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Alexander Prishchepenko
Battle of Leyte Gulf

The loss of the Mariana Islands and other areas important for defense cast doubt on Japan's chances of ending the war on favorable terms. If we remember that in 1941 the decision to start the war was not made unanimously, then after the crushing defeats the ranks of opposition to the militaristic course grew. As a result, the war government led by General Tojo Heideki fell on July 18, 1944. He was replaced by the more moderate Admiral Yonai Mitsumasa. It was decided, while continuing the war, to begin cautiously probing the terms on which peace could be concluded.

There were prerequisites for such efforts: the empire still owned vast territories and raw materials in the South Seas. There, near the oil sources, in Linga Roads, almost all the heavy artillery ships were concentrated. The strike carrier forces, battered in battle, were pulled to the mother country to be replenished with new aircraft and crews. Thus, the somewhat faded, but still significant Japanese naval power was concentrated in two power centers, very dependent on the sea communications that connected them. The northern island needed fuel supplies, and the southern island needed ammunition and weapons.

The enemy also understood the importance of communications for Japan; American submarines waged an unrestricted war against shipping, and army aircraft from bases in China mined coastal waters. The Imperial Navy was poorly prepared to cover its shipping, both technically (there were very few escort and minesweepers) and tactically. Therefore, by the fall of 1944, the only protection of communications from the complete arbitrariness of the Americans remained aviation, based on the islands of the Philippine archipelago, Formosa (Taiwan) and the Ryukyu Archipelago.

1. Escort aircraft carriers (in flight jargon - “jeeps”) were widely used in anti-submarine defense, as well as for direct air support of troops in landing operations. CVE-29 "Santi" (23870 tons, 30 aircraft) was rebuilt from a tanker

On September 15, 1944, American amphibious forces of Vice Admirals Daniel Barbie and Theodore Wilkinson captured the islands of Morogai, Pepeliu and Angaur. Losses among the paratroopers were high: almost as many Americans were killed on Peleliu and Angaur as during the Normandy landings. Nevertheless. On September 23, Ulithi Atoll with a lagoon convenient for anchoring ships was captured. Based on these forward bases, amphibious vultures could begin landing in the Philippines

Almost simultaneously, a colossal battle in the air flared up: the 38th Task Force (TF) of the US Pacific Fleet (9 heavy and 8 light aircraft carriers with numerous escort ships) conducted a series of successive raids on the enemy’s network of island air bases in order to bleed its aviation on the eve of the upcoming main attack. During these battles, especially in the three-day battle over Formosa, about 3 thousand Japanese aircraft were destroyed on the ground or shot down in the air. Airfields were also damaged by bomb attacks. Here, a new powerful incendiary agent was used for the first time - napalm (gasoline thickened with salts of naphthenic and palmitic acids).

2. Routes of Japanese forces in the Battle of Leyte Gulf

The few pilots who returned after raids on American ships did a disservice to the Japanese command. After their optimistic reports, the prevailing opinion at the headquarters of the Imperial Navy was that, although at the cost of colossal losses, the enemy had also suffered serious damage, and we could count on a respite. In fact, the losses of the 38th OS were small: 79 aircraft out of 1,100 available, one hit each on the aircraft carrier Franklin and the new cruisers Canberra and Houston. None of the ships were lost.

On the morning of October 17, 1944, landing forces landed from the leading ships of the invasion fleet and captured small islands at the entrance to Leyte Gulf. A large-scale Philippine landing operation began. Over the next 3 days, fire support ships continuously processed the landing sites. Finally, on October 20, troops of the 6th Army under Lieutenant General Walter Krueger landed at 2 points on the Philippine coast. General command in the zone was exercised by General Douglas MacArthur. Counteraction by weakened Japanese aircraft led to the sinking of one landing ship and a tug, as well as a torpedo hitting the light cruiser Honolulu. The aircraft of the 1st Special Corps "Kamikaze" crashed into the cruiser "Australia". Such sacrifice by Japanese pilots had not been uncommon before, but this time young pilots specially selected for this mission began to act, because the Japanese did not have time to train full-fledged air fighters.

3. US submarines played an important role in the fight against Japanese shipping, the centerpiece of the USS 383 Pampanito. Photo by the author, San Francisco. 2000

The disgraced General Yamashita Tomoyuki, previously famous as the “Tiger of Malaya,” arrived from the inactive Kwantung Army to defend the Philippines.

He began to pull on about. Reinforce your forces while trying to throw troops into the sea. Around the bridgeheads, focal battles broke out, with varying degrees of success. However, US carrier-based aircraft effectively isolated the battle area and supported their troops. Despite the rains, the bridgeheads expanded, and a few weeks after the landing (albeit later than planned), US Army Aviation and Marine Corps aircraft began operating from land airfields captured from the Japanese.

Then the command of the Imperial Navy decided to involve all combat-ready surface forces in the counter-landing operation. There was no longer any point in preserving them: the alternative to the honorable death of the fleet in battle could only be a blockade loop.

The plan of the operation was typical for the Japanese: dividing forces into several echelons, a covert approach to the battle area and a sudden, time-coordinated strike. On October 18, the sabotage strike force of Vice Admiral Kurita Takeo and Force C of Vice Admiral Nishimura Teiji left Linga Roads. Both units took delivery of fuel in Brunei on October 22. Then the sabotage strike force went to the San Bernardino Strait, and the Nishimura force went to the Surigao Strait, where on October 15 the second sabotage strike force of Vice Admiral Shima Kiyohide headed from the Inland Sea. On October 20, Vice Admiral Ozawa Yisaburo's Northern Force left the Inland Sea. A total of 116 aircraft were on Ozawa’s 4 aircraft carriers - they were destined to serve as bait, distracting the most powerful American ships. This is how the tasks of the once main striking force of the Imperial Navy were transformed.

The artillery ships, having taken different routes to Leyte Gulf, were supposed to suddenly appear there on October 25 and destroy supply transports, escort aircraft carriers and other ships covering the landing. General Yamashita was preparing to throw all his remaining forces at the Americans, temporarily deprived of supplies and air and sea support. This was the Sho plan, the implementation of which led to the largest naval and air battle in history. Regarding the fate of their ships participating in the battle, the Japanese command had no special illusions: the plan paid practically no attention to the phase of their withdrawal from the operation.

4. The abbreviation CVE, which denoted the class of escort aircraft carriers, was deciphered by sailors with gloomy humor as “highly flammable, vulnerable, costly.” Battle Damage CVE-26 Sengamon

October 22 west of the island. Kurita's Palawan connection was discovered by the US submarines Darter and Days. The boats' positions were very advantageous for torpedo firing. The first salvo of 6 torpedoes was fired by the Darter. hitting the flagship cruiser Atago. Kurita and his staff were taken off board and delivered by destroyer to the battleship Yamato.

The commander of the Days also fired 6 torpedoes, the explosions of which broke the cruiser Maya. Meanwhile, the Darter seriously damaged the heavy cruiser Takao with torpedoes from its stern tubes, which left the formation and set off on a reverse course.

Kurita's formation was discovered and suffered losses, but the vice admiral did not retreat

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Remember these last words!

In October 1944, as U.S. soldiers in Europe fought their way into Aachen, Germany, occupying street after street, and the opposing armies faced a cold winter with few gains, the time had come for Co-1 to defend the Philippines. Tarawa, with its bloody reef, was the pride of the Allies; and so were the Gilbert Islands, the Marshall and Mariana Islands, New Guinea, Biak, Palau and Morotai. B-29s flew to new airfields on Guam, Saipan and Tinian to bomb Japan; US submarines hunted enemy cargo ships; The American flag fluttered over the palm-fringed islands that were once remote strongholds of imperial power.

From August 31 to September 24, Admiral William F. Halsey's fast carriers, supported by battleships, harassed Japanese bases from Mindanao to Luzon, and on September 21, as Radio Manila broadcast "Music for Your Morning Mood"[a], naval aviation pilots scoured Manila bay. The loot on all the islands as a whole was large, the enemy resistance was surprisingly weak, and Admiral Halsey reported to Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief in the Pacific, "Our surface forces have no casualties, and there is nothing on the screen except Hedy Lamarr."

The weak Japanese response led to a change in American strategy. The planned capture of Yap and the gradual advance towards Mindanao in the southern Philippines and then north were cancelled; The amphibious attack on Leyte Island in the central Philippines was postponed by two months and scheduled for October 20, 1944.

It started according to plan. The great armada of over 700 American ships entered Leyte Gulf at dawn on October 20; Only a lone Japanese plane was flying in the sky. The initial Japanese resistance proved weak; A large American armada—the largest of the Pacific War, comprising 15 Landing Ships (LSTs), 58 Transports, 221 Landing Crafts (LCTs), 79 Landing Craft Infantry (LCIs), and hundreds of other vessels—could have intimidated the defenders. . By the end of A-Day Plus 2—October 21—thousands of American troops had landed on Leyte with few casualties and only three warships damaged.

Four hours after the first landing at Leith, General Douglas MacArthur was wading through the water toward the shore; Later, Colonel Carlos Romulo, a small Filipino who was with him, was forced to remark with irony: “The water reached the tall MacArthur’s knees, and behind him came little Romulo, trying to keep his head above the water.”

Speaking at the Signal Corps building on the newly conquered coast under a rainy sky, MacArthur recalled the bloody epic poem of Bataan: “This is the Voice of Freedom,” he said. “People of the Philippines, I’m back...”

The light cruiser Honolulu was the first American loss. On the day of the landing, a Japanese torpedo plane “put a fish” on its port side. The explosion tore a hole in the side of the Honolulu, causing the cruiser to tilt heavily; 60 people were killed and the first of many ships was disabled.

At 8:09 a.m. on October 17, just nine minutes after the USS Denver opened fire while liberating the Philippine Islands, Japanese forces were deployed to carry out Plan Co-1. Admiral Soemu Toyoda, Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet and "the leader of a lost hope" unbeknownst to him, had a final opportunity to "defeat the enemy who enjoys the luxury of material wealth." From his headquarters at the Naval War College near Tokyo, he sent the order: “Conquer” to his widely scattered units.

So's plan was bold and desperate, suitable for the final months of an empire stretched to its limits. The Japanese fleet had not recovered from its overall losses, particularly from the heavy blow it had suffered four months earlier at the Battle of the Philippine Sea, when Admiral Raymond W. Spruance, who had commanded our landings in the Marianas, had destroyed over 400 Japanese aircraft and sank three Japanese aircraft carrier and helped break the back of Japanese naval aviation [b]. In mid-October, when Hasley launched a heavy attack on Formosa in anticipation of the Leyte Gulf landings, Toyoda used his land-based aircraft and also committed his new, hastily trained carrier pilots. The game was lost. But the “pathology of fear” and the strange tendency of the Japanese to turn defeats into victories in their official communications increased the usually overly boastful claims of Japanese aviators. Tokyo announced that the 3rd Fleet "has ceased to be an organized strike force."

Enemy aircraft dropped leaflets over recently captured Peleliu:

TO THE RECKLESS YANKEE IS A BOOM

Do you know about the naval battle fought by the US 58th Fleet at sea near Taiwan [Formosa] and the Philippines? Japan's powerful air force sank 19 of its aircraft carriers, 4 battleships, 10 various cruisers and destroyers, and sent 1,261 of its aircraft to sea...

In fact, only two cruisers, Canberra and Houston, were damaged, and fewer than 100 American aircraft were lost; as the great armada approached Leyte Gulf, the Japanese had to say goodbye.

But as far as Toyoda was concerned, the battle in the Philippine Sea and his futility in defending Formosa had left the Japanese fleet defenseless against air attacks. Toyoda had aircraft carriers, but with a small number of aircraft and semi-trained pilots[c]. Co-1 therefore had to depend on stealth and cunning, on night operations and on what air cover would be provided, mainly by land-based aircraft from Philippine bases operating in close cooperation with the fleet.

Toyoda faced another problem - the fleet was separated by large distances. He exercised command from his headquarters over the theoretical "combined fleet," but Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa, whose flag flew on the aircraft carrier Zuikaku and who commanded the damaged aircraft carriers and several cruisers and destroyers, was based in the Inland Sea of ​​Japan's native waters. The core of strong naval units - the 1st Sabotage and Offensive Force of Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita of 7 battleships, 13 cruisers and 19 destroyers - was based at the Lingga site near Singapore, close to fuel sources. The Japanese fleet found itself divided in the face of the threat of superior naval forces; it could not be assembled before the battle began.

These shortcomings, as well as the geographic location of the Philippines, determined the enemy's plan, which was hastily revised at the last moment, in part due to the weakness of Japanese carrier air power. Two major straits - San Bernardino, located north of Samar Island, and Surigao, located between Mindanao and Dinagat and Leyte and Panay - led from the South China Sea to Leyte Gulf, where MacArthur's great armada assembled for the invasion. Japanese ships based near Singapore - the so-called 1st Sabotage and Offensive Force - were supposed to sail north to Leyte, stopping at Brunei Gulf of Borneo to refuel. There they were supposed to be separated. The central group under the command of Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita on the heavy cruiser Atago with 5 battleships, 10 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers and 15 destroyers was supposed to pass the San Bernardino Strait at night; The southern group of Vice Admiral Shoji Nishimura with two battleships, one heavy cruiser and four destroyers was to be reinforced in the Surigao Strait by auxiliary forces of three more cruisers and four destroyers under the command of Vice Admiral Kiyohido Shima, which intended to pass through the Formosa Strait with a stop at Pescadorose. All these forces were to strike the American armada in Leyte Gulf almost simultaneously at dawn on October 21 and wreak havoc among the thin-walled landing craft like hawks among chickens.

However, the key to this operation were the weakened Japanese aircraft carriers under the command of Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa, operating from their bases in the Inland Sea of ​​Japan. These ships - one heavy and three light aircraft carriers with 116 aircraft on board ("all that remained of the enemy's once powerful aircraft carrier force") - were supposed to sail south to Luzon and act as decoys or suicide bombers for a large Admiral Halsey's 3rd Fleet, which "covered" the amphibious invasion of Leyte. The northern diversion force was accompanied by two "hermaphrodite" battleships - the aircraft carriers Ize and Hyuga, on which the stern towers were replaced by short take-off decks, but without aircraft - and three cruisers and nine destroyers. Ozawa would lure Halsey's 3rd Fleet north, away from Leyte, and open a passage for Kurita and Nishimura into Leyte Gulf.

At the same time, all three groups were supposed to receive assistance not through direct air cover, but through intensive attacks by Japanese ground-based aircraft on American aircraft carriers and ships. At the last moment, it was decided to use Japanese special attack groups, and the kamikaze (“divine wind”) pilots began their suicidal attacks on American ships. Already on October 15, Rear Admiral Masabumi Arima, the commander of naval aviation, flying from an airfield in the Philippines, made a suicide dive and “lit the fuse of the ardent desires of his soldiers” [d]. When Vice Admiral Takijiro Onishi took command of the 1st Air Fleet on October 17, there were only 100 operational Japanese aircraft in the entire Philippine archipelago (the air fleet was subsequently strengthened). There were at least 20-30 American aircraft carriers nearby, and Admiral Onishi knew it. To solve this equation, kamikazes appeared. Admiral Onishi explained the mission in an address to the commanders of the Japanese air force in the Philippines on October 19: “The fate of the empire depends on this operation... Our surface forces are already advancing... The task of the 1st Air Fleet is to provide cover from land bases for the advance of Admiral Kurita.... To accomplish this, we must hit enemy aircraft carriers and neutralize them for at least one week.

In my opinion, there is only one way to ensure the maximum effectiveness of our inadequate forces, and that is to have fighters loaded with bombs fall on the decks of enemy aircraft carriers.

All these widely dispersed forces were under the command of Admiral Toyoda, who exercised his leadership far away in Tokyo.

Such was the desperate plan of "Co-1" - perhaps the greatest game, the most daring and unusual plan in the history of naval warfare.

It envisaged the use of virtually all that remained of Japan's existing naval forces at sea and in the air: 4 aircraft carriers, 2 battleships - aircraft carriers, 7 battleships, 19 cruisers, 33 destroyers and probably from 500 to 700 aircraft, most of them were based on land.

But the American forces opposing them were much more powerful. Like the Japanese, who had no common commander closer to Tokyo, the US fleet operated under separate command. General MacArthur, as commander of the Southwest Pacific theater of operations, had overall responsibility for the Leyte landing operation and, through Admiral Thomas Kinkaid, commanded the 7th Fleet, which was directly responsible for the landing. But the powerful covering force of the world's largest 3rd Fleet, Admiral Halsey, was not under MacArthur's command; it was part of Admiral Chester Nimitz's Pacific forces, and Nimitz's headquarters were in Hawaii. And over Nimitz and MacArthur the only unified command remained in Washington.

The artillery power of Kinkaid's 7th Fleet was formed by 6 old battleships, 5 of which were raised from the mud of Pearl Harbor. But Kinkaid had another 16 escort aircraft carriers (small low-speed ships converted from merchant ships), 8 cruisers and dozens of destroyers and their escorts: frigates, motor torpedo boats and other ships. Kinkaid was to provide shore bombardment and close air support for the ground army, as well as protection of the landing forces from submarines and aircraft.

