V. DYMARSKY: Hello. I greet the audience of the radio station “Echo of Moscow”, the RTVi TV channel, this is the “Price of Victory” program, and I am its host Vitaly Dymarsky. Today we are approaching Berlin with fighting, and the topic of our today's program is the Seelow Heights. Well, in fact, this phrase itself already says everything, it’s a fairly well-known thing. And our guest is a historian well known to you, to those who regularly watch our program, Alexey Isaev, whom I am pleased to introduce to you and say hello to. Hello, Alexey.

A. ISAEV: Hello.

V. DYMARSKY: +7 985 970-45-45 - SMS number, also familiar to you, another announcement, albeit familiar to you, but I’ll repeat it anyway - this is that the webcast is on website of the radio station “Echo of Moscow”, everything is connected, so you can see Alexey Isaev on the website, well, in addition, of course, to the television broadcast. Now, after all these introductions, we can begin our conversation. I would start with this more general question. Despite the fact that, as I already said, the phrase “Seelow Heights”, by the way, which simply comes from the town of Seelow, where, in fact, these battles took place, is quite well-known, but I would not say, even looking through and preparing for this program, looking through some literature on the Internet, which... I’ll even say it differently: it seems that very little has been written about this or not enough has been written, that, well, there’s something that prevents you from writing about it in more detail, as about the many other battles of World War II. Is this a misconception or do you agree with it?

A. ISAEV: Well, I would say that 1945, in general, is less known than many other battles. Because there is a birth trauma, the year 1941 and it attracts the greatest public interest. But the year 1945, in general, is less known, and I would even say that the Seelow Heights, which are just one of the episodes of 1945, are much better known. Strictly speaking, the concept of “Seelow Heights” was absent in German geography at that time. That is, the heights could be called, rather, Lebusovsky. This is a section of terrain slightly elevated in the Oder valley, not very high, about 50 meters above the Oder level. This is not very much, but, nevertheless, the heights with steep slopes and, in fact, the battles for them began long before April 1945. Here, for parts of these heights, the so-called (INAUDIBLE), they fought for it in March and successfully took it. And perhaps this prompted the Soviet command to think that if we take this one more piece of land, we will take it. Moreover, it should be emphasized that the Seelow Heights, the light did not converge on them like a wedge - they blocked only part of the bridgehead on which the 1st Belorussian Front stood. Moreover, they blocked even a smaller part. Of the 5 armies that stood on this bridgehead, only 2 were directly aimed at the Seelow Heights. The rest could advance on smoother terrain.

V. DYMARSKY: Looking ahead a little, can we say that these battles on the Seelow Heights, in fact, were decisive for the capture of Berlin?

A. ISAEV: Well, I would say that the outcome is on the Oder front in general, that is, on the entire front in front of the bridgehead. And the Seelow Heights became known to the public precisely because those who fought at these heights, Katukov and Chuikov, left memoirs. And those who fought to the north are the commander-in-chief of the 5th Shock Army Berzarin and the commander of the 2nd Guards Tank Army Bogdanov - one of them died literally shortly after the war (this is Berzarin), and the other did not leave any memoirs. Therefore, if it had happened, God forbid, on the contrary, that is, Chuikov would have died and would not have written his memoirs, again God forbid, Katukov, then we would be talking, for example, not about the Seelow Heights, but about the Altengrabow Canal. And he would be much more famous. Therefore, it is, one might say, an irony of fate that the Seelow Heights became known to a very wide circle of people who are often even far from military history.

V. DYMARSKY: These 2 armies are also the 1st Belorussian Front, right?

A. ISAEV: Yes, the 1st Belorussian Front - there were 5 armies on the bridgehead itself, and in addition to this there was, for example, Kuznetsov, the future conqueror of the Reichstag, Perkhorovich, who bypassed Berlin. Therefore, in fact, the fame of the Seelow Heights is such a reflection of that April 1945 in the eyes of historians and history. Because, as Konev wrote after Zhukov was removed in 1957, he wrote that Zhukov made a mistake with the Seelow Heights, so they went to repeat it. And, in fact, those people who actually hacked the Oder front (they hacked it north of the heights), they found themselves, as it were, in the shadows.

V. DYMARSKY: It must be said that Zhukov himself, if you believe his memoirs, he also confesses there. Well, of course, much softer than Konev did in 1957. I repeat once again, much softer, but, nevertheless, he writes that everything could have been done differently. Now I can’t guarantee the accuracy of the quote, but this is the meaning.

A. ISAEV: Yes, this is absolutely true. Zhukov had 2 plans. At the end of March he came up with two plans - one of an offensive from the Küstrin bridgehead through the heights, including through the heights, the other with a newly formed bridgehead near Frankfurt an der Oder. Those who travel to Germany by train, they pass through Frankfurt-on-Oder, and along this railway they could get to Berlin. This was Zhukov's second plan. He comes to Moscow with these two plans, and Stalin stuns him that the Allies have achieved enormous success, let's attack Berlin as quickly as possible.

V. DYMARSKY: When is this? Is it March?

A. ISAEV: This is the very end of March. On March 28, if I’m not mistaken, Zhukov went to Moscow, followed by Konev, and hasty preparations began for the attack on Berlin.

V. DYMARSKY: They forced it.

A. ISAEV: Therefore, this is the plan for a breakthrough from the Frankfurt bridgehead - the area there is more wooded, but there are no these heights that are difficult to overcome by tanks. Therefore, if Zhukov had been given a few more days, maybe a week, maybe a week and a half, he would have made this bridgehead a second one, and from there he would have rushed to Berlin and, perhaps, would have ended up there faster.

V. DYMARSKY: But on the other hand, again, my impression, in any case, is that the fame, on the one hand, the fame of the Seelow Heights, on the other hand, some understatements are connected with the fact that this battle was not very successful for Soviet troops.

A. ISAEV: Indeed, the Seelow Heights were not taken head-on, they were bypassed. In principle, it was such a bastion on which the Germans remained, practically they were moved not much to the West, and they were bypassed, then they were caught in a cauldron in the forests southeast of Berlin. So it was a partially intact bastion and, indeed, one could say that it was not very successful in combat. But, unfortunately, the losses in the entire Berlin operation are now very often projected onto these unfortunate heights. Now, as a person who looked at the reports on the losses of the 1st Belorussian Front, I can say that for the Seelow Heights the 1st Belorussian Front did not lose 300 thousand people, it lost 20 thousand people, including 5-6 thousand irretrievable losses, that is, killed and missing. In essence, this constitutes a smaller part, like the Berlin operation as a whole, and the losses of the 1st Belorussian Front in this operation. They were just one of the episodes. And one should not think that they, as they say, were soaked in blood and were covered with corpses - this was not the case at all.

V. DYMARSKY: Well, in any case, one of the articles that I saw before our broadcast about the Seelow Heights is called “The Victory We Suffered.” Well, the meaning is clear, right? And here this figure is also given that in the battle for Berlin the Soviet command killed 361,367 soldiers and officers.

