down in our history as the crimes of the period of the cult of personality. But from the very time when N. Khrushchev exposed Stalin at the 20th Congress of the CPSU in 1956, the question arose in full force of how to measure and how to combine crimes, responsibility for which was placed solely on one person, with the actions of the so-called laws of social development? How did such phenomena become possible within the framework of the Soviet socialist system? Or are these “objective” laws not so objective if one person can override their effect? Or did the action of these objective laws themselves predetermine the policies pursued by Stalin?

In short, many more questions arose than there were people capable of giving intelligible answers to them. Over time, as various stages of de-Stalinization unfolded, all sorts of rollback movements in criticism of the leader, etc. events, the severity of the questions posed not only did not weaken, but also became more and more pressing. Many concepts arose within the framework of which attempts were made to finally provide the necessary and historically correct explanation of the events of that time.

One of these concepts, an active supporter and developer of which was the prominent Russian patriotic historian V. Kozhinov, boils down to the following. “...Such a large-scale and multilateral turnaround is incorrect, even absurd, to consider as something that happened according to the personal plan and will of Stalin...” And then he writes that it was: “... the course of history itself, and not the implementation of some personal program of Stalin, who was only to one degree or another aware of the historical movement that was taking place and one way or another consolidated it in his “instructions.” And, as is clear from many facts, his support for this objective course of history was dictated first of all and most of all by the growing threat of global war, which immediately became on the agenda after the German Nazis came to power in 1933.”.

If we briefly outline the essence of V. Kozhinov’s position (as well as a number of other researchers who hold similar views), then it can be reduced to the following. Beginning in 1934, Stalin's political strategy marked a clear turn from traditional Marxist-Leninist class postulates to geopolitical thinking. The latter required the revival of Russian national values, many previously defamed traditions, and, finally, the return of its true history to the country and people. A story that would be based on real facts, and not on narrowly interpreted class criteria. In other words, the stage of revolutionary overthrow was coming to its logical end and the stage of national creation was inevitably going to begin. Moreover, national creation meant not only Russian national heritage (history, culture, science, art, etc.), but also the national values ​​of other nations and peoples that were part of the Union.

It was from this time that Stalin’s political philosophy began to increasingly clearly and consistently indicate a tilt towards a historically objective, reality-corresponding assessment of the role of the Russian people and, in general, the principle of statehood in the formation and establishment of a multinational Russian power in the international arena. A power that was fundamentally different from the classic colonial empires of the era of capitalism and imperialism. Thus, criticizing the poet D. Bedny, Stalin emphasized at the beginning of 1930:

“The leaders of the revolutionary workers of all countries are eagerly studying the most instructive history of the working class of Russia, its past, the past of Russia, knowing that in addition to reactionary Russia there was also revolutionary Russia, the Russia of the Radishchevs and Chernyshevskys, the Zhelyabovs and Ulyanovs, the Khalturins and Alekseevs. All this instills (cannot help but instill!) in the hearts of Russian workers a feeling of revolutionary national pride, capable of moving mountains, capable of working miracles.

What about you? Instead of comprehending this greatest process in the history of the revolution and rising to the height of the tasks of the singer of the advanced proletariat, they went somewhere into the hollow and, confused between the most boring quotes from the works of Karamzin and no less boring sayings from Domostroi, began to proclaim to the whole world that Russia in the past represented a vessel of abomination and desolation...”

In the context of the realities of today's Russia, it is especially important to emphasize that Stalin actually pursued a completely sound and time-tested idea: the creation of the new cannot be carried out on the basis of general destruction and desecration of the past. The iron law of historical continuity inexorably operates in the life of countries and peoples. And to break this continuity of times meant to jeopardize the future of the entire country. For history remains true history only when the connection of times, the connection between the past, present and future, is preserved.