Halsey, who commanded 8 large attack aircraft carriers, 8 light aircraft carriers, 6 fast new battleships, 15 cruisers and 58 destroyers, was ordered to "cover and support the forces of the Southwest Pacific (under MacArthur's command) to help capture and occupy targets in the central Philippines" [e]. He was supposed to destroy the enemy's naval and air forces that threatened the landing. And “if it is possible to destroy a large part of the enemy fleet, such an action should be the main task.” He was to remain subordinate to Admiral Nimitz, but believed that "necessary measures for detailed coordination of operations between<…>And<…>will be organized<…>commanders" [f].

The combined 3rd and 7th Fleets could assemble from 1,000 to 1,400 naval aircraft, 32 aircraft carriers, 12 battleships, 23 cruisers and more than 100 destroyers and destroyer escorts, as well as a large number of small ships and hundreds of auxiliary vessels. The 7th Fleet also had several patrol aircraft (flying boats) on mother ships [g]. But not all of these forces participated in the long-range air attacks and three major separate operations that later became known as the Battle of Leyte Gulf.

This was the scene, this was the actors, and this was the plot of the most dramatic and largest naval battle in history.

It begins with the first blood that went to the submarines. At dawn on October 23, the American submarines Darter and Days, patrolling the Palawan Passage, intercept Admiral Kurita. The Darter fires five torpedoes at Kurita's flagship, the heavy cruiser Atago, from less than 1,000 yards away and hits the cruiser Takao. "Dace" knocks out the cruiser "Maya" with four torpedoes. Atago sinks about 20 minutes later when Kurita transfers his flag to the destroyer Kishinani and later to the battleship Yamato. The Maya explodes and sinks within minutes; The Takao, burning and low in the water, is sent back to Brunei, escorted by two destroyers. Kurita swims further, shocked but not broken, to the San Bernardino Strait.

October 24

On board the battleship New Jersey, Bull Halsey's flagship, as the sun burns off the morning haze, planes prepare to take off. On aircraft carriers rocking on the waves, commands are heard on the take-off decks: “Pilots take the cockpits.”

At 6:00 a.m., 3rd Fleet launches search aircraft to scour a wide area of ​​sea covering the approaches to the San Bernardino and Surigao Straits. Reports from the submarines Darter, Days, and Guitarro alarmed the Americans, but it was too late to stop the largest task force of the 3rd Fleet, Task Force 381 under the command of Vice Admiral John McCain, which received orders to withdraw to Ulithi for rest and replenishment of supplies. Three other task forces span 300 miles of ocean east from the Philippines and Luzon in the center to Samar in the south; one of them, located to the north, was pursued all night by annoying enemy planes. As planes take off to survey the reef-strewn waters of the Sibiyan and Sulu Seas and the approaches to San Bernardino and Surigao, Kinkaid's old battleships and small aircraft carriers off Leyte keep the GIs ashore.

At 7:46, Lieutenant (Junior) Max Adams, flying in a Helldiver over the majestic palm-covered volcanic cliffs and striking blue sea of ​​the archipelago, reports a radar contact, and a few minutes later he sees the Admiral's 1st Commando-Offensive Force Kuritas that dot the picturesque sea like toy boats. The masts stand out clearly in the light of the sun.

Tension is transmitted to the New Jersey radio room when contact is reported. The radio transmits messages: “Urgent”, “Top Secret” to Washington, Nimitz, Kinkaid, all commanders of the operational groups. McCain, 600 miles to the east on his way to Ulithi, is recalled and the 3rd Fleet is ordered to assemble at Bernardino to strike the enemy.

But at 8:20, far to the south, the southern part of the Japanese ticks is discovered for the first time. Vice Admiral Nishimura with the battleships Fuso and Yamashiro, the heavy cruiser Mogami and four destroyers sails to Surigao. Enterprise's search planes attack, encountering heavy anti-aircraft fire; the catapult for launching planes on the Fuso is disabled, its planes are destroyed, and a fire breaks out on the ship; The gun turret on the destroyer Shigure is broken, but Nishimura continues to sail east at the same speed. And Halsey continues to assemble his fleet near San Bernardino to strike at the Japanese central forces.

To the north and northeast, the morning search had not been carried out, and Ozawa's distracting carriers, sailing south toward Luzon, had not yet been located.

The So plan now comes to its dramatic conclusion. Japanese planes flying from Ozawa's carriers and Philippine bases begin their most ferocious attack since the landings on the 7th and 3rd Fleets. North of Luzon, the aircraft carriers Langley, Princeton, Essex and Lexington experience the brunt of Japanese air attacks. Eight Hellcats from the Essex, led by Commander David McCampbell, intercept 60 Japanese aircraft (half of them fighters), and after fighting for 1 hour and 35 minutes, the Americans shoot down 24 Japanese aircraft, while suffering no losses themselves. Princeton reports the loss of 34 enemy aircraft during another massive raid; there was also work for the pilots of the Lexington and Langley; From the air, jubilant “Atu!” comes from the pilots: “One Betty and two Zekes fell into the water.”

But the Japanese also strike. Around 9:38 a.m., as the 3rd Fleet begins to converge on San Bernardino and the carriers prepare to lift their deck cargo into the air to strike the enemy's central force, a Japanese "Judy" (dive bomber or fighter-bomber) dives from - behind the clouds, invisible and undetected on the radar screen. A Japanese plane drops a 550-pound bomb directly onto the Princeton's flight deck; the bomb penetrates the hangar deck, ignites the fuel in six torpedo planes and causes a massive fire. The fight to save the ship begins, but at 10:02 a series of explosions causes the take-off deck to split open like the rind of a fallen watermelon and throw the aircraft lift high into the air, and by 10:20 the fire extinguishing system fails. The ship freezes on the water, and a column of smoke rises 1,000 feet above it. Hundreds of team members end up in the water. The task force sails south to San Bernardino, while the cruisers Birmingham and Renault and the destroyers Gatling, Irwin and Cassin Young hover around the stricken Princeton all day, trying to save it.

But Princeton is on fire. Kurita's main force of five battleships, accompanied by cruisers and destroyers, passes through the formation. The aircraft carrier begins striking the 1st Sabotage and Attack Force at about 10:25, and the excited American pilots concentrate their actions on targets that none of them have ever seen before - the world's largest battleships. Yamato and Musashi, long-standing and mysterious targets of naval reconnaissance, found themselves under the wings of naval aviation. Compared to their carrying capacity of 669,500 tons, 18.1-inch guns, and speed of 27.5 knots, their “brothers” seem dwarfed. "Musashi" had already been damaged earlier; oil leaves a trail on the blue water, flowing from the torn side, which was hit by a torpedo. But he is still strong; his speed did not decrease. This is not the case with Myoko. This heavy cruiser was heavily damaged during the first attack; his speed dropped to 15 knots, he turns and trudges alone to the port; Kurita lost four of the ten heavy cruisers that had sailed so gracefully from Brunei.

And “Mioko” doesn’t give a break. Three minutes after noon another blow comes from the sunny side. Japanese anti-aircraft shells bloom pink and purple in the sky; Even the main batteries of battleships are firing. Several American planes were shot down; one falls, engulfed in flames; but the Musashi is hit by two bombs and two torpedoes; he loses speed and slowly falls behind the formation.

An hour and a half later, the Yamato receives two charges into the forward turret No. 1, which begins to fire. However, its thick fencing protects it from damage; The fire has been extinguished. But "Musashi" is badly injured; during the attack, it is hit by four bombs and three more torpedoes; its upper superstructures are twisted, the bow is almost in the water, the speed is reduced first to 16 and then to 12 knots.

Kurita's slow agony continues throughout this long sunny day. He hopes in vain for air cover. The Yamato suffers further damage during the fourth attack, and the older battleship Nagato is also hit.

In the afternoon, when six bells are struck (at 15:00), Kurita orders the crippled Musashi to leave the battle. But it's' too late. The final, biggest attack hits him as he turns around heavily in hopes of escape. After 15 minutes, Musashi receives a fatal blow - another 10 bombs and four torpedoes; her speed has slowed to six knots, her bow has sunk, and she crawls slowly toward port like a dying gladiator.

Kurita is shocked. He has no air cover. He came under intense attack. His initial force of 5 battleships, 12 cruisers and 15 destroyers was reduced to 4 battleships, 8 cruisers and 11 destroyers; all remaining warships were damaged; The flotilla's speed is limited to 22 knots. There is no indication that Ozawa's northern diversionary force will succeed in luring the enemy and diverting the 3rd Fleet away from San Bernardino. At 15:30 Kurita changes course and goes west. American pilots report this “withdrawal” to Admiral Halsey, aboard the New Jersey: “One piece of the puzzle is missing—the [Japanese] aircraft carriers.”

The Northern Task Force of the 3rd Fleet was attacked by enemy aircraft similar to aircraft from aircraft carriers. But it is possible that they were based on land, since the ally did not receive any messages about aircraft carriers. Where are they?..

At 2:05 p.m., as Kurita's main force struggles through the Sibuyan Sea, Lexington planes take off to find them. They were ordered to search in the north and northeast, in those areas that were not affected by the morning search.

The search planes fly through the cloud-dotted sky through the intermittent rain, leaving behind the task force, which is subject to fierce, although intermittent, Japanese air attacks.

The burning Princeton, covered in fire and clouds of smoke, is still afloat, and rescue ships are swarming around it. Despite the explosions and scorching heat, the cruisers Birmingham and Renault and the destroyers Morrison, Irwin, and Cassin Young approach its side and pump water with their pumps onto the burning aircraft carrier. Submarines and air attacks interrupt the operation: rescue ships withdraw. At 15:23, when Kurita, 300 miles away, changes course and heads west into the Sibuyan Sea, the Birmingham cruiser again approaches the burning port side of the Princeton. The open decks of the cruiser are filled with soldiers - firefighters, signalmen, anti-aircraft gunners, doctors, rescuers, observers. There is 50 feet of open water between the Princeton and the Birmingham.

Suddenly, a “monstrous explosion” destroys the stern of the Princeton and the rear of the take-off deck; steel plates “the size of a house” fly through the air, chewed pieces of steel, broken gun barrels, fragments, helmets, and debris rain down on the Birmingham’s bridge. Its upper superstructures and decks filled with people in a split second turn into a crypt, bleeding - 229 killed, 420 mutilated and wounded; the upper part of the ship is turned into a sieve.

All firefighters on board the Princeton are injured. Captain John Hoskins, soon to take command of the Princeton, remains on board with the skipper he was assisting, tightening a tourniquet around his leg: his left foot is torn off and hanging by tendon and a piece of flesh. The surviving military doctor cuts off his foot with a scalpel, cauterizes the wound with sulfa powder, injects morphine... Hoskins remains alive, he will become the first modern admiral with a wooden leg.

But Princeton continues to stay afloat. It is completely engulfed in flames, like a volcano, and its decks are filled with bloody crew.

At 16:40 a search in the north produces results. American planes find Ozawa's carrier force distracting. Reports of enemy contact excite and confuse the 3rd Fleet. Ozawa's northern group of ships, which was discovered 130 miles east of the northern tip of Luzon, includes two "hermaphrodite" battleships, but our pilots mistakenly report four. The pilots do not know that Ozawa's aircraft carriers have almost no aircraft.

Contact reports determine Princeton's fate. His tired fire brigade stops working, the day-long fight ends; and at 16:49, Renault fires two torpedoes at the burning hull, the aircraft carrier explodes, breaks into two parts and sinks. The crippled Birmingham, which has lost more people than died on the Princeton, which it tried to save, leaves the battle and sails with its dead and dying to Ulithi...

Two hours later, near Shibuyan Island, the giant Masashi, the pride of Kurita's central group, loses its long battle. Mortally wounded, he slowly sinks into the calm sea, and towards evening the world's largest battleship collapses and takes half of its crew with it into the abyss. But not a single American sees him die... And not a single American saw how Kurita again changed course and at 17:14 again headed with his battered but still powerful forces back to the San Bernardino Strait...

At 19:50, with the onset of tropical twilight, Bull Halsey makes a decision and informs the commander of the 7th Fleet, Kinkaid:

“The central forces have suffered heavy damage. I'm heading north with three groups to attack the carriers at dawn."

The Third Fleet gathers and moves heavily north; irreverent historians would later call it the "Bull Rush". Night planes from the Independence fly over the Japanese northern forces, and the carriers receive orders to launch planes at dawn [h]. The San Bernardino Strait is not covered; There are not even patrol submarines in its waters [i]. Kinkaid and the 7th Fleet defending the Leyte landings believe that Halsey is covering it; Halsey, who gives too much credence to his pilots' exaggerated reports of enemy casualties[j], thinks that Kurita's forces have been stopped by daylight air attacks and that the remaining weakened Japanese can only go to Kinkaid. The course of history and the fate of nations are based on such misunderstanding [k].

Under the cover of land, the Surigao Strait darkens. No Japanese northern forces were detected in the morning; even their exact composition is unknown. But Kinkaid and the 7th Fleet have no doubt: the Japanese will try to break through at night. Kinkaid and Rear Admiral Jess B. Oldendorf, his tactical command officer, determined the disposition for the night naval battle. They formed a "reception committee", including torpedo boats that covered the southern approaches in the strait, three destroyer squadrons near the center and at the mouth where the strait enters Leyte Gulf, six old battleships and eight aircraft carriers.

The southern Japanese forces fall into this trap in two separate groups. Nishimura leads the procession with the battleships Fuzo and Yamashiro, the cruiser Mogami and four destroyers. 20 miles behind Nishimura is Vice Admiral Shima with three cruisers and four destroyers from internal Japanese bases. The two Japanese groups attack in fits and starts, with one unaware of the other's plans. Shima and Nishimura were classmates at the Japan Naval Academy; their careers spawned a rivalry. Nishimura, who had previously been superior in rank, was passed over in promotions carried out by Shima, who now commanded a smaller force but had been promoted to rank six months earlier. But Nishimura, a naval admiral, saw more of the war. Neither can serve with the other. Therefore there is no overall command.

Radars on torpedo boats detect the enemy around 23:00, when “a flash of lightning causes the blurry spot of the setting moon to fade, and thunder echoes in the mountains.”

Thirty-nine torpedo boats with their engines muted are heading towards Nishimura and attacking the enemy moving forward with successive strikes. But the Japanese open the scoring first. Enemy destroyers illuminate the small RT boats with their searchlights long before the torpedo boats come within attack range; as a result of the hit, the RT-152 begins to burn; the splash from a nearby shell puts out the fire; RT-130 and RT-132 were also hit. But Nishimura is discovered. Its course, speed and composition are reported to Kinkaid's flotilla, and the RT attacks continue.

On board the destroyer Remy, the flagship of the 54th Fighter Squadron, Commander R.P. Fiala goes to the bullhorn to talk to the team:

“Says the captain. Tonight it was decided that our ship would launch the first torpedo strike against the Japanese operational forces that stand in our way to stop us from landing in the Leyte Gulf area. Our task is to warn the Japanese. May God be with us this night."

Destroyers attack from both sides of the narrow strait; their silhouettes merge with the land; the Japanese can barely make out the dark outline of the ship against the background of the ground; The radar screen becomes covered with grain, and the luminous points on it merge into a continuous spot.

It is deep night when, at 3:01 on October 25, the first torpedoes fired by the destroyers rush through the strait. In less than half an hour, Nishimura gets hit hard. His slowly moving, listing flagship, the battleship Yamashiro, was hit. The destroyer Yamaguto was sunk; the other two lost control. Nishimura gives his last command: “We were hit by a torpedo. You must hold on and attack all ships."

The battleship Fuzo, the cruiser Mogami, and the destroyer Shigure are heading towards Leyte Gulf.

But at about 4:00 a fire breaks out on the Yamashiro and then flames arise: another American torpedo hits the ammunition depot. The battleship splits into two parts and sinks along with Nishimura's flagship.

“Fuzo” does not outlive his “brother” for long. Rising from the mud of Pearl Harbor, the Avengers are waiting - six old battleships patrol the mouth of the strait. This is an admiral's dream. Like Togo at Tsushima and Jellicoe in Jutland, Kinkaid and Oldendorf dot the i: the remaining Japanese ships move in one heavy formation towards the column of American ships at right angles. Concentrated broadsides from six battleships are fired at the leading Japanese ship, and only its forward turrets can offer resistance to the Americans.

The culmination of the battle. When the last and most powerful attack of the destroyers hits the target after the command: "Get those big guys", the night turns crimson.

Fuso and Mogami burn and shake as the “rain of shells” hits them. The Fuso drifts helplessly, struck by powerful explosions and surrounded by a blanket of fury. He dies before dawn, and “Mogami” dies later in the fire along with other cripples. Only the destroyer Shigure manages to escape at a speed of 30 knots.

Vice Admiral Shima, “heavy, stupid and happy,” swims into this crazy meat grinder with the dying remnants of his fellow student’s fleet. He knows nothing about what happened; he doesn't have a clear battle plan. Abukuma, Shima's only light battleship, is hit by a torpedo fired from a torpedo boat before she has penetrated far into the strait; The Abukuma remains behind, slowing, while the two heavy cruisers and four destroyers sail further toward the gunfire on the horizon. Around 4:00, Shima is met by the destroyer Shigure, the only survivor of Nishimura's fleet and departing through the strait.

"Shigure" doesn't tell Shima anything about the debacle; he simply signals, “I am “Shigure.” I have problems with control."