A. ISAEV: Yes. Only at the same time they forget that these are losses on the front 300 kilometers from the Baltic Sea, where the Rokossovsky, 2nd Belorussian Front was advancing to Bautzen and Dresden. This is in a huge space.

V. DYMARSKY: This entire group is Soviet.

A. ISAEV: Yes, these 3 fronts lost 360 thousand people.

V. DYMARSKY: How many people is this? 2 million?

A. ISAEV: 2 million - only the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts. Another approximately, in my opinion, 600 or 800 thousand - Rokossovsky’s 2nd Belarusian, which started later. Therefore, these 360 ​​thousand were lost in the vast space between the Oder and the Elbe.

V. DYMARSKY: But these are still huge losses - this happens every 6th or every 8th.

A. ISAEV: Again, these are general losses, that is, these are not irrecoverable losses. Irreversible losses are 80 thousand people on all 3 fronts. Therefore, they, again, were scattered over a large area, and significant losses, for example, the 1st Belorussian Front suffered when crushing the Germans surrounded near Halbe. This is a cauldron in which approximately 200 thousand German troops who stood on the Oder front fell, and they were crushed in the forests, partly, as they say, remotely, that is, by artillery and aviation, and partly in battle. And these losses are also included in the total figure, despite the fact that they have nothing to do with the Seelow Heights.

The same is true, for example, of the crossing of the Oder, when at the northern end of the Küstrin bridgehead they crossed the Oder with great difficulty. There, for example, the 1st Polish Army was advancing there, which lost somewhere in the initial period of the battle...

V. DYMARSKY: And there was still a Polish army there, right?

A. ISAEV: Yes, the 1st Army of the Polish army. That is, there were 2 Polish armies on the flanks of Konev and Zhukov. One of them was severely beaten near Bautzen, but the second one was easier.

V. DYMARSKY: Well, now I would like to ask you to go back a little earlier, to an earlier period. And I would even say at the end of 1944, and here’s why. One of the versions that there were a lot of casualties on our part at the Seelow Heights is that Zhukov, no matter what, no matter what losses, was eager to be the first to enter Berlin and that, in fact, in 1944, when he headed the 1st Belorussian Front instead of Rokossovsky; this replacement, in fact, was made precisely because it was to give Zhukov the opportunity to be the first to enter Berlin.

A. ISAEV: Yes, this is a turning point. How, here, Zhukov was appointed commander of the 1st Belorussian...

V. DYMARSKY: This is November, if I’m not mistaken, 1944.

A. ISAEV: Yes, November 1944. This, one might say, automatically meant that it was he who would enter Berlin, I would even say, regardless of what would happen. It’s just a front line - if you continue it, with the Vistula bridgehead, it ends in Berlin. And so he had to screw up very badly and badly in order not to get to Berlin. As for this replacement, he was a very experienced man and very smart and cunning. And I believe that if Rokossovsky had been stationed on the 1st Belorussian Front, we would have had a repeat of Danzig on an enlarged scale, when Rokossovsky was given the 1st Tank Army and told: “Come on, go ahead, smash the Germans, die.” And instead of using this tank army to cut off the troops retreating to Danzig, he threw it directly at Danzig, one might say, to take it outright. And the result of this was the prolonged butting battles near Danzig and Gdynia, because of which, in fact, Rokossovsky was late for the start of the Berlin operation. That is, his front began the offensive not on April 16 along with everyone else, but on the 18th. And, in general, things didn’t go very quickly for him, and in fact, I don’t even consider him in my book on Berlin, because he was...

V. DYMARSKY: She is next to you, right?

A. ISAEV: Yes. This is a book from 2007; I had great pleasure in studying 1945, because it turned out to be very interesting. And so it turns out that the 2nd Belorussian Front was such an outsider, that is, in fact, it took such a very indirect part in the battle for Berlin.

V. DYMARSKY: Was he assigned any role? Or was it the impression that everything was given to Zhukov?

A. ISAEV: Zhukov was there, yes. He was given a task; Berlin was in his front zone, but, nevertheless, on one side there was Rokossovsky, who, if Zhukov had been completely stuck on the Oder front, he had a hypothetical chance of going around to Berlin from the north. And Konev, who used, well, I would say, he had a chance, Konev, but he did not use it to break through to Berlin from the south. It cannot be said that these were competitors, but both had hypothetical chances that were not included in any betting directives before the start of the operation.

V. DYMARSKY: I don’t know, I haven’t seen, I’ll honestly say what Rokossovsky wrote about this and whether he wrote. But Konev, in those texts, so to speak, that we mentioned today, in 1957, when Zhukov fell into disgrace, he wrote about competition and that the Seelow Heights are the result of competition. The fact that Zhukov went ahead, not paying attention to anything, and everything in order to get ahead of him, Konev, and, apparently, Rokossovsky was implied. In general, others, let’s say, during the capture of Berlin.

A. ISAEV: The directives of the headquarters did not provide for Konev’s participation in the battle for Berlin. He was given tasks, and in his memoirs he says, “Well, I found a break in the demarcation line near Lubin.” But in the directive, the task rates were set before the Elbe, and in these directives it is not clear in any way that Konev was even trusted with the possibility of a throw at Berlin. Konev, in fact, secretly from headquarters, from Stalin, was preparing a plan to rush to Berlin and capture it with a cavalry attack, if something happened. This plan was not implemented, but nevertheless, it was de facto prepared very carefully and, I would say, through verbal orders without much publicity. And when Zhukov slowed down, I emphasize, not only on the Seelow Heights, but on the Oder Front as a whole, yes, Stalin gave Konev a chance to implement this plan and gradually, I would say, it expanded: first one tank army went to Berlin, then another part of another tank army. In general, not paying attention to anything, including the serious problems that Konev had near Bautzen, where the 2nd Polish Army was being beaten, Konev tried to rush towards Berlin. He failed to get ahead of Zhukov, but, nevertheless, this is a competition, its initiator was Konev, and Zhukov - he simply cracked the Oder Front, and not only the Seelow Heights, but also the chain of all these canals and rivers. And, in general, it broke...

V. DYMARSKY: In general, my question is perhaps naive. But is this kind of competition on the part of Konev, or on the part of Zhukov – is this generally normal? What, there was no coordination? Still, there is a stake, there are some solutions, right?

A. ISAEV: No, that’s exactly what there were decisions...

V. DYMARSKY: This is some kind of partisanship, right? “I’ll be the first to go in.” If I’m the first to arrive, I’ll be the first to go in.”

A. ISAEV: Well, naturally, in the directives, I emphasize, there was nothing like that in the rates. Then, on the fly, they began to change the plan of the operation, and Konev was finally turned back. They told him: “Yes, turn around, try to reach Berlin from the south.” But this is already a change of plan on the fly - this was no longer partisan warfare, he was given very clear instructions: “Turn around and go to Berlin from the south.” The distance there was large, he got stuck in the forests, then got stuck on the Berlin bypass, but, nevertheless, an attempt to change the plan on the fly. Stalin was nervous. He understood that the Allies could reach Berlin, they already had bridgeheads on the Elbe, well, as they say, Berlin is just a stone's throw away. If Zhukov gets stuck, things aren’t going well for Rokossovsky anyway with this crossing of two channels of the Oder at once - the Alt-Oder and, in fact, the Oder - then you never know what will happen. Therefore, he was nervous, although there was no reason to worry at the moment when all these orders were given “Turn, Konev, towards Berlin”...

