Wrote on August 19th, 2011

What happened to the participants in the events of August 1991?
Organizers, opponents of the putsch - what do they think about the State Emergency Committee, what happened to them

August 19, 1991, 6:00 am. Radio stations and Central Television announce the introduction of a state of emergency in Russia and the transfer of power to the State Committee for the State of Emergency, the GKChP. Troops entered Moscow. President Gorbachev is blocked in a dacha in Crimea.

The most important clash in the history of Russia, which threatened to develop into a civil war, lasted ridiculously little: on August 22, members of the GKChP were arrested. There were three dead - not counting Pugo, a member of the State Emergency Committee who committed suicide, who left a mysterious note about "his completely unexpected mistake." What happened to the main actors of the coup? How do they comprehend, and some justify what happened?

The main characters of the August coup

Mikhail Gorbachev, President of the USSR

Who was in August 1991: the president of the USSR.

What did you do after 1991: December 25, 1991 resigned. In 1996, he ran for the presidency of the Russian Federation, won only 0.5% of the vote. Since 1992 - President of the Gorbachev Foundation.

Direct speech:“They say that Gorbachev knew, but how could he not know ... Why didn’t they call me, they didn’t warn me: putsch, putsch, putsch ... The most important thing was not to bring a big one to blood ... And we avoided it. There could be a civil war" - response at a press conference on August 17, 2011.

“I was betting on a new Union Treaty. It was ready, we could sign it within a few days. We could re-found the USSR on a new foundation. The thought did not leave me that I would have to return soon, I even ordered the preparation of the plane on which we were to return to Moscow. It was Sunday 18 August when it all started. I talked on the phone with Georgy Shakhnazarov, who was vacationing in the Crimea, in the Yuzhny sanatorium. It was the last phone call before the phones went off" - an interview with the Italian newspaper La Repubblica.

Gennady Yanaev, Chairman of the State Emergency Committee

Who was in August 1991: Vice President of the USSR, Chairman of the State Emergency Committee.

What did you do after 1991: released under an amnesty in 1994. After his release, he worked at the Russian International Academy of Tourism. Wrote the book “GKChP against Gorbachev. The last battle for the USSR. Died in September 2010.

Direct speech:“I absolutely never admitted that I carried out a coup d'état, and I never will. In order to understand the logic of my actions, as well as the logic of the actions of my comrades, one must know the situation in which the country found itself by August 1991. At that time, it was about an almost total crisis, there was an open struggle for power in the country between supporters of maintaining a single state and socio-political system and its opponents ”- from an interview with the Ekho Moskvy radio station.

Boris Yeltsin, President of the RSFSR

Who was in August 1991: President of the RSFSR

What did you do after 1991: until December 31, 1999 - President of Russia. Died April 23, 2007.

Direct speech: “We decided to write an appeal to the citizens of Russia. Khasbulatov wrote down the text by hand, and everyone who was nearby, Shakhrai, Burbulis, Silaev, Poltoranin, Yaroshenko, dictated and formulated. The appeal was then reprinted. (...) Literally an hour after my daughters printed our appeal to the people, people in Moscow and other cities were reading this document. It was transmitted by foreign agencies, a professional and amateur computer network, independent radio stations such as Ekho Moskvy, stock exchanges, and a correspondent network of many central publications.

It seems to me that the elderly gekachists simply could not imagine the full scope and depth of this new information reality for them. Before them was a completely different country. Instead of a party-like quiet and imperceptible putsch, an absolutely public duel suddenly turned out. (...) Frankly, there was little to please at that moment. Everything seemed shaky and unreliable. Now let's rush to the White House, and suddenly there is an ambush somewhere. And if we break through, there might be a trap there too. The habitual soil was leaving from under the feet ”- from the book “Notes of the President”.

Boris Pugo, Minister of the Interior, member of the State Emergency Committee

Who was in August 1991: Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR, member of the Security Council, member of the State Emergency Committee.

Direct speech: “I made an absolutely unexpected mistake for myself, tantamount to a crime” - from a suicide note.

Alexander Rutskoi, Vice President of the RSFSR

Who was in August 1991: vice-president of the RSFSR, one of the main organizers of the defense of the White House. On August 21, together with Ivan Silaev, he flew to Foros to fetch Mikhail Gorbachev.

What did you do after 1991: until September 1993 he was vice president of the Russian Federation. In 1992, he headed the commission of the Security Council to combat corruption, in April 1993 he announced "11 suitcases of compromising evidence" on government officials, including Yegor Gaidar, Gennady Burbulis and Anatoly Chubais. In 1993, he was one of the main characters in the October conflict with Boris Yeltsin, called for the storming of the Moscow City Hall and the Ostankino television center. He was arrested and released in February 1994 under an amnesty. From 1996 to 2000 - Governor of the Kursk region. Now he is the chairman of the board of directors of a cement plant under construction in the Voronezh region.

Direct speech:“After it all calmed down, I came to Boris Nikolayevich myself and said:“ Boris Nikolayevich, what are we sitting on, waiting? Let's fly, bring Gorbachev? - "How will you do it?" "Well, that's another question." If they really wanted to destroy us, how could I first go from the building of the Supreme Council to the Kremlin, talk with Anatoly Ivanovich Lukyanov, and then two days later I got into a car and in my car drove past the columns, past the troops to Vnukovo. Nobody prevented me from capturing Yanaev's plane. And fly on this plane. Yes, the command was given to put the tanks on the runway so that we would not land there, well, the commander of the marine brigade did not do this, and we calmly sat down ”- from an interview with the Ekho Moskvy radio station.

Dmitry Yazov, Minister of Defense, member of the State Emergency Committee

Who was in August 1991: the Minister of Defense, a member of the State Emergency Committee, ordered the introduction of troops into Moscow.

What did you do after 1991: amnestied in February 1994, in 1998 he was appointed chief military adviser to the Main Directorate of International Military Cooperation of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. Since 2008 - Leading Analyst of the Service of General Inspectors of the Ministry of Defense.

Direct speech: « And when the so-called GKChP began, Grachev calls me and reports that Boris Yeltsin asks him to send guards to the White House. I answer: "Please send a battalion of the 106th Airborne Division, which was coming from Tula, there." The division was commanded by Lebed, although he was already Grachev's deputy in combat as commander of the Airborne Forces. The battalion has arrived. But it was full of drunks. The military got drunk. Lebed went to Yeltsin and reported that he "arrived for protection." In general, it turned out that Yeltsin recruited them (Grachev and Lebed) ”- from an interview with Nezavisimaya Gazeta.

Ruslan Khasbulatov, and. O. Chairman of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR

Who was in August 1991: Acting Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR. On August 19, I was at a dacha in the village of Arkhangelskoye next to Yeltsin's dacha. According to my own recollections, as soon as I saw “Swan Lake” on TV early in the morning, I ran to Yeltsin. He took part in the drafting of the appeal "To the Citizens of Russia", together with the Yeltsin team was in the White House.

What did you do after 1991: from 1991 to 1993 he was chairman of the Supreme Council. In September-October 1993, in the conflict between the Supreme Council and Boris Yeltsin, he was one of Yeltsin's main opponents, on October 4 he was arrested and placed in Lefortovo, released in February 1994. In the summer of 1994 he created the "peacekeeping mission of Professor Khasbulatov", trying to mediate between Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudayev and the Russian authorities, but the negotiations were not successful. Since 1994 - Head of the Department of World Economy of the Russian Academy. G. V. Plekhanov.

Direct speech:“The worst was the first night. We thought they were attacking the White House. We have seen many signs that the army is about to attack the building. It was then that Yeltsin wanted to take refuge in the US Embassy. I noticed that he was preparing to go down to the garage. “In half an hour they will start shooting at us,” he said. Fortunately, I convinced him to stay. We could not leave people, we would never be forgiven for this, ”from an interview with the Spanish newspaper El Mundo.

Pavel Grachev, commander of the Airborne Forces, participated in the preparation of the putsch

Who was in August 1991: Commander of the Airborne Troops of the USSR. He participated in the development of plans for the State Emergency Committee, on August 19 he carried out Yazov's order to send troops to Moscow, but then went over to Yeltsin's side and, instead of storming the White House, sent tanks to defend him.

What did you do after 1991: from 1992 to 1996 - Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, in 1994-1995 personally led the fighting in Chechnya. He was a suspect in the case of the murder of Dmitry Kholodov, a Moskovsky Komsomolets journalist. From 1998 to 2007, he was an adviser to the Federal State Unitary Enterprise Rosoboronexport. Now he is the head of the group of advisers to the general director of the OmPO “Radiozavod im. Popov.

Direct speech: “Then I spoke out against the GKChP, in fact, I did not allow the capture of Boris Nikolayevich in the White House. At least that's what many thought. That's probably why Yeltsin decided to thank me" - from an interview with the Trud newspaper.

Who was in August 1991: Secretary of the State Council under the President of the RSFSR, the right hand of Boris Yeltsin, participated in the preparation and signing of the Belovezhskaya Accords.

What did you do after 1991: from 1991 to 1992 - First Deputy Chairman of the Government of Russia. From 1993 to 2000 - State Duma deputy, one of the founders of the Russia's Choice party. From 2000 to 2007 - Vice Governor of the Novgorod Region, from 2001 to 2007 - Member of the Federation Council. Now he is the head of the department of political philosophy at the International University in Moscow.

Direct speech:“This is the political Chernobyl of the Soviet system, and these three days deprived us of our homeland and country, and already, say, after that there was no CPSU, there was no Soviet leadership, there was no Soviet government, and each republic was forced to solve the issues of the survival of an elementary almost alone" - from an interview with the radio station "Echo of Moscow".

Ivan Silaev, Prime Minister of the RSFSR

Who was in August 1991: Prime Minister of the RSFSR, signed the appeal "To the Citizens of Russia", together with Rutskoi flew to Foros for Gorbachev on August 21.

What did you do after 1991: opposed the Belovezhskaya Accords, September 26, 1991 was dismissed from the post of chairman of the Russian government. In 1991-1994 he was the Russian Ambassador to the EU in Brussels. From 2002 to 2006 - Chairman of the Russian Union of Mechanical Engineers.

