SMERSH is the legendary Soviet counterintelligence organization. On the fields of invisible battles of the “secret war,” this short five-letter abbreviation terrified enemies. All the spies in the world were afraid of her, because they guessed what was hiding in the basements of the Lubyanka - the best torturers in the world, who used not only physical torture, but also “white noise”, electric shock and who knows what else...
Counterintelligence "SMERSH" was created on April 19, 1943, but did not last long, only about three years - from 1943 to 1946. Below, this sinister organization was recreated in the USSR and was engaged in its previous work, which was never declassified - information even about its work was too secret. The new SMERSH combined the functions of not only counterintelligence, like its ancestor, but also intelligence in general. However, the experience previously accumulated by counterintelligence officers is still being studied and applied by counterintelligence agencies around the world.
Recently, many books have appeared whose titles use the word “Smersh”. For the most part, these publications contain a lot of speculation, myths and legends. In fact, not much is known about the practical activities of military counterintelligence officers during the Great Patriotic War. Basically, our contemporaries learned about “Smersh” only from V. Bogomolov’s book “The Moment of Truth. In August 1944" and from a feature film recently made based on the materials of this book.

¤ Main Directorate of Counterintelligence "SMERSH" in the People's Commissariat of Defense (NKO) of the USSR - military counterintelligence, head - V. S. Abakumov. Reported directly to People's Commissar of Defense I.V. Stalin.
¤ Counterintelligence Directorate "SMERSH" of the People's Commissariat of the Navy, head - Lieutenant General of the Coastal Service P. A. Gladkov. Subordinate to the People's Commissar of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsov.
¤ Counterintelligence Department "SMERSH" of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, head - S. P. Yukhimovich. Subordinate to People's Commissar L.P. Beria.

During the Great Patriotic War, Soviet military intelligence officers managed to virtually completely neutralize or destroy enemy agents. Their work was so effective that the Nazis failed to organize major uprisings or acts of sabotage in the rear of the USSR, as well as to establish large-scale subversive, sabotage and partisan activities in European countries and on the territory of Germany itself, when the Soviet army began to liberate European countries. The intelligence services of the Third Reich had to admit defeat, capitulate, or flee to the countries of the Western world, where their experience was in demand to fight the Soviet Union.
Military counterintelligence officers risked their lives no less than the soldiers and commanders of the Red Army who were on the front line. Together with them, they entered into battle with German troops on June 22, 1941. In the event of the death of the unit commander, they replaced them, while continuing to fulfill their tasks - they fought against desertion, panic, saboteurs and enemy agents. The functions of military counterintelligence were defined in Directive No. 35523 of June 27, 1941 “On the work of the bodies of the 3rd Directorate of NPOs in wartime.” Military counterintelligence conducted operational intelligence work in parts of the Red Army, in the rear, among the civilian population; fought against desertion (employees of special departments were part of the Red Army detachments); worked in territory occupied by the enemy, in contact with the Intelligence Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Defense.
Military counterintelligence officers were located both at headquarters, ensuring secrecy, and on the front line in command posts. Then they received the right to conduct investigative actions against Red Army soldiers and associated civilians who were suspected of anti-Soviet activities. At the same time, counterintelligence officers had to receive permission to arrest mid-level command personnel from the Military Councils of armies or fronts, and senior and senior command personnel from the People's Commissar of Defense. Counterintelligence departments of districts, fronts and armies had the task of fighting spies, nationalist and anti-Soviet elements and organizations. Military counterintelligence took control of military communications, the delivery of military equipment, weapons, and ammunition.
On July 13, 1941, the “Regulations on military censorship of military postal correspondence” were introduced. The document defined the structure, rights and responsibilities of military censorship units, talked about the methodology for processing letters, and also provided a list of information that was the basis for confiscation of items. Military censorship departments were created at military postal sorting points, military postal bases, branches and stations. Similar departments were formed in the system of the 3rd Directorate of the People's Commissariat of the Navy. In August 1941, military censorship was transferred to the 2nd Special Department of the NKVD, and operational management continued to be carried out by army, front-line and district special departments.
On July 15, 1941, 3 departments were formed at the Headquarters of the Commanders-in-Chief of the Northern, Northwestern and Southwestern directions. On July 17, 1941, by decree of the State Defense Committee of the USSR, the bodies of the 3rd Directorate of the NKO were transformed into the Directorate of Special Departments (DOO) and became part of the NKVD. The main task of the Special Departments was the fight against spies and traitors in units and formations of the Red Army and the elimination of desertion in the front line. On July 19, Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Viktor Abakumov was appointed head of the UOO. His first deputy was the former head of the Main Transport Directorate of the NKVD and the 3rd (secret-political) Directorate of the NKGB, Commissar 3rd Rank Solomon Milshtein. The following were appointed heads of the Special Departments: Pavel Kuprin - Northern Front, Viktor Bochkov - Northwestern Front, Western Front - Lavrentiy Tsanava, Southwestern Front - Anatoly Mikheev, Southern Front - Nikolai Sazykin, Reserve Front - Alexander Belyanov.
People's Commissar of the NKVD Lavrentiy Beria, in order to combat spies, saboteurs and deserters, ordered the formation of separate rifle battalions under the Special Departments of the fronts, separate rifle companies under the Special Departments of the armies, and rifle platoons under the Special Departments of divisions and corps. On August 15, 1941, the structure of the central apparatus of the UOO was approved. The structure looked like this: a chief and three deputies; Secretariat; Operations department; 1st Department - central bodies of the Red Army (General Staff, Intelligence Directorate and Military Prosecutor's Office); 2nd department - Air Force, 3rd department - artillery, tank units; 4th department - main types of troops; 5th department – ​​sanitary service and quartermasters; 6th department - NKVD troops; 7th department - operational search, statistical accounting, etc.; 8th department - encryption service. Subsequently, the structure of the UOO continued to change and become more complex.

A group of fighters from the SMERSH ROC of the 37th Army. Left (sitting) - sergeant major
Kirill Fedorovich Lysenko. Spring 1945

Military counterintelligence was transferred by a secret decree of the Council of People's Commissars of April 19, 1943 to the People's Commissariats of Defense and the Navy. Regarding its name - “SMERSH”, there is a well-known story that Joseph Stalin, having familiarized himself with the initial version of “Smernesh” (Death to German spies), noted: “Aren’t other intelligence agencies working against us?” As a result, the famous name “SMERSH” was born. On April 21, this name was officially recorded.

"Death to Spies!"

What reasons prompted the Soviet leadership to decide in the spring of 1943 to radically reform the country's security agencies? The radical turning point in the course of the war, which came after the defeat of the Wehrmacht near Moscow and Stalingrad, and the transition of the Red Army to active offensive operations significantly influenced the military and operational situation developing on the Soviet-German front.
In order to timely reveal the plans of the Soviet command, German intelligence sharply intensified work in the front line. Numerous reconnaissance and sabotage actions, manifestations of banditry and murders of military personnel began to be recorded in the rear areas of the fronts. The absence of a continuous front line, the significant length of front-line communications and a large number of objects requiring reliable protection, the weakness and low staffing of the revived local authorities and law enforcement created conditions for the unpunished activities of enemy reconnaissance and sabotage groups and criminal groups.
In addition, in the liberated territories there were various underground nationalist organizations, illegal armed groups, and criminal groups. A large number of enemy intelligence agents, German collaborators, traitors to the Motherland and traitors from among Soviet citizens settled here. These individuals attempted to legalize themselves, including by entering military service in units and formations of the Red Army and even in the institutions and troops of the NKVD.
After short consultations held in March-April 1943 within the apparatus of the NKVD of the USSR, drafts of relevant changes and structural diagrams of new departments were prepared for the country's leadership.

On April 19, 1943, Joseph Stalin signed a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, according to which the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD (UOO) was transferred to the People's Commissariat of Defense and reorganized into the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence (GUKR) of the NPO Smersh. V.S. was appointed head of the Main Counterintelligence Directorate “Smersh” of the USSR NGO. Abakumov, and his deputies – P.Ya. Meshik, N.N. Selivanovsky and I.Ya. Babich. The 9th (naval) department of the NKVD UOO was transformed into the Counterintelligence Department (UCR) of the NKVD "Smersh", and the 6th department of the NKVD UOO, remaining in the system of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, was transformed into the Counterintelligence Department (OCR) of the NKVD "Smersh" , reporting personally to People's Commissar L.P. Beria.