Then there is a comic decline in the performance. Shima goes into the strait, sees a group of dark shadows, fires torpedoes and manages to start a fight between his flagship Nachi and the damaged and burning Mogami, which against the backdrop of the dark water of the strait looks like the Empire State Building. And that's the end for the useless Shima; prudence is the best part of valor; death for the emperor is forgotten; and Shima changes course, heading back into the Mindanao Sea, into the shadow of history.

The Battle of Surigao Strait ends at dawn with the defeat of the Japanese. The Americans lost one torpedo boat and damaged one destroyer. The southern part of the ticks off Leyte Gulf has been destroyed.

the 25th of October

By this day, more than 114,000 troops and nearly 200,000 tons of supplies had been brought to the shores of Leyte, and most of the greatest amphibious fleet had cleared the bay. But when the day of battle begins, there are more than 50 more thin-walled Liberties, tank landing craft and landing craft anchored there.

Dawn on October 25 finds Admiral Ozawa with his decoy forces east of Cape Engano (the Spanish word "engano" means "bait" or "deception"). They are ready to die for the emperor. At 7:12, when the first American planes appear from the southeast, Ozawa knows that he has at least succeeded in his diversionary mission. The day before, he had been desperate at times as more than 100 aircraft from his carriers—all he had except a small number of patrol planes—joined Japanese land-based aircraft in attacking Halsey's northern task force. But his planes did not return; some were shot down, others flew to Philippine bases. On this day, fewer than 30 aircraft—iconic remnants of Japan's once great flying fleet—are all Ozawa commands. Some of them are in the air. They would quickly die under American gunfire when the first heavy attacks from Halsey's carriers began.

Pilots from American aircraft carriers are on the battlefield that day; the air is filled with the chatter of conversations between pilots.

“I shot down one, guys. Let them have it."

The Japanese group throws a carpet of protective fire into the sky; Multi-colored explosions and tracer shells color the boundaries of battle in the sky and sea. The ships twist and turn, performing intricate maneuvers to avoid bombs and torpedoes, but their time has come. Around 8:30 a.m., about 150 American aircraft from aircraft carriers strike. The aircraft carrier Chiyoda is hit, the mortally wounded aircraft carrier Chitose, emitting clouds of smoke, stops, receiving a heavy list; the torpedoed light cruiser Tama is heading back; The destroyer Akitsuki was blown up, the light aircraft carrier Tsuiho was hit, and Ozawa's flagship Tsuikaku was hit in the stern by a torpedo that distorted the steering motor - it is controlled manually.

The second strike at 10:00 cripples "Chiyoda", who dies a slow death. It would be dealt with later by American surface ships. In the early afternoon, the third strike sinks the aircraft carrier Tsuikaku, the last remaining one from the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. He slowly spins and sinks with a "battle flag of enormous proportions." At 15:27, the aircraft carrier Tsuiho "follows him." Battleships - “hermaphrodites” with take-off decks at the stern - “Hiuga” and “Ize”, “the fattest of the remaining spoils” - are subject to constant fire, their bottoms are punctured, their decks are flooded with tons of water from nearby explosions. The left Ize catapult is disabled. But they continue to live. Admiral Ozawa, having transferred the flag to the cruiser Oedo and completed his “diversionary mission,” makes his way north with his ships crippled in the battle at Cape Engano. All day long it is subjected to endless air attacks, and by the end of the day and night of October 25, the American cruisers and destroyers of the 3rd Fleet end up crippled.

“The cost of success for Admiral Ozawa's diversionary force is high: all four aircraft carriers, one of three cruisers and two of eight destroyers are lost. But he accomplished his task: he distracted Halsey, the San Bernardino Strait was left unguarded, and Kurita’s hawk was among the chickens.”

Off the coast of Samara that morning of October 25, the sea at dawn was calm, a light wind was blowing, the sky was covered with cumulus clouds, and raindrops were falling on the water. On board the 16 escort aircraft carriers of the 7th Fleet and their accompanying “babies” (destroyers and their escorts), the morning alarm was all cleared. Previous missions have been canceled (though not for search aircraft in the northern sectors). Many aircraft carriers are already over Leyte supporting ground forces, combat air and anti-submarine patrols are operating, and on the bridge of the aircraft carrier Fanshawe Bay, Admiral Sprague drinks his second cup of coffee.

The coming day is filled with work; small escort carriers have been assigned to provide support and are flying to the soldiers on the shores of Leyte Gulf. They would also support air defense and anti-submarine patrols and strike the stricken and escaping remnants of Japanese forces defeated in the night battle of Surigao Strait. Carrier escort groups are spreading from the east coast of the Philippines: from Mindanao to Samar. Sprague's northern force of six aircraft carriers, three destroyers and four carrier escort ships is sailing north at 15 knots 50 miles from Samar, opposite the island's central coast.

Escort carriers, designated CVE in the Navy, are tin-plated and have no armor. They are slow ships, converted from merchant ships or tankers, and carry between 18 and 36 aircraft. They have a lot of unflattering nicknames - “small airfields”, “tin cans”, “jeep carriers”, and when recruits first boarded, old-timers told them that CVE stands for Combustible, Vulnerable, Expendable (“burning, vulnerable, disposable”). . Their top speed of 18 knots is too slow to ensure safety in combat; thin sides and guns with a caliber of 5 inches or less are not suitable for surface combat; These are limited-capability ships intended for air support of land operations, anti-submarine operations and air defense, but not as part of the fleet.

However, this morning they would have to fight in the battle of recruits and giants.

Admiral Sprague barely had time to finish his coffee when a message about a battle with the enemy comes through the intership communication. The submarine detection team pilot reports that enemy battleships, cruisers and destroyers are 20 miles away and rapidly approaching.

“Check this information,” says the admiral, believing that some inexperienced pilot mistook Halsey’s fast battleships for enemy ships.

The answer is sharp, with obvious irritation. “The message is confirmed,” comes the pilot’s irritated voice. “The ships have pagoda-shaped masts.”

Almost simultaneously, radio operators hear Japanese conversations; northern CVE constellation sees anti-aircraft breaks in the sky to the north; Dots of unidentified ships appear on radar screens; and at about 7:00 a signalman with a long telescope discovers the multi-tiered superstructures and pagoda-shaped masts of Japanese ships.

One feels distrust, surprise and fear. The escort carriers, Admiral Kinkaid himself, in fact most of the 7th Fleet, were confident that the main Japanese force was still west of the Philippines and that in any case Halsey's fast battleships (now located far to the north, where the carriers were fighting off Cape Engano) guard the San Bernardino Strait. But Kurita came. And almost everything between it and the transport ships, cargo ships, landing craft in Leyte Gulf, Army headquarters and supply depots on the shore are “little airfields” and their accompanying “babies.”

There is no time to make plans; Within five minutes of visual observation, Japanese heavy shells from the 18.1-inch guns from the Yamato, a ship of the same type as the sunken Musashi, begin to whistle overhead. Sprague, giving orders through a radio horn, turns his ships to the east into the wind, increases speed to maximum, gives orders to scramble all aircraft. By 7:05 a.m., the escort carrier USS White Plains, launching aircraft, is hit several times as red, yellow, green, and blue jets of water from dye shells billow over its bridge, violently rocking the ship. They damage the starboard engine room, trip electrical circuit breakers, rip the fighter off its boots and throw it onto the flight deck.

White Plains smokes, and the Japanese transfer fire to St. Lo, which suffers from close explosions and suffers casualties from shrapnel. The “Little Ones” also smoke, and the aircraft carriers, whose boilers are suffocating from tension, release clouds of black, oily smoke from their chimneys that engulf the sea. There comes a moment of respite; planes are in the air. Most of them are armed with small or anti-personnel bombs, general purpose or depth bombs, which are not suitable for battle against armored ships. But there is no time for rearmament...

An alarm sounds over the radio. Sprague radios the danger in plain language at 7:01; At 7:07, Admiral Kinkaid, aboard the flagship Wasatch in Leyte Gulf, learns of the worst that has happened: the Japanese fleet is three hours from the beachhead; small escort carriers may be overwhelmed. Five minutes earlier, Kinkaid had learned that his assumption that the 3rd Fleet's plug was jammed into the neck of the San Bernardino Strait bottle was incorrect. In response to a radioed request at 4:12, Halsey informs him that Task Force 34 - modern fast battleships - is with the carriers of the 3rd Fleet off the coast of Cape Engano, far to the north.

Kinkaid "urgently and without delay" requests the help of high-speed battleships, air strikes, immediate action. Even Admiral Nimitz in distant Hawaii sends a message to Halsey: “Where is the operational force - 34 - everyone is interested.”

But in Leyte Gulf and Surigao Strait, the alarm bells transmitted over radio waves activate the 7th Fleet, tired from days of shelling and nights of battle[o].

Some old battleships and cruisers are being recalled from Surigao Strait. They are formed into an operational unit, and they feverishly prepare to arm and refuel. Heavy ships are not in very good shape for surface combat; they are short of weapons after shelling the coast for five days. Some of the armor-piercing shells were used up in the night battle. Destroyers don't have enough torpedoes, and many ships don't have enough fuel [p].

And in the battle near Samar, Sprague fights for his life.

Within 20 minutes, as the small carriers sailed east and launched planes into the air, the distance to the enemy was reduced to 25,000 yards. This benefits the large long-range Japanese guns, but the distance is too great for the American five-inch guns to fire effectively.

The destroyer USS Johnston, under the command of Commander Ernest Evans, understands her duty and fulfills it. Anticipating the orders (which were given by Admiral Sprague at 7:16), he increases speed to almost 30 knots and fires a dozen torpedoes at the enemy heavy cruiser Kumano, which is located on the carriers' flank. The destroyer emits smoke and fire, and its five-inch cannons fire continuously as the distance to the enemy closes. He avoids the blows and then turns to move away. A salvo of three 14-inch guns followed by six-inch shells penetrates the destroyer. The captain was wounded, the steering motor, rear gun compartment and engine room were damaged, the stern guns and gyrocompass were knocked out. The explosions overtake many of the crew and force the destroyer to reduce speed to 16 knots.

Sprague and his carriers, half obscured by smoke, find temporary shelter behind a wall of rain; a curtain of water saves the wounded Johnston for some time. But long before 8:00, Kurita sent several of his fast ships ahead and to the flanks of the escort carriers; Sprague gradually turns south, the enemy presses on both of his flanks and from behind.

“Small ships conduct torpedo attack,” Sprague orders over the ship-to-ship communications network.

The destroyers Heermann and Hoel and the crippled Johnston, already with their supply of torpedoes expended, but with their guns still firing, follow the order. Three destroyers in a daylight attack against heavily armed ships of the Japanese fleet, three tin-sided ships against four battleships, eight cruisers and eleven destroyers.

“Buddy” Commander Amos T. Hathaway, skipper of the Heermann, coolly tells his deck officer: “What we need is a bugler for sound.”

"Hoel" and "Heermann" following the trailing "Johnston" sail towards their sea immortality.

In a squall of rain, covered in black oily smoke from chimneys and white chemical smoke from smoke generators, the destroyers back away to avoid collisions. They hear the roar of 14-inch guns coming from above, like the noise of an express train; the destroyers fire at the heavy cruiser, cripple the battleship's upper superstructure with their five-inch shells, and fire their last torpedoes at a range of 4,400 yards. Hathaway then calmly enters his control room on the Heermann, calls Admiral Sprague via intership communication and reports: “Exercise over.”

But the destroyers are coming to an end. The Hoel's starboard engine has failed and is being controlled manually, its decks presenting a gruesome scene of blood and destruction. Fire control and power supply are disabled. Gun No. 3 is covered in white hot steam from broken steam pipes, No. 5 is jammed from a nearby explosion, half of No. 4's barrel has been torn off, and guns No. 1 and No. 2 continue to fire.

By 8:30 the left engine fails, all engineering rooms are flooded. The ship slows down and stops, and while it is burning, it will be destroyed by enemy guns. At 8:40, with a 20-degree list, the order comes: “Abandon ship.” After 15 minutes, it falls on the starboard side and sinks, bow first, having received several more holes from large-caliber shells.

On the Heermann, the crimson paint of enemy shells mixes with blood and paints the bridge and superstructures in reddish tones. The shell hits the refrigerator and sprays a brown mass across the deck. “Heermann” takes blows, but, despite the fire, continues to live.

Not so at Johnston. He spits fire until the very end, surrounded by virtually the entire Japanese fleet. He is overwhelmed by an avalanche of shells and sinks an hour after the Hoel.

Four smaller and slower destroyers make a second torpedo attack. "Raymond" and "John Butler" remained intact. The "Dennis" had its guns knocked out. But the Samuel B. Roberts, covered in smoke, surrounded by bursts of explosions, dies in a crazy fight. It is hit by many large armor-piercing shells, its speed drops, and by 9:00 a salvo of 14-inch guns, like a can opener, opens its starboard side, cripples the engine room, and causes a strong fire. From stem to stern, Roberts looks like “an inert mass of twisted metal.” He has no strength left, and he freezes motionless on the water.

But the crew of gun No. 2 loads, sends, aims and fires manually. He knows the risk: without compressed air to clear the barrel of the burning remnants of the previous round, the soft powder bags can “burn” and explode before the bolt is closed. But, despite the danger, six shells are fired. The seventh “burns out” and kills almost the entire crew. But artillery captain Paul Henry Carr, whose body was torn from neck to groin, still holds the 54-pound shell in his hands, and his last broken words before his death were words asking for help to load the gun.

Smoke clouds the sky, rain pounds. Torpedo attacks do not save slow, clumsy, small aircraft carriers. Kurita directed his ships towards the open sea. Slowly the battles move from south to southwest. Sprague's carriers, stretched across miles of ocean space, float wounded into Leyte Gulf as enemy destroyers close in on their left flank, battleships behind and cruisers ahead.

The carriers dodge and navigate between 150-foot-high columns of water that rise from the explosions of large-caliber Japanese shells. They fire salvos from five-inch cannons. Fanshawe Bay is hit by five shells and one eight-inch one explodes nearby, damaging the catapult and piercing the hull. A fire starts. Kalinin Bay is hit by 15 shells. The White Plains is riddled from stern to bow; most of the huge armor-piercing shells pass right through unarmored aircraft carriers without exploding. Gambier Bay, unprotected on the leeward side, where the smoke screen does not hide it, receives a blow to the take-off deck. Another shell explodes nearby, disabling the car. Its speed is reduced to 11 knots, the power supply is interrupted - it is doomed. Within an hour, far from the battlefield, Gambier Bay dies in agony, receiving a shell from the enemy every minute. He sinks around 9:00. Flames erupt as fuel explodes, and the Japanese cruiser is still in pursuit, only 2,000 yards away.

By 9:30 the battle is moving ever closer to Leyte Gulf, where frantic preparations are underway. It captures the northern escort carrier group; the central group is under fire, and 16 small aircraft carriers have already lost 105 aircraft.

Observers believed that the defeat of the two groups was only a “matter of time.”

Two destroyers, an escort destroyer and an aircraft carrier are sunk or sinking; two aircraft carriers, one destroyer and an escort ship were heavily damaged.

On board the Kitkan Bay, an officer sarcastically remarks: “Not much left, boys. We pull them into range of our 40mm.”

Suddenly, at 9:11, Vice Admiral Kurita disengaged from the battle, turned his ships to the north and completed the surface phase of the battle at Samar.

“Damn it,” says the sailor. - They are gone".

Kurita's actions, unexpected at that moment, were justified, although not completely. The attacks of the American "babies", which became one of the most exciting episodes in the long history of naval warfare, and the desperate courage of the pilots of the escort carriers, who launched improvised and uncoordinated air attacks, had their effect. Off the coast of Samara, American pilots from CVE aircraft carriers constantly harassed Kurita, shot down more than 100 land-based enemy aircraft, and dropped 191 tons of bombs and 83 torpedoes. Enemy ships turned and made desperate maneuvers to avoid being hit by torpedoes. The effective smoke screen confused the Japanese. The intensity and effectiveness of air attacks increased when aircraft took off from escort aircraft carriers of the central and southern groups and when the mission of ground force support aircraft was changed and transferred to a new urgent mission. The pilots bravely attacked Japanese ships, dropped depth and anti-personnel charges, and buzzed over Japanese masts without ammunition and without weapons to gain time and drive off the Japanese.

Torpedo attacks by surface ships and aircraft damaged Japanese ships; and Kurita's fleet, consisting of ships of varying speeds, stretched over miles of ocean space. The torpedoed cruiser Kumano slows down to 16 knots, the cruisers Chikuma and Chokai are hit, deck superstructures, chart rooms and communications equipment on other ships are damaged by five-inch ship shells and air fire. The Japanese are shocked. Kurita, who had lost close tactical control of the command, did not realize that he was close to victory. He believed that he was faced with several large fast aircraft carriers of the 3rd Fleet, and not with the escort aircraft carriers of the 7th Fleet. Radio intercepts of American communications convince him, although it is not true, that Leyte's airstrips are operational[q]. He believes that the rest of Halsey's powerful forces are somewhere nearby. Kurita knows that the southern part of Nishimura's pincers has been defeated in the Surigao Strait. He had received no communication from Ozawa, who was much further north, about the success of his diversionary mission. So Kurita recalls his ships and gathers his scattered forces - and the chance is lost.