Direct speech:“Today we can talk about complete uncertainty about what will happen to the Russian leadership in the coming days. We accept any situation. We don't have tanks or other weapons. But we have the trust of the Russian people, their support, and I have no doubt that it is the Russians who will have their say in defense of human rights, constitutional norms and rules concerning both the union president and the president of Russia and all legally elected bodies.<…>We are ready for anything. Even if the worst happens - which is also possible - the citizens of Russia will say a good word about us ”- an interview with RIA on August 19, 1991.

Oleg Baklanov, Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, member of the State Emergency Committee

Who was in August 1991: Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU for defense issues, member of the State Emergency Committee.

What did you do after 1991: released under an amnesty in 1994. Now he is the Chairman of the Board of Directors of JSC Rosobshchemash.

Direct speech:“The main motive for our trip [to Foros] is to postpone the action prepared by Gorbachev, the signing of a new union treaty. The signing of the union treaty would have led, in fact, to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, because only six or seven republics could have signed it at that time. (...) I personally was not acquainted with it, I learned its contents only on the 16th or 17th from the publication of the newspaper. This issue needed to be discussed both in the Cabinet of Ministers and at the Supreme Council. Lukyanov also did not approve of him, there were questions. This is the task we faced in order to stop Gorbachev…” — from an interview with Radio Liberty.

Valentin Pavlov, Prime Minister, member of the State Emergency Committee

Who was in August 1991: Prime Minister of the USSR, member of the State Emergency Committee.

What did you do after 1991: amnestied in 1994. In 1995, he was president of Chasprombank, whose license was later revoked. From 1996 to 1997 - Financial Advisor to the Chairman of the Board of Promstroibank. Died in 2003.

Direct speech:“In Russian reality, the complete destruction of a functioning control mechanism at an accelerated pace and to the ground, starting from headquarters, from brains, and then construction. Naturally, there can be only one payment for the next acceleration - the paralysis of production and the destruction of production potential. It was not only predicted to the Russian leadership more than once, but also calculated, the last time in August 1991. The results of the assessment were known to all republics. It is no coincidence that almost none of them followed the Russian path, with the exception of some forced steps, ”- from an interview with Kommersant-Vlast magazine.

Vasily Starodubtsev, agrarian, member of the State Emergency Committee

Who was in August 1991: People's Deputy, Chairman of the Union of Agrarians of the RSFSR and the Peasants' Union of the USSR, member of the State Emergency Committee.

What did you do after 1991: released from prison on health grounds in 1992. From 1997 to 2005 - Governor of the Tula Region. Since 2007, he has been a member of the State Duma from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation.

Direct speech: « Kryuchkov's headquarters developed the actions of the State Committee to restore order, primarily in Moscow, of course, but also throughout the country. And then the day of the performance of the State Emergency Committee was announced, when the capital<...>armored and other troops were introduced. But as a result of the betrayal of Grachev and, to some extent, Alfa, we were not able to restore order in Moscow ”- from an interview with km.ru.

Alexander Tizyakov, member of the State Emergency Committee

Who was in August 1991: President of the Association of State Enterprises and Associations of Industry, Construction, Transport and Communications of the USSR, member of the State Emergency Committee.

What did you do after 1991: amnestied in February 1994, after which he returned to Yekaterinburg, where he headed the branch of the Association of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs. He was the chairman of the board of directors of the New Technologies company. He was listed as a co-owner of the companies CJSC Stator, KomInfoPlus, Nauka93.

Direct speech: “There is an objective factor in the development of mankind, according to this factor, we will all sooner or later come to socialism” - an interview with regions.ru

Vladimir Kryuchkov, Chairman of the KGB, member of the State Emergency Committee

Who was in August 1991: Chairman of the KGB of the USSR, member of the State Emergency Committee.

What did you do after 1991: released in 1992, amnestied in 1994. Wrote memoirs "Personal business". He was a member of the board of directors of the information and analytical structure of the ASTR "Region" (part of AFK "Sistema"). Died in 2007.

Direct speech: « It was obvious to everyone: if the treaty had been signed on August 20, there would be no Soviet Union. We have extended the life of our country by 4 months" - an interview with the Izvestia newspaper.

The GKChP is an abbreviation for the name of the State Committee for the State of Emergency, created by several top functionaries of the Communist Party of the USSR on August 19, 1991 to save the collapsing Soviet Union. The formal head of the committee was the vice-president of the USSR, member of the Politburo, Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Gennady Ivanovich Yanaev

background

Economic restructuring

In 1982, the long-term head of the Soviet Union, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, L. I. Brezhnev, died. With his death, the period of relatively calm, stable, more or less prosperous life of the USSR ended, which began for the first time since the formation of the Land of Soviets. In 1985, MS Gorbachev took the post of General Secretary and, consequently, the absolute master of the fate of 250 million Soviet citizens. Aware of the complexities of the Soviet economy, its growing lag behind Western countries, Gorbachev made an attempt to cheer up the socialist economic system by introducing elements of the market into it.
Alas, having said “A”, you should definitely continue, that is, one concession to the ideological enemy was followed by another, a third, and so on until complete surrender

• 1985, April 23 - at the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Gorbachev proclaimed a course towards acceleration - improving the existing economic system
• 1985, May - Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU "On measures to overcome drunkenness and alcoholism"
• 1986, February 25-March 6 - XXVII Congress of the CPSU. It defined the task of "improving socialism"
• 1986, November 19 - The Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted the Law "On individual labor activity"
• 1987, January - at the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the task of a radical restructuring of economic management was put forward
• January 13, 1987 - Decree of the Council of Ministers allowing the creation of joint ventures
• 1987, February 5 - Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR "On the creation of cooperatives for the production of consumer goods"
• 1987, June 11 - the law "On the transfer of enterprises and organizations of sectors of the national economy to full self-support and self-financing"
• 1987, June 25 - The Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU considered the issue "On the tasks of the party for a radical restructuring of economic management."
• 1987, June 30 - the law "On the state enterprise (association)" was adopted, redistributing powers between ministries and enterprises in favor of the latter
• 1988, May 26 - Law "On Cooperation in the USSR"
• 1988, August 24 - in Chimkent (Kazakh SSR) the first cooperative bank in the USSR ("Soyuz-bank") was registered

The measures taken did not bring results. In 1986, the budget deficit doubled compared to 1985
The resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU "On measures to overcome drunkenness and alcoholism" led to more than 20 billion losses in budget revenues, the transition to the category of scarce products that were previously freely available (juices, cereals, caramel, etc.), a sharp increase in home brewing and an increase in mortality due to poisoning with counterfeit alcohol and surrogates. Due to low world prices for energy carriers, the inflow of foreign currency to the budget has decreased. Large-scale accidents and catastrophes became more frequent (1986, May - Chernobyl). Sugar stamps were introduced in the fall of 1989.

“In a Murmansk store near the bazaar, for the first time after the war, I saw food cards - coupons for sausage and butter (V. Konetsky “No one will take away the path we have traveled”, 1987)

• 1990, June - Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR "On the concept of transition to a market economy"
• 1990, October - resolution "Main directions for the stabilization of the national economy and the transition to a market economy"
• 1990, December - the government of the USSR, headed by N. Ryzhkov, was dismissed. The Council of Ministers of the USSR was transformed into the Cabinet of Ministers of the USSR, headed by Prime Minister V. Pavlov
• 1991, January 23-25 ​​- exchange of 50- and 100-ruble banknotes for new banknotes
• 1991, April 2 - double price increase for all products

Nevertheless, in 1991 there was an 11% decline in production, a 20-30% budget deficit, and a huge foreign debt of $103.9 billion. Products, soap, matches, sugar, detergents were distributed by cards, cards were often not stocked. Republican and regional customs appeared

Ideological restructuring

The introduction of elements of capitalism into the Soviet economic mechanism forced the authorities to change their policy in the field of ideology. After all, it was necessary to somehow explain to the people why the capitalist system, which had been criticized for 70 years, suddenly turned out to be in demand in their country, the most advanced and rich. The new policy was called glasnost

• 1986, February-March - at the 27th Congress of the CPSU, Gorbachev said:

  “The issue of expanding publicity is of fundamental importance for us. This is a political issue. Without glasnost, there is not and cannot be democracy, the political creativity of the masses, their participation in governance.

• 1986, May - at the V Congress of the Union of Cinematographers of the USSR, his entire board was unexpectedly re-elected
• 1986, September 4 - the order of Glavlit (the censorship committee of the USSR) to focus the attention of censors only on issues related to the protection of state and military secrets in the press
• 1986, September 25 - Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the termination of the jamming of the broadcasts of the Voice of America and the BBC
• 1986, December - Academician Sakharov returned from exile in Gorky
• 1987, January 27 - Gorbachev at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU:

  “We should not have areas that are closed to criticism. The people need the whole truth ... We need more light now than ever, so that the party and the people know everything, so that we don’t have dark corners where mold would start up again ”

• 1987, January - the anti-Stalinist film "Repentance" by T. Abuladze was released on the screens of the country
• 1987, January - the documentary film "Is it easy to be young?" directed by Juris Podnieks
• February 1987 - 140 dissidents released from prison
• 1987 - unlimited subscription to newspapers and magazines is allowed
• 1987, October 2 - the release of the independent television program "Vzglyad" on television
• 1988, May 8 - an organization of dissidents and human rights activists, the Democratic Union, is founded, positioning itself as an opposition party to the CPSU
• 1988, June 28-July 1 - at the XIX All-Union Party Conference of the CPSU, a decision was made on alternative elections of deputies to the Soviets of all levels
• November 30, 1988 - Jamming of all foreign radio stations is completely prohibited in the USSR
• 1987-1988 - publication of literary works banned in the USSR, articles about the past of the USSR were published in magazines and newspapers, refuting established myths ("New World", "Moscow News", "Arguments and Facts", "Spark")
• 1989, March 26 - the first free elections to the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR
• 1989, May 25 - The First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR opened in Moscow, at which for the first time the problems of the country were openly discussed, some actions of the authorities were criticized, proposals and alternatives were put forward. The meetings of the congress were broadcast live and listened to throughout the country.
• 1989, December 12-24 - at the II Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, Boris Yeltsin, who led a group of democrats, demanded the abolition of Article 6 of the Constitution of the USSR, which stated that "the CPSU is the leading and guiding force" in the state

Perestroika, acceleration, glasnost - the slogans of the policy pursued by M. S. Gorbachev

The collapse of the USSR

The Soviet Union was based on violence and fear, or discipline and respect for authority, as one likes. As soon as the people discovered a certain lethargy and helplessness in the actions of the state, some freedom, actions of disobedience began. Somewhere there were strikes (in the spring of 1989 in the mines), somewhere there were anti-communist rallies (in August-September 1988 in Moscow). However, inter-ethnic conflicts and the activities of national republics caused the biggest problems for Moscow, the leaders of which, sensing the weakness of the Center, decided to take all power in the territory under their control.