Viktor Semyonovich Abakumov

The counterintelligence "Smersh" NPO solved the same tasks as the former UOO of the NKVD of the USSR: to fight espionage, sabotage, terrorist and other activities of foreign intelligence services in units and institutions of the Red Army, in the navy and in the NKVD troops; through the command, take the necessary operational and other measures “to create conditions at the fronts that exclude the possibility of unpunished passage of enemy agents through the front line in order to make the front line impenetrable for espionage and anti-Soviet elements”; fight against betrayal and treason in units and institutions of the army and navy, with desertion and self-harm at the fronts, check military personnel and other persons who were captured and surrounded by the enemy.
By the Decree of the State Defense Committee of the USSR dated April 21, 1943, No. 3222 ss/s, the Regulations on the Main Counterintelligence Directorate “Smersh” of the NKO of the USSR were announced. On April 27, 1943, Stalin approved the staff of the Main Counterintelligence Directorate “Smersh” of the USSR NKO in the amount of 646 people, which provided for the positions of four deputy chiefs and his 16 assistants with a staff of 69 operational employees at the level of department heads, senior detectives and assistant detectives.
GUKR "Smersh" NPOs were subordinated to the counterintelligence departments "Smersh" NPOs on the fronts and the "Smersh" departments of armies, corps, divisions, brigades, military districts, garrisons of fortified areas and other institutions of the Red Army. During April-June, Stalin, according to Abakumov’s ideas, approved the structure and staff of the front-line, district and garrison bodies of Smersh, personal appointments and military ranks of the leadership of the Main Directorate and local military counterintelligence bodies.
The staff of the counterintelligence department "Smersh" of the front, which included more than five armies, was determined in the amount of 130 people, less than five - 112, the counterintelligence department "Smersh" of the armies - 57, the counterintelligence department "Smersh" of the district - from 102 to 193 people. In June, the staff of the Smersh Criminal Defense Forces of the Far Eastern and Transbaikal Fronts was approved, as well as the staff of individual rifle battalions under the Smersh directorates of all fronts in the West and East of the country, with weapons and materiel.
On May 31, 1943, the State Defense Committee approved the Regulations on the Counterintelligence Directorate (UCR) “Smersh” of the People’s Commissariat of the Navy and its local bodies. It was based on the principles of activity of the Smersh NGO bodies. In June, People's Commissar of the USSR Navy N.G. Kuznetsov approved the staff of the Smersh missile defense system for the Navy, fleets and flotillas. Commissar of State Security 2nd Rank P.A. Gladkov. In the same month, People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.P. Beria reviewed and approved the structure of the Smersh R&D of the NKVD of the USSR. During the war years, the Smersh ROC of the NKVD was headed by Major General S.P. Yukhimovich and Major General V.I. Smirnov (since May 1944).

"Smersh": organization and tasks

As part of the GUKR “Smersh” NPO, together with the secretariat, 14 departments functioned. They concentrated operational work on the institutions of the People's Commissariat in the center, on the fronts and military districts, as well as along the main lines of activity: work among prisoners of war, state verification of military personnel who were in captivity and encirclement, combating enemy agents (paratroopers), counterintelligence behind enemy lines and investigative work. The Main Directorate also had at its disposal units responsible for encryption communications and the use of other operational and technical means, as well as for the selection and training of personnel for military counterintelligence. To manage the work of the Smersh counterintelligence departments on the fronts, an institute of assistants (according to the number of fronts) was approved under the head of the Smersh Main Directorate of the Intelligence.

Since April 1943, the structure of the GUKR "Smersh" included the following departments, the heads of which were approved on April 29, 1943 by order No. 3/ssh of the People's Commissar of Defense Joseph Stalin:

¤ 1st department - intelligence and operational work in the central apparatus of the People's Commissariat of Defense (chief - Colonel of the State Security Service, then Major General Gorgonov Ivan Ivanovich)
¤ 2nd department - work among prisoners of war, checking of Red Army soldiers who were in captivity (chief - Lieutenant Colonel GB Kartashev Sergey Nikolaevich)
¤ 3rd department - fight against agents sent to the rear of the Red Army (chief - GB Colonel Georgy Valentinovich Utekhin)
¤ 4th department - work on the enemy’s side to identify agents being dropped into Red Army units (chief - GB Colonel Petr Petrovich Timofeev)
¤ 5th department - management of the work of Smersh bodies in military districts (chief - Colonel GB Zenichev Dmitry Semenovich)
¤ 6th department - investigative (chief - Lieutenant Colonel GB Leonov Alexander Georgievich)
¤ 7th department - operational accounting and statistics, verification of the military nomenclature of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, NGOs, NKVMF, code workers, access to top secret and secret work, verification of workers sent abroad (chief - Colonel A. E. Sidorov ( appointed later, no data in the order))
¤ 8th department - operational equipment (chief - Lieutenant Colonel GB Sharikov Mikhail Petrovich)
¤ 9th department - searches, arrests, external surveillance (chief - Lieutenant Colonel GB Kochetkov Alexander Evstafievich)
¤ 10th Department - Department “C” - special assignments (chief - Major GB Zbrailov Alexander Mikhailovich)
¤ 11th department - encryption (chief - Colonel GB Chertov Ivan Aleksandrovich)
¤ Political Department - Colonel Sidenkov Nikifor Matveevich
¤ Human Resources Department - GB Colonel Vradiy Ivan Ivanovich
¤ Administrative, financial and economic department - Lieutenant Colonel GB Polovnev Sergey Andreevich
¤ Secretariat - Colonel Chernov Ivan Aleksandrovich

The headcount of the central office of the GUKR “Smersh” NPO was 646 people.

The structure of local authorities was established in relation to the GUKR "Smersh" NPO and approved by the People's Commissar of Defense. For military support of operational work, protection of the locations of Smersh organs and filtration points, convoy and protection of those arrested from units of the Red Army, the following were allocated: for the front control of Smersh - a battalion, for the army department - a company, for the corps department, division and brigade - security platoon.
Smersh counterintelligence officers were given military ranks similar to those in the Red Army. For the purpose of secrecy, their uniforms, shoulder straps and other insignia (with the exception of the senior management of the center) were established as in the corresponding branches of the military.
In accordance with wartime conditions, the Smersh counterintelligence agencies were endowed with broad rights and powers. They carried out a full range of operational-search activities using all operational forces and means characteristic of a special service. In accordance with the procedure established by law, military counterintelligence officers could carry out seizures, searches and arrests of Red Army servicemen, as well as associated civilians suspected of criminal activities.

Arrests of military personnel were necessarily coordinated with the military prosecutor in relation to private and junior command personnel, with the commander and prosecutor of a military formation or unit - in relation to middle command personnel, with military councils and the prosecutor - in relation to senior command personnel, and the highest - were carried out only with the sanction of the People's Commissars of Defense , Navy and NKVD. The detention of ordinary military personnel, junior and mid-level command personnel could be carried out without prior approval, but with the subsequent registration of the arrest. The Smersh counterintelligence agencies had the right, “in necessary cases,” to shoot deserters, self-harmers, and persons convicted of committing terrorist acts against the commanding and political personnel of the army (according to the resolutions of the Smersh departments and departments).

On April 21, 1943, J.V. Stalin signed the State Defense Committee Resolution No. 3222 ss/ov approving the regulations on the GUKR “Smersh” NPO of the USSR. The text of the document consisted of one phrase:

Approve the regulations on the Main Counterintelligence Directorate “Smersh” - [Death to Spies] and its local bodies.

The appendix to the document detailed the goals and objectives of the new structure, and also determined the status of its employees:
¤ "The head of the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence of the NPO ["Smersh"] is the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, subordinate directly to the People's Commissar of Defense and carries out only his orders"
“Smersh bodies are a centralized organization: on the fronts and districts, Smersh bodies [Smersh NCO departments of the fronts and Smersh NCO departments of armies, corps, divisions, brigades, military districts and other formations and institutions of the Red Army] are subordinate only to their higher authorities"
¤ “Smersh bodies inform the Military Councils and the command of the relevant units, formations and institutions of the Red Army on issues of their work: about the results of the fight against enemy agents, about anti-Soviet elements that have penetrated into army units, about the results of the fight against treason and betrayal, desertion, self-harm"
¤ Problems to be solved:
“a) the fight against espionage, sabotage, terrorism and other subversive activities of foreign intelligence services in units and institutions of the Red Army;
b) the fight against anti-Soviet elements that have penetrated into units and institutions of the Red Army;
c) taking the necessary intelligence-operational and other [through the command] measures to create conditions at the fronts that exclude the possibility of unpunished passage of enemy agents through the front line in order to make the front line impenetrable for espionage and anti-Soviet elements;
d) the fight against betrayal and treason in units and institutions of the Red Army [switching to the enemy’s side, harboring spies and generally facilitating the work of the latter];
e) combating desertion and self-mutilation at the fronts;
f) checking military personnel and other persons who were captured and surrounded by the enemy;
g) fulfillment of special tasks of the People's Commissar of Defense.
¤ Smersh bodies are exempt from carrying out any other work not directly related to the tasks listed in this section"
¤ Smersh bodies have the right:
“a) conduct intelligence work;
b) carry out, in accordance with the procedure established by law, seizures, searches and arrests of military personnel of the Red Army, as well as associated civilians suspected of criminal activities [The procedure for making arrests of military personnel is defined in Section IV of this Appendix];
c) conduct an investigation into the cases of those arrested with the subsequent transfer of cases, in agreement with the prosecutor's office, for consideration by the relevant judicial authorities or a Special Meeting at the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR;
d) apply various special measures aimed at identifying the criminal activities of foreign intelligence agents and anti-Soviet elements;
e) summon, without prior approval from the command, in cases of operational necessity and for interrogation, the rank and file and command and command staff of the Red Army.”
¤ “The Smersh bodies are staffed by the operational staff of the former Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR and a special selection of military personnel from among the command and control and political personnel of the Red Army.” In connection with this, “employees of the Smersh bodies are assigned military ranks established in the Red Army,” and “employees of the Smersh bodies wear uniforms, shoulder straps and other insignia established for the corresponding branches of the Red Army.”

It should be noted that the legislation provided for a significant expansion of the use of punitive measures against criminals, including citizens of foreign countries. This was due to the fact that during the liberation of Soviet territories and the countries of Eastern Europe, military counterintelligence, troops and rear security units detained and arrested deserters, traitors, various categories of what were then called anti-Soviet or hostile elements, and war criminals in large numbers. All of them henceforth fell under the jurisdiction of counterintelligence and internal affairs bodies, which were endowed with extraordinary rights in the process of operational search and investigative actions.