The Russian emigration followed with great tension the turn that was taking place in the Soviet country. Some emigrants regarded this turn as a revolution, although it was not of a social and political nature, but of an everyday nature, that is, at the level of ordinary life. The prominent Russian thinker G. Fedotov wrote in this regard: “Starting with the murder of Kirov (December 1, 1934), arrests, exiles, and even executions of members of the Communist Party have not stopped in Russia. True, this is happening under the banner of the fight against the remnants of the Trotskyists, Zinovievites and other left opposition groups. But it is unlikely that anyone will be deceived by these officially sewn-on labels. The evidence of “Trotskyism” is usually sewn with white thread. Looking at them, we see that Trotskyism generally means revolutionary, class or international socialism... The struggle... affects all cultural policies. In schools, political literacy is canceled or reduced to nothing. In place of Marxist social science, history is being restored. In the interpretation of history or literature, a fight has been declared against economic schemes that negated the cultural originality of phenomena... One might ask oneself why, if Marxism has been given a long life in Russia, its faded decorations will not be removed from the stage. Why do they sanctimoniously mutter old formulas at every step, betraying him and even mocking him?.. To renounce one’s own revolutionary genealogy would be reckless. The French Republic has been writing “Liberty, equality, fraternity” on its walls for 150 years, despite the obvious contradiction of the last two slogans to the very foundations of its existence.”.

Reading these lines, you involuntarily ask yourself the question: has Soviet Russia, since the mid-30s, really entered into a period of retreat from the revolution, or rather, on the path of a kind of counter-revolution? If yes, then all subsequent repressions of a mass nature find their historical and logical explanation, and not at all because, according to the famous expression, the revolution devours its children. By the way, Stalin’s opponents from the Trotskyist and right-wing camp believed that things were turning out this way, since the very foundations of the psychology of old Bolshevism turned out to be incompatible with the new course of Stalin’s policy, with his reforms, which revived many of the foundations of the previous regime.

Later, the idea of ​​some kind of historical retribution even arose, which, supposedly, was supposed to fall on the old guard of the Bolsheviks as legal punishment for everything that they had done to the former Russia. And fate chose Stalin as the instrument of this punishment, putting an end to manifestations of revolutionary internationalism that had become not only unnecessary, but also harmful and dangerous.

Of course, one can agree or disagree with these kinds of concepts that explained the events of the thirties. It seems to me personally that they look unconvincing, because they are based on a purely external coincidence of events, and not on their deep historical analysis. And in the end, the fundamental parameters of the Soviet system under Stalin did not undergo radical changes during these years. Therefore, in its true meaning, the terms new revolution or counter-revolution are unlawful to use here. The reforms carried out by Stalin were dictated not by the desire to destroy or undermine the foundations of the established Soviet system, but by the desire to adapt it to new historical realities. This meant making this system more resilient, more effective in the face of inevitably approaching upheavals in the international sphere. And one more argument: the leader never ceased to consider himself a consistent disciple of Lenin, and therefore an adherent of the theory of revolutionary transformation of the world. Of course, both in theory and especially in practice, there were certain differences between these two luminaries of Soviet communism, which fit well within the framework of evolutionary development. After all, the objective living conditions of the country itself and the world as a whole were radically changing, and at a pace unprecedented in history. Therefore, blindly following some pre-formulated theories and principles would be tantamount to idiocy, which Stalin cannot be suspected of. New conditions required new approaches and new solutions. But they were nevertheless carried out as a whole within the framework of the system, the fundamental foundations of which were laid by the founder of Bolshevism.

Due to the above arguments, there are no serious grounds to regard the events of the mid and second half of the 30s as some kind of new revolution of the Stalinist type. It follows from this that the idea of ​​some kind of social retribution as the root cause of terror looks more like a literary metaphor than a solid historical argument. Undoubtedly, Stalin's reforms of this period affected many aspects of the country's life, but they did not affect the socio-economic and political foundations of the Soviet regime. On the contrary, it was thanks to these reforms that the regime became more stable and more adapted to the realities of life. He cleansed himself only of the dense growths of orthodox Bolshevism, following which could really lead the multinational Soviet society to a deep crisis. And individual symptoms of this kind of phenomena became more and more noticeable. But the main thing was that Soviet Russia had to prepare itself for severe and inevitable tests on the external front. For the threat of war, from a propaganda cliché as it was in the late 20s and early 30s, was increasingly clearly turning into an inevitable reality. The only question was when it would break out.