• 1986, December 17-18 - anti-communist protests of Kazakh youth in Alma-Ata
• 1988, November-December - aggravation of relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia because of Nagorno-Karabakh
• 1989, June - pogrom of the Meskhetian Turks in the Ferghana Valley
• 1989, July 15-16 - bloody clashes between Georgians and Abkhazians in Sukhumi (16 dead).
• 1989, April 6 - anti-Soviet rally in Tbilisi, suppressed by the army
• 1990, January - unrest in Baku, suppressed by the Army
• 1990, June - conflict between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in the city of Osh
• 1990, March 11 - Declaration of Independence of Lithuania
• 1990, May 4 - Declaration of Independence of Latvia
• 1990, May 8 - Declaration of Independence of Estonia
• 1990, June 12 - declaration of independence of the RSFSR
• 1990, September 2 - the proclamation of the Transnistrian Republic
• 1991, January 8-9 - bloody clashes between the army and demonstrators in Vilnius
• 1991, March 31 - a referendum on the independence of Georgia
• 1991, April 19 - conflict between Ingush and Ossetians, one dead

On August 20, 1991, the former republics of the USSR, Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and in the fall - Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine and Turkmenistan, were to sign a new treaty that terminated the union from 1922 and created a new state formation - a confederation instead of a federation

GKChP. Briefly

For the sake of preventing the creation of a new state and saving the old - the Soviet Union, part of the party elite formed the State Committee for the State of Emergency. Gorbachev, who was resting in the Crimea at that moment, was isolated from the ongoing events.

Composition of the State Committee for the State of Emergency

*** Achalov - Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, Colonel General
*** Baklanov - First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Defense Council
*** Boldin - Chief of Staff of the President of the USSR
*** Varennikov - Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces
*** Generalov - head of security of the residence of the President of the USSR in Foros
*** Kryuchkov - Chairman of the KGB of the USSR
*** Lukyanov - Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR
*** Pavlov - Prime Minister of the USSR
*** Plekhanov - Head of the Security Service of the KGB of the USSR
*** Pugo - Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR
*** Starodubtsev - Chairman of the Peasants' Union of the USSR
*** Tizyakov - President of the Association of State Enterprises of the USSR
*** Shenin - member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU
*** Yazov - Minister of Defense of the USSR
*** Yanaev - Vice President of the USSR

• 1991, August 15 - the text of the new Union Treaty was published
• 1991, August 17 - Kryuchkov, Pavlov, Yazov, Baklanov, Shenin, Boldin at a meeting decide to introduce a state of emergency from August 19, require Gorbachev to sign the relevant decrees or resign and transfer powers to Vice President Yanaev
• 1991, August 17 - the conspirators decided to send a delegation to Gorbachev demanding the introduction of a state of emergency and non-signing of the Treaty
• 1991, August 18 - Yanaev in the Kremlin met with members of the delegation who returned from the Crimea after a meeting with Gorbachev
• 1991, August 18 - Yazov ordered to prepare the entry of troops into Moscow
• 1991, August 19 - Yanaev signed a decree on the formation of the State Committee for the State of Emergency

GKChP Resolution No. 1 introduced a ban
- rallies
- demonstrations
- strikes
- activities of political parties, public organizations, mass movements
- issues of some central, Moscow city and regional socio-political publications
- the allocation of 15 acres of land to all interested residents of cities for gardening and gardening

• 1991, August 19 - units of the Taman motorized rifle division, the Kantemirovskaya tank division, the 106th (Tula) airborne division entered Moscow
• 1991, August 19 - people opposing the GKChP began to gather near the building of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR, on Manezhnaya Square, in the evening B. Yeltsin spoke to them, reading out the Decree "On the illegality of the actions of the GKChP"
• 1991, August 20 - the confrontation between Muscovites, led by Yeltsin and the State Emergency Committee, continued. There were rumors about the preparation of a forceful dispersal of the protesters, the storming of the White House, on TV they suddenly showed a true story about what was happening near the White House
• 1991, August 21 - at 5 o'clock in the morning Yazov ordered the withdrawal of troops from Moscow
• 1991, August 21 - at 17:00, a delegation of the State Emergency Committee arrived in Crimea. Gorbachev refused to accept it and demanded to restore contact with the outside world
• 1991, August 21 - At 9 o'clock in the evening, Vice-President Yanaev signed a decree in which the State Emergency Committee was declared dissolved, and all its decisions were invalid
• 1991, August 21 - at 10 p.m., the Prosecutor General of the RSFSR Stepankov issued a decree on the arrest of members of the State Emergency Committee ( more details about the August Putsch are written on Wikipedia)

Outcome of the GKChP

• 1991, August 24 - Ukraine declared state independence
• 1991, August 25 - Belarus
• 1991, August 27 - Moldova
• 1991, August 31 - Uzbekistan
• 1991, October 27 - Turkmenistan
• 1991, August 31 - Kyrgyzstan
• 1991, September 9 - Tajikistan
• 1991, September 21 - Armenia
• 1991, October 18 - Azerbaijan
• 1991, December 8 - in Viskuli near Brest (Belarus), President of the RSFSR B. Yeltsin, President of Ukraine L. Kravchuk and Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Belarus S. Shushkevich signed an Agreement on the disintegration of the USSR and the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

Perestroika, acceleration, glasnost, the State Emergency Committee - all these attempts to fix, restore the Soviet state machine were in vain, because it was inseparable and could only exist in the form in which it was

The events that took place from August to December 1991 in the USSR can safely be called the most important in the entire post-war world history. Russian President Vladimir Putin has rightly described the collapse of the Soviet Union as the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the century. And to a certain extent, its course was determined precisely by the putsch attempt by the State Committee for the State of Emergency (GKChP). 25 years have passed, new generations of Russian citizens have grown up, for whom these events are exclusively history, and those who lived in those years must have forgotten a lot. However, the very fact of the destruction of the USSR and the timid attempt to save it still cause lively controversy.

Weakening of the USSR: objective and artificial causes

Centrifugal tendencies in the USSR clearly began to be seen already in the late 80s. Today we can confidently say that they were the consequences of not only internal crisis phenomena. The course for the destruction of the Soviet Union immediately after the end of World War II was taken by the entire Western world and, first of all, by the United States of America. This was fixed in a number of directives, circulars and doctrines. Fabulous funds were allocated annually for these purposes. Since 1985 alone, about $90 billion has been spent on the collapse of the USSR.

In the 1980s, the US authorities and intelligence agencies were able to form in the Soviet Union a fairly powerful agency of influence, which, although it did not seem to occupy key positions in the country, was capable of exerting a serious influence on the course of events at the national level. According to numerous testimonies, the leadership of the KGB of the USSR repeatedly reported on what was happening to the Secretary General Mikhail Gorbachev, as well as about the US plans to destroy the USSR, take control of its territory and reduce the population to 150-160 million people. However, Gorbachev did not take any actions aimed at blocking the activities of supporters of the West and actively opposing Washington.

The Soviet elites were divided into two camps: the conservatives, who offered to return the country to traditional tracks, and the reformers, whose informal leader was Boris Yeltsin who demanded democratic reforms and greater freedom for the republics.

March 17, 1991 An all-Union referendum on the fate of the Soviet Union was held, in which 79.5% of citizens who had the right to vote took part. Nearly 76.5% of them supported the preservation of the USSR , but with a cunning wording - like "renewed federation of equal sovereign republics".

On August 20, 1991, the old Union Treaty was to be canceled and a new one was signed, giving a start to an actually renewed state - the Union of Soviet Sovereign Republics (or the Union of Sovereign States), whose prime minister he planned to become Nursultan Nazarbaev.

The members of the State Committee for the State of Emergency, in fact, spoke out against these reforms and for the preservation of the USSR in its traditional form.

According to information actively disseminated by Western and Russian liberal media, KGB officers allegedly overheard a confidential conversation about the creation of the JIT between Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Nazarbayev and decided to act. According to the Western version, they blocked Gorbachev in Foros, who did not want to introduce a state of emergency (and even planned to physically liquidate him), introduced an emergency situation, brought army and KGB forces to the streets of Moscow, wanted to storm the White House, capture or kill Yeltsin and destroy democracy. Printing houses mass-printed arrest warrants, and factories produced huge quantities of handcuffs.

But this theory has not been objectively confirmed by anything. What actually happened?

GKChP. Chronology of major events

August 17 part of the leaders of law enforcement agencies and executive authorities held a meeting at one of the secret facilities of the KGB of the USSR in Moscow, during which they discussed the situation in the country.

August 18 some future members and sympathizers of the GKChP flew to the Crimea to Gorbachev, who was ill there, to convince him to introduce a state of emergency. According to the version popular in Western and liberal media, Gorbachev refused. However, the testimonies of the participants in the events clearly indicate that Gorbachev, although he did not want to take responsibility for making a difficult decision, gave the go-ahead to the people who arrived to him to act at their discretion, after which he shook hands with them.

In the afternoon, according to the well-known version, communications were cut off at the presidential dacha. However, there is information that journalists managed to get through there by regular phone. There is also evidence that government special communications were working at the dacha all the time.

On the evening of August 18, documents on the creation of the State Emergency Committee are being prepared. And at 01:00 on August 19, Vice-President of the USSR Yanaev signed them, including himself, Pavlov, Kryuchkov, Yazov, Pugo, Baklanov, Tizyakov and Starodubtsev in the committee, after which the State Emergency Committee decided to introduce a state of emergency in certain areas of the Union.

On the morning of August 19th The media announced Gorbachev's inability to perform duties for health reasons, the transfer of power to Gennady Yanaev and the creation of the State Committee for the State of Emergency throughout the country. In turn, the head of the RSFSR Yeltsin signed a decree "On the illegality of the actions of the State Emergency Committee" and began to mobilize his supporters, including through the radio station "Echo of Moscow".