On April 19, 1943, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was issued “On punitive measures for Nazi villains guilty of murder and torture of the Soviet civilian population and captured Red Army soldiers, spies, traitors to the Motherland from among Soviet citizens and their accomplices.” For these crimes, called in the law “the most shameful and serious,” the death penalty by hanging was imposed.
The court included: the chairman of the military tribunal, the head of military counterintelligence, the deputy commander for political affairs, and the division prosecutor. The sentence was passed by military courts attached to divisions of the Active Army. Along with spies and traitors from among Soviet citizens, foreign citizens (German, Italian, Romanian, Hungarian, Finnish) convicted of these crimes could also be sentenced to exceptional punishment. Accomplices of the occupiers from the local population were sentenced to 15 to 20 years of hard labor. To accommodate them, the NKVD organized special departments at the Vorkuta and North-Eastern camps - with extended working hours for heavy work in the mines. The sentences were approved by the division commanders, and the execution of capital punishment could be carried out publicly, in front of the people, as if as an edification to others. This kind of public execution was considered by the Soviet authorities as a necessary measure designed to demonstrate the inevitability of retribution to all those who subjected the peoples of the USSR to genocide.
The State Defense Committee obliged the GUKR "Smersh" and its local bodies to constantly inform military councils and the command of the relevant units, formations and institutions of the Red Army about the results of the fight against enemy agents, desertion and treason, about anti-Soviet and other negative manifestations in the army. In turn, the heads of the Smersh departments of fronts, armies and military districts had the right to attend meetings of military councils, and, if necessary, to get acquainted with all the secret materials of the headquarters.

A group of soldiers and soldiers of the SMERSH counterintelligence department of the 70th Army against the backdrop of the Reich Chancellery. Berlin, May 9, 1945.

By the first order on the personnel of the GUKR “Smersh”, April 29, 1943, (order No. 1/ssh), the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR I.V. Stalin established a new procedure for assigning ranks to the officers of the new Main Directorate, who had predominantly “Chekist” special ranks:
“In accordance with the regulations approved by the State Defense Committee on the Main Counterintelligence Directorate of the People’s Commissariat of Defense “SMERSH” and its local bodies, - DIRECTIVES: 1. Assign the military ranks established by the Decree to the personnel of the “SMERSH” bodies Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in the following order: TO THE MANAGEMENT STAFF OF SMERSH BODIES: a) having the rank of junior lieutenant of state security - junior lieutenant; b) having the rank of lieutenant of state security - LIEUTENANT; c) having the rank of senior lieutenant of state security - ST. LIEUTENANT; d) having the rank of captain of state security - CAPTAIN; e) having the rank of state security major - MAJOR; f) having the rank of lieutenant colonel of state security - LIEUTENANT COLONEL; f) having the rank of State Security Colonel - COLONEL.
2. The rest of the commanding officers who have the rank of State Security Commissioner and above will be assigned military ranks on a personal basis.”

Solving the personnel issue

On July 26, 1941, training courses for operational workers for Special Departments were created at the Higher School of the NKVD. They planned to recruit 650 people and train them for a month. The head of the Higher School, Nikanor Davydov, was appointed head of the courses. During training, cadets participated in the construction of defensive structures and the search for German paratroopers near Moscow. On August 11, these courses were transferred to a 3-month training program. In September, 300 graduates were sent to the front. At the end of October, 238 graduates were sent to the Moscow Military District. In December, the NKVD handed over another issue. Then the school was disbanded, then recreated. In March 1942, a branch of the Higher School of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs was created in the capital. There they planned to train 400 people over a 4-month period. In total, during the war, 2,417 people completed these courses (according to other sources, about 2 thousand), who were sent to the Red Army and Navy.

First Deputy Head of SMERSH Nikolai Selivanovsky

Personnel for military counterintelligence were trained not only in the capital, but also in the regions. In the very first weeks of the war, departments of military districts created short-term courses for training operational personnel on the basis of inter-regional NKGB schools. In particular, on July 1, 1941, on the basis of the Novosibirsk Interregional School, Short-term courses were created at the Special Department of the NKVD of the Siberian Military District. They recruited 306 people, commanders and political workers of the Red Army. Already at the end of the month there was a graduation, and a new group was recruited (500 people). The second group was dominated by young people - 18-20 years old. This time the training period was increased to two months. After graduation, everyone was sent to the front. In September - October 1941, the third recruitment (478 people) was made. In the third group, most of the cadets were responsible party workers (workers of district and regional committees) and political workers of the Red Army. From March 1942, the training course increased to three months. From 350 to 500 people attended the courses. During this period, most of the students were junior commanders of the Red Army, sent from the front by the Military Counterintelligence Directorates.
Veterans became another source for replenishing the ranks of military counterintelligence. In September 1941, the NKVD issued a directive on the procedure for reinstating former workers and sending them to serve in the active army. In October 1941, the NKVD issued a directive on organizing the registration of employees of special departments who were undergoing treatment and their further use. The “special officers” who were cured and successfully passed the medical examination were sent to the front.
On June 15, 1943, a GKO order was issued, signed by Stalin, on the organization of schools and courses of the Main Counterintelligence Directorate. They planned to form four schools with a 6-9 month course of study, with a total number of students - more than 1,300 people. Courses with a 4-month training period were also opened in Novosibirsk and Sverdlovsk (200 students each). In November 1943, the Novosibirsk courses were transformed into a Main Directorate school with a 6-month and then a year course of study (for 400 people). The Sverdlovsk courses in June 1944 were also transformed into a school with a training period of 6-9 months and 350 cadets.

Face to face with German intelligence

By the summer of 1943, the reorganization and main personnel appointments in the Smersh counterintelligence agencies were practically completed. They coincided with the period when, after the winter offensive of 1942/1943, the Red Army troops were ordered to go on the defensive, consolidate on the achieved lines, accumulate and regroup forces and means for further offensive actions on the Soviet-German front.
The Germans, for their part, also took measures to transfer troops and equipment east from Western Europe and Africa, and after a powerful and successful counterattack south of Kharkov in February-March 1943, they took up a strong defense and prepared for the decisive battle on the so-called Kursk salient. The Wehrmacht armies were replenished not only with people, but also with new types of armored vehicles and aircraft. Hitler's troops still represented a formidable force.
In the Battle of Kursk, Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence played an extremely important role. They managed not only to detect in advance the Germans’ preparation for an offensive in the Kursk direction, but also to determine the location and timing of the operation.

Having comprehensive information about the enemy’s plans, the Soviet command at the Kursk Bulge chose the tactics of “deliberate defense” followed by a counteroffensive. In accordance with this task, the USSR intelligence services were given the goal of strengthening disinformation activities in order to hide the preparation of the Soviet offensive operation. To achieve this goal, military counterintelligence officers actively used radio games, broadcasting from radio stations captured from enemy agents.
As a result of the battle of Kursk and Belgorod, an attempt at a large-scale offensive by the Wehrmacht was thwarted. Revenge for the defeat at Stalingrad did not take place; the Reich's armies were finally bogged down in protracted, mostly defensive battles. Deeper cracks began to appear in the unity of the countries of the fascist bloc, and relations between the USSR and its allies strengthened. Evidence of this is the agreement on the opening of the Second Front and post-war cooperation between the three powers, reached at the Tehran Conference of 1943.
On the secret front of the confrontation, the balance of forces was increasingly leaning in favor of the anti-Hitler coalition. However, the intelligence services of Nazi Germany remained a formidable adversary, still directing the main efforts in their subversive work against the USSR. Army counterintelligence officers promptly caught all changes in the tactics of the enemy intelligence services to undermine the Red Army and the rear. This was evidenced by Abakumov’s regular reports to the State Defense Committee, the General Staff, the Council of People’s Commissars and other higher authorities, as well as reports and messages from military counterintelligence agencies from the fronts.
Beginning in 1943, the enemy began to more intensively send its agents across the front line on airplanes. When the German troops retreated to the rear of the Red Army, the enemy left behind intelligence groups, individual saboteur agents with special assignments, as well as a hostile nationalist underground associated with them or operating independently.

In 1943 - 1944, the objects of reconnaissance and sabotage aspirations of German intelligence in the theater of military operations remained the same: headquarters establishments, military reserves, places of their concentration. When carrying out subversive activities, the German special services, without reducing their activity at the front and in the front-line zone, increasingly began to transfer their actions to the deep rear of the Soviet Union. First of all, they were interested in all types of communications, industrial enterprises and other economic facilities that were of great importance for the defense of the country.
The enemy also paid increased attention to the national regions of the USSR, where they planned measures to provoke armed uprisings in the rear. The Germans carried out the transfer of armed detachments and groups to Kalmykia, Kazakhstan, the North Caucasus, Crimea, and to spread the ideas of the so-called New Generation National Labor Union (NTNL) to the Oryol and Bryansk regions. These formations were eliminated by joint counterintelligence and security-military operations of the territorial counterintelligence of the NKGB, GUKR "Smersh" of the NKO of the USSR and the NKVD of the USSR.