Already a real person, I believe, a hero of the battle for Berlin, one who remained in the shadows is the commander of the 1st mechanized corps Krivoshein. This is the man who met Guderian. And this corps - at the moment when Stalin was nervous, gave all these orders, “Let’s take Berlin from the north, and let’s take it from the south,” this corps, like a spoke, pierced the Oder front almost to its entire depth. The result of this breakthrough was used in the following days. Approximately on the third or fourth day of the operation, the dam had already collapsed, and that was it, the front had crumbled.

V. DYMARSKY: What was Stalin, strictly speaking, afraid of? That the Allies will be the first to enter Berlin? But was there already an agreement with the allies on division?

A. ISAEV: She was. Well, this is the same division - they could go to Berlin and come back, and, so to speak, forever.

V. DYMARSKY: So this is a purely symbolically moral thing?

A. ISAEV: This is not symbolically moral. Churchill wanted to run to Berlin with all his might, but Eisenhower preferred the bird in his hand. We have a Russian cauldron, God forbid the Germans run away from the Russian cauldron and settle in an Alpine fortress, from where we will pick them out for another year. Why do we need this? And Churchill turned a deaf ear to all these requests. And despite all attempts to influence Eisenhower through the president, it all did not work out - he stood like a wall. He understood that he would be president, and if he got involved in some kind of adventure at the end of the war, he would be reminded of this during the presidential campaign. So he acted cautiously.

Stalin didn't know this. He made all these promises... Eisenhower was completely frank with him when he wrote, “I won’t go to Berlin, I don’t need this.” He was absolutely sincere. But Stalin underestimated the sincerity of his allies, who were from a different, one might say, political camp. And he understood that they could say one thing to their faces, but make completely different plans. Therefore, it seemed like such a game, very intricate, when it led to the acceleration of planning, and this nervousness, twitching the tank armies in the process... But, nevertheless, Zhukov, although he was behind the plan, was very confident... Here, the breakthrough of the Oder Front Zhukov should be studied in textbooks. Now, if the Germans had acted the way near Kursk, as Zhukov acted on the Seelow Heights (on the Oder Front, in fact), they might have broken through the defenses of the Voronezh Front, I mean the Germans. Because Zhukov is very clear: a breakthrough has formed, narrow, thin. In this breakthrough, we first have one tank army, then a second tank army, and behind them the infantry - and that’s it, and the front falls to the enemy.

V. DYMARSKY: Well, we will talk about this topic later, about the battles themselves on the Seelow Heights and not only on them. I still have this question. Is it true that Stalin, well, in addition to the plans you talked about about Berlin-Berlin, set the task of taking Berlin by May 1?

A. ISAEV: The task was set to take Berlin much earlier. And May 1 means that the Berlin garrison capitulated on May 2, this is a failure of all deadlines. He should have been taken much earlier, I would even say before Lenin’s birthday. The fact that May 1 turned out to be close to the point of surrender of the Berlin garrison is a lag and a violation, and not what they said in advance: “Let’s take it by May 1.” They were not going to take it by May 1st.

A. ISAEV: Well, there were flags over the Reichstag, but the Germans still had large groups that continued to resist. The flakturms were all standing - these are air defense towers - not a single flakturm was taken on April 30th. And there was a huge area of ​​Humbolthain and Friedrichshain, which remained completely under German control. One should not think that they were squeezed from all sides, and, behold, the Reichstag was the last center of resistance. On April 30, when the flags were already fluttering in the windows of the Reichstag, the Fuhrer was still thinking whether to commit suicide or not. And, in general, this happened quickly. And despite the short distance from the Reichstag to the Reich Chancellery, resistance there continued.

V. DYMARSKY: Well, the official dates of the battle for Berlin and, in particular, the beginning of the battle for the Seelow Heights are April 16 - May 8, right?

A. ISAEV: Yes.

V. DYMARSKY: But since you said about Hitler, Hitler, after the success at the Seelow Heights, he was generally there, it seems, so, according to evidence, he almost shouted “Hurray, we won! It’s starting to look like a fracture.” So, he hoped that it would be the same as near Moscow?

A. ISAEV: No, he hoped when Roosevelt died shortly before the start.

V. DYMARSKY: Well, yes, I agree.

A. ISAEV: Then there was stormy delight.

V. DYMARSKY: But the Seelow Heights also inspired him with some kind of optimism.

A. ISAEV: If you look at the documents of the Vistula Army Group, there was very cautious optimism that the Russians had launched an offensive and we were still holding out. That we are still holding on, despite the disastrous balance of forces for us. So there was no reason to rejoice.

V. DYMARSKY: I’ll interrupt you, Alexey. We will now, in fact, pause for a few minutes, after which we will continue the “Price of Victory” program.

NEWS

V. DYMARSKY: Once again we welcome our radio and television audience, the “Price of Victory” program. Let me remind you that today I am hosting it, Vitaly Dymarsky, and our guest is Alexey Isaev and we are talking about the battles on the Seelow Heights. I will immediately respond here to several of our listeners who continue to ask me about my colleague, Dmitry Zakharov. His vacation is coming to an end, I talked to him, so I think that either next week or the week after he will appear, we will restore our duet after such a long vacation that Dima was on.

Well, let's return, after all, to the Seelow Heights. Alexey, before this short break you said that this operation is worthy of textbooks. But how can I tell you? This is the first time I’ve heard such an assessment. There's someone there praising. Well, how is he praising? Some don't scold so much, others scold a lot. But in such a way that, in fact, we talked about this right in the textbook - Zhukov himself was quite critical of himself and of this operation. Still, there, as I understand it, from what I read and saw, there was enough... And, by the way, according to the recollections of veterans, they are not strategy, they, of course, did not see the entire front and the whole picture, but, nevertheless, there are also some personal testimonies and sensations. Both military leaders and privates... Yes, everyone says that the news, in general, does not look like a textbook, that there were quite a lot of mistakes, starting with the fact that, like, when the tanks were launched, that they almost hit the infantry, in general , ours were coming.