In the morning, units of the army, the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs are moving to Moscow, which take a number of important objects under protection. And at lunchtime, crowds of Yeltsin's supporters begin to gather in the center of the capital. The head of the RSFSR publicly demands "to repulse the putschists." Opponents of the GKChP begin to build barricades, and a state of emergency is introduced in Moscow.

August 20 large-scale rally near the White House. Yeltsin personally speaks to its participants. Participants of mass actions are beginning to be frightened by rumors about the impending assault.

Later, the Western media will tell heartbreaking stories about how the putschists were going to throw tanks and special forces at the "defenders of democracy", and the commanders of the special forces refused to carry out such orders.

Objectively, there is no data on the preparation of the assault. Special Forces officers subsequently denied both the existence of orders to attack the White House, and their refusal to carry them out.

In the evening, Yeltsin appoints himself and. O. Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces on the territory of the RSFSR, and Konstantin Kobets- Minister of Defence. Kobets orders the troops to return to their places of permanent deployment.

Evening and night from 20 to 21 August in the capital, there is a movement of troops, there are local clashes between protesters and the military, three participants in mass actions are killed.

The command of the internal troops refuses to advance units to the center of Moscow. Armed cadets of educational institutions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs arrive to protect the White House.

Toward morning, the troops begin to leave the city. In the evening, Gorbachev already refuses to accept the delegation of the State Emergency Committee, and Yanaev officially dissolves him. Prosecutor General Stepankov signs a decree on the arrest of members of the committee.

August 22 Gorbachev returns to Moscow, interrogations of members of the State Emergency Committee begin, they are relieved of their posts.

August 23"Defenders of Democracy" demolish the monument Dzerzhinsky(doesn't it remind you of anything?), the activities of the Communist Party are prohibited in Russia.

site

On August 24, Gorbachev resigned as General Secretary of the CPSU and proposed that the Central Committee dissolve itself. The process of the collapse of the USSR became irreversible, culminating in the well-known events of December 1991.

Life after the USSR. Assessment of the events of 1991

Judging by the results of the referendums and elections that took place at the end of 1991 in various parts of the USSR, most of the population of the Union then actually supported its collapse.

On the territory once As a united state, wars and ethnic cleansing began to flare up one after another, the economy of most republics collapsed, crime increased catastrophically and the population began to decline rapidly. The "dashing 90s" burst into people's lives like a whirlwind.

The fate of the republics was different. In Russia, the era of the aforementioned "dashing 90s" ended with the coming to power Vladimir Putin, and in Belarus - Alexander Lukashenko. In Ukraine, the drift towards traditional ties began in the early 2000s, but was interrupted by the Orange Revolution. Georgia moved away from the general Soviet history in jerks. Relatively smoothly out of the crisis and rushed to the Eurasian integration of Kazakhstan.

Objectively, nowhere in the post-Soviet territory the population has social guarantees of the level of the USSR. In most of the former Soviet republics, the standard of living did not come close to the Soviet one.

Even in Russia, where people's incomes have risen significantly, social welfare problems call into question the thesis of rising living standards compared to those that existed before 1991.

Not to mention the fact that a huge superpower ceased to exist on the world map, which shared the first place in the world in terms of military, political and economic power only with the United States, which the Russian people have been proud of for many years.

It is indicative how Russians assess the events of 1991 today, 25 years later. The data of the study conducted by the Levada Center, to some extent, sum up the numerous disputes about the State Emergency Committee and the actions of the Yeltsin team.

So, only 16% of the inhabitants of Russia said that they would come out "to defend democracy" - that is, they would support Yeltsin and defend the White House - in the place of the participants in the events of 1991! 44% categorically answered that they would not defend the new government. 41% of respondents are not ready to answer this question.

Today, only 8% of the inhabitants of Russia call the events of August 1991 the victory of the democratic revolution. 30% characterize what happened as a tragic event that had disastrous consequences for the country and people, 35% - just as an episode in the struggle for power, 27% found it difficult to answer.

Speaking about the possible consequences after the victory of the State Emergency Committee, 16% of the respondents said that given the current development of events, Russia would live better today, 19% - that they would live worse, 23% - that they would live the same way they live today. 43% could not decide on an answer.

15% of Russians believe that in August 1991 the representatives of the State Emergency Committee were right, 13% - that Yeltsin's supporters. 39% say that they did not have time to understand the situation, and 33% do not know what to answer.

40% of those polled said that after the events of August 1991 the country went in the wrong direction, 33% - that in the right direction. 28% found it difficult to answer.

It turns out that about a third to a half of Russians are not sufficiently informed about the events of August 1991 and cannot unequivocally assess them. The rest of the population is moderately dominated by those who evaluate the "August revolution" and the activities of the "defenders of democracy" negatively. The vast majority of Russian citizens would not take any action to counter the GKChP. In general, few people today rejoice at the defeat of the committee.

So what really happened in those days and how to evaluate these events?

GKChP - an attempt to save the country, an anti-democratic coup or a provocation?

On the eve it became known that the CIA predicted the emergence of the State Emergency Committee in April 1991! An unknown speaker from Moscow informed the secret service leadership that the "hard-liners", the traditionalists, were ready to remove Gorbachev from power and reverse the situation. At the same time, Langley believed that it would be difficult for Soviet conservatives to retain power. A Moscow source listed all the leaders of the future GKChP and predicted that Gorbachev, in the event of a potential rebellion, would try to maintain control over the country.

It is clear that there is not a word about the US response in the information document. But, of course, they should have been. When the GKChP arose, the US leadership severely condemned it and did everything in order to achieve similar actions from other Western countries. The position of the heads of the United States, Great Britain and other Western states was voiced by journalists directly in the Vesti program, which, in turn, could not but affect the minds of the doubting Soviet citizens.

In the whole history of the GKChP, there are a number of oddities.

Firstly, the leaders of the powerful power structures of the USSR, undisputed intellectuals and excellent organizers of the old school, for some reason acted spontaneously, uncertainly and even somehow bewildered. They have not been able to decide on the tactics of action. Yanaev's shaking hands went down in history while speaking to the camera.

From which it is logical to assume that the creation of the State Emergency Committee was a completely unprepared step.

Secondly, Yeltsin's team, which did not consist of such experienced and powerful people as their opponents, worked like clockwork. Warning schemes, transport, communications were effective; the defenders of the barricades were well fed and watered; leaflets were printed and distributed in huge numbers; their own media worked.

Everything indicates that Yeltsin was well prepared for such a development of events.

Thirdly, Mikhail Gorbachev, who continued to be the official head of the USSR, fell ill at the right time and left Moscow. Thus, the country was deprived of supreme power, and he himself remained as if he had nothing to do with it.

Fourth, the president of the USSR did not take any measures to try to stop the leaders of the GKChP. On the contrary, with his words he gave them complete freedom of action.

Fifth, today it is known that back in June 1991, the US authorities discussed the prospect of a putsch in the USSR with Gorbachev and the leadership of the USSR Foreign Ministry. Wouldn't the president of the Union, if he wanted to, have prevented it in two months?

All these strange facts raise questions and doubts about the official interpretation of the victorious side, according to which the GKChP was an illegal military junta that, without the knowledge of Gorbachev, tried to stifle the germs of democracy. Moreover, all of the above suggests the version that Gorbachev and Yeltsin could deliberately provoke their political opponents to take action at an inconvenient time for them.

On the one hand, the signing of the new Union Treaty was a victory for the reformers. But the victory, to put it mildly, half-hearted. The traditionalists, who occupied almost all key positions in the state, if they were well prepared, had all the necessary tools to disrupt the signing of the treaty during the event itself by political means and to politically counterattack during the crisis that would inevitably follow the signing itself. In fact, the traditionalists were forced to act without preparation, at an inconvenient time for themselves against opponents who, on the contrary, were well prepared for the fight.

Everything indicates that Gorbachev and Yeltsin could banally lure the organizers of the State Emergency Committee into a trap, after falling into which they were forced to act according to someone else's scenario. Everyone who could stop the death of the USSR in 1991 was thrown out of the game overnight.

Some of the members of the GKChP and those who sympathized with the committee died soon after the coup under mysterious circumstances, committing strange suicides, while the other part was quietly amnestied in 1994, when it no longer posed any threat. The gekachepists were set up, but when it became clear it was too late to do anything.

The events of August 1991 fit perfectly into the scheme of color revolutions, with the only difference that the head of state actually played on the side of the "revolutionaries - defenders of democracy." Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev could probably tell a lot of interesting things, but he is unlikely to do it. A man whom fate has elevated to the very heights of world politics, the head of a superpower, has exchanged all this for an advertisement for pizza and a bag. And the citizens of Russia, even after 25 years, perfectly understand this and evaluate it accordingly.

Those who propose to forget the history of August 1991 as a nightmare are categorically wrong. Then we experienced one of the most tragic events in our history, and it is simply vital to work on the mistakes in this regard. The bloody consequences of the collapse of the USSR still have to be disentangled - including in Ukraine: in the Donbass they are now being killed largely due to the fact that the State Emergency Committee could not stop the local princes who wanted to break the state for the sake of personal power.

At the same time, the supporters of the other extreme, denying the right of the Russian Federation to exist because of the tragedy of August 1991, are also wrong. Yes, the USSR was destroyed contrary to the will of the people, expressed at the referendum on March 17, but this is not a reason to refuse Russia to have the current statehood - a guarantee of the sovereign existence of the Russian people. On the contrary, everything must be done to develop the Russian Federation as an internationally recognized successor to the USSR. And the most important task is to restore the former greatness of our Fatherland on its basis.

19.08.2015 23:55

On August 19, 1991, 24 years ago, the Soviet people learned from the morning TV news about the formation of the State Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR (GKChP). It was announced that the President of the country, Mikhail Gorbachev, was ill and Vice President Gennady Yanaev, Chairman of the State Emergency Committee, took over his duties.

Meanwhile, armored vehicles entered Moscow. Columns of armored personnel carriers and tanks obediently stopped at a red light. TV announcers every hour handed over the documents of the State Emergency Committee, after which they showed "Swan Lake" on TV. It started to look like a farce.