Admiral Sprague notes (in his post-battle report) in grateful confusion: “That the enemy... did not completely destroy all the ships of the task force was due to the effectiveness of our smokescreen, our torpedo counterattacks and, in part, to Almighty God.”

results

Kurita's decision was accompanied by increased American attacks. Only two hours from the landing sites at Leyte Gulf, his original objective, Kurita wasted time rallying his scattered forces and assisting the stricken ships. His fleet stood almost in one place for a long time. The cruiser Suzuya received fatal damage after an air attack, and at 10:30, two to three hours flight to the east, Admiral McCain's Task Force 38.1 (which had been sent to Ulithi to rest and refuel, and then hastily recalled and hurried to the rescue) dealt a strong blow. The bell rang across Kurita, and the Japanese sun passed its zenith. And far to the north, Bull Halsey, striking at Ozawa's distracting forces, was finally alarmed by Kinkaid's frantic calls for help and, in particular, a request from Nimitz. Most of his fleet changed course, 40 miles from decisive surface action, and Halsey sent several of his fast battleships south, but it was too late and they could not intervene.

The rest of the day on October 25th and the entire day on the 26th was difficult. The remnants of the Japanese fled, but Japanese ground-based aircraft dealt heavy blows. Japanese kamikaze planes attacked and knocked out resistance aircraft carriers, damaging three of them and smashing the stern of the St. Lo, which survived the firing of the Yamato's 18.1-inch guns. But Kurita, who came so close to fame, paid dearly for the luxury of being indecisive. It was hit again and again by air attacks on the afternoon of October 25th. Three of his crippled and burning cruisers had to be scuttled. Tone, one of the two remaining heavy cruisers, was hit in the stern; and on the night of October 25, as Kurita steered his battered ships through the San Bernardino Strait, American surface forces caught and sank the destroyer Novaki. At midnight on October 25, only one of Kurita's ships, the destroyer, remained undamaged.

On October 26, the slow destruction of Kurita's ships continued. Halsey and Kinkaid pilots, supported by several Army bombers, attacked the retreating Japanese. And the 1st sabotage-attack force, “which had endured more air attacks than any other force in naval history, once again prepared for final disaster.” The destroyer Noshiro was sunk. The Yamato, with its gigantic but useless 18.1-inch guns, was hit twice and its superstructure riddled with shrapnel. The other “cripples” of the Battle of Samar and the Battle of Surigao Strait, including the cruiser Abukuma and the destroyer Hayashimo, were dealt with. And there was still a formation of American submarines.

So's great game plan has completely failed. In the sprawling naval battle at Leyte Gulf, Japan lost one heavy and three light aircraft carriers, three battleships, including the world's two largest warships, two heavy cruisers, four light cruisers and 12 destroyers. Most of the remaining ships were damaged to varying degrees. Hundreds of planes were shot down. Between 7,475 and 10,000 Japanese sailors died. The Japanese naval forces ceased to exist as a combat fleet. Leyte Gulf was a blow to the enemy from which he never recovered.

However, for the United States, which could have won the game, it was not a complete victory. Divided command, failure to "define areas of responsibility" and inaccurate assumptions by Kinkaid and Halsey became detrimental to our small carriers and led to the escape of Kurita with his remaining ships, including 4 battleships, and Ozawa with 10 of the 17 ships he initially had.

Admiral Halsey ran north, leaving behind the 7th Fleet, a force ill-matched in power and speed to the task of defeating Kurita, and then, just as he was ready to defeat Ozawa, turned and headed south in response to Kinkaid's calls for urgent assistance [ s]. The Japanese bait worked, but So's plan, which depended chiefly on good communications, quick coordination, and bold leadership, was a complete and disastrous failure.

For the United States, the victory cost 2,803 lives; they lost several hundred aircraft, one light cruiser, two escort carriers, and the “babies” that helped change the direction of the battle - the destroyers Johnston and Hoel and the escort destroyer Samuel B. Roberts. They fought "in well-trained teams, with enthusiasm, in accordance with the best traditions of naval forces."

Analysis

The Battle of Leyte Gulf will always be a source of controversy (comparable, but certainly not as bitter) as that between Sampson and Schley after the Spanish-American War, or between Jellicoe and Beatty after Jutland. Admiral Halsey and Admiral Kinkaid believed that their judgments were fair. Each of them believed that the other could and should have covered the San Bernardino Strait [t].

Leyte Gulf showed the importance of communications to victory. Its poor quality made it impossible to coordinate the Japanese actions and, therefore, ensure their success. Kurita, for example, did not receive Ozawa's messages. But the US forces also received too many messages, incorrectly constructed, which made it possible for Kurita to suddenly appear in front of Sprague's light aircraft carriers.

On October 24, as the 3rd Fleet conducted air attacks on Kurita's forces, which was then in the Shibuyan Sea, Halsey sent a "preparatory dispatch" [u] to the senior commanders of the 3rd Fleet, naming four of the six fast battleships with support units in as an operational force–34. This task force was to be detached from the main fleet and used as a surface battle line against Japanese surface ships in the event of certain developments. Halsey did not form such forces; he simply informed the commanders that this was a “battle plan” that should be carried out in the event of a separate order. However, Kinkaid, Nimitz, and Vice Admiral Mark Mitscher intercepted this message, although it was not directed to any of them, and later during the battle, thanks in part to subsequent instructions, they all misinterpreted it.

When Halsey made the decision late on October 24 to march north with his entire fleet and attack Ozawa, he reported to Kinkaid that he was "advancing north in three groups." Kinkaid, who had intercepted an earlier message about Task Force 34, thought that Halsey had taken his three carrier groups north and left four of his six fast battleships to guard the San Bernardino Channel. But Kinkaid, busy preparing for night operations in the Surigao Strait, did not ask Halsey until 4:12 a.m. on October 25 whether Task Force 34 was guarding the San Bernardino Strait.

He did not receive a negative answer from Halsey until Kurita pounced out of the morning fog at a surprised Sprague.

If Kinkaid had tried to clarify the situation earlier, if he had not intercepted the message about Task Force-34, or if Halsey had informed him that he was “advancing north with all his forces” instead of “advancing north in three groups,” the surprise would not have occurred [ v].

There was another factor that influenced Kurita's unexpected appearance. Kinkaid did not send a single search aircraft south of the San Bernardino Strait along the Samara coast on the night of October 25 and the morning of October 25. There were no reports from the PBY (Black Cat) night search aircraft, and the morning search did not begin until Kurita's masts appeared on the horizon. Halsey's fleet also sent night bloodhounds, and a message from one of them, which the 3rd Fleet received on the night of October 24, stated that Kurita had turned east again towards San Bernardino.

However, the fact remains that between the 3rd and 7th fleets there was no good understanding regarding San Bernardino. The "coordination" required by Admiral Halsey's orders turned out to be poor, and he himself wrote (in US Naval Institute proceedings) that the fighting in Leyte Gulf "suggests the need for one naval command in the combat area, which would be responsible for all combat units involved and for their complete control [w]. At the very least, the separation of operational control in the combat area leads to misunderstanding, lack of coordination and communication overload (an American mistake that was often noted during the battle) and can lead to disaster.

The 3rd Fleet's report after the battle on January 25, 1945, indicated Admiral Halsey's reasons for withdrawing his entire force north, taking Ozawa's bait: "Admiral Kinkaid had the advantage in position and strength to deal with the northern (Japanese) forces." forces. The main body could have sailed through the San Bernardino Strait to Leyte Gulf, but carefully assessed reports of severe enemy damage convinced the commander of the 3rd Fleet that even if the main body had left the San Bernardino Strait, its combat effectiveness would not have been as effective. great to win the battle at Leyte (7th Fleet). [Ozawa's] Northern forces were powerful, dangerous, intact, and free to operate for now. The commander of the 3rd Fleet decided to a) hit Ozawa suddenly and with all his forces, b) keep them all together and c) trust the assumption that the main force was hopelessly weakened - an assumption that implied the Japanese inability to cope with the CVA and the rest of the minutia standing next to them and stopped them on the way."

Admiral Kinkaid's position, as stated in the report of the battle, is obviously inconsistent with the admiral's following conclusion: "The objectives of the force must be kept in mind."

“The key to the Battle of Leyte Gulf lies in the missions of the two fleets,” Kinkaid writes. – They should be clearly understood. The 7th Fleet's mission was to land and support the invasion force. I was the commander of the main Philippine offensive force. Our job was to land the soldiers and support them on the shore. The ships were armed accordingly, and they had few armor-piercing shells left [x]. The CVE carried anti-personnel bombs instead of torpedoes and heavy bombs. We were not prepared for a naval battle...

The only thing I think could have been done differently. If I had known that Kurita was definitely moving through San Bernardino unopposed, moving the northern CVE group further south, I would have created a strike force of resistance carriers to look for him at dawn.

Mistakes made during battle should not be attributed to deficiencies in plans. All of them turned out to be errors of inference, not of organization. The two contiguous regions - the central Pacific and the southwestern Pacific - presented a complex command problem, but intelligence alone would not have corrected the situation."

In retrospect, it seems clear that: 1) San Bernardino should have been heavily patrolled by the 7th Fleet, Halsey's force, or both; 2) that Halsey was “lured” north and the strait became open to Kurita; 3) that the indecision and ineffectiveness of Kurita’s actions and the bold actions of the escort aircraft carriers to delay the enemy prevented the Japanese main forces from entering Leyte Gulf; 4) that only delay, and not defeat, would result from Kurita's forces successfully bombarding the Leyte beachhead and the entrance to Leyte Gulf. Admiral Halsey is dead and judgments are easy to make now with information that was not available at the time. But it seems likely that three main considerations led to the decision to take the entire fleet north when he learned that Ozawa's carriers had been discovered.

Concentration of force is an ancient principle of war; every commander was taught from a young age that it was dangerous to divide them before meeting the enemy.

First, Halsey must have known that at this stage of the war in the Pacific, the United States 3rd Fleet alone (even without Kinkaid's forces) had the advantage over the Japanese main and northern forces and could easily afford to split up its fleet to meet the threat of the Japanese from different sides. But principles that were once taught are difficult to violate.

Secondly, Halsey was an admiral of the air and sea forces and one of the most successful during the Second World War. He believed better than anyone that Japanese aircraft carriers, the most feared and dangerous ships, were the right target for his fleet. He knew that Kurita's main force had no aircraft carriers; from his own words, he did not know that Ozawa's carriers had too few aircraft.

Thirdly, Halsey’s orders, which he knew how to formulate well, set his main goal, if possible, to destroy most of the Japanese fleet. This phrase, Morison notes, contrasts with other orders for other major amphibious landings in the Pacific. A similar situation that Halsey faced occurred during the Marianas landings, when Admiral Raymond Spruance was attacked by aircraft from Japanese aircraft carriers. They were then destroyed in what became known as the Mariana Turkey Shoot, but Spruance, who had aborted his main mission of covering the amphibious invasion, resisted the temptation to withdraw his fleet from the islands and pursue the Japanese one.

Halsey, who has a different temperament and, unlike Spruance, was an air admiral, could not resist the opportunity, especially since the orders required it. Halsey was aggressive, with a touch of Nelson tradition, and had a great desire to lead. His South Pacific campaign had a touch of grandeur. But he did not have the cold calculation and thoroughness of Spruance. Spruance, on the other hand, did not possess the qualities of Halsey's dynamic and vibrant leader and was not known either to the Navy or to the public. But judging by his actions, this is a great battle admiral. As Admiral Robert B. Carney wrote, “Each was a remarkable man in his own way.”

Had Kurita reached Leyte Gulf, in view of his previous defeat in Surigao Strait, it is unlikely that he could have achieved decisive success. Most of the landing ships sailed without cargo. It would face six American battleships, each carrying 13–24 armor-piercing shells per gun, and without strong air support of its own it would be constantly attacked by American aircraft. The losses of the naval forces of both sides would probably have been more severe. Kurita, for example, would have discovered that the San Bernardino Strait was guarded by Halsey's battleships if he had delayed the change of course for another two hours. But he could not destroy the coastal bridgehead or cut the umbilical cord of shipping. As Halsey noted in the notes to this chapter, the fast-moving Japanese forces, some of them virtually unopposed, constantly bombarded the US beachhead on Guadalcanal and sometimes our cargo ships, but the Americans held out there despite Japanese superiority at the time and sometimes and in the air. The Japanese made many mistakes at Leyte Gulf, and it was unlikely that their So plan would succeed. After the defeat at Surigao Strait, the best Kurita could hope for was to sink many American ships and delay the conquest of Leyte.

Despite the mistakes and initial exaggerated reports of enemy casualties by our pilots, the Battle of Leyte Gulf was undoubtedly a major American victory. But the Japanese, who had a chance in this game to at least prolong the war by inflicting significant losses on the Americans, themselves contributed to their decisive defeat by failing to cope with communications (z), not providing sufficient air cover, and not coordinating the nature of air and surface operations. They had a surprising inability to time actions, poor judgment and indecisiveness, and at times stupidity, in three of the four main commanders. Only Admiral Ozawa completed his task.

The Japanese wanted to carry out one of the most complex plans in the history of naval warfare - a plan that required excellent coordination and communication and sacrificial courage. It was too complex, boldly conceived, but poorly executed.

Luck, as well as judgment, obviously played an important role in the battle. But luck, as it turns out, favors good commanders. The Japanese missed their chance by abandoning their main target, the thin-walled landing craft in Leyte Gulf, in the middle of the battle, thereby violating an important military principle.

And the American 3rd and 7th fleets, as Admiral Halsey radioed to Hawaii and Washington, broke the backbone of the Japanese fleet, “providing support to our soldiers landing on Leyte.”

Leyte was the battleship's magnificent valedictory and probably the last naval battle in which a ship armed with large guns played a major role.

The battle doomed the Japanese to further defeat and became the final chapter in the history of the Pacific War.

70 years ago, the Japanese United Fleet fought its last major battle. The naval battle in Leyte Gulf became one of the largest naval battles in the history of mankind and opened a new word - “kamikaze”. The secrets of some of the circumstances of this grandiose battle have not yet been fully revealed.

Wrong side of the perimeter

The Japanese war strategy in the southern direction, which included the conquest of Indochina and the South Seas in order to provide the empire with the necessary resources and markets, also determined the operational concept of the defensive perimeter. This perimeter, supposedly starting from the Aleutian Islands and going south through Midway to the Marshall and Caroline Islands, then captured the Bismarck Archipelago, the Solomon Islands, New Guinea, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and, finally, Burma. A network of bases along the perimeter and inside it was supposed to provide control over sea and air space, make it possible to timely detect approaching enemy forces and respond to their actions. However, after several months of continuous victories, in the first half of 1942, the plan began to falter. The first, still minor, occurred during the Battle of the Coral Sea, when the Americans thwarted a Japanese plan to capture Port Moresby on the southeastern tip of New Guinea. This was followed by defeat at the Battle of Midway, during which the United Fleet lost four of its six heavy aircraft carriers and most of the trained pilot cadres of the pre-war carrier-based aircraft.

These losses were compounded during the long campaign in the Solomon Islands (especially in the battles for Guadalcanal). As a result, 1943 passed in a state of strategic pause - Japan lost the strength for active offensive operations, its allies - the United States with the support of Britain and its dominions - did not yet have them. What was fatal for Japan was the fact that it had to face the strongest enemy from the weakest side of its unfinished defensive perimeter: if in the west, on the side facing the Indian Ocean, the line of contact actually froze until the end of the war, the Japanese left Indonesia and Indochina After the surrender, having lost only Burma during the war, for which the British and Indians fought fierce battles in the mountains and jungles for almost three years, the Americans began to test the strength of the eastern perimeter back in 1942, regularly finding gaps.

The second fatal circumstance was the fact that, unlike the Japanese, who could not in any way influence the US economy and industry on the North American continent, the Americans looked for every opportunity to undermine Japan’s economic potential and its ability to wage war and successfully found them: submarines , who started the war on communications, very quickly brought the level of losses of the Japanese merchant fleet to unacceptable levels. At the same time, the weak anti-submarine defense, built with the expectation that the main enemy forces would be delayed by the perimeter, was unable to withstand the actions of American submarine forces. By the beginning of 1943, Japanese imports had decreased by 15 percent due to the loss of the merchant fleet, which further undermined the empire’s ability to restore its military potential, weakened by losses.

The American offensive, which made up for the losses of the first months of the war and finally gained numerical superiority, began in the fall of 1943 from the Gilbert and Marshall Islands. In the spring of 1944, the Americans finally broke through the defensive perimeter in the center and southeast, and as a result, Japan was under threat of attack on a vast front anywhere from western New Guinea to the Mariana Archipelago. The June defeat in the Battle of the Mariana Islands deprived Japan of the last remnants of trained carrier-based pilots, and from that moment on it was only a question of the time it would take for the United States and its allies to end the war.

The main goal of the United States for the second half of 1944, however, was obvious: the Americans needed to regain control over the Philippines - this would allow Japan to immediately and sharply worsen the situation, effectively severing ties between the mother country and the resource base in the southern seas. On the morning of October 17, the American fleet began landing troops in Leyte Gulf.