A. ISAEV: Well, again, there are many exaggerations.

V. DYMARSKY: Maybe these are myths.

A. ISAEV: Yes, there are many exaggerations relating to the Seelow Heights and the Berlin operation as a whole. When I talked about the textbook, I said that the maneuver of forces was carried out very competently and the plan was changed on the move, when, indeed, they found a weak point among the Germans, knocked out a traffic jam in their defense, and not many rushed into this traffic jam like a stormy river, not a few, but 6 tank mechanized corps of two tank armies. And this build-up of forces, which was then, again, wisely used when the Germans brought in their reserves, these reserves were carefully bypassed from the north and south. This maneuver, despite the fact that the battle could have turned into a second Verdun, there, in the second Rzhev, this did not happen, this transformation. Precisely because they competently maneuvered with the forces that they had, and indeed changed a lot on the fly and were quite flexible in their approach to how to move forward. And so, the Germans strengthened this front for several months. And they had considerable strength there, if we take it in human terms, and very good engineering preparation of the area, which in itself is not sugar. These canals, again, spring, the flooding of rivers and streams, which sometimes turned those canals that in the summer can be easily crossed by a tank, in April 1945 this was not an easy task, it was necessary to build a bridge.

And, in fact, the slowdown on the Seelow Heights is the need to overcome all these engineering obstacles, when they successively drive the Germans away from the bank of the next canal, build a bridge, launch one tank corps across it somewhere, then, if events develop here successfully, another . That is, we had a very clear system in 1945, which, by the way, is very rare among the Germans: someone achieves success, and their neighbor is immediately turned around in the back of his head. Your neighbor is stuck somewhere, there is no need to suffer there, there is no need to lose people there, tanks - turn around to face your successfully advancing comrade and develop success through him. This system, by the way, worked for both Konev and Zhukov. In Zhukov it was simply, as it were, more clearly manifested, just this, what I said, as in the textbook. But Rybalko, for example, attacked in exactly the same way: when they got stuck, they turned around, and in a favorable area they broke through further into the depths.

Therefore, despite the severe exhaustion of the troops, when our divisions with a staff of 10 thousand people began the Berlin operation in the amount of 4-5 thousand people, when the companies there were not 150 people, but 100.

V. DYMARSKY: Understaffed?

A. ISAEV: This was a terrible understaffing of the troops, and it, I would even say, has no precedents before. That is, in 1945, on average, half the number of troops fought, and in some places there were divisions of 2 thousand people, but this was, as it were, on the periphery, somewhere in Courland. And Berlin - yes, there was a small margin of safety for the troops. If they had not shown any cunning, some use of combat experience, then with these divisions of 4-5 thousand people they simply would not have reached Berlin. They had too few people to put them on the heights, and then that was it - there was no one to advance with.

V. DYMARSKY: Alexey, another question. This German group, which was defeated somewhere, was bypassed somewhere, was this, as it were, the last redoubt, the last frontier before Berlin? What is it, 60 kilometers, if I'm not mistaken, approximately?

A. ISAEV: Yes, it was 60. If you take, as they say, from the top of the bridgehead, then 60 kilometers to the outskirts of Berlin. And the German 9th Army of Busse, General Busse, stood on the way to Berlin.

V. DYMARSKY: Later?

A. ISAEV: No, she stood on the Oder front. And if it was defeated and surrounded, then what remained was the Berlin garrison, which included Volkssturmists, policemen, and firefighters.

V. DYMARSKY: Well, these are already urban battles, right?

A. ISAEV: These are urban battles, in which... Again, why do I consider Zhukov a very literate person? He thought through the operation well so that the bulk of these qualified military men from Busse’s army were cut off from Berlin. Several defeated divisions were driven to Berlin with part of the Seelow Heights from the Oder Front, and the rest were unskilled people, these were Volkssturmists, that is, either young people or old people, police, air defense, in general, all those who were poorly trained in infantry battle. Therefore, Berlin was taken in 10 days. This is to some extent a record. And the Germans did not have the strength to defend such a large city and defend every building. Now, if we take Poznan, even Küstrin, which are smaller cities, was taken with great difficulty, again, in proportion to their size than Berlin. Because what’s it like in Berlin? The Germans could only control individual buildings. And these buildings were demolished and moved forward. And, in fact, this was a consequence of the success on the Seelow Heights, again, conditionally on the Seelow Heights, but it would be more correct to call it “On the Oder Front.”

When this Oder front was broken, the Germans were surrounded in the forests southeast of Berlin, there some remnants of Berlin were dispersed in different directions and they took the city, which was being defended by non-professionals. Naturally, non-professionals had very little chance against professionals. This handful of beaten divisions under the command of Weidling, they could not become the cement of the city’s defense. And the fate of Berlin will be decided on the Oder front - that’s what the Germans said, and Busse, and the commander of the army group Wisla Heinrici, that if the front collapses on the Seelow Heights, again, then the fate of Berlin will be decided. And the front collapsed. In just 4 days it was really broken.

V. DYMARSKY: Could they have broken it earlier? Could it be more effective? Well, it’s probably always possible, I understand.

A. ISAEV: If you look back, then perhaps it was worthwhile, for example, to delay the introduction of tank armies. Although, in reality, it turned out that it was the tank armies that found and knocked out that traffic jam.

V. DYMARSKY: And there really was this attack, if you like, literally, of tanks on infantry?

A. ISAEV: Well, one might say, the attack is conditional and in quotes, it consisted in the fact that the artillery was moving. On the morning of April 16, the Seelow Heights were visible only through binoculars. We actually walked for some time on terrain as smooth as a table. Well, I was there, and it’s very clear that the terrain is smooth, and then these low, but still, heights go up sharply. So, they came to the end of the first day of the operation.

It was necessary to move the artillery, and at this moment 2 tank armies entered the field with their mass of tanks, trucks and other equipment. And the roads were clogged. Artillery moving forward with agricultural tractors, Chuikov and these tank armies. Naturally, there was a hodgepodge, confusion and, despite draconian regulatory measures, there was a certain level of chaos. And this is sometimes considered a mistake. Chuikov rightly says: “Yes, I had tanks!” He actually had 50 ISs for a narrow front, IS-2 heavy tanks, with which he, in fact, broke the defense. On the first day he lost 25, he still had 50 left and, in principle, he was ready to fight his way forward on his own. But, nevertheless, they decided to introduce tank armies, but they were not introduced as they would have been introduced somewhere near Rzhev, they were not ground down on the first day, as at Prokhorovka - when an army is introduced, 50% of its armored vehicles are knocked out on the first same day. Then they carefully entered the bridgehead, got involved in the battle, felt that the resistance was too strong and very carefully probed the German defenses, found a weak point, broke through and then rushed forward. Because the losses that could have occurred were avoided. There, indeed, Soviet tank troops fought headlong. And we must pay tribute to Katukov and Bogdanov that, despite the fact that they were up against such a tough positional defense, they did not turn this battle into Prokhorovka or Rzhev.

V. DYMARSKY: Also, so to speak, among the mistakes of the Soviet command they call... Well, firstly, the fact that the fortified positions of the Germans on the Seelow Heights themselves turned out to be a surprise - for some reason they were not expected there, they were expected below, right?

A. ISAEV: Not exactly. The enemy resistance forces turned out to be unexpected. What positions will be overcome in the valley - they were overcome with difficulty, let's go out...