Boris Yeltsin (by that time - already the president of the RSFSR) was gathering his comrades-in-arms to the White House to "rebuff the junta." The members of the Soviet leadership themselves sat back, as if waiting for something. The press conference given by the GKChP members in the evening did not add any clarity. On the contrary, it provoked chuckles at Yanaev's trembling hands.

It was a very strange putsch.

On August 20, it became clear: the GKChP was losing to Yeltsin, who gathered a rally near the White House to repel the "putschists" and "protect" Gorbachev, who was illegally removed from power. On the night of the 21st, in the tunnel on the Garden Ring, three guys died under caterpillars trying to stop armored vehicles, and in the afternoon Gorbachev was rescued from Foros. This was followed by arrests by the Russian prosecutor's office of members of the State Emergency Committee and those leaders who actively supported it.

As a result, in the cells of the pre-trial detention center "Matrosskaya Tishina" were: Vice-President of the USSR G.I. Yanaev, Prime Minister V.S. Pavlov, Minister of Defense D.T. Yazov, head of the KGB of the USSR V.A. Kryuchkov, Deputy Chairman of the Defense Council O.D. Baklanov, Chairman of the Association of State Enterprises of Industry, Transport and Communications A.I. Tizyakov, chairman of the Agro-Industrial Union and chairman of the collective farm V.A. Starodubtsev. As well as their like-minded people: Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and member of the Politburo O.S. Shenin, chief of staff of the President of the USSR V.I. Boldin, Deputy Minister of Defense, Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, General V.I. Varennikov, heads of KGB departments Yu.S. Plekhanov and V.V. Generalov. A couple of days later, they were joined by the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, A.I. Lukyanov, who was not a member of the committee and did not support him. To all of them, the Russian prosecutor Valentin Stepankov sewed "treason against the motherland." Only 4 months remained before the liquidation of the USSR.

The coup lasted only three days, but became a point of no return for a huge country.

The empire, which in August 1991 was only cracking along the borders of the republics, irrevocably broke into several pieces in December of the same year.

But then, on August 21, the victory over the GKChP was greeted with rejoicing. People believed that even if not immediately, even if it is difficult, but in the foreseeable future we will live in a prosperous, civilized, democratic country. However, this did not happen.

outside the country

After the end of World War II, the main directions of the struggle against the Russian people were determined, which were later embodied in official documents of the US government, and, above all, in the directives of the US National Security Council and the laws of this country.

In a circular from US Secretary of State J.F. Dulles to American Embassies and Missions Abroad on March 6, 1953, immediately after Stalin's death, emphasized:

Our main goal remains to sow doubts, confusion, uncertainty about the new regime, not only among the ruling circles and the masses of the people in the USSR and the satellite countries, but also among the communist parties outside the Soviet Union.

Finally, the Enslaved Peoples Act, passed by the NOA Congress in August 1959, openly raised the question of dividing Russia into 22 states and inciting hatred against the Russian people. The same law also defines the independence of the current Donbass, referred to in the text as Cossacks, and thereby invalidates the current US policy towards the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics.

Since 1947, under the pretext of fighting communism, the American government has been allocating hundreds of millions of dollars annually to carry out programs to fight Russia and the Russian people.

One of the main points of these programs was the training of "like-minded people, allies and helpers" in Russia.

The most detailed plan for the destruction of the USSR was described in Directive 20/1 of the US NSS of August 18, 1948:

Our main goals with regard to Russia, in essence, come down to just two:

a) Minimize the power and influence of Moscow;

b) To carry out fundamental changes in the theory and practice of foreign policy,

adhered to by the government in power in Russia.

For the peaceful period, the directive of the National Security Council 20/1 provided for the surrender of the USSR under pressure from outside. The consequences of such a policy in the directive of the National Security Council 20/1, of course, were foreseen:

Our efforts to make Moscow accept our concepts are tantamount to a statement: our goal is the overthrow of Soviet power. Starting from this point of view, we can say that these goals are unattainable without war, and, therefore, we thereby recognize that our ultimate goal in relation to the Soviet Union is war and the overthrow of Soviet power by force.

It would be a mistake to follow such a line of reasoning.

Firstly, we are not bound by a fixed time frame to achieve our goals in peacetime. We do not have a strict alternation of periods of war and peace, which would prompt us to declare: we must achieve our goals in peacetime by such and such a date, or "we will resort to other means ...".

Secondly, we should rightly feel absolutely no guilt in seeking to destroy concepts incompatible with international peace and stability and replace them with concepts of tolerance and international cooperation. It is not our business to ponder the domestic consequences of adopting such concepts in another country, nor should we think that we bear any responsibility for these events ... If the Soviet leaders consider that the growing importance of more enlightened concepts of international relations is incompatible with the preservation of their power in Russia, then this is their business, not ours. Our job is to work and ensure that internal events take place there... As a government, we are not responsible for the internal conditions in Russia... .

The new US strategic doctrine on the USSR NS DD-75, prepared for US President R. Reagan by Harvard historian Richard Pipes, proposed to intensify hostile actions against Russia.

The directive clearly formulated, - writes the American political scientist Peter Schweitzer, - that our next goal is no longer coexistence with the USSR, but a change in the Soviet system. The directive was based on the conviction that it was entirely within our power to change the Soviet system with the help of external pressure.

Another American doctrine - "Liberation" and the concept of "Information War", developed for the administration of President George W. Bush, openly proclaimed the main goal of the Western world "the dismantling of the USSR" and "the dismemberment of Russia", ordered American legal and illegal structures to exercise control over the state, initiate and manage anti-Russian sentiments and processes in the Russian republics and establish a fund in billions of dollars. a year to help the "resistance movement".

In the 1970s and 1980s, the American program for training agents of influence in the USSR acquired a complete and purposeful character. It cannot be said that this program was not known to the Soviet leadership. The facts say that it was. But those people whom we today with full responsibility can call agents of influence deliberately turned a blind eye to it.

Inside the country

In the KGB of the USSR, a special document was prepared on this occasion, which was called "On the plans of the CIA to acquire agents of influence among Soviet citizens."

According to the testimony of KGB Chairman Kryuchkov, the competent authorities of the USSR knew about these plans:

Pay attention to the term - it speaks of a well-thought-out, long-term policy, the core of which is genocide.

Today, we can speak with complete certainty about the implementation of many plans developed by the world behind the scenes in relation to the USSR. In any case, by the beginning of the eighties, American intelligence had dozens of assistants and like-minded people in the highest echelons of power. The role of some of them is already quite clear, the results of their activities are obvious and the data on their cooperation with foreign intelligence services cannot be refuted.

According to data reported by the Latvian Foreign Minister, from 1985 to 1992 the West (primarily the United States) invested “90 billion dollars in the process of democratization of the USSR (that is, in the destruction of Russia). With this money, the services of the right people were bought, agents of influence were prepared and paid, special equipment, instructors, literature, etc. were sent.

Hundreds of people who formed the backbone of the destroyers of the USSR and the future Yeltsin regime, including: G. Popov, G. Starovoitova, M. Poltoranin, A. Murashov, S. Stankevich , E. Gaidar, M. Bocharov, G. Yavlinsky, Yu. Boldyrev, V. Lukin, A. Chubais, A. Nuikin, A. Shabad, V. Boxer, many "shady people" from Yeltsin's entourage, in particular the head of his electoral campaigns in Yekaterinburg A. Urmanov, as well as I. Viryutin, M. Reznikov, N. Andrievskaya, A. Nazarov, prominent journalists and television workers. Thus, a "fifth column" was formed in the USSR, which existed as part of the Interregional Deputy Group and "Democratic Russia".

It is reliably known that M. Gorbachev knew from the reports of the KGB of the USSR about the existence of special institutions for the training of agents of influence, he also knew the lists of their "graduates". However, he did nothing to stop the activities of the traitors.

Having received from the leadership of the KGB a dossier containing information about an extensive network of intruders against the state, Gorbachev forbids the KGB to take any measures to curb criminal encroachments. Moreover, he does his best to cover up and shield the “godfather” of agents of influence in the USSR A.N. Yakovlev, despite the fact that the nature of the information about him coming from intelligence sources did not allow doubting the true background of his activities.

Here is what former KGB chairman Kryuchkov says about this:

In 1990, the State Security Committee, through intelligence and counterintelligence, received extremely alarming information regarding A. N. Yakovlev from several different (and, moreover, rated as reliable) sources. The meaning of the reports was that, according to Western intelligence services, Yakovlev occupies positions advantageous for the West, reliably opposes the "conservative" forces in the Soviet Union, and that he can be firmly counted on in any situation. But, apparently, in the West they believed that Yakovlev could and should show more perseverance and activity, and therefore one American representative was instructed to conduct an appropriate conversation with Yakovlev, directly telling him that more was expected of him.

It is worth recalling that many of the “young reformers” went through the Andropov “Longjumeau School”, which was the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Vienna, where regular, quarterly seminars were held, to which our “trainees” came, accompanied by “curators ” from the KGB and met there with Western “management specialists”, half of whom were Western intelligence officers. And Gorbachev himself got along with Andropov back in the 1970s, which can explain a lot.

Andropov and Gorbachev, Stavropol, 1973

Even after receiving this information, Gorbachev refuses to do anything. Such behavior of the first person in the state testified that by that time he, too, was closely integrated into the system of connections of the world behind the scenes.

The first published news about M. Gorbachev's affiliation with freemasons appears on February 1, 1988 in the German small-circulation magazine "Mer Licht" ("More Light"). Similar information is published in the New York newspaper "New Russian Word" (December 4, 1989), there are even photographs of US President Bush and Gorbachev making typical Masonic signs with their hands.

Meeting in Malta. In the photo: left - Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, second left - General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev, second right - US President George W. Bush. Photo: RIA Novosti

However, the strongest evidence of Gorbachev's belonging to Freemasonry is his close contacts with the leading representatives of the world Masonic government and his membership in one of the main mondialist structures - the Trilateral Commission. The intermediary between Gorbachev and the Trilateral Commission was the well-known financial businessman, freemason and agent of the Israeli special service "Mossad" J. Soros, who formed the so-called Soros-Soviet Union Foundation in 1987, from which the Soviet-American Cultural Initiative Foundation later grew, which had frankly anti-Russian character.