In the period from October 25 to December 1, 1944, the Smersh authorities of the Active Army arrested 776 German intelligence and counterintelligence agents dropped by parachute or left by the Germans during the retreat at the location of Soviet troops and in the liberated territory.
In July 1944, Smersh organs captured Sonderführer Erwin Bronikovsky-Gerasimovich, who, as an intelligence instructor at the headquarters of the German military command, toured the stations left during the German retreat on Soviet territory. He was known to military counterintelligence officers as the deputy head of the Borisov intelligence school, and then the radio operator school in the town of Niedersee.
During the interrogation, Bronikovsky named 36 agents who were dropped into the areas of Moscow, Kalinin (Tver), Tula, and were also left in Lithuania, Western Belarus and Western Ukraine. Using this information, the security officers arrested 27 of them, and put the rest on the wanted list, and some of the converted agents were successfully used in a radio game from the Moscow area.

Knowledge of the enemy, his weaknesses and strengths, largely determined the success of counterintelligence operations behind the front line. Some idea of ​​it is given by the final data sent by the GUKR “Smersh” to the State Defense Committee. Before the start of the offensive, military counterintelligence regularly supplied information to the command of units and formations of the Red Army. For example, in August 1944, before an offensive operation on the outskirts of the capital of Latvia, Riga, the Smersh Criminal Defense Forces of the 2nd Baltic Front prepared an orientation for all military counterintelligence units about the Abverstelle-Ostland reconnaissance and saboteur schools.
The corresponding order noted that the Smersh department of the front “has significant materials that make it possible to paralyze their subversive activities.” In this regard, under the leadership of the head of the department, Smershev operational groups, reinforced by soldiers of rifle battalions, were sent to the area of ​​the Riga junction to the locations of German schools following the advancing units of the Red Army. They carried out tasks to identify and arrest enemy intelligence officers and agents, leaders of anti-Soviet formations, as well as to capture documentation of the enemy’s reconnaissance and sabotage “nests”.

A significant change in the operational situation occurred after the entry of Soviet troops into the territory of foreign states and the NKVD border troops taking the state border under the protection. After Soviet troops reached the USSR border, a new military-political situation was created.
The leadership of the Soviet Union decided to defeat Nazi Germany on its territory. The slogan “Forward to Berlin!” The Soviet people and the army were unanimously perceived as a necessary measure of retribution to the occupiers for the grief and suffering they caused, for the death of millions of relatives and friends.
The expansion of the scale and growth of the pace of offensive operations of Soviet troops on the territory of Germany and other European countries also required more large-scale and effective operational-search work from the security agencies. In this regard, at the beginning of January 1945, Stalin approved the initiative to introduce the institution of representatives of the NKVD of the USSR on all fronts of the Western theater of military operations.

Kubatkin P.N.

Major leaders of state security and internal affairs bodies were appointed NKVD commissioners on all seven fronts: Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR I.A. Serov (1st Belorussian), People's Commissar of State Security of the BSSR L.F. Tsanava (2nd Belorussian), head of the GUKR “Smersh” NPO of the USSR V.S. Abakumov (3rd Belorussian), deputy head of the GUKR “Smersh” NPO of the USSR P.Ya. Meshik (1st Ukrainian), Deputy Head of the GUKR “Smersh” NPO of the USSR N.N. Selivanovsky (4th Ukrainian), authorized by the NKVD and NKGB of the USSR for the Lithuanian SSR I.M. Tkachenko (1st Baltic), Head of the NKGB Directorate for the Leningrad Region P.N. Kubatkin (2nd Baltic). Those authorized by the NKVD of the USSR were not relieved of their direct duties. Their deputies were appointed the current chiefs of the Smersh Ukrainian Criminal Defense Forces of the fronts and the chiefs of the NKVD troops for protecting the rear of the front.
Essentially, the authorized representatives of the NKVD of the USSR at the fronts were the main operational chiefs, and their deputies directly carried out and coordinated work related to the search for enemy agents, ensuring the impenetrability of the front line, clearing the rear of the Red Army from hostile elements, protecting railway junctions and industrial enterprises. The NKVD authorized representatives on the fronts were ordered to immediately carry out measures to identify and arrest members of various enemy organizations, gangster groups, identify and seize illegal radio stations, weapons depots, underground printing houses, material and technical bases intended for sabotage work.
To carry out these tasks, specially created operational groups were allocated at the disposal of the NKVD Commissioners on the fronts, which were entrusted with the tasks of identifying and arresting employees of the enemy’s intelligence and punitive agencies, leaders and members of collaborationist formations, as well as persons serving in the national SS legions, etc.
In the process of carrying out these operational activities, the authorized representatives of the NKVD of the USSR used the forces and means of the counterintelligence bodies “Smersh” of the fronts, in addition, all the NKVD troops for protecting the rear of the fronts, numbering 31 thousand 99 people, were under their subordination. Additionally, for these purposes, four divisions and four separate regiments with a total number of 27 thousand 900 people were also allocated from the internal, border and rifle troops of the NKVD, which should have arrived by January 20, 1945 in the areas of their use.
1,050 experienced security officers were seconded to the commissioners' offices, and uninterrupted HF communications with Moscow were ensured.
As subsequent events showed, the offices of the commissioners played an important role in concentrating and coordinating the efforts of the relevant departments to carry out operational search activities and operations in the areas of offensive operations of the Red Army. In the last months of the decisive battles, such a measure was fully justified. Special powers made it possible to maneuver forces and means, closely linking the actions of Smersh organs with the plans of the military command. The presence of such powers made it possible to accurately and timely inform the country's leadership and coordinate with it almost daily issues that had not only military, but also political significance: after all, the events took place on the territory of foreign states.
On the eve of the Berlin offensive operation, special operational groups were created in the Counterintelligence Directorate "Smersh" of the 1st Belorussian Front, according to the number of districts of Berlin, whose task was to search for and arrest government leaders and all persons subject to seizure (employees of punitive and intelligence agencies of Germany, members of anti-Soviet formations, etc.). In addition, the task forces were also involved in establishing storage facilities for valuables and documents of operational importance.

At the same time, army counterintelligence officers were preparing to conduct operational search activities in the German capital. In a memo dated April 23, 1945, the head of the Smersh counterintelligence department of the 1st Belorussian Front, Lieutenant General A.A. Vadis informed the head of the Smersh State Administration V.S. Abakumov about ongoing events:

“To carry out operational work in the mountains. Berlin, under the Smersh Directorate of the front, a central operational group was created, headed by the deputy head of the Smersh Directorate of the 1st Belorussian Front, Major General Melnikov. According to the number of urban districts, 20 district operational groups were created (on the right side of the Spree River - 9 districts, on the left - 11 districts - Author's note), headed by senior officials of the Smersh Directorate of the front and the Smersh departments of the armies.
All task forces of the mountains. Berlin is supplied with certificates about the location of intelligence and counterintelligence agencies, government and party institutions, certificates about anti-Soviet and white émigré organizations located in Berlin, and materials on the search for criminals who lived and worked in Berlin. Among anti-fascist Germans, prisoners of war, German soldiers and officers, as well as the civilian population, 26 people were selected who knew Berlin well, the institutions and organizations located there, and individuals who were of operational interest to us. All these individuals will be used by the task forces as identification officers.
Additional selection of identification officers continues from among prisoners of war of German soldiers and officers captured during the last offensive operations in the Berlin direction. In connection with the entry of our troops into the eastern regions of Berlin, two operational groups have already begun work, headed by the deputy head of the Smersh department of the 1st Tank Army, Lieutenant Colonel Arkhipenkov, and the deputy head of the Smersh department of the 2nd Tank Army, Lieutenant Colonel Mikhailov. All operational work on servicing the suburbs of Berlin is entrusted to the Smersh departments of the armies in the army’s operating zone. Appendix: plan for organizing work in the mountains. Berlin, city plan. Berlin".

As a result of the activities of the Smersh operational groups in Berlin, valuable documents from government, intelligence and counterintelligence agencies were captured, and prominent figures of the Nazi regime and punitive departments were detained in Germany, some of whom were subsequently charged with committing crimes against humanity.

Counterintelligence Directorate "SMERSH" of the People's Commissariat of the USSR Navy - Counterintelligence and anti-sabotage work in units of the Navy and Marine Corps

There is a known episode when, during the Battle of Berlin, military counterintelligence officers of the 47th Guards Rifle Division of the 8th Guards Army of the 1st Belorussian Front carried out an operation to seize one of the central Abwehr institutions in Berlin. According to intelligence data, it was located in the offensive zone of the 47th division in the Zehlendorf area, on the outskirts of the German capital, and was disguised as an agricultural institute. Throughout the war, this institution personified the main enemy of military counterintelligence.
On May 3, at 4:45 a.m., the head of the Smersh Criminal Investigation Department of the 1st Belorussian Front, Vadis, as the deputy commissioner of the NKVD of the USSR for HF, reported to Lavrenty Beria on the results of the search by the task forces for Nazi party figures and major officials of the departments of Nazi Germany in Berlin. Among them were the head of the radio broadcasting department of the Ministry of Propaganda Hans Fritsche, Goebbels' consultant on agitation and propaganda Wolf Heinrichsdorf, the head of the Reich Chancellery Hospital, Hitler's personal physician Professor Werner Haase, and the president of the German sailors' union in Berlin Ern Ginzmann. The latter claimed that Hitler and Goebbels committed suicide and their corpses were burned, and the Fuhrer’s corpse, according to him, could have been “in the pit of the shelter.”
In addition, the report of the head of the front’s military counterintelligence reported the arrival of V.I. to the commander of the 8th Guards Army. Chuikov, the commandant of Berlin, General G. Weidling, who signed the order for the surrender of all personnel of the Berlin garrison. According to Vadis, at 18:00 on May 2, 46 thousand German officers and soldiers surrendered from among those defending the city, among whom were three generals and Vice Admiral G.-E. Foss.
In May-June 1945, the Berlin task force "Smersh" discovered part of the archives of the Main Directorate of Imperial Security (RSHA), in particular, Gestapo developments on the apparatus of the German Foreign Ministry and its employees abroad, materials from the former 6th Directorate (foreign intelligence) with information on issues of foreign policy of Nazi Germany and information about foreign agents. In the headquarters of the SS troops in the capital, lists of agents deployed to the rear areas of the USSR in 1942-1943 were captured.
However, Smersh employees were not only engaged in the search for German war criminals. In May-June 1945, Smersh authorities brought to Moscow 36 Red Army generals who were captured at the beginning of the war with Nazi Germany. In accordance with Stalin's instructions, military counterintelligence summarized all available operational data about their behavior in captivity, as well as the results of conversations with them.
As a result, a decision was made to place 25 generals at the disposal of the Main Personnel Directorate of NGOs of the USSR, who were provided with the necessary assistance in treatment and living conditions. A number of them were sent to military training, others, due to severe wounds and poor health, were dismissed. At the same time, it was decided to arrest and try 11 Red Army generals who, while in captivity, joined organizations created by the Germans and conducted active anti-Soviet activities.