Suicide Geometry: Double Bluff

The actions of the Americans were generally calculated. The Japanese already had a framework plan for a general battle in the Philippines in this regard - “Sho-1”.

But the specific implementation of this plan makes us seriously respect the Japanese admirals, the authors of the operation. Who it was, by the way, is still unknown. Commander-in-Chief Soemu Toyoda did not delve into it in particular. It is usually customary to attribute the idea of ​​the most beautiful adventure to Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa. After the war, he himself did not comment on his role in developing the plan, answering only questions about his own role in the battle.

Ozawa played the role of bait in the battle, leading a formation made up of the aircraft carriers remaining in Japan. There were still aircraft carriers, but there were no trained pilots. We're finished. Therefore, there were no more than 100 aircraft left for all four ships, but this fit into the plan: even when “empty,” the aircraft carriers remained aircraft carriers, and therefore the number one target.

The “bait” was supposed to move out from the north and, showing itself to the Americans, pull their aircraft carriers towards itself. This is an established fact: after the end of the war, such a plan was confirmed personally by Ozawa. After this, the battleships of Admirals Takeo Kurita and Shoji Nishimura were supposed to infiltrate from the west, through the narrow straits of the Philippine archipelago, enter Leyte Gulf from the north and south and strike at the American landing forces, deprived of cover distracted by Ozawa.

It is generally accepted that only Ozawa was the bait, and the formations of Kurita and Nishimura were two parts of a single strike group. At the same time, it is overlooked that Kurita led a powerful formation of modern ships, and Nishimura’s detachment was quite weak. Both of his battleships were obsolete.

Apparently, the bait was double. Ozawa lured the American aircraft carriers of the 38th formation to the north. Nishimura - to the south the battleships of the 77th formation, after which Kurita was supposed to break into the weakened American position in the center and smash all the pots at the bridgehead in Leyte Gulf.

The plan is elegant, delicate in its geometry and at the same time frankly suicidal, given the balance of forces of the fleets. The Americans, not counting light forces, had 16 aircraft carriers, 18 small escort aircraft carriers (“jeeps,” as they were called), 12 battleships and 24 cruisers in the Philippines area. The Japanese could oppose them with 4 aircraft carriers, 2 battleships, 7 battleships and 20 cruisers.

Kurita could enter Leyte Gulf only with great difficulty, at the same time risking not getting out. Commander-in-Chief Toyoda said frankly after the war: “There was no point in saving the fleet at the expense of losing the Philippines.” Indeed, the loss of the Philippines destroyed the entire Japanese position in Southeast Asia. So it was possible to risk iron for this.

Kamikaze on the ground

On September 24, Kurita's main forces entered the Sibuyan Sea, in the middle of the Philippine archipelago. They were discovered by the Americans and came under attack from the air and from submarines. The Japanese lost the super battleship Musashi, the same type as the Yamato. Kurita delayed his advance, and, amid fantastic reports from his pilots, the commander of the 38th carrier force of the Americans, Mitscher, and the commander of the 3rd Fleet, Admiral Halsey, who was with him, the senior naval commander in the area, decided that the Japanese forces were either destroyed or suffered heavy losses and retreat.

During these same days, Americans for the first time became en masse acquainted with a new Japanese technique, just right for a suicidal plan - the so-called special attacks, which went down in history as kamikaze attacks.

Ozawa maneuvered in the north, trying to attract the attention of the 38th formation, which had so inopportunely taken up Kurita. Meanwhile, Kurita, having fought off the attacks, carefully continued to advance to the east.

The movement of the two formations in the archipelago was not coordinated in any way: Nishimura followed his route like a tram, not paying attention to Kurita’s forced stops. By the evening of October 24, Nishimura, perfectly tracked by the Americans, reached the Surigao Strait, leading from the south to Leyte Gulf. The battleships of Admiral Kincaid's 77th formation were already lined up there in anticipation of an easy victory: the American artillery radars allowed accurate shooting at night, while the Japanese were blind as moles, navigating only by the flashes of salvos.

At the same time, the 38th formation of aircraft carriers bought into the desperate maneuvers of Ozawa, who at the northern Cape of Engaño had just not fired signal flares and had not gone on air in plain text, demanding the Americans for a fair fight.

Nishimura entered the strait and moved north without even trying to maneuver. Before dawn it was all over: his ships were simply dismantled to pieces. But that no longer mattered. Historians write about an admiral who either went crazy or decided to die in battle. Everything was simpler: the death of Nishimura’s unit was included in the plan. Kincaid's battleships went south, leaving escort formations off Samar Island, opposite Leyte Gulf.

This created an absurdity that the Japanese could not have planned. Due to “communication problems,” as they would say in modern management jargon, the San Bernardino Channel was left unattended. Kincaid was fully confident that he was guarded by one of the aircraft carriers, and they ran in full force to catch Ozawa, not considering it necessary to report to their neighbors.

The American “big boys” dispersed to the corners of the stage, tempted by the baits ostentatiously laid out there. Everything was ready for the soloist to appear. On the night of October 25, when Kincaid's battleships were sinking Nishimura, Takeo Kurita's main forces crossed the San Bernardino Strait, rounded the island of Samar and approached Leyte Gulf from the north by dawn.

Only there they were able to find them, when they literally appeared out of nowhere in front of a group of American escort aircraft carriers of Admiral Sprague, who believed himself to be deep in the rear.

The suicide plan worked. The ferret entered the chicken coop. But the chickens turned out to have iron claws and beaks.

The battle near the island of Samar was characterized by the rarest stupidity. Kurita's battleships and cruisers fell on Sprague's force, which included light forces and those same second-rate "jeep aircraft carriers." These were bad ships, but in large numbers, and they carried up to 450 aircraft.

Covering the aircraft carriers, Sprague set up smoke screens, attacked destroyers and, without ceasing, filled the airwaves with cries that he was being killed. He threw all his available planes against Kurita. He, in turn, tried to hit the unarmored “jeeps” with heavy armor-piercing shells, which did not have time to detonate and literally “flyed” through the ship.

At the same time, the pressure from the aviation of the “second-rate” aircraft carriers turned out to be strong: Kurita’s headquarters began to seriously suspect that Ozawa’s maneuver did not work and the main forces of the 38th carrier force were acting against them.

Meanwhile, in the north, Jisaburo Ozawa finally completed his task. For this purpose, he “gave” all four of his dummy aircraft carriers to the aviation of the 38th formation, but excluded the main American forces from the battle at Samara.

And Samara was approaching a turning point. Kurita suddenly ordered the battleships to break contact and go north. His formation, having lost a battleship and five heavy cruisers in two days, destroyed only one escort aircraft carrier and three destroyers from the enemy. Apparently, on the Yamato bridge they finally realized the futility and hopelessness of a fight in such a balance of forces.

The Japanese succeeded in everything in the operation, except for that one episode for the sake of which it was started. The largest naval battle in history (in terms of the tonnage of ships involved) ended in painful awkwardness.

The last goodbye

From the moment of the defeat in the Philippines, the Japanese leadership, which began preparing for battles for the Japanese islands themselves, was essentially deciding one main problem: how to lose the war, saving face and avoiding bloody battles on the main islands of Japan. The Japanese garrisons, remaining on numerous small islands in the American rear, after the loss of the Philippines and the main forces of the fleet were left to their own devices - fighting mainly with hunger and disease in the absence of supplies and shifts for the wounded and sick.

The remnants of the Japanese fleet, which returned some to Singapore and some to the bases of the metropolis, actually ceased to influence the course of the war. The main problem was fuel - many thousands of tons of naval fuel oil or crude oil were required to refuel battleships, aircraft carriers, and heavy cruisers, and these thousands of tons were no longer available. The final point in the fate of the Imperial Navy was set on April 7, 1945, when the battleship Yamato, which survived the Battle of Leyte, left the base in Kure with residual fuel reserves with the task of inflicting the greatest possible losses on the American forces storming the fortifications of Okinawa, and was sunk by carrier-based aircraft. Americans halfway between Kyushu and Okinawa.

Instead of an afterword. On the other side of silence

We read the American history of the Battle of Leyte because no other has been written. Historians have different interpretations of the Japanese plan and its execution in battle. Naturally, Takeo Kurita was especially hard hit.

Those who are simpler write about the incompetent coward Kurita. Let’s say this is what Admiral Sherman, one of the four carrier commanders of the 38th formation, spoke about him in his memoirs. Apparently, he was tormented by resentment that he was cheated like a boy: instead of guarding San Bernardino, he and his aircraft carriers ran back and forth after Ozawa.

Those who are more polite explain Kurita’s behavior by saying that he was already “old, sick and tired” and had not slept for several days. Apologists for imperial Japan, fascinated by samurai aesthetics, write that the fleet decided to commit suicide in the most beautiful way possible, without being interested in the result of the battle.

In general, a lot of nonsense is written, just to obscure the fact that the American command managed to get into completely rationally organized “set-ups” twice in one day by the guaranteed weaker Japanese, who were not going to just “die gracefully.”

The Japanese commanders who carried out this adventure hardly commented on their participation in the battle. We have already cited the opinions of Toyoda and Ozawa, who escaped from the battle. Nishimura died along with his flagship. There was only one main character left - Takeo Kurita.

Here we will go off the factual rails and fantasize a little, trying to preserve the dramaturgy of the characters and plot.

From the testimony given by Kurita to American investigators in 1945, it is impossible to extract anything about the plan of the operation. The admiral's words are scanty and confused, like those of a terminally ill and tired man... or a man who wants to appear so.

The fact is that “tired and sick” Kurita died in 1977, just short of his 90th birthday. For most of this time, the admiral was silent about the decision to withdraw from the battle, but shortly before his death he spoke. He said that he saw no point in wasting the lives of his men for a war that had already been lost.

These words were uttered in the 1970s, when Japan was reborn, re-created an excellent industry and literally overwhelmed the victorious US with cars and electronics. The old admiral saw this, and therefore could afford a little subtle oriental humor.

But he probably also understood his shame as a warrior. For the only opportunity to strike, Ozawa literally danced on the edge of a sword, and Nishimura resignedly sank to the bottom of the Surigao Strait. And when it was Kurita’s turn, he realized that he could hit, but there was no point in it anymore. The Americans will endure pre-calculated losses, and then respond threefold to the blows. How many lives did Kurita save by leading the ships away from Samar? Not only on the decks, but also in Japan itself, in the war with which the Americans already put two bullet points in Hiroshima and Nagasaki?

Such shame is a very personal thing, it is not washed in public, like dirty linen. You need to live with such shame for a long time and alone. Kamikazes in the battle of Leyte took off and did not return. Takeo Kurita returned, lived another 33 years and lived to see victory.

Admiral Robert B. Carney, who was Admiral Halsey's Chief of Staff at the Battle of Leyte Gulf, made several important comments in a letter to the author (March 3, 1965) regarding lessons learned and considerations that influenced the admiral. He notes: “Halsey was wise to point out the need for unified command in the naval theater of operations. It's hard to argue with this. If all U.S. naval forces remained under a single command, missions would be consistent, the commander would understand the full capabilities of the units, communications plans would be developed and implemented, and battle tactics would be well controlled.

In the spring of 1944, Halsey had a plan for just such a situation that arose in Leyte Gulf. At that time, he proposed to the commander of the Pacific Fleet to use submarines in the common naval theater, transferring them across the enemy’s line of retreat. This was the plan "Zu" ("Zoo"), so named after the names of the animals that designated the proposed areas of operation of submarines. The proposal was not approved.

An obstacle to the creation of a unified command was the division of authority in the Pacific between Nimitz and MacArthur.

After the war, I told Admiral King that the main conclusion drawn from the Battle of Leyte Gulf should be the need for unified command and control. Admiral King did not accept my point of view...

The problem Halsey faced was not dividing the entire U.S. naval force against concentrated Japanese forces, but dividing the 3rd Fleet in front of the Japanese central and northern forces. Halsey later decided not to share it.

It is true that Halsey considered Japanese aircraft carriers to be a prime target. At the headquarters meetings before the attack to the north, it was taken into account that other operations would follow Leyte and, if the Japanese aircraft carriers were destroyed, the Japanese fleet would no longer pose a threat to us. His assumptions about Kinkaid's ammunition situation are wrong.

Later, during Lingayen, when General MacArthur expressed concern about the threat posed by the Japanese fleet, Halsey declared that the Japanese fleet no longer posed a serious threat. And it turned out to be true.

The "third consideration" was the orders given to Halsey: they required him to destroy the Japanese fleet, which was the first priority. You will remember that in October 1944, east of Formosa, the 3rd Fleet tried to lure Japanese naval forces into the sea. This plan would have been successfully carried out if one Japanese reconnaissance plane had not discovered the main force and transmitted this information before it could be shot down.

I point out that the pilots' reports of damage after air attacks on Kurita's forces in the Sibiyan Sea played a role when the decision was made to go north after Ozawa. These reports turned out to be exaggerated.

One aspect regarding the reasons why Kurita turned back has received little attention. The tactics of the Japanese fleet included circular maneuvers of individual ships in the face of the threat of an air attack. The weak little carriers, in desperate attempts, sent their planes into battle two or three at a time, but Kurita's ships made circling maneuvers every time there was a raid, even with small forces. This significantly slowed down the speed of Kurita's ships' advance—which proved important because Kurita overestimated the speed of his advance and, therefore, the withdrawal speed of the carriers that were ahead of him. Only large aircraft carriers could develop it. Therefore, when Kurita had little fuel left and when he learned that the 3rd Fleet was ahead of him, Kurita retreated."

Notes by Retired Admiral Thomas Kinkaid, US Navy

1. The invasion armada was "MacArthur's armada" in the sense that it came from his area [southwest Pacific] and could also be called the "great armada from below" [or from MacArthur's area]. MacArthur received his authority from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He was appointed "supreme commander" in the southwest Pacific, and was not allowed to personally command his forces. He was required to exercise command through his three main commanders of land, sea and air forces: Blamey [General Sir Thomas Blamey, the Australian Army general who commanded the ground forces], Kinkaid and Kenney [General George Kenney, the US Army Air Forces, who commanded the air force. forces].

From the time we left the ports of the Admiralty Islands and New Guinea for the conquest of the Philippines, I was in direct command of the "armada", including the ground forces on board, until I handed over command of the ground forces on the shores of Leyte Gulf to Kruger [Lieutenant General Walter Krueger, commander of the 6th Army]. MacArthur occupied a passive position as supreme commander in the southwestern Pacific region. I took direct action. This is evidenced by the fact that I decided to continue the operation without MacArthur's permission when Halsey sent a message that was received when we were within a few hours of Holland. It stated that Halsey was gathering his forces to attack the Japanese fleet and was unable to provide planned support for our landing on Leyte. When MacArthur joined our convoy, I sent him a signal: “Welcome to our city.” He gave a condescending reply, noting that this was the first time he was under my command, and ended the message with the words: “Believe it or not, we are on our way.”

2. Nishimura was supposed to be in Leyte Gulf an hour before Kurita. For no reason he arrived early, which was a serious mistake that affected the coordinated actions. Kurita was late for good reasons.

3. 7th Fleet had 18 CVEs [escort carriers]. Two were sent to Halmahera to replace aircraft, and only 16 were present during the fighting. The 7th Fleet had several PBYs. There were a total of 34 [American] aircraft carriers.

4. "Darter" and "Days" pursued Kurita at night in the Palawan Strait and attacked at dawn, having done their job well. It is extremely important from an operational point of view that Kurita had no signalmen during his transfer from Atago to Kishinani to Yamato. Any naval commander would sympathize with him in such a situation.

5. Only one strike was carried out against Nishimura's forces, and then only in small patrol groups. Davison [Rear Admiral Ralph I. Davison, commander of Task Force 38.4, 3rd Fleet] reported that the movement to concentrate forces took him out of range of the enemy's southern force, but Halsey continued to concentrate. In 7th Fleet we felt we could "take care" of the [enemy] southern force and spent the day preparing to receive them. Halsey did not inform me that he left Nishimura to me.

6. Halsey ordered a morning search to the north by a northern team, but Japanese attacks prevented this and it could not begin until midday.

7. In the 7th Fleet, we carefully calculated the noise and came to the conclusion that Ozawa could only have two battleships in the northern group - Ize and Hayuga.

8. Halsey had four carrier groups and gave preliminary orders to form Task Force-34. “Go north in three groups” - these were the words that not only Nimitz and I, but also others could not understand the meaning of this step. Mitscher [Vice Adm. Mark A. Mitscher, commander of Task Force 38, a four-carrier task force and its supporting warships from 3rd Fleet] had actually issued orders for the use of two battleships that were to remain with him. He also stated that Task Force 34 would remain behind to guard San Bernardino. The proposed composition of the operational forces in those conditions was extremely correct.

Although Halsey gave too much credence to the pilots' reports that overestimated enemy casualties, he knew, thanks to the Independence's night flights, that Kurita was heading to San Bernardino, and he should have realized:

a) that the composition of the 7th Fleet was intended to provide support for the amphibious landings and soldiers on the shore, and not to fight major battles. The slow speed of the old battleships and their predominance of powerful armor-piercing shells made them unable to resist the central Japanese force, even if they were there and had enough fuel and ammunition.

b) that the 7th Fleet would have to engage in a night battle with surface forces in Surigao Strait and in any case would not be able to leave Leyte Gulf without protection and take up a position away from San Bernardino.

c) that the three groups of escort aircraft carriers of the 7th Fleet would have been in their positions on the afternoon of October 25, carrying out their mission, and they would have needed cover.

d) that my destroyers would have expended their torpedoes in Surigao Strait, and the battleships would have had little anti-personnel ammunition left to provide gunfire support to the forces ashore for several days.