AGENTS OF INFLUENCE

Soros paid for the anti-Russian activities of politicians who played a tragic role in the fate of the USSR, and in particular Y. Afanasyev. In 1990, he financed the stay in the United States of a group of developers of the 500 Days program for the destruction of the Soviet economy, headed by G. Yavlinsky, and later members of the "Gaidar team" (when they were not yet in government).

Thus, by August 1991, the highest echelons of power in the USSR, as an analysis of relations with the West shows, for the most part had pro-Western sentiments and financial support for the fulfillment of the goals set by the masters of the West, which did not meet the interests of the country's population.

Causes of the Putsch: Judgments and Opinions

The need to introduce a state of emergency due to the actual collapse of life support systems, a catastrophic shortage of energy sources and the refusal of agricultural enterprises and local authorities to ensure the implementation of the plan for the state supply of food to state reserves, judging by many reports, was repeatedly discussed among Gorbachev and his subordinate authorities. In an interview with Lukyanov to a group of deputies of the USSR Armed Forces, given by him on the second day of the coup, it is said that Gorbachev intended to introduce a state of emergency after the signing of the Union Treaty, on the basis of the 9 + 1 agreement.

However, the signing of the Union Treaty automatically removed the leaders of the State Emergency Committee from power and, according to the now former leaders of the basic sectors of the national economy, made it impossible to stabilize the economy and maintain life support systems in working condition in view of the upcoming winter.

The signing of the Union Treaty would intensify the collapse of the unified financial system and the economic space of the USSR as a whole, liquidate the activities of defense complex enterprises with long technological chains.

Of the events that undoubtedly stimulated the attempt of the August coup and the preservation of the USSR as a single power, recreated by the people after the war under the leadership of I. Stalin, the following should be noted:

1. The nationalization of the oil and gas industry by Russia and the increase in domestic prices for oil and oil products promised by Yeltsin in Tyumen, which, according to Pavlov, would blow up the entire economy of the country.
2. The proposed introduction of national currencies in some republics.
3. Nationalization by Yakutia and Kazakhstan of the gold mining industry.
4. Non-fulfillment of plans for state deliveries of new crop grain and the closure of economic spaces by grain-producing union republics.
5. A 50% reduction in defense orders and the coming paralysis of the defense industry, the social consequences of the ill-considered conversion of defense industries.
6. An avalanche-like commercialization of relations between the heads of large enterprises and sub-sectors of the national economy, leading to the loss of the planned components of their management.
7. The phenomenon of personal financial independence of the heads of enterprises of organizations and the resulting loss of the last levers of their management.
8. Yeltsin's decree on departization, removing the apparatus of the CPSU from the sphere of making any decisions on the management of the economy and social life.
9. The need to introduce a state of emergency remains even after the failure of the coup. It is likely that it will be introduced, but in other forms and with other leaders.
10. The creation of republican security systems, including militarized own formations and national guards, the beginning of the transition of the republican KGB to the jurisdiction of the republics.

How Gorbachev staged the 1991 August Putsch

During his reign, Gorbachev, step by step, drove a wedge into the state apparatus of power, destroying it to its very foundations. However, it was already clear to him - the plan was a success, and there was very little left before its final implementation.

Former member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Yuri Prokofiev, later recalled how, back in March 1991, Gorbachev gathered key leaders of the country and discussed the current situation with them. The situation was difficult:

When a meeting was held with Yazov, a sharp question arose: Gorbachev can conduct business on the principle of "back and forth", then he will stop. How to be in that case? Someone said that then Yanaev would have to take the leadership of the country into his own hands. He protested: neither physically nor intellectually, they say, he is not ready to fulfill the duties of the president, this option is unacceptable.

Pugo and Yazov declared that they agreed to introduce a state of emergency only if the issue was resolved constitutionally, that is, with the consent of the president and by decision of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Otherwise, they will not participate in the introduction of a state of emergency.

Gorbachev knew that the meetings were taking place. For example, when we were at Yazov's, he was returning from Japan and called Kryuchkov from the plane. He, in a conversation with Gorbachev, said that, in fulfilling his instructions, we are now sitting and conferring. So Gorbachev was the initiator of the development of documents on the introduction of a state of emergency in the country, and, in fact, almost the entire composition of the GKChP was formed by him,

Prokofiev notes.

Marshal Dmitry Yazov himself emphasizes in one of his interviews:

In August 1991, in fact, there was no one to conclude an agreement with, but "the process began", and the state was literally falling apart before our eyes. It was then that the government headed by Valentin Pavlov gathered. It was in one of the secret buildings of the KGB, near Kryuchkov. There was no question at all about the GKChP at that time. We simply discussed the situation in the country and decided: in order to fulfill the will of the people and preserve the Soviet Union, a state of emergency must be introduced. Now there is a lot of speculation about this. But the fact remains: leaving on August 3 for a vacation in Foros, Gorbachev gathered the government and strictly warned that it was necessary to monitor the situation and, if anything, introduce a state of emergency,

Yazov notes.

The final document was soon adopted. Based on the prepared materials, President Gorbachev issued a decree on the procedure for introducing a state of emergency in certain regions and sectors of the national economy of the country. This decree was published in May and passed almost unnoticed.

The only thing I remember then was that Gorbachev called and, chuckling, said: “I agreed with Yeltsin on the decree. He agreed and made only one amendment: the decree is introduced only for a year. And we don’t need more than one year.”

Remembers Yuri Prokofiev.

On May 24, 1991, changes were adopted to the constitution of the RSFSR on the names of the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics (ASSR) - the word “autonomous” was removed from them and they began to be referred to as the Soviet Socialist Republics (SSR) within the RSFSR, which contradicted Article 85 of the USSR constitution.

And on July 3, 1991, changes were made to the constitution of the RSFSR from the status of the Autonomous Regions to the Soviet Socialist Republics within the RSFSR (except for the Jewish Autonomous Region), which also contradicted Article 87 of the USSR constitution.

The political leaders, shaken by the social depression that had gripped the country, were preparing to create a new Union of Soviet Sovereign Republics (USSR). However, this option did not suit Gorbachev's curators - when forming a renewed USSR, it would be too easy to remove him from power and return the system to the previous order. Then the Western plan did not work.

Gorbachev went for broke and organized another most cynical political provocation - the "August Putsch". The fact that the Secretary General himself was the beneficiary of the Putsch has now been admitted by almost all the direct participants in those events. The August putsch was directed by Gorbachev.

The writer and historian Nikolai Starikov, in his publication “There Was No Putsch,” speaks directly about the reverse side of this bloody event, started at the suggestion of Mikhail Gorbachev and his foreign counterparts:

It was a crude and cynical deception. There was betrayal. There was a cold-blooded desire for blood to be shed. A lot of things happened in those August days of 1991. But all this was not done by the State Emergency Committee. But there was no coup. When the GKChP began to carry out the actions agreed upon and entrusted to them, Yeltsin declared them traitors and putschists. And after him, the whole world repeated it.

And what about Gorbachev? And he simply did not pick up the phone in Foros. The stories “about blocking” Gorbachev at the dacha in Foros by the “putschists” are complete nonsense. In the August days of 1991, one of the St. Petersburg journalists ... got through to the General Secretary's dacha on a regular phone. Gorbachev betrayed his subordinates. He deceived them. And together with the “putschists” who were confused precisely for this reason, he betrayed and deceived his people,

The researcher notes.

Here is a comment by General Varennikov, one of the members of the State Emergency Committee:

There were young people on both sides of the barricades. She was pushed to a provocation: to make an ambush one and a half kilometers from the White House, on the Garden Ring. American and other cinematographers and TV reporters were planted there in advance so that they would film an episode that no one knew about, neither the police nor, of course, the troops that were patrolling and were ambushed.

Crowds of people quickly formed on the streets of Moscow, instigated by provocateurs. Collisions between people and armored vehicles, "highlighted" by TV cameras of Western channels and flashes of foreign photographers, showed how orchestrated the August scenario was.

There was no Putsch, not only in 1991. What happened in August 1991 repeated the events of the summer of 1917:

Then Kerensky (the head of Russia at that time) ordered his subordinate, commander-in-chief General Kornilov, to send troops to Petrograd and restore order. When Lavr Kornilov began to fulfill his plan, Kerensky himself declared him a traitor and arrested him along with a group of senior officers. Accused of trying to seize power, which in fact never existed even in the thoughts of too honest Russian generals. After that, Kerensky released the Bolsheviks from prisons and distributed weapons to those who would overthrow him, Kerensky, the “Provisional Government” in two months, the researcher emphasizes. - The scenarios of August 1991 and 1917 are striking in their similarity. Order to put things in order. Announcement for this by traitors. The confusion of the military. Their defeat, inevitable - after all, they were not prepared to fight. They were only prepared to follow orders. And then - the destruction of the country. Decay. Civil War.

And in 1991, we can say that at the "curfew" all the activities of the State Emergency Committee ended. It was already clear that the "putschists" saluted their honor to the future "Tsar Boris". It all ended on August 21 with a fake curfew: the troops stood still, did not touch anyone, waiting for some orders from the “putschists.” They seemed to frighten themselves. This was their last day. As expected, the crowd got excited and attacked the troops themselves, not knowing what to do. The blood of the “defenders of democracy” was shed, whom no one attacked, after which the GKChP was doomed to become a “putsch”. And for the brethren from television, and for the crowd, in the end, the fifth day came - on August 22, when they "demolished the tower" to the head of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, in which Gorbachev's accomplices formed special police units - OMON.

Someone made the head of the OMON "chik" - the last Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR - Boris Karlovich Pugo - they took off his head. If you believe the official version, he shot himself, although everyone on television was shown a gun that was lying on the nightstand, where he supposedly put it himself after he shot himself.

According to the official version, before putting a bullet in his temple, Pugo shot his wife. The pistol, at his request, was brought in the morning by his son Vadim, a KGB officer who had left for work before the tragedy. Economist Grigory Yavlinsky, who came to arrest the head of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs in the company of the chairman of the KGB of the RSFSR Viktor Ivanenko, Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the RSFSR Viktor Yerin and Deputy Prosecutor General of the RSFSR Yevgeny Lisov, described what he saw.