On June 7, 1945, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR approved the Decree “On amnesty in connection with the victory over Nazi Germany.” It did not apply to persons convicted under political charges or who had committed serious criminal offenses, but affected certain categories of the working population and military personnel sentenced to terms of no more than three years in prison or to various administrative penalties.
We were talking about citizens who violated the martial law regime during the war, who allowed unauthorized departure from military industry enterprises, and about military personnel who committed military crimes. According to the 1st Special Department of the NKVD of the USSR as of October 16, 1945, according to the Decree of June 7, 734 thousand 785 people were released from forced labor camps (ITL) and colonies. According to the decree, it was provided not only for release, but also for the reduction of sentences by half, as well as the expungement of criminal records from military personnel who distinguished themselves in battles with the Nazi invaders.

Fight after the Victory

After signing on May 8, 1945 by the representative of the USSR Marshal G.K. Zhukov's Act on the Unconditional Surrender of Germany, military counterintelligence was tasked with searching for foreign intelligence agents abandoned on Soviet territory and surrounded by occupation forces in all countries of the fascist bloc. In addition, it was necessary to identify traitors, collaborators, former employees of German and Romanian occupation institutions and other state criminals who were hiding from retribution after the end of the war.
To completely eliminate the threat from armed groups, an unprecedented operation was carried out to clear the rear of the already disbanded front. Beginning with
On May 12, the forces of 37 divisions carried out a combing of the area by passing a continuous front with a deployed chain of fighters. The military operation was headed by army commanders, and counterintelligence support in each battalion was led by a Smersh detective. As a result of the operation, by July 6, 1945, task forces had identified warehouses of weapons and ammunition, and detained 1,277 German agents, saboteurs and active fascist collaborators.

Parade on Red Square

To commemorate the victory of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces over Nazi Germany, a historic Victory Parade was held in Moscow on June 24, 1945. It was attended by combined regiments of the fronts, various branches of the military and the NKVD troops, the People's Commissariats of Defense and the Navy, parts of the Moscow garrison and military educational institutions. Military counterintelligence officers, along with other intelligence services, took the necessary measures to ensure the security of this grandiose event. Smersh employees, like other parade participants, could be proud of the awards of the Motherland. The first awarding of counterintelligence officers took place in the fall of 1943. At that time, 1,656 employees were awarded orders and medals, and 1,396 of them represented the operational staff of the Smersh counterintelligence agencies. Later, in 1944, 386 employees were awarded, and in February 1945, 559.

Description of one of the SMERSH operations.

From the report of the UKR “Smersh” of the Bryansk Front, deputy. People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR B.C. Abakumov about the results of operational security measures under the code name “Treason to the Motherland”
June 19, 1943
Top secret

In May of this year The most affected by the betrayal of the Motherland were the 415th and 356th SD of the 61st Army and the 5th SD of the 63rd Army, of which 23 soldiers went over to the enemy.
One of the most effective measures to combat traitors to the Motherland, among others, was to carry out operations to stage military personnel under the guise of group surrenders to the enemy, which were carried out on the initiative of the Smersh Counterintelligence Directorate of the front under the leadership of experienced operatives of the army's counterintelligence departments.
The operations took place on June 2 and 3 this year. in the sectors of the 415th and 356th SD with the task: under the guise of surrendering our military personnel, to get close to the Germans, throw grenades at them, so that in the future the enemy would meet with fire and destroy every transition to his side of groups or single traitors.
Three groups of military personnel from the 415th and 356th Infantry Divisions were selected and carefully checked to carry out the operations. Each group included 4 people.
In the 415th Infantry Division, one group consisted of division reconnaissance officers, the second - of penal soldiers.
One group of division scouts was created in the 356th Infantry Division.
The groups were selected and carefully checked by brave, strong-willed and devoted servicemen from among the juniors. commanders and Red Army soldiers.

Operation of the first group (scouts) 415th Infantry Division

I provide characterizing data on individual members of the group:
Pom. commander of a reconnaissance platoon of the 356th SD Sergeant Vasiliev, born in 1920, native of Moscow, lived there before being drafted into the Red Army, Russian, member of the Komsomol, 5th grade education, social status - worker, no judge.
He completed reconnaissance courses and participated in three combat operations. While performing a combat mission on the night of May 24 this year. was the first to break into the enemy trenches, throw grenades at the Germans, and promptly evacuate the wounded scouts. For completing combat missions he was awarded the medal “For Military Merit”.
Red Army soldier of the penal company of the 415th SD Dorokhov, born in 1906, native of the Tula region, Russian, by origin - from poor peasants, collective farmer, 4th grade education, b/p, married, previously convicted of elements.
Mobilized into the Red Army in June 1941, wounded near Mozdok in September 1942. He ended up in a penal company after a trial on charges of desertion from the Red Army.
I was not surrounded or captured. Disciplined, strong-willed, decisive. He willingly expressed a desire to atone for his guilt before his homeland.
Yurin, born in 1917, native of the Chelyabinsk region, Russian, second-hand, secondary education, married. In the Red Army since 1938, he had two wounds. I was not surrounded or captured. He was sent to a penal company after a trial for self-mutilation in December 1942 (one finger was torn off by the explosion of a modernized fuse). He proved himself to be one of the best Red Army soldiers, disciplined and proactive. Upon meeting him personally, he gave the impression of being serious and able to carry out a responsible project.
Scout of the 415th Infantry Division, Red Army soldier Vorontsov, born in 1914, native of the Ordzhonikidze region, Russian, peasant origin, 4th grade education, member of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) since 1942, no criminal record, single. He has served in the Red Army since 1937. He was wounded. I was not captured or surrounded. Repeatedly participated in combat operations, proactive, disciplined intelligence officer, resourceful.
The remaining group members are characterized by similar data.

Operation of the second group of the 415th SD (penalties)

After selection, the groups were taken to the rear of the divisions, where they underwent special training under the guidance of experienced commanders.
During preparation, special attention was paid to the ability of those participating in the operation to effectively throw grenades at the Germans and quickly escape after completing it. The training was carried out on terrain similar to the intended areas of operation. [...]
At the same time, specific areas of action for the groups were identified, action plans and calculations of artillery and mortar fire were prepared to support the groups during the operation.
The places for the groups' operations were chosen where there were cases of group crossings of the front line by traitors to the Motherland.
On June 2, 1943, the first and second [groups] operated in the defense area. June 3 this year a third group operated in the defense area of ​​the 356th Infantry Division.
June 2 this year at 4.00, after concentrating at the starting line, the group crawled to the German wire fence, stood up and, raising its hands, began to look for a passage in the wire fence.
The Germans immediately noticed those walking and began to call them to them. Three Germans, led by an officer, came out to meet the scouts, approaching the group at the wire fence at 30 m. The scouts threw grenades at the approaching Germans, killing three Germans, and returned without losses.
The group's retreat was supported by fire from a range of weapons.
June 2 this year at 3.00 the group concentrated on the starting line 100 m from the enemy, not far from our wire fence.
At 4.00, two parties of two people, with their hands raised, went to the wire fence, one of the first was holding a white sheet of paper in his hands, indicating a German leaflet.

At the entrance to the German wire fence, the group saw two German soldiers who began to indicate a place to pass through the fence.
The group, having passed the German wire fence, noticed that there were two communication passages from the latter to the German trenches and about 20 German soldiers were waiting for the group in the trenches.
When approaching the German concentration at 30 m, the group threw grenades at the German soldiers. And after using up the entire supply of grenades, under the cover of artillery and mortar fire, she retreated to our trenches.
During the retreat, two people from the group were slightly wounded and are now in service.

Operation of the third group of the 356th Infantry Division (reconnaissance)

June 3 this year at 3.00 the group left the starting line and reached the German wire fence, where they were met by one German soldier, who stopped them with the word “halt”.
When the leader of the group named the password for the transition - “bayonets in the ground,” the German began to show the way to the passage, being 20 m from the group.
At this time he was bombarded with grenades, and the group returned to their trenches.
The enemy opened fire on the group, but none of them were wounded.
All groups completed the tasks assigned to them perfectly, no incidents occurred during the operations.
The question was raised before the Military Council of the 61st Army about rewarding the participants in the operations, as well as about removing the criminal record from a group of Red Army soldiers from the penal company of the 415th Infantry Division who took part.
The army's counterintelligence departments were given instructions to conduct similar stagings of "Treason to the Motherland" in the units most affected by military personnel crossing over to the enemy.