9. The commander was rarely able to spend a calm day in port, preparing without interruption for a night operation. The tactical disposition and plans of the 7th Fleet were checked and rechecked by everyone associated with it.

10. I believe it was discovered around 10:15 pm a few miles south of Bohol Island. All three torpedo boats from that group were damaged by artillery fire and could not report contact, but one of them (after thinking) managed to contact the next group of torpedo boats in the east and then transmitted the message. Oldendorf received it 26 minutes after midnight.

11. Fired by torpedo boat 137. The torpedo boat fired at the destroyer, missed, but hit the cruiser [Abukuma] and severely damaged it.

12. No, we did not think that the main Japanese group was located west of the Philippines, but we believed that the 34th Task Force was guarding San Bernardino.

It is also interesting to note that at Leyte Gulf the temporary headquarters of the army commanders were only a few yards from the water's edge, and the shores were heaped with food, ammunition and other supplies for immediate use. If these warehouses were destroyed, our forces would be left ashore without food or ammunition. Halsey said that Kurita could only "disturb" our forces in Leyte Gulf.

13. I believe that several words of Nimitz's message were crossed out at the very beginning by the liaison officer for security reasons. The message was initially brought to me without amendments, as it should be. Later they told me about them. [Halsey initially took the phrase “The world is worried” as a criticism of himself and was annoyed. Once the message was deciphered, the phrase should have been crossed out, as in Kinkaid's version, but not Halsey's.]

14. The attacks by destroyers and destroyer escorts on heavy Japanese ships were very daring as well as effective, which I noticed during the war.

15. Kurita made a serious mistake by losing tactical control over his forces. He lost most of his signalmen. His ships were heavily damaged by torpedoes from 7th Fleet aircraft and surface ships, as well as bombing attacks by 7th Fleet aircraft. The ships' deck superstructures, navigation rooms, radio rooms, etc. were damaged by five-inch shells and aircraft fire. The ships lost formation, trying to dodge torpedo attacks from aircraft and escort ships. Soon Kurita's individual groups were scattered, which he should not have been, and he could not see his forces or the enemy's forces due to the heavy smoke left by the escort carriers and other ships. Kurita was confused, and his subordinates did not help him, since they could not communicate which enemy they were attacking. Ozawa did not report his success in diverting Halsey's forces to him. Moreover, I have no doubt that Kurita was physically exhausted after several intense days.

16. McCain sensed what was going to happen long before Halsey did. And he carried out his strike at a distance of 350 miles, which exceeds the two-way flight range of aircraft.

Below is an analysis of what happened.

Halsey did exactly what the Japanese wanted him to do. He left San Bernardino unguarded, allowing Kurita to pass through the strait without resistance. Taking all six of his battleships when only two were enough and four were needed at San Bernardino, he belatedly turned south at 11:55 in response to my calls and Nimitz's message. And again, having taken all six battleships, he left Mitscher without a single one. Mitscher urgently needed two battleships. By 11:15, Mitscher's planes had discovered Ozawa's forces, and Ize and Hayuga were known to be accompanying them. But six battleships remained in the south. Later, Mitscher sent Dubose [Rear Admiral Laurent Dubose] an order to clear the area of ​​damaged ships (4 cruisers and 12 destroyers). Ozawa was informed of Dubose's actions and sent the Ize and Hayuga south to find him. Fortunately, the Japanese battleships passed east of our cruisers on their way south and on their return to the north.

Halsey informed me that he would arrive at San Bernardino at 8:00 on October 26th. Too late! At 16:00, after refueling, he decided to accelerate south to 28 knots, taking his two fastest battleships, Iowa and New Jersey, with three cruisers and eight destroyers. He was two hours late to the Kurita entrance to the strait. Suppose he intercepted it. But two battleships were clearly not enough.

Halsey could have turned south at top speed immediately after receiving my first message at -8:25. He would have been five hours faster at San Bernardino. In fact, Halsey sailed for an hour and 45 minutes at 25 knots—69 miles. If it had been heading south at 27 knots - 77 miles - the difference in the position it occupied at 11:15 would have been 156 miles.

Ultimately, the world's six most powerful battleships, excluding Yamato and Musashi, sailed some 300 miles north and 300 miles south in "the greatest naval battle of World War II and the largest concentration of forces in combat at sea," not not firing a single shot. I can well imagine how my classmate Lee [Rear Admiral Willis A. Lee, who commanded the battleships of the 3rd Fleet] felt.

Even today (1955), Halsey believes that sending the entire 3rd Fleet north was not a mistake. He apparently does not take into account that the absence of Task Force 34 at San Bernardino prevented the destruction of Kurita's forces. And, in addition, one should keep in mind the losses of American soldiers and ships from the carrier escort. He didn't seem to think about the threat to our invasion of the Philippines. Halsey stated that I needed to send aircraft from escort carriers to search over the Sibuyan Sea and the San Bernardino Strait on the night of October 25th. I believed that Task Force 34 was guarding San Bernardino and Lee was receiving information from Independence planes that made night flights. Indeed, I did not order a search in the north at night with reconnaissance aircraft and during the day with aircraft from escort aircraft carriers in the direction of San Bernardino, mainly because I did not know what was happening.

But even if I knew that San Bernardino was wide open, I did not have enough strength to meet Kurita. You correctly quoted my words from Battle Report. I would not deprive Leyte Gulf of its defensive forces. I would move the escort carriers to avoid direct collision with Kurita's surface forces. And of course, he would have sent planes from aircraft carriers to monitor Kurita’s movements, although they did not have the necessary equipment, and the pilots were not trained to carry out night search flights.

Could Kurita have reached Leyte? This is interesting to speculate about. Quite possibly. His direct encounter with the northern group of escort carriers, although painful to us, slowed the progress, caused great damage to his forces and so puzzled him that he turned back while only two hours away from his objective.

17. “Separate command,” of course, is an unwise decision. However, the undeniable fact is that, despite this, both Halsey and I had what seemed to me to be clear, definite objectives. If Halsey had remembered his cover job when Ozawa lured him north, he would never have left San Bernardino wide open. Moreover, he had to tell me clearly what he was going to do.

The "unwarranted guess" you attribute to me probably refers to my guess that Task Force 34 was guarding San Bernardino. This may have been the wrong assumption, but in my unbiased opinion, all the logic of events pointed to that being the case. Halsey's task included covering our amphibious assault operation from the Japanese fleet. His preliminary order to form Task Force-34, which I intercepted, included a plan to protect San Bernardino from the passage of Kurita's forces, which was different in design and in the composition of the forces of Task Force-34. I have received no further communications regarding this group. If I had intercepted them, I would, without a doubt, not have remained silent.

It seemed unlikely that Halsey would abandon such an excellent plan. His message: “I’m going north in three groups” meant to me that Task Force 34, as well as the carrier group, remained, which would have been quite reasonable. Not only did I and my entire staff think so, but Nimitz and probably his staff believed it, as did Mitscher and his staff. As I have already noted, Mitscher actually gave orders for the use of two battleships that were to accompany him on the northern route [four of the six battleships of the 3rd Fleet were to remain in Task Force 34 to defend San Bernardino; two - go north with Mitscher's aircraft carriers behind Ozawa]. When Mitscher and his staff learned that Group 34 had not remained to defend the strait, Chief of Staff [Captain] Arley Berke tried to persuade Mitscher to send a message to Halsey about this, but Mitscher refused on the grounds that Halsey probably had information , which he did not have.

You note that I did not ask Halsey whether Task Force-34 was guarding San Bernardino until 4:12 on October 25th. It's right. Without information to contradict Halsey's message, nothing more could be thought of. Early in the morning of October 25, a headquarters meeting was held in my cabin to check if there were any mistakes in our actions. I took a break at 4:00; Operations Officer Dick Krusen [Captain Richard Krusen] returned to the cabin and said, “Admiral, I can only think of one thing. We never directly asked Halsey if Group 34 was guarding San Bernardino." I told him to send a message.

18. The contradiction was not significant for the simple and only reason, which was that I did not defend my point of view, but remained silent for ten years. But Halsey published several articles or interviews in addition to his book that purported to justify his actions in Leith, sometimes to my detriment.

19. I believe that the radio communications on Ozawa's flagship failed when the first bomb hit, but other ships could have sent a message to Kurita.

20. It was only because of the strange wording of Halsey’s message that, to Kurita’s surprise, Sprague’s aircraft carriers were sent.

Early in the morning there was a delay in sending important messages from me to Halsey, and this should not have happened.

21. In fact, one or two reconnaissance and patrol aircraft flew north at night to search. But they turned out to be ill-equipped for such a task. And they had no time for this, because every American ship they approached opened fire on them. I can imagine how much effort they had to make to avoid meeting with US ships, instead of searching for Japanese ships.

The dawn search, ordered by the escort carrier, should have been carried out much earlier.

22. Halsey's articles in the Proceedings of the Naval Institute were subjective. If he had remembered that he should have provided cover and not been distracted by other matters, the question of a “unified naval command” would have been purely academic.

23. Halsey's arguments regarding [the enemy's] main forces are unconvincing. His “thorough verification” of reports of enemy damage is not confirmed. Kurita's movements seem to refute any such assessments. We knew from our chart that Kurita was approaching San Bernardino at 22 knots. Good job! Halsey later received a message from the Independence plane that was not relayed to me. Didn’t he really draw up Kurita’s movement schedule?..

My headquarters' ship count indicated that Ozawa's forces could not be as "powerful and dangerous" as Halsey seemed to think. He took 119 ships north to deal with the 19 ships of the [enemy's] northern forces. The division of his forces was reasonable. Having formed Task Force 34, he actually carried it out, but failed to implement it.

Halsey's decisions (a) and (b) would have been reasonable if he had no other responsibilities. His decision (c) can only be called erroneous. I doubt that anyone will disagree with my statement: the only reason why Kurita did not reach Leyte Gulf and did not defeat the escort carriers along the way was that he turned back when victory was in his hands. His [Halsey's] judgment of the "fatally weakened state of [the enemy's] northern forces" was clearly wrong. Did his judgment include the prediction that Kurita would withdraw from the fight? If so, then his magic ball was certainly in working order. Does anyone believe that the Japanese were “not capable” of dealing with the escort carriers? They did not cope with them as they could have done, but this does not mean that they “were not capable.”

24. I was quoted correctly, but I did not have the opportunity to edit my statements. The last line, “mind alone could not have made the situation better,” could have been used in other words because this statement means that “mind alone could not have achieved a better result if both Halsey and I had carried out our specific tasks.”

Notes from Fleet Admiral William Halsey

A. I don't remember what Radio Manila was broadcasting. They usually broadcast false propaganda from Tokyo Rose or other Japanese broadcasts. We used Radio Manila as an alarm clock. As soon as we heard the air raid alert, we knew that our pilots had been discovered.

The change in American strategy was a direct result of my recommendations. In particular, cancel the capture of Yap and Palau and carry out landings in the Central Philippines, and not in Mindanao. I have previously advised against the annexation of Palau. Admiral Nimitz approved my recommendations, with the exception of Palau, and immediately transmitted them to the Joint Chiefs of Staff at Quebec, where they conferred. General Sutherland in Holland, General MacArthur's chief of staff in the general's temporary absence, approved the landing in the Central Philippines rather than Mindanao. The Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed it, as did President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. I was fortunate that there was a conference going on in Quebec at that time.

The 1st Marine Division suffered heavy losses on Peleliu (in the Palau group of islands), which in many ways can be compared with losses on Tarawa. One combat unit from the 81st Army Division (Wildcat) also suffered heavy losses in the fighting at Peleliu, where it had so ably provided assistance. We built airfields on Angaur, captured by the 81st Division, and on Peleliu Island, as well as a partial naval base at Kossol Road. Kossol Road was not occupied by the Japanese, and we simply needed to organize a defense there on the island of Bebeltuap, the largest in the Palau archipelago. I mention these actions and the timing to show that this was not a belated assessment of the situation on my part. It was recommended to capture Ulithi, as I had always considered this point essential for the anchorage of the fleet. Ulithi was occupied without resistance. Pileliu, Angaur and Kossol Road turned out to be very convenient, but I thought then and think now that they were not necessary for the further campaign in the Pacific.

The end of the war in the Pacific was clear before the Battle of Leyte Gulf. When our fleet received freedom of movement, almost anywhere in the Pacific Ocean, the Japanese were doomed to defeat.

Plan So is just one of many plans developed by the Japanese. They all failed.

Toyoda [Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Japanese Fleet] had aircraft carriers, but very few aircraft and poorly trained pilots. Now, as it turns out, everyone knew this, except for my headquarters and me. The responsibility lay with us. If the rest of the naval forces at that time did not know about it, we, in the 3rd Fleet, clearly understood that the aircraft carrier replaced the battleship and represented the strongest and most formidable naval weapon available to our enemy. We fought the Japanese for several years. We did not know how many aircraft the Japanese had, and we could not take advantage of the opportunities presented. We knew that the Princeton was attacked and received a message about it. These were planes from an aircraft carrier. As we stood in the north on the morning of the 26th, a “ghost” appeared on our screens. We thought these were aircraft carriers flying towards the Japanese. Eventually they left the screens towards Luzon. The Japanese fired at us several times, and only once at Guadalcanal were we able to respond.

My decision to go north was not based solely on the pilots' reports. We had long discussed and studied a possible battle with the Japanese fleet, playing it out on the training board mounted on the flagship. Since then we have come to the conclusion that aircraft carriers are the most dangerous ships of the Japanese, not only to ourselves, but also to MacArthur and in the entire Pacific campaign. We called them our main goals. We knew that Kurita's ships had received damage from our attacks, in particular the deck superstructures and, probably, the fire-tracking devices, which was explained by their poor shooting at small aircraft carriers.

b. The "Turkish Shot" in the Mariana Islands (Battle of the Philippine Sea) was a magnificent spectacle. I seriously doubt that it was the only place where the backbone of Japanese naval aviation was broken, despite its great success. I cannot forget the magnificent American pilots in the South and Southwest Pacific who shot down so many formations of Japanese naval aircraft based at Rabaul. This claim is based on Japanese responses to American investigators after the war. The pilots who did this were from the US Army Air Corps, the Naval and Marine Corps Air Forces, the New Zealand Air Force and the Australian Air Force. The Japanese made their usual mistake of paying little attention to them, and received a serious rebuff.

c. The Japanese Navy had several aircraft carriers completing construction in the Inland Sea. I have the original badge given to me after the war. In the middle there is an American flag, around it and around the edges are silhouettes of various Japanese ships, including aircraft carriers, battleships, a heavy cruiser, light cruisers and submarines. Along the edge is the inscription: “The badge is made of metal obtained from these ships sunk by American aircraft from aircraft carriers, July 1945, Kure Naval Base, Japan.” Interesting names and designations: CV – ASO, CV – AMAGI, CVE – RYUHO, BB – ISE, BB – HYUGA, BB – HARUNA, CA – SETTSU, CL – TONE, CL – OYODO (fleet flagship), CL – AOBA, CL –IZUMA, CL – AWATE and 5 SS (CV – large aircraft carrier, CVE – small aircraft carrier, BB – battleship, CA – heavy cruiser, CL – light cruiser, SS – submarine).

We had orders to get rid of the Japanese Air Force in such a way that they could not interfere with the Russians if they decided to invade Japan. I sometimes wonder about this in view of current events! Of course, these ships were sitting ducks, and even high-altitude bombing could, with some luck, hit them.