According to the future Yabloko:

Pugo's wife was wounded, covered in blood. The face is covered in blood. It was impossible to figure out if it was a stab wound or a gunshot wound. She was sitting on the floor on one side of the double bed, and on the other side of the bed, in a tracksuit, lay Pugo. His head lay back on the pillow and he breathed. But he looked like a dead man. The wife looked insane. All her movements were absolutely uncoordinated, her speech was incoherent. ... I am not a professional and did not think about the circumstances then. Before me lay a state criminal. And only after Ivanenko and I had left, my memory highlighted two circumstances that I cannot explain.

First. The gun lay neatly on the nightstand behind Pugo's head. Even Yavlinsky, a purely civilian man, it was difficult to imagine how a man, having shot himself in the temple, could put him there. And then lie down on the bed and stretch out. If the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs first lay down on the bed, and then fired, then it would be simply impossible for him to reach out to the bedside table, put a gun on it and take the position in which he was found.

The investigation put forward the version that the wife was the last to shoot. She allegedly put the gun on the bedside table. But what a strange thing: the investigators found three spent shell casings!

It should be noted that the putsch scenario largely repeated the events of the summer of 1953, when the Interior Minister Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria was liquidated (we wrote a series of articles about this, and tanks were brought into Moscow, after which the country's course was abruptly changed.

The August crisis led to the destruction of the institutions of government, the core of which was the CPSU and the KGB. As a result, Russia was struck by the deepest crisis of governance, from which the country could not recover for many years. Having interrupted the evolutionary nature of political development, the August coup contributed to the strengthening of the polarization of political forces, which ultimately resulted in the bloody drama of October 1993.

According to the doctor of historical sciences Mikhail Geller, everything was completed in August. Witnesses and participants in the events did not yet know that the history of the USSR was over.

In September 1991, Gorbachev's book The Putsch was published, which was hastily dashed off by his American assistants. In it, the author claims that:

The Soviet Union remains and will remain a great power, without which world problems cannot be solved.

According to Geller, the "Putsch" was nothing but a well-played spectacle put on before the whole world.

This is explained by the fact that the main roles in the "Coup" were played by people, each of whom was carefully chosen and placed in their place by Gorbachev himself. These were his closest associates. The "August putsch", although Gorbachev presents it as a betrayal of loved ones, was of a different nature. Until the last minute, the "conspirators" urged Gorbachev to head the Committee, to start acting decisively in order to restore order in the country,

The researcher notes.

According to Geller, on August 18, a delegation from the future "putschists" flew to Foros to beg the president to declare a state of emergency. After their arrest, the “putschists” claimed that Gorbachev knew about their intentions and left for Foros with parting words: do as you wish.

This, probably, should be understood: if it succeeds - I will be with you, if it fails - you answer.

Marshal Dmitry Yazov also speaks of this in his memoirs:

Its failure was convincingly shown by General Valentin Ivanovich Varennikov. During the trial, he directly asked Gorbachev: “When we left Foros on August 18, did you remain president or not?” Gorbachev twisted and twisted, but, in the end, he said: “Yes, I thought that I remained president.” - “So, it means that we have not seized power from you?” "Not captured..."

Yes, and it is difficult to call a coup a situation that leaves the entire structure of state power in place, the cabinet of ministers in full force, the entire party hierarchy. Only the head of state was absent. But there were constant negotiations with Gorbachev, with him or his supporters, who remained in their offices next to the "conspirators".

On February 1, 2006, in an interview with the Rossiya TV channel, Boris Yeltsin stated that Gorbachev's participation in the State Emergency Committee was documented.

The purpose of the GKChP

The main goal of the putschists was to prevent the liquidation of the USSR, which, in their opinion, was to begin on August 20 during the first stage of the signing of a new union treaty, turning the USSR into a confederation - the Union of Sovereign States. On August 20, the agreement was to be signed by representatives of the RSFSR and the Kazakh SSR, the rest of the future components of the commonwealth during five meetings, until October 22.

On the 20th, we did not allow the signing of the union treaty, we thwarted the signing of this union treaty.

G. I. Yanaev, interview with the radio station "Echo of Moscow"

In one of the first statements of the State Emergency Committee, distributed by Soviet radio stations and central television, the following goals were indicated, for the implementation of which a state of emergency was introduced in the country:

In order to overcome a deep and comprehensive crisis, political, interethnic and civil confrontation, chaos and anarchy that threaten the life and security of the citizens of the Soviet Union, the sovereignty, territorial integrity, freedom and independence of our Fatherland; proceeding from the results of the nationwide referendum on the preservation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; guided by the vital interests of the peoples of our Motherland, of all Soviet people.

In 2006, the former chairman of the KGB of the USSR, Vladimir Kryuchkov, stated that the GKChP did not aim to seize power:

We opposed the signing of a treaty destroying the Union. I feel like I was right. I regret that measures were not taken to strictly isolate the President of the USSR, questions were not raised before the Supreme Council about the abdication of the head of state from his post.

Opponents of the State Emergency Committee

The resistance to the GKChP was headed by the political leadership of the Russian Federation (President B.N. Yeltsin, Vice President A.V. Rutskoi, Prime Minister I.S. Silaev, Acting Chairman of the Supreme Council R.I. Khasbulatov).

In an address to the citizens of Russia, Boris Yeltsin on August 19, describing the actions of the State Emergency Committee as a coup d'état, said:

We believe that such forceful methods are unacceptable. They discredit the USSR before the whole world, undermine our prestige in the world community, return us to the era of the Cold War and the isolation of the Soviet Union. All this forces us to declare illegal the so-called committee (GKChP) that came to power. Accordingly, we declare illegal all decisions and orders of this committee.

Khasbulatov was on the side of Yeltsin, although 10 years later, in an interview with Radio Liberty, he said that, like the State Emergency Committee, he was dissatisfied with the draft of the new Union Treaty:

As for the content of the new Union Treaty, besides Afanasiev and someone else, I myself was terribly dissatisfied with this content. Yeltsin and I argued a lot - should we go to the meeting on August 20? And, finally, I convinced Yeltsin, saying that if we don't even go there, if we don't form a delegation, it will be perceived as our desire to destroy the Union. There was a referendum, after all, in March on the unity of the Union. Sixty-three percent, I think, or 61 percent of the population, were in favor of maintaining the Union. I say: "You and I have no right ...". Therefore, I say: "Let's go, make up a delegation, and there we will motivatedly state our comments on the future Union Treaty."

On the role of non-political communities in those Three Days

Independent research centers, civil associations, charitable foundations suddenly closed in a network - what the Americans call the word network - and messages, help, resources needed to counter the tanks moved along this network.

Here is what Gleb Pavlovsky, director of the POSTFACTUM Information Agency, wrote on August 30, 1991:

Among these cells of civil society, I cannot fail to mention the ones closest to us: the editorial offices of the journal “XX Century and the World” and the weekly “Kommersant”, the Center for Political and Legal Research, the Memorial Society, the Institute for Humanitarian and Political Research and, of course, the publishing house “ Progress". At the same time, the true role and scope of the long-term programs of the Soviet-American Cultural Initiative Foundation (known to most under the name of the Soros Foundation) were revealed, especially the Civil Society program - the groups supported by it were active participants in the Three Days resistance. Days of confrontation have united us in a common effort, the result of which - freedom - is more and more uncertain every day. Freedom as a state is like information: it is open, it is doubtful and dangerous. But this is the risk we actually wanted.

Western reaction

As a result of the anti-Russian coup d'etat in August-December 1991, the plans of the world behind the scenes were achieved. However, institutions for training and instructing agents of influence are not only not being dismantled, but are also being turned into an important part of the power structure of the Yeltsin regime, developing for it a kind of directive program of activity and supplying it with advisers.

In the United States, a legal public center of this structure was opened under the name "Russian House", which was headed by an agent of influence E. Lozansky, although, of course, all responsible decisions were made within the walls of the CIA and the leadership of the world behind the scenes.

Confident in the final victory, Yeltsin no longer concealed his direct connection with subversive anti-Russian organizations such as the American National Contribution to Democracy, to whose leaders he sent a message, which, in particular, said:

We know and appreciate the fact that you have contributed to this victory (fax dated August 23, 1991).

The world behind the scenes rejoiced, each of its representatives - in their own way, but they all noted the key role of the CIA. US President Bush immediately after the August 1991 coup, with full knowledge of the matter and as a former director of the CIA, publicly stated that the coming to power of the Yeltsin regime:

Our victory is a victory for the CIA.

The then director of the CIA, R. Gates, in Moscow, on Red Square, holds his own "victory parade" in front of BBC television cameras, stating:

Here, on Red Square, near the Kremlin and the Mausoleum, I make a solo parade of my victory.

Between the CIA and representatives of the Yeltsin regime, quite naturally, a relationship of master and vassal is established. For example, in October 1992, R. Gates met with Yeltsin in complete secrecy. Moreover, the latter is not even given the opportunity to use the services of his translator, who is put out the door, and the entire translation is carried out by the translator of the CIA director.

Maltese brothers

The world behind the scenes awards Yeltsin with the title that almost every member of the world Masonic public organization wears - Knight Commander of the Order of Malta. He receives it on November 16, 1991. No longer embarrassed, Yeltsin poses for reporters in the full garb of a knight-commander.

In August 1992, Yeltsin signed Decree No. 827 "On the restoration of official relations with the Order of Malta". The content of this decree was kept a complete secret for some time. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia was ordered to sign a protocol on the restoration of official relations between the Russian Federation and the Order of Malta.

Conclusion

Calling the GKChP a "coup" or a "coup" is not entirely correct, since it was not supposed to break the state system, but rather, measures were proposed to protect the system that exists. It was an "attempt" by a number of senior officials of the state to save the Union from collapse.

On the part of Gorbachev, this was actually a "top action", the local communists did not receive any instructions about their actions. And this action was carried out in order to instill fear in society, disperse the CPSU and destroy the Union. The putschists found themselves in the role of "set-ups". They were arrested for good measure. But after a while they were amnestied.

Attempts by M.S. Gorbachev to take control of the country into his own hands again encountered resistance from the leaders of the republics. Through the efforts of the putschists, the central government was compromised. In Moscow, the President of the RSFSR B.N. Yeltsin.

The highest body of state power - the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR - on September 5, 1991, announced its self-dissolution and the transfer of power to the State Council, consisting of the leaders of the republics. M.S. Gorbachev as the head of a single state has become superfluous.