Stalin, being an old Bolshevik himself, to put it mildly, did not have much respect for them. Moreover, in the depths of his soul, he considered them a burden to the new regime, since they, either due to their conviction, or due to the conservatism inherent in people, were very critical, if we don’t look for stronger expressions, towards Stalin’s general course. They organically rejected the reforms that were so necessary for the regime to move forward. The old Bolsheviks perceived Stalin's entire policy as a rejection of Lenin's behests, as a kind of betrayal of the ideals of the revolution. There is plenty of evidence of this. I will at least refer to the “Letter of an Old Bolshevik”, which was already discussed earlier. It said: “Having grown up in conditions of revolutionary struggle, we have all cultivated in ourselves the psychology of oppositionists... we are all not builders, but critics, destroyers. In the past this was good, now that we must engage in positive construction it is hopelessly bad. With such human material... nothing lasting can be built...".

In the context of all these realities, it was no coincidence that the dissolution of the organization of the Old Bolsheviks, the society of former political prisoners and other measures designed to put an end to the already turned page of history.

All these arguments only complement the overall mosaic of the picture, but they do not answer the main question - what are the underlying causes of mass terror and repression of those unforgettable years. Now I will try to answer it in the most general form, although I understand that my explanations are also more in the nature of historical hypotheses and speculative assumptions than convincing conclusions.

I will not adhere to any strictly verified system in substantiating my assumptions. The reasons, their entire set, are closely interconnected with each other, sometimes so intertwined that it is difficult to draw a dividing line between them. But in the end it is not their distinction that is the crux of the problem.

Firstly, the entire ten-year period, starting from the death of Lenin, for Stalin was filled with a permanent, essentially never weakened, struggle, first for conquest, and then for the establishment of his power. From this he drew a number of conclusions for himself, and, obviously, one of the main ones was the following: his opponents will never stop fighting against him, will never agree with his strategic course. Their public admissions of their mistakes, their repentant speeches at congresses and plenums of the Central Committee are just a disguise, forced actions, which they immediately disavow as soon as the right moment presents itself. Moreover, at the slightest weakening of his position of power, they will not hesitate for a moment to launch a counter-offensive against him again. The only compromise acceptable to them is his unconditional and complete surrender, that is, his removal from power.

The leader had more than enough reasons for such a stream of thoughts. The reader can himself recall the speeches of Stalin’s repentant opponents cited in previous chapters, from which they reeked of hypocrisy and double-mindedness a mile away. It may be objected that this hypocrisy and the ignorant praise of Stalin, coming from the lips of people who hated him fiercely in their souls, was a forced step, dictated by the hopelessness of the situation in which Stalin’s opponents found themselves. All this, of course, is true, but from the leader’s understanding of this circumstance, apparently, the distrust of his defeated opponents not only did not decrease, but also increased exponentially: the more they swore allegiance to him and devotion to his general line, the less he believed them.

The second important factor explaining the growing wave of repressions had its source in Stalin’s deep conviction (sincere or not is another question) in the inevitability of an intensification of the class struggle even in the conditions of the triumphant victories of socialism, which was trumpeted by all propaganda organs at that time. Just at the very height of the wave of repression, the leader found it necessary to reaffirm that his concept of intensifying the class struggle not only had not lost its relevance, but had become even more topical. This is how he formulated this thought: “We must put an end to the opportunistic complacency that comes from the erroneous assumption that as our forces grow, the enemy becomes more and more tame and harmless. This assumption is fundamentally wrong. It is a regurgitation of the right deviation, which assures everyone and everything that the enemies will slowly creep into socialism, that they will eventually become real socialists. It is not the job of the Bolsheviks to rest on their laurels and act rote. What we need is not complacency, but vigilance, real Bolshevik revolutionary vigilance. We must remember that the more hopeless the enemy’s position, the more willingly they will seize on extreme means as the only means of the doomed in their struggle against Soviet power. We must remember this and be vigilant.".