Deputy Head of the Counterintelligence Directorate of the NPO "Smersh" of the Bryansk Front

Defeat of the Kwantung group

Already in the summer of 1945, the Soviet Union, faithful to its allied obligations, began practical actions to enter the war against militaristic Japan. After the Japanese government rejected the offer of surrender contained in the Potsdam Declaration of the Allied Powers, the USSR declared war on Japan on August 9. Together with the army, military counterintelligence was also preparing for actions on the Soviet-Japanese front.
From August 9 to September 2, 1945, the forces of the Far Eastern Front, the Pacific Fleet and the Amur Military Flotilla, with the participation of the MPR Army, carried out the Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation to defeat the Japanese Kwantung Army.

During its implementation, the Smersh counterintelligence agencies used the operational capabilities of intelligence and counterintelligence of the Far East and the combat experience accumulated by army security officers in the fight against German intelligence. The Soviet security agencies had extensive data on the structure, location and methods of subversive activities of Japanese intelligence. The main efforts of counterintelligence officers were aimed at defeating the Japanese intelligence services stationed in close proximity to the border of the USSR, as well as white émigré anti-Soviet organizations in Manchuria, which worked closely with enemy intelligence.
During the military operations and the offensive of the Red Army troops, operational search activities were carried out in the liberated territory. Counterintelligence operational groups "Smersh", which had lists of persons to be wanted and arrested, moving along with the landing troops and advancing units, seized the premises of former Japanese intelligence and police agencies, white emigrant organizations and individuals identified by the addresses received or by filtering prisoners of war.
After the defeat of Japan, many Japanese intelligence officers, leaders of White emigrant organizations and other anti-Soviet individuals remained in the liberated territories of China, Korea and Manchuria.
Military counterintelligence officers took vigorous measures to search for enemy agents. The head of the GUKR "Smersh" periodically informed the country's leadership about the results of this work in the liberated territory of Manchuria and Korea.

Thus, a memorandum dated February 27, 1946 from the head of the Smersh GUKR in the NPO of the USSR stated that the Smersh bodies of the Trans-Baikal-Amur, Primorsky and Far Eastern military districts in the territory of Manchuria and Korea occupied by Soviet troops, as of February 25, 1946, arrested 8745 employees and agents of Japanese intelligence, as well as leading and active participants in White Guard and other enemy organizations that carried out subversive activities against the Soviet Union, of which: employees and agents of Japanese intelligence and counterintelligence agencies - 5921 people; leading and active participants in White Guard and other enemy organizations, as well as traitors to the Motherland - 2824 people.

During the years of the Great Patriotic War, military counterintelligence officers neutralized more than 30 thousand enemy spies, about 3.5 thousand saboteurs and more than 6 thousand terrorists. “Smersh” adequately fulfilled all the tasks assigned to it by the Motherland.

From Smersh to the 3rd Main Directorate of the MGB

For objective peacetime reasons, a new reform was brewing in the military counterintelligence agencies “Smersh” and in the People’s Commissariats of State Security and Internal Affairs. Since March 1946, all people's commissariats were renamed ministries. The Ministry of State Security (MGB) of the USSR was created, which included all the structures of the former NKGB of the USSR, and the military counterintelligence bodies “Smersh” NKO and NKVMF of the USSR were transformed into the 3rd Main Directorate of the new ministry with the tasks of counterintelligence support for the army and navy. Colonel General V.S. was confirmed as Minister of State Security. Abakumov, and the head of military counterintelligence - N.N. Selivanovsky.
The Main Directorate of Counterintelligence "Smersh" of the NPO, the Criminal Investigation Department of the NK of the Navy, and the OKR of the NKVD legally existed for about three years. From the point of view of history, the period is extremely short. But these t

Military counterintelligence SMERSH was created in the Soviet Union in 1943. Only 70 years later, the “top secret” classification was removed from many operations carried out by counterintelligence officers.

The main task of this unit was not only to counter the German Abwehr, but also to introduce Soviet counterintelligence officers into the highest echelons of power in Nazi Germany and intelligence schools, destroy sabotage groups, conduct radio games, and also in the fight against traitors to the Motherland. It should be noted that the name of this special service was given by I. Stalin himself. At first there was a proposal to name the unit SMERNESH (that is, “death to German spies”), to which Stalin said that Soviet territory was full of spies from other states, and it was also necessary to fight them, so it was better to call the new body simply SMERSH. Its official name became the counterintelligence department SMERSH of the NKVD of the USSR. By the time counterintelligence was created, the battle of Stalingrad was left behind, and the initiative in the conduct of military operations began to gradually pass to the Union troops. At this time, territories that had been under occupation began to be liberated; a large number of Soviet soldiers and officers fled from German captivity. Some of them were sent by the Nazis as spies. Special departments of the Red Army and Navy needed reorganization, so they were replaced by SMERSH. And although the unit lasted only three years, people still talk about it to this day.

The work of counterintelligence officers in searching for saboteurs and agents, as well as nationalists and former White Guards, was extremely dangerous and difficult. To systematize the work, special lists, collections and photo albums of those people who needed to be found were compiled. Later, in 1944, a collection of materials concerning German intelligence agencies at the front was published, and a few months later a collection on Finnish military intelligence.
Active assistance to the security officers was provided by identification agents, who in the past had assisted the fascists, but later turned themselves in. With their help, it was possible to identify a large number of saboteurs and spies who operated in the rear of our country.

The search and front-line reconnaissance was carried out by the 4th department of SMERSH, headed first by Major General P. Timofeev, and later by Major General G. Utekhin.

Official information states that during the period from October 1943 to May 1944, 345 Soviet counterintelligence officers were transferred behind enemy lines, of which 50 were recruited from German agents. After completing the tasks, only 102 agents returned. 57 intelligence officers managed to infiltrate enemy intelligence agencies, of which 31 later returned, and 26 remained to carry out the task. In total, during this period of time, 1,103 enemy counterintelligence agents and 620 official employees were identified.

Below are examples of several successful operations carried out by SMERSH.

Junior Lieutenant Bogdanov, who fought on the 1st Baltic Front, was captured in August 1941. He was recruited by German military intelligence officers, after which he completed an internship at the Smolensk sabotage school. When he was transferred to the Soviet rear, he confessed, and already in July 1943 he returned to the enemy as an agent who had successfully completed the task. Bogdanov was appointed platoon commander of the Smolensk school of saboteurs. During his work, he managed to persuade 6 saboteurs to cooperate with Soviet counterintelligence agents. In October of the same 1943, Bogdanov, along with 150 school students, was sent by the Germans to carry out a punitive operation. As a result, the entire personnel of the group went over to the side of the Soviet partisans.

Beginning in the spring of 1941, information began to arrive from Germany from Olga Chekhova, a famous actress who was married to A.P. Chekhov’s nephew. In the 20s he left for Germany for permanent residence. Very soon she gained popularity among Reich officials, becoming Hitler's favorite and making friends with Eva Braun. In addition, her friends were the wives of Himmler, Goebbels and Goering. Everyone admired her wit and beauty. Ministers, Field Marshal Keitel, industrialists, Gauleiters, and designers repeatedly turned to her for help, asking her to put in a word with Hitler. And it doesn’t matter what we were talking about: the construction of missile ranges and underground factories or the development of “retribution.” The woman wrote down all requests in a small notebook with a gilded cover. It turned out that not only Hitler knew about its contents.

The information that Olga Chekhova conveyed was very important, since it came “first hand” - from the Fuhrer’s inner circle, Reich officials. Thus, the actress learned about when exactly the offensive near Kursk would take place, about how much military equipment was being produced, as well as about the freezing of the nuclear project. It was planned that Chekhova would have to take part in the assassination attempt on Hitler, but at the very last moment Stalin ordered the operation to be interrupted.

German intelligence officers could not understand where the information leak came from. Very soon they found the actress. Himmler volunteered to interrogate her. He came to her home, but the woman, knowing in advance about his visit, invited Hitler to visit.

The woman was arrested by SMERSH officers at the very end of the war, allegedly for harboring Himmler’s adjutant. During the first interrogation, she gave her operational pseudonym - “Actress”. She was summoned to an appointment first with Beria, and then with Stalin. It is clear that her visit to the Soviet Union was kept strictly secret, so she was not even able to see her daughter. After returning to Germany, she was provided with lifelong maintenance. The woman wrote a book, but did not say a word about her activities as an intelligence officer. And only a secret diary, which was discovered after her death, indicated that she actually worked for Soviet counterintelligence.

Another successful operation that caused significant damage to enemy intelligence was Operation Berezino. In 1944, about 2 thousand German soldiers, led by Colonel Scherhorn, were surrounded in the forests of Belarus. With the help of saboteur Otto Skorzeny, Hitler's intelligence decided to turn them into a detachment of saboteurs that would operate in the Soviet rear. However, for quite a long time the detachment could not be detected; three Abwehr groups returned with nothing, and only the fourth established contact with the encircled.

For several nights in a row, German planes dropped the necessary cargo. But practically nothing reached its destination, because instead of Colonel Scherhorn, who was captured, Colonel Maklyarsky, who was similar to him, and State Security Major William Fisher were introduced into the detachment. After conducting a radio session with the “German colonel,” the Abwehr gave the order to the detachment to make its way into German territory, but not a single German soldier managed to return to their homeland.