V. DYMARSKY: Yes. And there the second echelon turned out to be.

A. ISAEV: Yes. That we, as it were, will be able to shoot him down. But they couldn’t bring him down right away. That is, they could not shoot down on the Seelow Heights - these were 2 left-flank armies; on all the Haupt Graben canals, those who were north of the Seelow Heights could not shoot down, which, again, these Seelow Heights were seen only through binoculars. But they too were stuck.

V. DYMARSKY: Another mistake from what I saw was that there was a very short artillery preparation, there, half an hour instead of the usual couple of hours.

A. ISAEV: Well, here the situation is as follows. Zhukov had a very powerful artillery fist. And it was enough, in fact, due to the enormous power... Heavy artillery up to 305 millimeters inclusive was used there. And so, in fact, half an hour was enough. And then she moved on based on requests from the troops.

Here, again, there is such a stereotype: here, the artillery hits, hits, hits, then the infantry comes and takes over. But here it turned out that first artillery preparation, and then work - exactly as it is written in the documents - work according to the requests of the troops. That is, we encountered resistance, not just, so, in the abstract, we shot several cars, hundreds and thousands of cars of ammunition in 2 hours, but we encountered resistance, and we are collapsing this knot of resistance. At the request of the troops. Therefore, the Germans, when they wrote in the daytime report of Army Group Vistula, indicated the duration of Soviet artillery preparation as 2.5 hours. They had the illusion, firstly, because of the power of the artillery barrage itself, and secondly, that it continued with the accompaniment of the infantry, work according to its requests.

V. DYMARSKY: And, by the way, here, in my opinion, even the question was like this, if I’m not mistaken. Okay, I won’t look for it, I just remember this question. What is the Germans’ assessment of these battles, which naturally appeared after the war?

A. ISAEV: Well, after the war they considered it to some extent a success, but, again, they considered their defense of the Seelow Heights a success. And the Oder Front itself - yes, it collapsed. It was such a tactical success. Well, one might say, a kind of fortress that stood in the middle of a stormy sea.

V. DYMARSKY: Also, clarify this situation, which is very often mentioned, with these spotlights.

A. ISAEV: The situation with spotlights is as follows. Still, this is spring, this is not June 22, when we have the longest day, it is dark. And they extended the first day. The first day is very important. Therefore, we decided to start as early as possible. Firstly, it was a surprise for the Germans, this attack under the light of searchlights, they did not expect that the offensive would begin so early. And, in principle, Zhukov made the most of his situation, which was not the best.

He started unexpectedly with spotlights, he actually spent the first hour or two under spotlights, lengthening the day. That is, he received more light time to continue the offensive and to reach, in fact, the 2nd line of defense.

V. DYMARSKY: This probably also indicates a rush, after all.

A. ISAEV: Well, it’s not so much a rush. This is a man, everything that could be thought of, and, as they say now, creativity - he squeezed out the maximum amount of creativity from an initially rather rotten situation. Now, if someone else had been in his place, more people would have been lost on these Seelow Heights. And so, for the Germans this blow was unexpected, despite the fact that the searchlights did not live up to expectations, and partly, one might say, because of the shoals below, when they entrusted the placement of searchlights to the non-commissioned staff, as a result they were not placed very well. But nevertheless, in general, this was assessed as not the worst element of the operation. Moreover, the Germans attacked under searchlights in 1941. And the Ardennes operation also began with searchlights. This is one of the tricks. And, for example, the Vistula-Oder began in the light of illumination shells. This is simply a technique that allows you to fight longer in a short day.

V. DYMARSKY: Well, once again, I’ll just refer to Zhukov, right? Here, his order is dated April 18, that is, this is the third day of fighting. “The main reason for the poor offensive lies in disorganization, lack of coordination of troops and lack of requirements for individuals, and so on. I order”... I see, right? “The offensive on Berlin is developing unacceptably slowly.” That is, these are Zhukov’s own assessments.

A. ISAEV: Yes, I was lagging behind.

V. DYMARSKY: Constant orders, disorganization, everything is bad.

A. ISAEV: Well, naturally. The boss, when he comes, if he says, “Everything is fine,” people will naturally relax. He comes and says that everything is bad, you are cheaters, slackers, and so on. This is, I would say, a typical managerial technique, and there, in the same order, there is a very interesting point - it forces us to move command posts closer to the front line. This was, in fact, the German strategy, even the tactics and style of command, when commanding from the front line. Guderian commanded from the front line, Romel commanded from the front line. This was considered a rule of good manners when the commander, the commander of the formation, sees the battlefield. And Zhukov, so to speak, used a stick to force some of his subordinates to command in this style. And so, for me it was a very funny correlation of command styles. That Zhukov really wanted to command the front lines. And his command post was on Rheintwein, a branch of the Seelow Heights, which had already been captured (more precisely, the Lebus Heights). And he saw the battlefield, and he could make decisions. He made decisions about sending in tank armies precisely by seeing what was happening.

V. DYMARSKY: Let’s answer the questions a little, Alexey - we have very little time. Dmitry asks: “Tell me, was it possible to bypass the Seelow Heights from the north and blockade Berlin?”

A. ISAEV: They were bypassed from the north. It was possible to get around from the south of Frankfurt - that’s what the second plan of the Oder is. So, in reality, the Seelow Heights, I emphasize again, were bypassed and bypassed from the north.

V. DYMARSKY: Vadim asks: “Did Hitler have a chance to stop the offensive and recapture the territory?” What does it mean to “recapture territory”? Well, stop the offensive, probably.

A. ISAEV: There was a chance to stop the offensive if he had more troops, if some other person opposed him. Now, if it were someone else, we won’t even name specific names.

V. DYMARSKY: Well, what can I say? (laughs)

A. ISAEV: Well, I, nevertheless, will honestly say my personal opinion - I think that I have the right to it. If Rokossovsky had been in Zhukov’s place, there would have been a good chance of getting stuck on the Seelow Heights.

V. DYMARSKY: By the way, I generally want to tell our audience that all our guests, and we too, naturally express not some official points of view, but our personal ones, and, in general, we always speak in our programs, that they (the programs) exist not to dot the i's, but to somehow stimulate you, or something, and to take up this issue yourself, draw your own conclusions, nothing more.

“And they say,” Vlad writes to us, “that Antonov clashed with Stalin. Stalin wanted to take Berlin on two fronts, and Antonov proposed three. This is true?"

A. ISAEV: As a result, when the throwing began, there were attempts to deploy 2 neighboring fronts to Zhukov towards Berlin. Yes, this happened, but in reality those directives that Stalin and Antonov signed on April 2, 1945, they set the task of taking Berlin to Zhukov, and, accordingly, Konev and Rokossovsky to reach the line of contact with the allies without setting them the task of taking Berlin.

V. DYMARSKY: Oh, I just found a question that I couldn’t find, how our allies assessed the assault on the Seelow Heights. Teacher from Kazan Triad. Well, I mean, not the Germans, but the allies, right? Well, the British, the Americans.