The next significant reason The unleashing of repression was due to the fact that, according to Stalin, successes in building a new social order created an atmosphere of arrogance and complacency in the country. This situation was fraught with considerable dangers and threats, since it discouraged people and opened up favorable opportunities for the subversive actions of enemies. The leader tried to dispel these sentiments, without which the campaign to launch mass repressions would have been impossible. The creation of an appropriate political and psychological atmosphere in the party and in society acted as a mandatory component of the repression campaign. In such a simple, exaggerated form, Stalin attacked the complacency and intoxication of successes, which supposedly almost paralyzed the entire country:

“It is not surprising that in this stupefying atmosphere of arrogance and complacency, an atmosphere of ceremonial manifestations and noisy self-praise, people forget about some essential facts that are of paramount importance for the destinies of our country, people begin not to notice such unpleasant facts as capitalist encirclement, new forms of sabotage, dangers associated with our successes, etc. Capitalist environment? Yes, this is nonsense! What significance can any capitalist environment have if we fulfill and exceed our economic plans? New forms of sabotage, the fight against Trotskyism? All this is nonsense! What significance can all these little things have when we fulfill and exceed our economic plans? Party charter, election of party officials, reporting of party leaders to the party masses? Is there a need for all this? Is it even worth bothering with these little things if our economy is growing and the financial situation of workers and peasants is improving more and more? All this is nonsense! We are exceeding our plans, our party is not bad, the Central Committee of the party is also not bad - what the hell else do we need? Strange people sit there, in Moscow, in the Central Committee of the Party: they invent some questions, talk about some kind of sabotage, they themselves do not sleep, they do not allow others to sleep...”

In connection with the quoted statements, the question involuntarily arises: did Stalin himself believe in what he said? Was he sincere even to himself? Could this ominous idea of ​​an endless aggravation of the class struggle really coexist in the leader’s mind with his sharp practical mind, with his ability to realistically assess the situation and not fall into exaggerations unforgivable for a political leader? It is difficult to give a definite answer to this question. It seems that he was not an involuntary and helpless captive of the idea of ​​​​increasing the class struggle. There are more reasons to believe that he consciously and purposefully emphasized the issue of class struggle in order to have both theoretical and political-psychological justification for his course of unleashing repression.

However, from the standpoint of historical objectivity, it is not so important whether Stalin himself believed in what he said or whether he was engaged in self-deception coupled with deceiving public opinion as a whole. In the end, it's the final result that matters.

Considering further the reasons for large-scale repressions, one cannot lose sight of the following point. There were many dissatisfied with Stalin's policies in the party and the country. By the way, this was confirmed by Stalin’s then close ally A. Mikoyan, who stated in 1937: “I thought I should say this, I don’t know about you, comrades, but I thought that if Marxists before the revolution were against terror, against the tsar and autocracy, how can they, people who went through the school of Marx, be for terror under the Bolsheviks , under Soviet rule? If communists around the world, being enemies of capitalism, do not blow up factories, how can a person who has gone through the school of Marxism blow up a factory in his country? I must say that this never entered my head. But apparently you have to learn. Apparently, the fall of the class enemy, the Trotskyists, is so low that we did not even imagine, namely, as predicted by Comrade Stalin, who seemed to lead us by the hand and said that there is no dirty trick that the Trotskyists and the rightists could not commit. So it turned out that our political vigilance turned out to be weakened... Understand, comrades... we have a lot of people are dissatisfied (emphasis mine - N.K.). These people are recruited for subversive work by the Japanese-German fascists.".

Stalin, who had all the information at his disposal when planning the launch of a campaign of large-scale repression, undoubtedly took into account the very serious level of dissatisfaction with his policies. And here they meant not only his former opponents from the ranks of the party itself, but also other social forces that never came to terms with the revolution and Soviet power. Remnants of the former exploiting classes, dispossessed peasants, a large contingent of innocent victims as a result of the great upheavals of the late 20s - early 30s, special settlers, representatives of the old intelligentsia who were subjected to undeserved persecution, all kinds of nationalists in the Soviet republics, and in general those who suffered in any way from Soviet power - all of them, taken together, represented a great force. And this force, under a certain set of circumstances, could openly oppose the new system, against the course, the personification of which was Stalin.