It must be said that another of the most successful operations of Soviet counterintelligence officers was the prevention of an attempt on Stalin’s life in the summer of 1944. This was not the first attempt, but this time the Nazis prepared more thoroughly. The start of the operation was successful. The saboteurs Tavrin and his radio operator wife landed in the Smolensk area, and, using a motorcycle, headed towards Moscow. The agent was dressed in the military uniform of a Red Army officer with orders and the Star of the Hero of the USSR. In addition, he also had the “ideal” documents of the head of one of the SMERSH departments. To avoid any questions at all, an issue of Pravda was printed especially for the “major” in Germany, which included an article about awarding her the Hero’s Star. But the German intelligence leadership did not know that the Soviet agent had already managed to report the impending operation. The saboteurs were stopped, but the patrolmen immediately did not like the “major’s” behavior. When asked where they were coming from, Tavrin named one of the remote settlements. But it rained all night, and the officer himself and his companion were completely dry.

Tavrin was asked to go to the guardhouse. And when he took off his leather jacket, it became completely clear that he was not a Soviet major, since during the “Interception” plan to capture saboteurs, a special order was issued regarding the procedure for wearing awards. The saboteurs were neutralized, and a radio station, money, explosives and weapons, which none of the Soviet military had ever seen before, were taken from the sidecar of the motorcycle.

It was a Panzerknacke, a miniature grenade launcher that was developed in the laboratory of the German Main Security Administration. It could easily fit into the sleeve of an overcoat. In addition, Tavrin also had a powerful explosive device as a backup option, which was placed in his briefcase. In the event that the assassination attempt had not been carried out the first time, Tavrin planned to leave the briefcase in the meeting room. During interrogations, he confessed to everything, but this did not help him. The saboteur was later shot.

Radio games conducted by Soviet intelligence services on air are also well known. Carrying out such games with the enemy on the radio provided an excellent opportunity to supply German headquarters with disinformation. In total, 183 radio games were held during the war. One of the most famous and successful was the radio game “Aryans”. In May 1944, an enemy plane with 24 German saboteurs on board landed near the Kalmyk settlement of Utta. Fighters were sent to the landing area. As a result, 12 paratroopers and saboteurs were captured. During the subsequent radio game, 42 radiograms containing disinformation were transmitted to Berlin.

SMERSH existed until 1946. After the war, military counterintelligence again became part of various intelligence services: first the MGB, and then the KGB. But even now the work of SMERSHevites during the war evokes delight and admiration.

Main Directorate of Counterintelligence "Smersh" NKO USSR and NKVMF USSR

Military counterintelligence, by a secret resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of April 19, 1943, was transferred to the People's Commissariats of Defense and the Navy, under which the counterintelligence departments “Smersh” (short for “death to spies”) were established. Regarding the name, there is a well-known story about how Joseph Stalin, having become familiar with the original version of “Smernesh” (“death to German spies”), remarked: “Aren’t other intelligence services spying on us?”, as a result of which the now legendary and famous abbreviation SMERSH appeared . In any case, the decoding of the word SMERSH was officially recorded two days later.

The birth of "Smersh"

On April 21, 1943, Joseph Stalin signed Resolution of the State Defense Committee No. 3222 ss/ov approving the regulations on the GUKR “Smersh” NKO of the USSR. The text of the document consisted of only one laconic phrase: “Approve the regulations on the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence “Smersh” - (Death to Spies) and its local bodies (see appendix).” But in the appendix to the document it was described in detail what the new division of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR and the People's Commissariat of the Navy should do, and the status of its employees was also determined.

According to the Regulations, the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence NGOs (“Smersh” - death to spies), created on the basis of the former Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR, is part of the People's Commissariat of Defense.

The head of the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence of the NPO (“Smersh”) is the Deputy People’s Commissar of Defense, subordinate directly to the People’s Commissar of Defense and carries out only his orders.” Let us explain that Joseph Stalin himself was the People's Commissar of Defense.

Moreover, the Resolution especially emphasized that “Smersh bodies” are a centralized organization: on the fronts and districts, Smersh bodies (Smersh Directorates of NCOs of the fronts and Smersh departments of NCOs of armies, corps, divisions, brigades, military districts and other formations and institutions of the Red Army) are subordinate only to their higher authorities.”

With regard to the command of the Red Army, it was indicated that “Smersh bodies inform the Military Councils and the command of the relevant units, formations and institutions of the Red Army on issues of their work: about the results of the fight against enemy agents, about anti-Soviet elements that have penetrated into army units, about the results of the fight against treason and betrayal, desertion, self-mutilation.”

Informing does not mean obeying. Although the decree provided for the possibility of cooperation between the command of the Red Army and military counterintelligence.

At the same time, the list of tasks solved by the Smersh bodies was clearly defined:

“a) the fight against espionage, sabotage, terrorism and other subversive activities of foreign intelligence services in units and institutions of the Red Army;

b) the fight against anti-Soviet elements that have penetrated into units and institutions of the Red Army;

c) taking the necessary intelligence-operational and other (through the command) measures to create conditions at the fronts that exclude the possibility of unpunished passage of enemy agents through the front line in order to make the front line impenetrable for espionage and anti-Soviet elements;

d) the fight against betrayal and treason in units and institutions of the Red Army (switching to the enemy’s side, harboring spies and generally facilitating the work of the latter);

e) combating desertion and self-mutilation at the fronts;

f) checking military personnel and other persons who were captured and surrounded by the enemy;

g) carrying out special tasks of the People’s Commissar of Defense.”

It was especially emphasized that “Smersh bodies are exempt from carrying out any other work not directly related to the tasks listed in this section.”

The resolution listed the rights that were vested in the NPO Counterintelligence Directorate (Smersh) and its local bodies have the right to:

a) conduct intelligence work.

b) carry out, in accordance with the procedure established by law, seizures, searches and arrests of military personnel of the Red Army, as well as associated civilians suspected of criminal activities.

Note. The procedure for making arrests of military personnel is defined in Section IV of these Regulations.

c) Conduct an investigation into the cases of those arrested with the subsequent transfer of cases, in agreement with the prosecutor's office, for consideration by the relevant judicial authorities or a Special Meeting at the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

d) Apply various special measures aimed at identifying the criminal activities of foreign intelligence agents and anti-Soviet elements.

e) Summon, without prior approval from the command, in cases of operational necessity and for interrogation, the rank and file and command and command staff of the Red Army.”

According to Section IV of the Resolution: “Smersh authorities arrest Red Army soldiers in the following order:

a) Arrests of private and junior command personnel - in agreement with the prosecutor.

b) Middle command personnel - in agreement with the commander and prosecutor of the formation or unit.

c) Senior command personnel - in agreement with the Military Councils and the prosecutor.

d) The highest command staff - with the sanction of the People's Commissar of Defense."

The Resolution also described in detail the structure of Smersh. According to the text of the document:

"1. The Main Directorate of Counterintelligence of the NPO (“Smersh”) includes:

Assistants to the head of the Main Directorate (according to the number of fronts) with groups of operational workers assigned to them, who are entrusted with the responsibility of managing the work of the Smersh bodies on the fronts.

1st Department - intelligence and operational work in the central bodies of the Red Army - the departments of the People's Commissariat of Defense.

2nd Department - work among prisoners of war who are of interest to the Smersh authorities, checking of Red Army soldiers who were captured and surrounded by the enemy.

3rd Department - fight against enemy agents (parachutists) thrown into our rear.

4th Department - counterintelligence work on the enemy’s side in order to identify channels of penetration of enemy agents into units and institutions of the Red Army.

5th Department - management of the work of the Smersh bodies of military districts.

6th Department – ​​investigative.

7th Department – ​​operational accounting, statistics.

8th Department – ​​operational technology.

9th Department - searches, arrests, installations, external surveillance.

10? Department “C” - work on special assignments.

11th Department – ​​cipher communications.

Human Resources Department - selection and training of personnel for Smersh bodies, formation of new Smersh bodies.

Administrative department - financial and logistical services of the Department, commandant's office.

Secretariat.

2. The following bodies of “Smersh” are organized locally:

a) Counterintelligence Directorate of the NKO (“Smersh”) of the fronts;

b) Counterintelligence departments of NPOs (Smersh) of armies, districts, corps, divisions, brigades, reserve regiments, garrisons, fortified areas, institutions of the Red Army.

The structure of local bodies of "Smersh" is established in relation to the structure of the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence of the NPO ("Smersh") and approved by the People's Commissar of Defense.

To ensure operational work, escort, security of arrested persons and places of detention, local Smersh bodies are allocated from Red Army units:

a) To the Smersh Directorate of the front - a battalion;

b) to the Smersh department of the army - a company;

c) “Smersh” department of a corps, division, brigade – a platoon.”

An important section of the Decree, which few modern historians paid attention to. Military counterintelligence bodies “are staffed by the operational staff of the former Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR and a special selection of military personnel from among the command and control and political personnel of the Red Army.” With the first category of persons everything is clear - it would be strange not to use experienced military security officers. But the second category is soldiers of the Red Army, and not employees of state security agencies, as was the case at the beginning of the war. There are many reasons for the change in personnel policy, starting with the fact that security officers were needed in other areas of work - for example, to staff the state security agencies of the liberated territories of the Soviet Union and ending with the desire of Joseph Stalin to introduce “new blood” into the personnel of military counterintelligence.

The following facts indirectly testify to the “orientation” of the personnel policy of the leadership of “Smersh” towards the army. According to the Resolution: “Employees of the Smersh organs are assigned military ranks established in the Red Army” and “Employees of the Smersh organs wear uniforms, shoulder straps and other insignia established for the corresponding branches of the Red Army.”