A. ISAEV: Well, they, in fact, knew too little and their information from the Germans was distorted. The Germans, naturally, puffed out their cheeks and said: “Yes, we retreated from the first position and deceived the Russians.” In fact, shortly before Busset’s operation, the commander of the 9th Army on the Oder Front said, “I cannot give my troops this order to jump back and get away from the Russian artillery, because my troops are too weak morally. If they start to retreat, it will end in flight on the streets of Berlin."

V. DYMARSKY: Well, here’s a question, Dmitry, a specialist from Moscow: “Was there any point in securing the flanks for 2 months, wasn’t it more rational to move troops to Berlin in February 1945? After all, the Pomeranian, East Prussian and similar groups could be pinned down by maneuverable defense.

A. ISAEV: We had a program on this topic, I think, 2 months ago. But now I will answer briefly that thanks to the fact that the Germans were defeated in Pomerania, those armies lined up shoulder to shoulder on the Küstrin bridgehead, some of which would otherwise have had to be placed at the front to the north. For example, the 3rd Shock Army, which eventually took the Reichstag, would have stood front to the north against the Pomeranian group.

V. DYMARSKY: Well, by the way, when Zhukov became commander of the 1st Belorussian Front in November 1944, he also promised to first take Berlin by February 20th. At first, right?

A. ISAEV: Well, here the allies promised that they would go home for Christmas in the summer of 1944. This is what a person assumes, and the enemy always interferes with his plans.

V. DYMARSKY: Well, we will probably complete our program little by little. We also have, as usual, a portrait at the end of the program. Well, and the “Price of Victory” program itself... Thanks, firstly, to Alexey Isaev, and we say goodbye to you for the week. See you.

A. ISAEV: Goodbye.

T. DZYADKO: They say about people like him that they don’t grab stars from the sky. And it's true. Leonid Govorov did not take Berlin, he did not head the General Staff, a sort of eternal, almost Tolstoyan artilleryman. In a combat description of him in 1942, when he was the commander of the 5th Army, it was stated that, further quote, “in operational-tactical terms, he is well prepared, the main drawback of Comrade Govorov is some scattering along the entire front and the lack of skills in collecting a fist for a strike actions. Comrade Govorov is a strong-willed, demanding, energetic, brave and organized commander of the troops.” At the request of Zhukov, Govorov was appointed commander of the 5th Army - then, in 1941, there were heavy battles near Mozhaisk, and then Govorov’s luck was to convince the command of the inappropriateness of fighting for the city. But the central thing, of course, is not this, but the Leningrad Front, whose commander Govorov became in the summer of 1942, and breaking the blockade, which was not immediately successful.

Stalin could not doubt Govorov's complete devotion. Like some other marshals, he had something to fear in his biography: he was a former White Guard, served under Kolchak, and at the beginning of the war was a non-party member. It’s strange, but true: the Soviet regime did not come back to haunt him with his white past. He had something to fear, so Stalin could not doubt his loyalty. Although, unlike, for example, Budyonny, Govorov does not seem to be noticed in an overly vivid demonstration of his feelings. In any case, he did not try to administer justice in the same way as Budyonny. On the contrary, after the war, without much pleasure or enthusiasm, he met the case of the Leningraders and the case of the doctors, with which he was allegedly associated not as an accused, but as a victim.

Everything that happened after the war is not so important compared to what happened at the front. 10 years of various positions in the Leningrad Military District of the Ministry of Defense. By the end, he had already become commander-in-chief of the air defense forces. He died in 1955 as a marshal, hero of the Soviet Union, holder of the Order of Victory.

Battle of Seelow Heights

By April 1945, the fate of the Third Reich was already decided. The armies of the USSR and Western allies tightened the ring. The whole question now was in what configuration and at what cost the war would end. The Allies, through a series of maneuvers, blocked the main forces of the German Western Front in the Ruhr. The Red Army stood on the bridgeheads beyond the Oder, several tens of kilometers from Berlin, and was preparing for the final push.

At the beginning of April, it was not obvious who exactly would enter the German capital. The collapse of the German front awakened Churchill's ambitions. The British leader wrote to Roosevelt about the need to quickly break through to the depths and capture Berlin. However, this plan met with opposition from the Allied commander Dwight David Eisenhower.

He noted that a rush to Berlin with bare flanks would lead to a supply crisis, and in a military sense it was necessary to defeat the group encircled in the Ruhr and prevent the Wehrmacht from retreating to the so-called Alpine fortress in Bavaria and western Austria.

It is interesting that the earlier agreements with the Soviet Union were not even mentioned by anyone. Military considerations prevailed. Therefore, a headlong rush to Berlin from the west did not take place.

Meanwhile, Stalin understood perfectly well that Berlin gave its occupier serious political preferences, so he was not going to let such valuable booty slip from his hands. There were also purely military reasons to defeat the Nazis as quickly as possible. The Wehrmacht was not at all incapable of combat. The German army still numbered several million soldiers, and its reserves of weapons allowed them to conduct active battles for several more months.

A little-known fact is that the Germans tried to impose their will on the allies until the very end, and the last cauldron of the war dates back to April 1945, when several Polish divisions were surrounded near Bautzen, from where they were hardly rescued. In short, stopping and complacently waiting for the allies to arrive from the west was in any case a bad idea.

Georgy Zhukov presented the headquarters with two plans for the conquest of Berlin. The “long” plan involved the consolidation of bridgeheads beyond the Oder and the encirclement of the Germans in Frankfurt-on-Oder. According to this plan, two Soviet fronts bypassed Berlin from the south with combined forces, delivering only auxiliary attacks from Küstrin. A ramming attack on two fronts immediately south of Berlin would, without a doubt, have demolished everything in its path: in reality, they were managed there with much smaller forces. However, its implementation required at least a few more weeks.

According to Stalin, the Red Army did not have several weeks. Therefore, it was necessary to implement a “short program”: Konev’s 1st Ukrainian Front operated south of Berlin, and Zhukov’s 1st Belorussian Front attacked the German capital directly. He left for the 1st Belorussian Front to prepare a strike on the German capital.

And so the battle for the Seelow Heights began.

SEELOWSKIE (Seelow) HEIGHTS, a ridge of heights on the North German Lowland, 50-60 km east of Berlin, passing along the left bank of the old river bed. Oder.

Length up to 20 km, width 4-10 km, height exceeding the river valley. Oder 40-50 m, slope steepness up to 30-40°. The fascist German command created a second defense line on the 3elovsky heights, which had continuous trenches, a large number of bunkers, machine gun sites, trenches for artillery and anti-tank weapons, anti-tank and anti-personnel barriers. An anti-tank ditch up to 3 m deep and 3.5 m wide was dug in front of the heights, and the approaches to the heights were mined and shot through with multi-layered cross artillery and rifle-machine gun fire. The enemy turned some buildings into strongholds. The fascist German troops (mainly the 9th Field Army) defending the 3elovsky heights were reinforced by artillery from the Berlin air defense zone.