According to the leader’s logic, everyone dissatisfied with Soviet power automatically became its enemies and were only waiting for an opportunity to strike at it. The leader's policy proceeded from the fact that a preemptive strike should be launched at all these forces at the appropriate moment in order not only to demoralize them, but also, if necessary, to physically destroy them. It is no coincidence that in these years the motto proclaimed by M. Gorky became almost the slogan of the day: “If the enemy does not surrender, he is destroyed!”

While listing the actual and potential causes of repression, one cannot ignore the following circumstance, which played the role of a kind of driving spring that set the entire repressive mechanism in motion. The point is that for a number of years Stalin received quite reliable and completely trustworthy reports from the security agencies about plans for his physical liquidation. The suppression of plans for the physical liquidation of Stalin was one of the most important reasons for the deployment of a campaign of mass repression, at least in its first stages

This issue is worth dwelling on specifically, since in the literature about Stalin the point of view is quite firmly rooted that all talk about plans to kill the leader is nothing more than a myth specially created by Stalin himself and his entourage, designed to substantiate and justify the repressions themselves. Meanwhile, there are good reasons to consider such a point of view untenable. Indeed, even before the deployment of mass repressions and the inclusion of attempts to organize the murder of Stalin and some of his closest associates among the indispensable and especially grave charges that were brought against those arrested, there were objective facts indicating that the leader’s opponents quite seriously raised the question of the need to eliminate him. Let us at least remember Ryutin’s platform, not to mention other episodes. After all, the call for the elimination of Stalin, if interpreted legally correctly, did not in the least exclude the possibility of his physical destruction. It is impossible to deny this without violating basic common sense. In addition, no matter how insignificant the number of underground Trotskyist and other anti-Stalinist organizations was, it is absolutely clear that they existed. And they did not exist for the sake of periodically exchanging secret letters condemning the Stalinist regime and its policies. Their plans extended much further and did not unconditionally exclude the use of individual terror. It must be admitted that in Stalin’s place, any other political and state figure should have taken into account the possibility of organizing an attempt on his life.

And if all this is multiplied by Stalin’s generally recognized suspicion, his immanent sense of distrust of people, then it is not surprising that this moment became one of the levers that set in motion the mechanism of repression. Since the leader himself proceeded from the fact that only the physical destruction of a real or potential enemy puts an end to the fight against him, he extended a similar way of thinking to those against whom he fought. It turned out that the finale of a political victory over the enemy was his physical destruction. This postulate, unspoken nowhere, largely determined both the nature of the repressions and their scale.

The next motivation for the repression was Stalin’s desire to intimidate not only his opponents, but also his own supporters, including his closest associates. People filled with fear and uncertainty about their future will follow the leader’s instructions with great zeal and will not dare to oppose him in any situation. Such a calculation, of course, was present in the system of motivations explaining Stalin’s policies and behavior. But this motive also has a broader dimension. In an atmosphere of fear and suspicion, it was much easier to implement the toughest decisions made by the leader. No one dared to express even the slightest doubt about the correctness of such decisions. And this applied not only to the political elite or the middle ranks of party functionaries, but to virtually all segments of the population.

Of course, Stalin relied more on fear than on the love of his fellow citizens. He, apparently, was not misled by the endless panegyrics addressed to him - he knew how it was all done and what it all cost on the field of political struggle. Therefore, when launching a campaign of repression, he was aware that the fear that had settled in the country, in the souls of his fellow citizens, would be a serious help, a kind of reliable tool in the implementation of his further plans.