There is one Japanese cruiser for which I would feel sorry for, if I could feel sorry for Japanese ships at all in those days. He left the battle at Leyte Gulf severely wounded. The Japanese brought him to a harbor or parking lot in western Luzon, carefully camouflaged him and made him almost invisible. They worked day and night so that he could sail the sea and return home. At that time, our pilots combed every nook and corner, looking out for Japanese ships. As one of the planes was about to return, a photograph of the shelter was taken. Expert photographers recognized it as a cruiser. A heavy blow was dealt to him immediately in the morning. This meant his end.

d. "Betty" attempted to board the Enterprise among our aircraft during the attack on the Marshall and Gilbert Islands on February 1, 1942 (Eastern Time). Thanks to the masterful handling of the ship by then-captain and now Admiral (ret.) George D. Murray, the Betty was forced to skid until it fell into a “ditch,” causing minor damage to the Enterprise. "Betty" damaged the edge of the take-off deck, broke its tail and fell on its side. When he crashed into us, he was already on fire. He broke the rear fuel supply pipe, which started a fire, cut off the forward fuel supply pipe, where, fortunately, the fire did not start, and cut off the tail of one of our Douglas dive bombers. The fire on the funnel was soon dealt with, and I do not remember that there was any other damage, except for small and easily repairable ones on the take-off deck. This was my first encounter with a kamikaze plane. I saw many others later. I even doubt that this Japanese knew that he was a kamikaze. His plane dropped all its bombs and, fortunately for us, they missed the Enterprise. His intentions were quite clear. He knew the plane was doomed and decided to inflict as much damage on us as possible. He was trying to land among 35 or 40 of our planes that had returned from a mission, filling their tanks with fuel and waiting their turn for the next flight. The ship's captain's quick actions prevented the disaster. I do not want to disparage the very brave but reckless suicidal actions of Rear Admiral Masaburi Arima. Obviously, we fought to live, and the Japanese fought to die.

e. My orders went further than the quotation "to provide cover and support to southwest Pacific forces to facilitate the capture and occupation of targets in the Central Philippines." This is written from memory, without reference to notes, so my orders can only be quoted approximately. They boiled down to the fact that, despite the prevailing conditions, my main task was to destroy the Japanese fleet.

f. “The necessary measures for precise coordination of operations between and will be organized by their commanders.” There are too many words here, but nothing more. They could not be implemented. Kinkaid and I have not seen each other since our meeting in Holland, after plans for the invasion of the Philippines were changed. Some key members of my staff and myself flew from Saipan to Holland to discuss preliminary actions with Kinkaid and his and MacArthur's staffs. Both Kinkaid and I were very busy discussing during the invasion of the Philippines. This shows, like nothing else, the importance of unified command in a combat zone. If Kinkaid or I had been in high command during the Battle of Leyte Gulf, I am sure it would have been fought differently. But better or worse - this will never be answered.

g. Besides the PBY, I believe 7th Fleet had several Martin-class patrol bombers (PBYs) at the time.

h. The Night Bloodhounds not only searched for northern forces, but also flew over the Sibuyan Sea and transmitted reports that Kurita had turned east again and was heading towards the San Bernardino Strait. This was reported directly to Kinkaid that night at 9:00 pm or 9:30 pm.

i. I did not exercise operational control over the submarines, except when some of them were transferred to me for specific operations. I didn't have submarines at that time.

j. I never thought that Kurita's forces were stopped by daylight air attacks. I received and passed on a message that his forces were again heading towards the San Bernardino Strait. I didn’t really believe the pilots’ exaggerated reports of enemy losses. At that time we were quite good at assessing the pilots' reports. I thought that Kurita had suffered too many casualties from our air attacks, especially in the deck structures, and that their fire control would be poor. Their poor shooting at our aircraft carriers, destroyers and destroyer escort ships the next day confirmed this. I did not think that they would encounter resistance from aircraft carriers, destroyers and escort vessels. Their thin lining probably saved them to some extent. After the Battle of Guadalcanal, in which Rear Admiral Callaghan and Rear Admiral Scott were killed, there were several thin-walled ships that penetrated heavy armor-piercing shells. I remember one destroyer - I don’t remember its name - which I later inspected. As far as I remember, it received 14 holes from the 14-inch shells of the Japanese battleship. His commander was Coward. Never before has a commander's name been so consistent with his actions in battle.

k. I do not agree with the statement that “the course of history and the fate of nations are based on such misunderstanding.” I had no misunderstanding, except (if this is the case) that the Japanese carriers had no aircraft. At any time, I knew what I was doing and deliberately took risks in order to get rid of the Japanese aircraft carriers. My assumptions that the 7th Fleet could cope with Kurita's battered forces were confirmed in the battle on October 26, which involved our aircraft carriers and small ships. These American ships fought a battle that will become an epic poem for all time. I take my hat off to them.

l. The Battle of Surigao Strait, with Admiral Oldendorf in tactical command, was well conceived and executed. Never before had a target been so effectively covered, and never before had a force been so overwhelmed and demoralized as the Japanese forces in Surigao Strait.

m. I'm still far from convinced that Ozawa's forces were intended solely as a decoy. During the war, the Japanese lied constantly, even to each other. Therefore, you should not believe them even after the end of the war. They had plenty of time to fly missions to achieve their goals. Despite their banzai calls, their kamikaze planes, their "stupid bombs" (man-controlled), their one- and two-man submarines built for the purpose of crew sacrifice, and despite their many other stupid actions, I still find it difficult believe that they deliberately used their potentially dangerous ships as victims. This is partly explained by reports from Americans who questioned Admiral Kurita after the war. When asked why he turned away from Leyte Gulf, he stated that he wanted to link up with Ozawa's forces and attack the 3rd Fleet.

n. Admiral Nimitz sent me the following request: “Where is Task Force 34?” In this form, the message constitutes a violation of the rules of secrecy.

o. I noticed that the 7th Fleet was described by pilots with "red eyes" after days of shelling and nights of battle. My fleet has been fighting almost non-stop since the beginning of September. When we finally reached Ulithi at the end of September to rest and replenish supplies, after a night's stay a typhoon hit us. We were in almost constant combat until the end of the Battle of Leyte Gulf. I don’t know what color the eyes of my wonderful pilots should have been, but I know that they were close to exhaustion, and this was holding me back. I didn't dare attack the Japanese when we were chasing them. This applies to all my officers and men, combat crews above and below decks. It was an almost unbearable tension. We weren't fighting for Cape Engano - we were fighting to finish off the Japanese carriers.

R. I knew what kind of forces Kinkaid had and believed that they could cope with Kurita's damaged ships. I was not aware of the ammunition situation on the old Kinkaid battleships. I was later told that one of these battleships did not fire a single shot from its main battery during the operations in Surigao Strait.

Moving north, I took risks, but with calculation. I thought then and think now that if Kurita had come to Leyte Gulf, he could have done nothing except “shell and retreat.” When I was commander in the South Pacific, Japanese battleships, cruisers and destroyers fired upon my forces on Guadalcanal many times. The forces on shore suffered greatly from the merciless shelling, but they only delayed us for a short time. The ships, often half unloaded, put to sea to escape the shelling zone. The soldiers on the shore had to take cover in the trenches. In most cases I did not have heavy warships to offer resistance, and they were fired upon without much difficulty. Once the torpedo boats drove them away. On another occasion, Dan Callaghan and Norm Scott (Rear Admirals) performed a magnificent act of sacrifice when they attacked a Japanese force of battleships, cruisers and destroyers with several ships, cruisers, air defense vessels and destroyers. This sacrifice was not in vain. As a result, the Japanese lost the battleship Hayei, which the crew abandoned, and it was sunk by our planes the next day. During one of their last attacks, we were able to deceive the Japanese by placing our two new battleships, South Dakota and Washington, near Savo Island. They were commanded by Rear Admiral, and later Vice Admiral U.A. Lee is a junior in the US Navy. As a result of the night operation, the Japanese lost destroyers and one battleship, which was scuttled that night.

q. Following the radio interception, Kurita is said to have erroneously concluded that the Leyte airstrips were operational. It wasn't a mistake. Admiral McCain sent his planes so far that they could not return to their carriers. They were directed to land at the Leyte airstrips. They landed there and operated from these airfields for the next few days until I received instructions to return them to Ulithi. This was done - through Palau. But I don't remember seeing any reports of how much casualties McCain's planes inflicted on Kurita's forces. They were probably minor.

r. I don't quite understand what the author means when he talks about my inaccurate assumptions. It was probably that I trusted the pilots' reports too much. But that was not the case. They were carefully checked and evaluated. My calculations that the 7th Fleet could take care of Kurita's battered forces were confirmed. “You won’t know the taste of pudding until you try it.” Remember that these calculations were made on time, not late.

s. I agree that I made a mistake by turning south. I consider this the most serious mistake I made during the Battle of Leyte Gulf.

t. I never claimed, as far as I know and remember, that Kinkaid could and should have covered the San Bernardino Strait. I thought that Kinkaid's forces could take care of defeating Kurita, and believed that Kurita could only make a quick withdrawal bombardment if he entered Leyte Gulf. Such an attack would have little effect on the soldiers on shore and could only delay us for a short time.

u. I did not send a preparatory message, but instead sent a "Battle Plan" to the 3rd Fleet. To make sure that 3rd Fleet understood everything correctly, I sent another message saying that the plan would not proceed until I gave the order. As commander of Task Force 38, Vice Admiral Mitscher should have received both of these messages.

v. The statement that if I had sent a message to Kinkaid: “moving north with all my forces” rather than “moving north in three groups” would have changed the situation, I consider it purely rhetorical. I did not know that he had intercepted my battle plan, and I believed that the plan was being carried out. The carrier task force was well defined, and every naval commander in the area knew its composition. My message was correct. I briefed all parties involved when Admiral McCain's carrier task force departed for Ulithi. I'm sure everyone understood this message correctly.

w. I explained earlier that the orders requiring "coordination" were just words and meant nothing. I continue to insist, as I have written before, on “the need for a unified naval command in the combat area, which must be responsible for and exercise control over all combat units involved.”

X. I knew nothing about the weapons of the 7th Fleet. At that time, I believed that the 3rd Fleet was being rearmed. I didn't think about the 7th Fleet shells.

y. I agree with Admiral Kinkaid when he says that all errors were errors of inference. But I completely disagree with his statement that “the two contiguous regions of the central Pacific and the southwestern Pacific presented a difficult command problem, but intelligence alone would not have corrected the situation.” As I said earlier, "if Admiral Kinkaid or I had been in the High Command, the course of the battle would have gone completely differently."

z. There is only one word to describe the bond between the American side during the battle. She was "disgusting." We sent long reports describing our difficulties and shortcomings, as well as recommendations for fundamental changes. As I recall, our battle network was filled with relatively unimportant intelligence reports that could be put aside. Most of them did not involve the IUD. As a result, important and urgent messages were delayed. This should never be allowed to happen in the future.

These comments were written almost entirely from memory, without the use of notes or reports. I hope I don't trust my memory too much. Ten and a half years is a long time.”

Of particular interest is a message that was written by Halsey during the battle. It justifies his actions. This is a historical account, and I owe much to Admiral Eller, Director of Naval History, for allowing me to use it in the book.

"Commander of the 3rd Fleet

From: Com. 3rd Fleet

To: Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, Commander-in-Chief Fleet Southwest Pacific, Commander 7th Fleet, Acting Commander

TOP SECRET

Lest there be any misunderstanding regarding the latest operations of the 3rd Fleet, I inform you of the following: in order to obtain information on Japanese plans and movements, which became necessary on the twenty-third (23) October, three carrier groups were moved to the coast of the Philippines opposite Polillo, to San - Bernardino and Surigao, to search as far west as possible. On October 24 (24), a search by the 3rd Fleet discovered Japanese forces moving east through the Sibuyan and Sulu Seas, and the 3rd Fleet launched air strikes on both forces. The existence of a Japanese joint action plan was then evident, but the objective was not clear and the expected carrier force was not identified. Searches carried out by aircraft carriers of the 3rd Fleet revealed the presence of enemy aircraft carrier forces on the afternoon of the twenty-fourth (24th) of October, which completed the picture. Staying put, guarding the San Bernardino Strait and waiting for the enemy to coordinate surface attacks and air attacks from carriers would be unwise, so three (3) carrier groups were concentrated at night and sailed north to make a dawn surprise attack on the carrier fleet. enemy. I took into account that the enemy forces in the Sibuyan Sea were so badly damaged that they did not pose a serious threat to Kinkaidu, and that the forecasts were based on the events of the twenty-fifth (25) off Surigao. The enemy carrier forces were taken by surprise and no air attacks were carried out against us. Their air groups were apparently based ashore and arrived too late to board their carriers or engage in combat. I launched surface attack units ahead of the carriers to coordinate surface and air force attacks on the enemy. The urgent calls for assistance from the 7th Fleet Commander came at a time when enemy forces had suffered extensive damage and my surface strike force was forty-five (45) miles from the damaged enemy ships. I had no choice. It was only possible to miss the golden chance and go south to support Kinkaid, although I was convinced that he had enough strength to cope with the enemy forces, which were weakened by our attacks on the twenty-fourth (24). This belief was confirmed later by events at Leyte. I wish to note that MacArthur and Kinkaid were supported by the following forces: Able (Ey), who destroyed one thousand two hundred (1,200) enemy aircraft between the tenth (10) and twentieth (20) October, as well as many of his ships; Becker (B)'s air attacks on Japanese forces in the Sulu Sea, Charlie (Si), which inflicted heavy losses on the enemy in the Sibuyan Sea; Dog (Dee), who destroyed more than one hundred and fifty (150) aircraft on the twenty-fourth (24th) of October; Easy (I) who destroyed the enemy’s aircraft carrier force on October twenty-fifth (25); Fox (Ef), who carried out intimidating attacks from aircraft carriers on enemy forces at Leyte on the twenty-fifth (25) of October; George (Gee), who moved surface forces on the evening of the twenty-fifth (25) of October to cut off the enemy's retreat to San Bernardino.

The backbone of the Japanese Navy was broken during operations in support of our landing on Leyte.

Acknowledgments and Bibliography

Books

Cannon, M. Hamlin. Leyte – The Return to the Philippines (U.S. Army in World War II – The War in the Pacific). Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1954.

Cant, Gilbert. The Great Pacific Victory. New York: John Day, 1945.

Commager, Henry Steele, ed. The Story of the Second World War. Boston: Little Brown, 1945.

Craven, W. F., and Cate J. L., eds. The Army Air Force in World War II, Vol. 5, The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki, June 1944 to August 1945. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953.

Field, James A. Jr. The Japanise at Leyte Gulf. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947.

Halsey, Fleet Admiral William F., USN, and Bryan, Lieutenant Commander J., III, USNR. Admiral's Halsey Story. New York: Whittlesey House, 1947.

Karig, Captain Walter, USNR; Harris, Lieutenant Commander Rus – sel L., USNR; and Manson, Lieutenant Commander Frank A., USN, Battle Report, Vol. 4. The End of An Empire. New York: Rinehart, 1948.

King, Fleet Admiral Ernest J., USN. Official Reports - U.S. Navy at War - 1941–1945. U.S. Navy Department, 1946.

Naval Analysis Division, U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific). The Campaigns of the Pacific War. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946.

Sherman, Admiral Frederick C., USN (Ret.). Combat Command. New York: Dutton, 1950.

Willoughby, Major General Charles A., and Chamberlain, John, McArthur, 1941–1951. New York: McGraw–Hill, 1954.

Woodward, C. Vann. The Battle for Leyte Gulf. New York: Macmillan, 1947.

Magazines

Halsey, Admiral William F., "The Battle for Leyte Gulf", U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May, 1952.

Admiral Halsey's additional comments in the notes were written specifically for this chapter.

Admiral Kinkaid and other major commanders of the US Navy have not yet published their memoirs, but their reflections are given in the Battle Report and in the special notes to this chapter. I am grateful to him for permission to quote his words.

Post-war explanations from Japanese commanders are given in Field, The Japanese at Leyte Gulf.

I owe a lot to retired Rear Admiral I.M. Eller of the US Navy, Director of Naval History, and several of his assistants who reviewed this chapter. Retired Admiral Robert B. (Mick) Carney, USN, former Chief of Naval Operations and, at the Battle of Leyte Gulf, Chief of Staff to Admiral Halsey, kindly read the final pages of this chapter and made some valuable comments on the judgments and reasons that influenced Halsey's decisions at the time. Vice Admiral John S. McCain, Jr. read the manuscript critically.

This chapter uses reports from the 3rd Fleet, as well as the American ships Hoel, Heermann, Johnston and others.

Probably the most complete published account of the battle is Samuel Eliot Morison, Leite, June 1944–January 1945, Volume XII, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Little Brown, 1958. This volume by Morison is not official as it contains his own opinions, but his work has received the full support of the Navy.

Morison, in turn, based part of his narrative on the most careful and detailed study of the battle. This work was carried out under the direction of Rear Admiral Richard W. Bates, who was Admiral Oldendorf's chief of staff during the battle, at the Naval Warfare College at Newport. The result was a very large, detailed work, which, unfortunately, was limited for use in the Navy and was not completed due to insufficient government funding. Rafe Bates's work is not widely available, but Morison also drew on it.

I owe a lot to retired Rear Admiral I.M. Eller of the US Navy, Director of Naval History, and several of his assistants who reviewed this chapter. Retired Admiral Robert B. (Mick) Carney, USN, former Chief of Naval Operations and, at the Battle of Leyte Gulf, Chief of Staff to Admiral Halsey, kindly read the final pages of this chapter and made some valuable comments on the judgments and reasons that influenced Halsey's decisions at the time. Vice Admiral John S. McCain, Jr. read the manuscript critically.

This chapter uses reports from the 3rd Fleet, as well as the American ships Hoel, Heermann, Johnston and others.

Probably the most complete published account of the battle is Samuel Eliot Morison, Leite, June 1944–January 1945, Volume XII, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Little Brown, 1958. This volume by Morison is not official as it contains his own opinions, but his work has received the full support of the Navy.

Morison, in turn, based part of his narrative on the most careful and detailed study of the battle. This work was carried out under the direction of Rear Admiral Richard W. Bates, who was Admiral Oldendorf's chief of staff during the battle, at the Naval Warfare College at Newport. The result was a very large, detailed work, which, unfortunately, was limited for use in the Navy and was not completed due to insufficient government funding. Rafe Bates's work is not widely available, but Morison also drew on it.