Armored vehicles and vehicles could overcome the slopes of the 3elovsky heights mainly along highways, which were mined and shot through by anti-tank and anti-aircraft (88-mm) guns. The troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, having gone on the offensive on April 16 and successfully overcome the first line of defense, by the end of the day met fierce enemy resistance on the 3yelovsky heights, where the enemy withdrew from the first line and his divisions from the reserve approached. The density of enemy artillery on both sides of the highway running from Zelov to the west was increased to 200 guns per 1 km of front. The front commander's attempt to speed up the advance of troops by introducing two tank armies into battle on the very first day of the offensive did not lead to the desired result. The mobile formations were unable to break away from the infantry and became involved in grueling battles. Only towards the end of April 17, after powerful artillery and air preparation, the enemy defenses in the main directions of the 3elovsky heights. was broken through by troops of the 8th Guards Army in cooperation with the 1st Guards Tank Army.

German defense

He was considered one of the best specialists in defensive tactics. He knew in advance that the Soviet Army would direct its main attack along the highway, not far from which the Seelow Heights were located.

Hendrizi did not strengthen the river bank. Instead, he took advantage of the advantageous location of the heights through which the Oder flowed. The river's floodplain was always saturated with floods in the spring, so German engineers first destroyed part of the dam and then released the water upstream. Thus, the plain turned into a swamp. Behind it there were three lines of defense: the first - a system of various fortifications, barriers and trenches; the second is the Seelow Heights, the battle for which will last from April 16 to 19; the third is the Wotan line, located 17-20 km behind the front line itself.

By the beginning of the battle, the 56th German Tank Corps numbered about 50 thousand people. After the battle, only 13-15 thousand fighters were able to break into Berlin, who later became defenders of the fascist capital.

Operation plan of the 1st Belorussian Front

The general plan of the operation of the 1st Belorussian Front under the command of Marshal G.K. Zhukov was to deliver a crushing blow to the Wehrmacht group covering Berlin from the east, to develop an offensive against the German capital by bypassing it from the north and south, followed by an assault on the city and the exit of our troops to the river Elbe.
The troops of the 1st Belorussian Front occupied a section of the front 172 km wide, from Nipperwiese to Gross-Gastrose. The main attack group of the front deployed on the 44-kilometer section of Güstebise, Podelzig. The right flank of the front was deployed in the Nipperwiese, Güstebise sector. The left flank of the front deployed on the 82-kilometer section of Podelzig, Gross-Gastrose.
The main blow was delivered by 4 combined arms and two tank armies from the Küstrin area. The troops of the 3rd Shock Army under the command of Vasily Ivanovich Kuznetsov, the 5th Shock Army of Nikolai Erastovich Berzarin and the 8th Guards Army of Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov, deployed in the center of the Kyustrin bridgehead, were supposed to break through the German defenses, ensure the entry of tank formations into the breakthrough and attack the German capital.

V.I. Kuznetsov N.E. Berzarin

V.I. Chuikov

On the sixth day of the operation they were supposed to be on the eastern shore of Lake Havel (Havel) in the Hennigsdorf, Gatov area. The 47th Army of Franz Perkhorovich received the task of bypassing Berlin from the north-west, advancing in the general direction towards Nauen, Rathenow and on the 11th day of the operation to reach the Elbe. In addition, the 3rd Army of Alexander Gorbatov was located in the second echelon of the front in the main direction.
The tank armies were in the second echelon of the strike force and were supposed to develop an offensive bypassing Berlin from the north and south. 1st Guards Tank Army commanded by Mikhail Efimovich Katukov should have attacked not from the north together with the 2nd Guards Tank Army, as the Supreme High Command Headquarters had previously planned, but from the south in order to take the southern part of Berlin.

The offensive of Katukov’s army was also supported by Ivan Yushchuk’s 11th Tank Corps. This change in the mission of Katukov’s army was proposed by Zhukov, and Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin approved. The northern part of the bypass group was already very powerful, it included: the 61st Army of Pavel Belov, the 1st Army of the Polish Army Stanislav Gilarovich Poplavsky, 47th Army of Perkhorovich, 2nd Guards Tank Army of Semyon Bogdanov, 9th Tank Corps of Ivan Kirichenko and 7th Guards Cavalry Corps of Mikhail Konstantinov.

S.G. Poplavsky

To ensure the advance of the main attack group of the front in the center on the flanks, two auxiliary attacks were launched from the north and south. In the north, Belov's 61st Army and Poplavsky's 1st Army of the Polish Army were advancing. They struck in the general direction of Liebenwalde, Wulkau, and on the 11th day of the offensive they were supposed to reach the Elbe in the areas of Wilsnack and Sandau.
In the south, the second blow, ensuring the offensive of the main strike group, was delivered by the 69th Army of Vladimir Kolpakchi, the 33rd Army of Vyacheslav Tsvetaev and the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps. The Soviet armies advanced in the Podelzig, Briskov sector in the general direction of Fürstenwalde, Potsdam and Brandenburg. The armies of Kolpakchi and Tsvetaev were supposed to break through the German defenses in the Frankfurt direction and, advancing to the west, with access to the southern and southwestern parts of Berlin, cut off the main forces of the 9th German Army from the capital.
In total, the 1st Belorussian Front had 9 combined arms and 2 tank armies, one air army (16th Air Army of Sergei Rudenko), two tank corps (9th Tank Corps of Ivan Kirichenko, 11th Tank Corps of Ivan Yushchuk ), two Guards Cavalry Corps (7th Guards Cavalry Corps of Mikhail Konstantinov, 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps of Vladimir Kryukov). The 1st Belorussian Front was also supported by the 18th Air Army of Chief Air Marshal Alexander Golovanov (long-range aviation) and Dnieper military flotilla of Vissarion Vissarionovich Grigoriev.

The 1st Belorussian Front had at its disposal more than 3 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, 18.9 thousand guns and mortars.
The three brigades of the Dnieper flotilla were armed with 34 armored boats, 20 minesweepers, 20 air defense boats, 32 half-gliders and 8 gunboats. The boats were armed with 37-, 40-, 76- and 100-mm cannons, 8-M-8 launchers for firing 82 mm caliber rockets, and heavy machine guns. The flotilla received the tasks of supporting the advancing troops, assisting in crossing water barriers, protecting water communications and crossings; destroy enemy mines installed on rivers; carry out breakthroughs into the depths of enemy defenses, disorganize the German rear, and land troops. The 3rd Brigade was supposed to capture hydraulic structures in the Furstenberg area, preventing their destruction.

A battery of Soviet 152-mm ML-20 howitzer guns near Berlin. 1st Belorussian Front

Preparing the operation

On the main direction of the offensive, an artillery group was formed with a density of about 270 barrels per 1 km of front (excluding 45 mm and 57 mm guns). To ensure tactical surprise of the offensive, they decided to carry out artillery preparation at night, 1.5-2 hours before dawn. To illuminate the area and blind the enemy, they concentrated 143 floodlight installations, which were supposed to start working with the start of the infantry attack.