On May 31, 1943, the GKO Resolution approved a similar “Regulation on the Smersh UCR of the NKVMF.”

The structure of the Counterintelligence Directorate of the NPO Smersh was as follows:

Boss;

Human Resources Department;

Secretariat;

Commandant's Office;

Accounting department;

1st Department – ​​front headquarters and administration;

2nd Department - counterintelligence work in the rear, the fight against enemy agents (paratroopers), work among prisoners of war; filtering those who were captured or surrounded;

3rd Department - management of the work of subordinate bodies, the fight against subversive activities of foreign intelligence services, anti-Soviet elements, treason, and military crimes;

4th Department – ​​investigative.

Structure of the Counterintelligence Department of the NPO "Smersh" of the army:

Boss;

Secretariat;

Commandant's Office;

Accounting group;

1st Division - work on headquarters, management departments;

2nd department - work on rear management and its facilities;

3rd department - management of subordinate bodies (corps, division, brigade);

4th department - fight against enemy agents, filtration, behind-the-front work;

Investigation department.

Fulfilling the Decree of the State Defense Committee

Now let’s talk about how the GKO Decree of April 21, 1943 was implemented in practice. Commissar of State Security of the 2nd Rank V. S. Abakumov was appointed head of the Main Counterintelligence Directorate "Smersh" of the NPO; GB Commissioner P. A. Gladkov was appointed head of the Counterintelligence Directorate "Smersh" of the NK Navy.

Abakumov’s deputies in the GUKR “Smersh” were appointed state security commissars of the 3rd rank (from May 1943 - lieutenant generals) Nikolai Nikolaevich Selivanovsky (for intelligence work) and Isai Yakovlevich Babich, who previously headed the Special Departments of the Southern and Northwestern Fronts, respectively, and the former head of the ECU of the NKVD of the USSR, state security commissioner of the 3rd rank Pavel Yakovlevich Meshik, on May 26, 1943, Colonel Ivan Ivanovich Vradiy was appointed deputy head of the main department. The assistants to the head of the GUKR were the GB Commissioner (since May of the same year - Major General) Ivan Ivanovich Moskalenko, Major Generals Konstantin Pavlovich Prokhorenko (died in October 1944) and Alexander Petrovich Misyurev.

Since April 1943, the structure of the GUKR "Smersh" included the following departments, the heads of which were approved on April 29, 1943 by order No. 3/ssh of the People's Commissar of Defense Joseph Stalin:

1st department - intelligence and operational work in the central apparatus of the People's Commissariat of Defense (chief - Colonel of State Security, then Major General Ivan Ivanovich Gorgonov);

2nd department - work among prisoners of war, checking of Red Army soldiers who were in captivity (chief - Lieutenant Colonel of State Security Sergei Nikolaevich Kartashev);

3rd department - the fight against German agents sent to the rear of the Red Army (chief - Colonel of State Security Georgy Valentinovich Utekhin);

4th Department - work on the enemy’s side to identify agents being dropped into Red Army units (headed by State Security Colonel Pyotr Petrovich Timofeev);

5th department - management of the work of Smersh bodies in military districts (chief - State Security Colonel Dmitry Semenovich Zenichev);

6th department - investigative (chief - Lieutenant Colonel of State Security Alexander Georgievich Leonov);

7th - operational accounting and statistics, verification of the military nomenclature of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, NGOs, NKVMF, code workers, access to top secret and secret work, verification of workers sent abroad (head, Colonel A. E. Sidorov, apparently was appointed later, because there was no data in the order dated April 29, 1943);

8th department - operational technicians (chief - Lieutenant Colonel of State Security Mikhail Petrovich Sharikov);

9th Department - searches, arrests, external surveillance (chief - Lieutenant Colonel of State Security Alexander Evstafievich Kochetkov);

10th Department (Department “C”) - work on special assignments (chief - State Security Major Alexander Mikhailovich Zbrailov);

11th department - encryption (chief - State Security Colonel Ivan Aleksandrovich Chertov).

There was also a political department, consisting of a chief, Colonel Nikifor Matveyevich Sidenkov, and a typist; apparatus of 16 assistants (according to the number of fronts) of the head of the Main Directorate of Civil Defense (69 people, by position - heads of departments, senior detectives and their assistants); administrative, financial and economic department (chief - Lieutenant Colonel of State Security Sergei Andreevich Polovnev); the personnel department (headed by State Security Colonel Ivan Ivanovich Vradiy) and the secretariat (Colonel Ivan Aleksandrovich Chernov).

The headcount of the central office of the GUKR “Smersh” NPO was 646 people.

The deputy chiefs of the Smersh management complex of the Navy's NK were major generals of the coastal service Alexei Pavlovich Lebedev and Sergei Grigorievich Dukhovich.

The Smersh bodies in the Active Army have been assigned the number of employees. The front department, which consisted of more than five armies, was supposed to have 130 employees, no more than four armies - 112, army counterintelligence departments - 57, counterintelligence departments of military districts - from 102 to 193, with the most numerous being the Smersh ROC of the Moscow Military District. Military units were also attached to guard the locations of military counterintelligence agencies and filtration points, escorting arrested Red Army soldiers. Thus, the Smersh ROC of a brigade, division and corps had a platoon for these purposes, the army department had a company, and the front command had a battalion.

Almost immediately after the transfer of military counterintelligence to the People's Commissariat of Defense, the “special officers” were assigned combined arms military ranks instead of the previously existing special state security ranks. By order of the People's Commissar of Defense Joseph Stalin dated April 29, 1943, officers with ranks from junior lieutenant to GB colonel received similar military ranks.

A month later, on May 26, 1943, by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, published in the central press, the rank of “lieutenant general” was awarded to the deputy chiefs of the Smersh Main Military Directorate I. Ya. Babich, P. Ya. Meshik and N. N. Selivanovsky , as well as the head of the Smersh Criminal Investigation Department of the Western Front, Pavel Vasilyevich Zelenin.

The title of “Major General” was given to the heads of counterintelligence directorates and departments of military districts, fronts and armies:

Head of the Smersh Criminal Defense Forces of the North Caucasus Front, Mikhail Ilyich Belkin;

Deputy Chief of the Smersh Criminal Defense Forces of the 1st Ukrainian Front Alexander Mikhailovich Belyanov;

Head of the Smersh Criminal Defense Forces of the Leningrad Front Alexander Semenovich Bystrov;

head of the Smersh Criminal Investigation Department of the Central Front, Alexander Anatolyevich Vadis;

Head of the 1st Department of the Main Directorate for the Management of the Crimea "Smersh" Ivan Ivanovich Gorgonov;

head of the Smersh R&D Army of the Leningrad Front, Fedor Ivanovich Gusev;

head of the Smersh ROC of the 3rd Shock Army of the Kalinin Front, Alexander Mikhailovich Davydov;

Head of the Smersh Criminal Defense Forces of the North-Western Front, Yakov Afanasyevich Edunov;

Nikolai Ivanovich Zheleznikov, head of the Smersh Criminal Defense Forces of the Bryansk Front;

Head of the Smersh Criminal Defense Forces of the Southwestern Front Pyotr Ivanovich Ivashutin;

Head of the Smersh Criminal Investigation Department of the Southern Front Nikolai Kuzmich Kovalchuk;

head of the Smersh Criminal Investigation Department of the Steppe District (since July of the same year - Steppe Front) Nikolai Andrianovich Korolev;

Head of the Smersh R&D of the Ural Military District Georgy Semenovich Marselsky;

Head of the Smersh Criminal Defense Forces of the Volkhov Front Dmitry Ivanovich Melnikov;

Nikolai Alekseevich Osetrov, head of the Smersh Criminal Investigation Department of the Voronezh Front;

head of the Northern Regional Development Department Ilya Semenovich Pavlov;

Head of the Smersh Criminal Defense Forces of the Transcaucasian Front Nikolai Maksimovich Rukhadze;

Head of the Smersh Criminal Defense Forces of the Trans-Baikal Front, Ivan Timofeevich Saloimsky;

Head of the Smersh Criminal Defense Forces of the Karelian Front Alexey Matveevich Sidnev;

head of the 4th department of the Main Directorate for Civil Investigations, Petr Petrovich Timofeev;

Head of the Criminal Investigation Department of the Moscow Military District Fedor Yakovlevich Tutushkin;

Head of the Smersh Criminal Defense Forces of the Kalinin Front Nikolai Georgievich Khannikov;

Head of the Smersh Criminal Defense Forces of the Far Eastern Front Alexander Nikolaevich Chesnokov.

All heads of Smersh front-line departments remained in their posts until the end of the war or until the liquidation of the fronts.

In May 1943, the Counterintelligence Department “Smersh” of the NKVD of the USSR was organized in the NKVD troops. This structure was engaged in counterintelligence support for NKVD institutions and troops.

Structure of the Counterintelligence Department “Smersh” of the NKVD of the USSR:

boss;

two deputy heads of department;

secretariat;

special group;

operational accounting group;

1st department - intelligence and operational work in the central directions of the NKVD troops of the USSR;

2nd Department - management of intelligence and operational work of the Smersh departments and protection of the military rear of the fronts;

3rd Department - management of the intelligence and operational work of the Smersh departments in the border troops of the NKVD;

4th Department - management of the intelligence and operational work of the Smersh departments in the internal troops, railway, industrial, convoy troops of the NKVD and MPVO;

5th department – ​​investigative;

The 6th department is organizational and mobilization.