Admiral Halsey was probably referring to the heavy cruiser Kumano. This ship was hit by a torpedo from a destroyer during the attack of Hoel, Heerman and Johnston in the battle of Samar on the morning of October 25. He was subsequently hit by a bomb and withdrew with Kurita's depleted center force on 26 October. His nose was almost torn off and only one boiler was working; she trudged at a speed of 5 knots to Manila Bay, where priority repairs were made. On November 6, while she was returning to Japan for permanent repairs, the American submarine Guitarro, one of several patrolling west of Luzon, hit the ship with another torpedo. The damaged Kumano, firing back, entered Dazol Bay off Luzon, where it was finally sunk as a result of an air attack from the Ticonderoga aircraft carrier on November 25.

English "coward" means "coward".

This message has been quoted in full in many previous publications. The phrase "the world is wondering" after the question about the whereabouts of Task Force 34 was, as Admiral Kinkaid notes, formulated for the purpose of encoding a message. Normally such an edit would have to be deleted before forwarding the message to Halsey, but in this case the phrase apparently remained and seemed critical to him. This angered the Admiral, but also pointed out to him the importance of helping Kinkaid relay messages. The ciphers used at the Battle of Leyte Gulf have long since changed and, despite comments by Admiral Halsey, written with some irritation several years after the battle, there is no danger in revealing them now.

Battle of Leyte Gulf

The ocean war against Japan has now reached its climax. From the Bay of Bengal to the central Pacific Ocean, the power of the Allied fleet increasingly affected itself. By April 1944, three British battleships, two aircraft carriers and several light ships were concentrated in the waters of Ceylon. They were joined by the American aircraft carrier Saratoga, the French battleship Richelieu and Dutch ships. In February, a strong flotilla of British submarines arrived and immediately began sinking enemy ships in the Strait of Malacca. Within a year, two more British aircraft carriers arrived, and the aircraft carrier Saratoga returned to the Pacific. With these forces in place, Admiral Somervell achieved significantly greater results. In April, its aircraft carriers struck Sabang, on the northern tip of the island of Sumatra, and in May they bombed an oil refinery and industrial plants in Surabaya, on the island of Java. This operation lasted 22 days and the fleet covered a distance of seven thousand miles. In the following months, British submarines and aircraft cut off the Japanese sea route to Rangoon.

In August, Admiral Somervell, who had commanded the Eastern Fleet throughout the difficult period from March 1942, was replaced by Admiral Bruce Fraser. A month later, Admiral Fraser received two more new battleships - Howe and King George V. On November 22, 1944, the British Pacific Fleet was already officially formed.

The organizational activities and industrial production of the United States, reaching enormous proportions, had a full impact on the Pacific Ocean. The following example demonstrates the scale and success achieved by the Americans. In the fall of 1942, during the most intense struggle for Guadalcanal, the Americans had only three aircraft carriers. A year later there were already fifty of them, and by the end of the war - more than a hundred. There were similar remarkable achievements in the field of aviation. These enormous forces were driven by active strategy and improved new effective tactics. The Americans faced an enormous task.

A long chain of islands, some two thousand miles long, stretched south across the Pacific Ocean from Japan to the Mariana and Caroline Islands. Many of these islands were fortified by the enemy and had excellent airfields, and at the extreme southern end of this chain of islands was the Japanese naval base at Truk. Behind this island barrier were Formosa, the Philippines and China, and between them lay supply routes to the most advanced enemy positions. Thus, it was impossible to invade or directly bombard Japan itself. It was necessary first of all to break this chain. It would have taken too long to capture each fortified island individually, so the Americans resorted to the "leapfrog" tactic. They captured only the most important islands and bypassed the rest. However, their naval forces by this time were already so large and growing so rapidly that the Americans created their own lines of communication and interrupted the enemy's lines of communication, rendering the defenders of the bypassed islands helpless. Their method of assault also fully justified itself. First, aircraft based on aircraft carriers were launched, followed by intensive, sometimes prolonged bombardment from the sea, then landing operations were carried out and battles broke out on the shore. Once the island was in American hands and garrisoned, land-based aircraft were used to repel enemy counterattacks. These same aircraft contributed to the further advance of American troops. The fleet operated in echelons. When one group of ships was fighting, the other was preparing for a new attack. This required enormous resources not only to support combat operations, but also to create bases along the route of advance. The Americans coped with all this.

In June 1944, the American offensive developed successfully. In the southwest, General MacArthur had almost completed the capture of New Guinea, and in the center, Admiral Nimitz had penetrated deep into the chain of fortified islands. Both of these offensives targeted the Philippines, and the struggle for this area soon culminated in the defeat of the Japanese fleet. The Japanese fleet had already been significantly weakened; it especially lacked aircraft carriers. But the Japanese had only one hope left - victory at sea. To preserve their strength for this dangerous but extremely important period, the main Japanese fleet was withdrawn from the island of Truk, and was now divided between the islands of the Dutch Indies and the waters of the mother country. However, he soon had to fight. In early June, Admiral Spruance, with the help of his aircraft carriers, attacked the Mariana Islands and landed on the fortified island of Saipan on the 15th. The capture of Saipan and the adjacent islands of Tinian and Guam would lead to a breakthrough of the enemy defense line. In view of the extremely serious threat, the Japanese fleet decided to intervene. On this day, five Japanese battleships and nine aircraft carriers were spotted off the Philippine Islands, heading east. Spruance had enough time to take the necessary positions. Its main purpose was to cover the landing on the island of Saipan. He coped with this task. He then assembled his ships, including 15 aircraft carriers, and waited for the enemy to the west of this island. On June 19, Japanese aircraft from aircraft carriers bombarded American aircraft carriers from all directions. Air battles continued throughout the day. The Americans suffered minor losses, but they battered the Japanese air squadrons so much that their aircraft carriers were forced to retreat.

That same night, Spruance searched in vain for his missing enemy. Late in the evening of the 20th he discovered it at a distance of about 250 miles. American planes, launching a bombing campaign just before sunset, sank one aircraft carrier and damaged four other aircraft carriers, as well as a battleship and a heavy cruiser. The day before, American submarines sank two other large enemy aircraft carriers. Further attacks became impossible and the remaining enemy ships managed to escape, but this sealed the fate of Saipan. Although the garrison fought hard, the landings continued, the accumulation of forces increased, and by July 9 all organized resistance had ceased. The neighboring islands of Guam and Tinian were captured, and in the first days of August the Americans established complete dominance in the Mariana Islands.

The fall of Saipan was a great blow to the Japanese high command and indirectly led to the resignation of the government of General Tojo. The enemy's concerns were well founded. This fortress was less than 1,300 miles from Tokyo. They thought it was impregnable, but now it has fallen. Their southern defenses were cut off, and American heavy bombers were given a first-class base for bombing the Japanese islands themselves. For a long time, American submarines sank Japanese merchant ships off the coast of China; now other warships could join the submarines. Further advance of the Americans threatened to cut off Japan from sources of oil and raw materials. The Japanese fleet was still quite strong, but it had become unbalanced. It was so starved of destroyers, aircraft carriers, and airmen that it could no longer fight effectively without support from land-based air bases. The Japanese fleet did not have enough fuel, and this not only interfered with training, but also deprived the command of the opportunity to concentrate ships in one place, with the result that at the end of the summer most of the heavy ships and cruisers were located near Singapore and near fuel supply sources in the Dutch Indies, and a few the surviving aircraft carriers remained in the internal waters of the metropolis, where their new air squadrons completed training.

The position of the Japanese army was not much better. Although its numbers were still quite large, the army was scattered in China, in Southeast Asia, languishing on remote islands that could not be supported. The most sensible enemy leaders began to look for ways to end the war, but could not defeat the militaristic machine. The High Command brought in reinforcements from Manchuria and ordered fighting to the end in Formosa and the Philippines. Here, as in Japan itself, troops had to fight to the death. The Japanese Navy Ministry was no less determined. If it loses the upcoming battle for the islands, then Japan will be cut off from fuel sources in the Dutch Indies. There was no point, they argued, in preserving ships without fuel. Ready for sacrifices, without losing hope of victory, in August they decided to throw their entire fleet into battle.

On September 15, the Americans advanced further. General MacArthur captured the island of Morotai, halfway between the western tip of New Guinea and the Philippines, and Admiral Halsey, who now took command of the American naval forces, captured the forward base for his fleet in the Palau Islands. This simultaneous advance was of exceptional importance. At the same time, Halsey constantly probed the enemy's defenses with all his forces. He hoped in this way to force a decisive battle at sea, which would destroy the Japanese fleet and especially the remaining aircraft carriers. The next push was to be made to the Philippine Islands, but then a significant change in the American plan unexpectedly occurred. Until this time, our allies intended to invade the southernmost part of the Philippine Islands - the island of Mindanao, and planes from Halsey's aircraft carriers were already bombing Japanese airfields here in the south and on the large northern island of Luzon. They destroyed a significant number of enemy aircraft and, during the course of the battle, discovered that the Japanese garrison on Leyte Island was weaker than expected. This small but now famous island, located between the two larger but strategically less important islands of Mindanao and Luzon, proved to be the undisputed landing point for the Americans. On September 13, while the Allies were still conferring in Quebec, Admiral Nimitz, at Halsey's suggestion, began to push for an immediate invasion. MacArthur agreed to this, and two days later the American chiefs of staff decided to schedule the assault for October 20, that is, two months earlier than planned. Such was the case with the Battle of Leyte Gulf.

The Americans began the campaign on October 10 with raids on airfields located on the islands between Japan and the Philippines. Continuous, devastating raids on Formosa provoked the fiercest resistance, and from 12 to 16 October there were constant heavy air battles between carrier-based aircraft and land-based aircraft. The Americans inflicted serious damage on Japanese aircraft both in the air and on airfields, but suffered little themselves, and their aircraft carriers withstood powerful attacks from aircraft based on land bases. This result was decisive. Enemy aircraft were destroyed before they could even take part in the battle for Leyte. Many Japanese aircraft intended to operate from carriers were unwisely sent as reinforcements to Formosa, where they were destroyed. Thus, in the decisive naval battle that now lay ahead, the Japanese aircraft carriers had no more than a hundred poorly trained pilots.

In order to imagine the course of the ensuing battles, it is necessary to familiarize yourself with the attached maps. The two large islands of the Philippine archipelago - Luzon in the north and Mindanao in the south - are separated by a whole group of smaller islands, among which Leyte occupies a central and key place. This central group of islands is divided by two navigable straits, which were destined to play an important role in this famous battle. To the north is the San Bernardino Strait and about 200 miles south of it is the Surigao Strait, which leads directly to Leyte. The Americans, as we have seen, intended to capture Leyte, and the Japanese were determined to hold them there and destroy the American fleet. The plan was simple and bold. Four divisions under the command of General MacArthur were to land on the island of Leyte under the cover of gunfire from American ships and aircraft - this is how the Japanese imagined the operation, or perhaps they even had such information. To pull back this fleet, divert it far to the north and start a secondary battle there - that was the first task. But this would be only a preliminary step. As soon as the main fleet can be diverted, two strong columns of ships will pass through the straits - one through San Bernardino, the other through Surigao - and head for the landing site. All attention will be directed to the shores of Leyte, all guns will be aimed there, and heavy ships and large aircraft carriers, which alone can withstand the onslaught, will pursue the ships that served as bait far to the north. This plan almost failed.

On October 17, the Japanese commander-in-chief ordered his fleet to go to sea. The decoy ships, under the command of Supreme Commander Admiral Ozawa, sailed directly from Japan and headed for Luzon. It was a combined squadron that included aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers and destroyers. Ozawa's mission was to appear off the east coast of Luzon, engage the American fleet and divert it from the landing site in Leyte Gulf. The carriers were short of planes and pilots, but this did not matter much since they were only supposed to serve as bait, and bait is meant to be eaten. Meanwhile, the main Japanese strike forces headed into the straits. The larger squadron, which can be called the central squadron, consisted of 5 battleships, 12 cruisers and 15 destroyers. She headed from Singapore under the command of Admiral Kurita to San Bernardino in order to, having rounded the island of Samar, reach Leyte. The second, smaller, or southern, squadron, consisting of 2 battleships, 4 cruisers and 8 destroyers, headed in two independent groups through the Surigao Strait.

On October 20, the Americans landed on the island of Leyte. At first everything went well. Resistance on the shore turned out to be weak, a bridgehead was created quickly, and General MacArthur's troops began their offensive. They were supported by ships of the American 7th Fleet under the command of Admiral Kincaid, who was under MacArthur's command. Its older battleships and small aircraft carriers were quite suitable for amphibious operations. Further to the north was Admiral Halsey's main fleet, protecting them from attack from the sea.

However, there was still a crisis ahead. On October 23, American submarines spotted the Japanese central squadron (Admiral Kurita) off the coast of Borneo and sank two heavy cruisers, including the flagship, damaging a third ship. The next day, October 24, aircraft from Admiral Halsey's aircraft carriers entered the battle. The huge battleship Musashi, which had nine 16-inch guns, was sunk, other ships were damaged, and Kurita turned back. American pilots delivered optimistic and perhaps misleading information. Halsey concluded, not without reason, that the battle had been won completely, or at least partially. He knew that the enemy's second, or southern, squadron was approaching Surigao Strait, but he judged quite correctly that it could be driven back by Kincaid's 7th Fleet. He ordered reconnaissance in the north, and on October 24, late in the evening, his pilots discovered Admiral Ozawa's ships, serving as bait, heading south far northeast of Luzon. There were four aircraft carriers, two battleships equipped with decks for aircraft, three cruisers and ten destroyers! Here, he decided, was the source of the trouble and the real target for attack. The next day, Halsey ordered his entire fleet to head north and destroy Admiral Ozawa's fleet. So he fell into a trap. On the afternoon of the same day, October 24, Kurita turned east again and again headed for the San Bernardino Strait. This time no one had to stop him.

Meanwhile, the Japanese southern squadron was approaching Surigao Strait, and the same night the ships entered it in two groups. A fierce battle followed, in which ships of all classes took part, from battleships to light coastal ships. The first group was destroyed by Kincaid's fleet massed at the northern exit; the second group tried to break through, taking advantage of the darkness and confusion, but were repulsed. Everything seemed to be going well. However, while Kincaid was fighting in the Surigao Strait, and Halsey was at full speed pursuing the Japanese ships serving as bait far to the north, Kurita, under the cover of darkness, passed unhindered through the San Bernardino Strait and in the early morning of October 25 attacked a group of escort aircraft carriers supporting the landing of General MacArthur's troops. Caught by surprise and not fast enough to escape, the aircraft carriers were unable to immediately scramble their planes to repel the attack from the sea. For almost two and a half hours, these small American ships fought a stubborn rearguard action under the cover of a smoke screen. In this battle they lost two aircraft carriers, three destroyers and more than a hundred aircraft, with one of the aircraft carriers being sunk by a Japanese aircraft piloted by a suicide pilot. However, they in turn managed to sink three enemy cruisers and damage others. Help was far away. Kincaid's heavy ships, having defeated the Japanese southern squadron, were located far south of Leyte Island and were in dire need of ammunition and fuel. Halsey, with his ten carriers and all his fast battleships, was still further away, and although another group of his carriers, sent to refuel, was now called, it could not arrive for the very next few hours. It seemed that victory was in Kurita's hands. No one could stop him from entering Leyte Gulf and destroying MacArthur's landing fleet.

But Kurita turned back again. It is unclear what motivated him. Many of his ships had been bombarded and scattered by Kincaid's light escort carriers, and he knew by now that the southern squadron had been destroyed. He had no information about the fate of the bait ships in the north, and he did not know exactly the location of the American fleet. The intercepted signals made him think that Kincaid's and Halsey's ships were surrounding him with superior forces and that MacArthur's landing craft had already managed to escape. Left alone, without support, he now abandoned the desperate attempt for which so much had been sacrificed and which was already close to success. Without attempting to enter Leyte Gulf, Admiral Kurita turned around and headed again for the San Bernardino Strait. He hoped to give the last battle to Halsey's fleet on the way, but he failed to do this either. In response to Kincaid's repeated calls for help, Halsey finally turned back with his battleships, leaving two carrier groups to continue pursuing the enemy to the north. During the day, they destroyed all four of Ozawa's carriers, but Halsey himself returned to San Bernardino too late. The squadrons did not meet. Kurita fled. The next day, Halsey and MacArthur's planes pursued the Japanese admiral and sank another cruiser and two destroyers. This was the end of the battle.

The Battle of Leyte Gulf was decisive. At the cost of the loss of their three aircraft carriers, three destroyers and one submarine, the Americans defeated the Japanese fleet. The battle lasted from October 22 to 27. Three battleships, four aircraft carriers and twenty other enemy warships were sunk. From now on, the enemy had the only effective means of combating the fleet - aircraft piloted by suicide pilots. Used as a measure of extreme desperation, these weapons were still lethal, although they did not promise any hope of victory.

In the following weeks, the fighting for the Philippines grew in depth and breadth. By the end of November, nearly a quarter of a million Americans had landed on Leyte, and by mid-December Japanese resistance had been broken. MacArthur continued his main offensive and soon landed unopposed on the island of Mindoro, a little over 100 miles from Manila. As the Americans advanced toward Manila, resistance increased, but they were able to make two more landings on the west coast and encircle the city. The enemy defended desperately until the beginning of March, when the last defenders were killed. In the ruins, they counted 16 thousand dead Japanese.

Although fighting on the islands continued for several months, dominance of the seas of southern China had already passed to the winner, and with it control of the sources of oil and other raw materials on which Japan depended.

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