Finally, another version in the by no means complete list of reasons that caused the wave of repressions is the version according to which Stalin launched a preventive strike against the supposedly existing and operating Soviet Union in conditions of the deepest secrecy of the so-called fifth column. This version has many adherents among the left spectrum of Russian historians. They, based on certain data and facts, prove that Stalin promptly learned about the existence of such a fifth column, operating primarily in the ranks of the army, and therefore delivered a crushing preventive blow, thereby protecting the country from treason and betrayal among the senior command of the armed forces in the conditions the impending war. Thus, they say, he saved the country from defeat during Hitler’s invasion.

I will not analyze the validity of this version, since in the course of further presentation I will touch upon the issue of the so-called fascist conspiracy in the Red Army in connection with the case of Tukhachevsky and other military leaders. I would like to note here that this version does not seem entirely convincing. After all, one of the statements of Hitler, who said: “Stalin did the right thing in destroying all his military leaders...”. The praise of his worst enemy is by no means a compliment to Stalin, and certainly not proof of the correctness of the fact that the top of the army was repressed during these years. Of course, much in this version raises puzzling questions that do not find a convincing answer. But as one of the possible motivating reasons for Stalin’s purges, it can be considered and subject to analysis and critical assessment. And in this sense, it undoubtedly has the right to exist. In general, it should be noted that in such complex and delicate issues, getting to the truth is often almost impossible. For every argument there is a counterargument, and everything, as they say, returns to normal. But, repeating myself, I will say that it has the right to be considered as one of the possible explanations for the epidemic of Stalinist repressions in the 30s. Although, in passing, it should be noted that the orgy of repression began before the discovery of the alleged conspiracy in the army. This already says something.

The version discussed above about a preventive strike on the fifth column is organically related to version of a comprehensive spring cleansing, which Stalin undertook in order to fully guarantee the implementation of his general line in the new conditions that emerged after the completion of collectivization and in connection with fundamental changes in the international arena. The main direction of these changes, of course, was the growing danger of war, which was almost impossible to avoid. This version, paradoxical as it may seem, was first expressed by N.I. Bukharin is one of the main victims of Stalin's hammer of repression. Three months before the execution, while under investigation, he sent a purely personal letter to Stalin. This message contains the following remarkable assumption regarding the underlying motives of the repressions being carried out.

"There is some big and bold political idea general purge a) in connection with the pre-war period, b) in connection with the transition to democracy. This purge captures a) the guilty, b) the suspicious and c) the potentially suspicious. They couldn't get by here without me. Some are neutralized in one way, others in another way, others in another way. The safety net is that people inevitably talk about each other and forever instill distrust in each other (judging by myself: how angry I was with Radek, who trashed me! And then I myself went down this path...). Thus, management creates full guarantee.

For God's sake, don't misunderstand that I'm secretly reproaching you here, even in reflection with myself. I have grown so much out of baby's diapers that I understand that big plans, big ideas and big interests overshadow everything, and it would be petty to question my own person along with world-historical tasks, lying primarily on your shoulders.

But this is where I have the main torment, and the main painful paradox.”

The internal logic in Bukharin’s reasoning is such that he seems to agree with the historical inevitability of repression, viewing it through the prism of grandiose tasks and plans for building a new society. It cannot be said that he justifies these repressions, but in a sense he expresses an understanding of their inevitability and even regularity. Of course, it is quite natural to assume that the arrested person, expressing such a point of view, wanted to gain the leniency of the leader, hoping that he would appreciate his “objectivity” and would not agree to impose a death sentence during the upcoming trial. At the same time, the above explanation does not at all look like just a plea for forgiveness. It also contains a large share of truth and casts additional light on the picture of the events that took place. Or rather, to their behind-the-scenes - and most important - side.

Appendix A. North Causes of Stalin's repressions. Little-known facts Revolutionaries or businessmen? Of course, one of the reasons for Stalin’s repressions was blatant corruption in the highest echelon of government. We will begin our story about this with the “demon

Doubts and oddities The first incomprehensibility. Neither before nor after the legend about the Massacre of Mamaev, Orthodox warrior monks are ever mentioned anywhere. The Roman Church had military monastic orders, yes, but that’s a completely different story. And - not a single battle between the Russians and