On December 8, 1991, in Belovezhskaya Pushcha near Minsk, the leaders of Russia (B.N. Yeltsin), Ukraine (L.M. Kravchuk) and Belarus (S.S. Shushkevich) announced the denunciation of the Union Treaty of 1922, the termination of the existence of the USSR and creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The great power has ceased to exist. The place of Belaya Vezha was not chosen by chance, since it was here on July 3, 964 that the Great Forgotten Victory over the Khazar Khaganate was won.

historical retreat

Svyatoslav not only crushed the Khazar Khaganate, the top of which converted to Judaism, but also tried to secure the conquered territories for himself. The Russian settlement Belaya Vezha appears on the site of Sarkel, Tmutarakan passes under the rule of Kiev, there is evidence that Russian detachments were in Itil and Semender until the 990s. The Khazar Khaganate was the first state that Ancient Russia had to face. The fate of not only the East European tribes, but also many tribes and peoples of Europe and Asia depended on the outcome of the struggle between these two states.

As many researchers note, the crushing of Khazaria, the tops of which professed Judaism and supported it among the subject and surrounding peoples through the spread of a worldview that was beneficial to them - all the same biblical doctrine (about it, meant breaking the shackles of the most difficult oppression - spiritual, which could destroy the foundations of a bright , the original spiritual life of the Slavs and other peoples of Eastern Europe.

The Khazar kingdom disappeared like smoke immediately after the elimination of the main condition for its existence: military superiority over its neighbors and the economic benefits that the possession of the most important trade routes between Asia and Europe brought. Since there were no other grounds for its existence, under the blows of the stronger Russian state, it crumbled into its component parts, which later dissolved in the Polovtsian Sea,

The historian M.I. Artamonov concludes.

Therefore, it is especially symbolic that in Belaya Vezha, as if in retaliation for that Great Victory of 964, agreements shameful for our country were signed.

December 25, 1991 M.S. Gorbachev resigned from the post of President of the USSR, which meant the end of "Perestroika".

As a result of the collapse of the USSR - financial and economic scams of the 90s.

George Soros was the executor of almost all the major financial and economic scams committed in Russia in the first half of the 90s.

It was he who stood behind Chubais, Gaidar, Burbulis and a number of other newly-minted Russian functionaries during the so-called privatization, as a result of which the vast majority of the property belonging to the Russian people passed into the hands of international financial swindlers.

According to the chairman of the State Property Committee V.P. Polevanov:

500 largest privatized enterprises in Russia with a real value of at least 200 billion dollars. were sold for next to nothing (about $7.2 billion) and ended up in the hands of foreign companies and their shell structures.

In the mid-90s, the Soros Foundation carried out a number of operations to undermine the Russian economy. According to the Wall Street Journal (1994.10.11.), American financial experts consider the collapse of the ruble in Russia on the so-called Black Tuesday, October 11, 1994, to be the result of a group of funds led by Soros. Attention is drawn to the fact that by the beginning of the summer of 1994, the Soros Foundation had acquired shares of Russian enterprises in the amount of 10 million dollars. In late August - early September, Soros, having waited for the growth in the price of shares, sold them. According to experts, he made a profit equivalent to $400 million from this operation. At the end of September, the Soros Foundation began buying dollars for rubles, which, according to American experts, caused a rapid rise in the US dollar and a rapid fall in the ruble, the collapse of the financial system and the rapid ruin of many Russian enterprises.

"FAVORITES" OF THE WORLD BEHIND THE SCENE

Opinions of event participants

In 2008, Mikhail Gorbachev commented on the August 1991 situation as follows:

I now regret - I should not have left. Wrong, yes, I already said that. Just as it was a mistake that I did not send Yeltsin forever somewhere in the country to harvest banana products. After known processes. When the plenum demanded - to exclude from the members of the Central Committee. Some of the party demanded to be expelled for what he started.

A member of the State Emergency Committee, Marshal Dmitry Yazov in 2001 spoke about the impossibility of managing public opinion in 1991:

I would not call the events of 1991 a putsch for the reason that there was no putsch. There was a desire of a certain group of people, the leadership of a certain former Soviet Union, aimed at preserving the Soviet Union as a state in any way. That was the main goal of these people. None of them pursued any selfish goals, none of them shared portfolios of power. One goal is to save the Soviet Union. .

conclusions

It should be noted that all the participants in the events were from the same managerial "elite", which had the abbreviation of the Central Committee of the CPSU, which is disclosed by many as the Central Committee of the Capitulatory Party of Self-Liquidation of Socialism. Perhaps, if not they themselves, their “puppeteers” simply agreed on who to rule in the new conditions, and who, after a short stay in prison, go on a well-deserved rest, having previously secured the halo of “sufferers for the happiness of the people”, and “puppeteers” - the possibility of a legitimate return to the scenario of the policy of "socialism" in the future.

After all, if, after Yeltsin’s victory, lawyers substantiated the illegality of the State Emergency Committee, then, if necessary, another team of lawyers will no less strictly substantiate the fact of high treason by Gorbachev and his associates and, accordingly, the competence and legality of the State Emergency Committee, whose fault in this case will consist only in the fact that they did not achieve success and such figures and scenarios are already trying to promote today.

And if we remember about conceptual power and that any legislation is a line of defense, on which one concept protects itself from the implementation in the same society of another concept that is fundamentally incompatible with it. In a conceptually undecided society, which was the USSR in the last years of its existence, mutually exclusive concepts were expressed in one legislation. That is why, on its basis, having defined conceptually, it is possible to legally justify the indictment against Gorbachev, and against the State Emergency Committee, and against Yeltsin and the team of reformers of the Gaidar-Chernomyrdin era.

The August coup was one of those events that marked the end of the CPSU and the collapse of the USSR and, according to the popular opinion of liberals, gave impetus to democratic changes in Russia.

On the other hand, supporters of the preservation of the Soviet Union argue that a mess began in the country associated with the inconsistent policy of the then authorities.

Almost twenty years ago, the former USSR had to go through three days of coup, from August 19 to 21, 1991. During these three days, the first and last president of the USSR M. Gorbachev was under house arrest at the state dacha in Foros, in Crimea, and the press was shown on TV -a conference of five conspirators, one of whom was shaking hands. And neither these five nor the other seven (Pavlov, Pugo, Kryuchkov, Yanaev, Yazov, Sheinin, Baklanov, Varennikov, Plekhanov, Lukyanov, Starodubtsev, Tizyakov) looked too much like leaders capable of thinking through and carrying out a coup, not to mention to stay in power. Someone is behind this, everyone thought. A man with trembling hands, who by this time had already received the nickname “Accordion in the swamp” (like a piano in the bushes) among the people, cannot become the organizer and ideological inspirer of the conspiracy. Too unbelievable, this is a farce, not a coup. So it was, in fact.

But then who is the gray cardinal who organized the putsch? As you know, in everything that happened, you need to look for someone who benefits from it. And who benefited from the putsch?

First you need to remember what state the country was in before the putsch. The USSR was on the verge of collapse, and despite the fact that in the referendum the majority of the people voted against the collapse of the USSR, there was a mood among the people and among the leaders of the country and republics to secede, to declare sovereignty, including in Russia. On August 20, Gorbachev was scheduled to sign the Union Treaty, which was supposed to indicate the new position of the union republics, their rights and obligations, but within the limits of the Soviet Union. But how could the Union Treaty be signed if the president was declared ill, incompetent, and in fact was prevented from signing it?

The first conclusion: the putsch was organized in order to disrupt the signing of the Union Treaty. And it was beneficial for those who advocated the collapse of the Soviet Union, and not for the sake of the idea of ​​\u200b\u200bliving separately, but for the sake of receiving the fullness of life from the fullness of power. After all, one can be the most important thing in Russia without having the most important thing in the USSR over oneself.

Now let us remember what were the results of the putsch. At the end of August 1991, the activities of the CPSU throughout the country were suspended. And exactly four months after the failure of the coup, the signing of the Belovezhskaya Agreement took place, according to which Russia, Ukraine and Belarus became sovereign states. The signatories of the agreement - B. Yeltsin, L. Kravchuk and S. Shushkevich - became the first presidents of these states.

The second conclusion: it is quite obvious who benefited from the putsch.

And now some interesting facts. It is worth referring to the notes of the wife of the President of the USSR R. Gorbacheva.

A minor fact, but a remarkable one. On August 4, after flying to Foros, she writes: “ Irina and I noticed that Yanaev had eczema on his hands. Among our loved ones there is a person who suffered from this kind of disease for a very long time and was cured quickly, quite unexpectedly by means of traditional medicine. On the plane, we agreed: as soon as we return from vacation, I will talk with Yanaev, give the address of this person, and advise him to turn to him for help.» This eczema, called psoriasis, comes from strong nerves. Those. the conspiracy by the time of M. Gorbachev's departure to the Crimea had already been organized and was waiting in the wings, and the figurehead was very nervous, no matter how something happened.

Another fact, also insignificant, but revealing. Upon Gorbachev's arrival in the Crimea, S. Gurenko, secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, usually spoke the first words at the table, but this time it was L. Kravchuk.

Members of the State Committee for the State of Emergency: before and now

The third fact is the most important. While Gorbachev and his family are in fear that they will be shot, and they are afraid not only to swim in the sea, but to leave the house ... While it is reported on the BBC that B. Yeltsin condemned the conspirators ... At the same time on August 21, Yazov, Kryuchkov, Baklanov, Ivashko, Lukyanov and Plekhanov arrive in Crimea and guiltily ask Gorbachev for a meeting, and a little later A. Rutskoi and his team calmly fly by plane to Crimea and freely take Gorbachev and his family to Moscow.

The third conclusion: when the coup is no longer needed, it calmly dissipates, and the conspirators return power back.

The fourth fact is also important. The trial of the GKChPists began in 1993, and ended in 1994 with nothing. The court decision says: "Stop all criminal cases that are in progress on the events of August 19-21, 1991, related to the formation of the State Emergency Committee."

Fourth conclusion: the conspirators were guaranteed in advance that they would not be touched, and the agreements had to be fulfilled.

In conclusion, a cartoon created four or five days after the defeat of the conspirators. The creators of the cartoon in the troubled days of August 19-21, 1991 defended the White House. True, now the halo of the romance of defending the White House has greatly faded, because people, without knowing it, played along with the one who benefited from the putsch.