30 minutes before the start of the artillery bombardment, night bomber aircraft were supposed to strike enemy communications headquarters. Simultaneously with artillery preparation, attack and bomber aircraft of the 16th Air Army launched massive attacks on enemy strongholds and firing positions to a depth of 15 km. After the introduction of mobile formations into the battle, the main task of aviation was to suppress the anti-tank defense of German troops. Most of the attack and fighter aircraft switched to direct support of combined arms and tank armies.
On April 14-15, our troops conducted reconnaissance in force to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the German defense, its firing positions and force the enemy to pull up reserves to the front line. The main events took place in the zone of the 4 combined arms armies of the front's main strike group. In the center, the offensive was carried out by reinforced rifle battalions of first-echelon divisions, and on the flanks by reinforced companies. The forward units were supported by heavy artillery fire. In different directions, our troops managed to penetrate the enemy’s battle formations by 2-5 km.
As a result, our troops overcame the strongest minefields and violated the integrity of the enemy's first line of defense, which facilitated the offensive of the front's main forces. In addition, the German command was misled. Based on the experience of previous operations, the Germans thought that the main forces of the front would go on the offensive behind the reconnaissance battalions. However, neither on April 14 nor on April 15 did our troops launch a general offensive. The German command made the erroneous conclusion that the offensive of the main forces of the 1st Belorussian Front was postponed for several days.

Soviet bombers are heading for Berlin

Soviet soldiers cross the Oder River

Breaking through enemy defenses

At 5 a.m. on April 16, 1945, artillery preparation began in complete darkness. At the front of the main strike group, artillery suppressed enemy targets within 20 minutes to a depth of 6-8 km and in places up to 10 km. In such a short period, about 500 thousand shells and mines of all calibers were fired. The effectiveness of the artillery strike was great. In the first two trenches, from 30 to 70% of the personnel of the German units were disabled. When Soviet infantry and tanks went on the attack in some directions, they advanced 1.5-2 km without encountering enemy resistance. However, soon German troops, relying on a strong and well-prepared second line of defense, began to offer fierce resistance. Fierce fighting broke out along the entire front.
At the same time, bombers of the 16th Air Army attacked headquarters, communications centers, and 3-4 trenches of the enemy’s main defense line. The 18th Air Army (heavy aviation) also took part in the attack. For 40 minutes, 745 vehicles bombed the specified targets. In just one day, despite the unfavorable weather conditions, our pilots made 6,550 sorties, including 877 at night. More than 1,500 tons of bombs were dropped on the enemy. German aviation tried to resist. During the day, 140 air battles took place. Our falcons shot down 165 German vehicles.

The 606th Special Purpose Division, defending in the offensive zone of Perkhorovich’s 47th Army, suffered heavy losses. German soldiers were caught in the trenches by artillery fire and many died. However, the Germans put up stubborn resistance; our troops had to advance, repelling numerous counterattacks. By the end of the day, our troops advanced 4-6 km, capturing a number of important strongholds deep in the enemy’s defenses. More than 300 prisoners were captured.
Kuznetsov's 3rd Shock Army advanced successfully. The troops began to advance under the light of searchlights. The greatest success was achieved in the offensive zone of the right-flank 79th Rifle Corps of General S.N. Perevertkin. Our troops repulsed several enemy counterattacks and captured the important strongholds of Gross Barnim and Klein Barnim. To increase the pressure of the 79th Corps into its offensive zone at 10 o'clock. Kirichenko's 9th Tank Corps was introduced. As a result, our infantry and tanks advanced 8 km and reached the enemy's intermediate defensive zone. On the left flank, the 12th Guards Rifle Corps under General A.F. Kazankin advanced 6 km in a day. Particularly stubborn battles took place here for the Lechin stronghold.

German troops repelled a frontal attack by the 33rd division of General V.I. Smirnov with heavy fire. Then the 33rd division and the 52nd division of General N.D. Kozin bypassed Lechin from the north and south. So they took the strong point. Thus, during the day of a difficult battle, the troops of the 3rd Shock Army broke through the main line of enemy defense and with their right wing reached the intermediate zone. About 900 prisoners were captured.
Under the light of searchlights, Berzarin's 5th Shock Army went on the offensive. The greatest success was achieved by the central 32nd Rifle Corps of General D.S. Zherebin. Our troops advanced 8 km and by the end of the day reached the right bank of the Alt Oder River, to the second line of enemy defense in the Platkov-Guzov sector. On the right flank of the army, the 26th Guards Rifle Corps, overcoming fierce enemy resistance, advanced 6 km. The troops of the left flank of the 9th Rifle Corps also advanced 6 km. At the same time, units of the 301st Infantry Division of Colonel V.S. Antonov took an important enemy stronghold - Verbig.
In the battle for the Verbig station, the Komsomol organizer of the 1st battalion of the 1054th Infantry Regiment, Lieutenant Grant Arsenovich Avakyan, distinguished himself. Having discovered an enemy detachment preparing for a counterattack, Avakyan, taking the fighters with him, headed towards the house. Having sneaked up on the enemy secretly, Avakyan threw three grenades out the window. The Germans, gripped by panic, jumped out of the house and came under concentrated fire from machine gunners. During this battle, Lieutenant Avakyan and his soldiers destroyed 56 German soldiers, captured 14 people, and captured 2 armored personnel carriers. On April 24, Avakyan distinguished himself once again when capturing and holding a bridgehead across the Spree River on the streets of Berlin. He was seriously wounded. For his courage and heroism, Lieutenant Avakyan was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
Thus, by the end of the day, the troops of the 5th Shock Army, breaking enemy resistance, advanced 6-8 km. Our troops broke through all three positions of the main line of German defense, and entered the offensive zone of the 32nd and 9th Rifle Corps to its second line of defense.
The troops of Chuikov's 8th Guards Army moved into the attack under the light of 51 searchlights.

It should be noted that their light stunned the Germans and at the same time illuminated the way for our advancing troops. In addition, the searchlights were disabled by German night vision systems due to powerful illumination. Almost simultaneously with the infantry, the advanced brigades of Katukov's 1st Guards Tank Army moved. The reconnaissance units of the advanced brigades entered the battle in the ranks of the infantry. Having broken through the enemy's defenses and repelled several counterattacks by the 20th Motorized and 169th Infantry Divisions, our troops advanced 3-6 km. The main line of enemy defense was broken through. By 12 o'clock, Chuikov's guards and the advanced units of the tank army reached the Seelow Heights, where the second powerful line of enemy defense lay. The battles for the Seelow Heights began.

The assault on the Seelow Heights begins.

Zhukov's decision to bring tank armies into battle

The German command managed to withdraw part of the forces of the 20th Motorized Division to this line of defense, and also transferred the Muncheberg tank division from the reserve.

The anti-tank defense of the Seelow direction was reinforced by a significant part of the artillery of the Berlin air defense zone. The second line of German defense had a large number of wood-earth firing points, machine gun platforms, firing positions for artillery and anti-tank weapons, anti-tank and anti-personnel barriers. There was an anti-tank ditch in front of the heights; the steepness of the slopes reached 30-40 degrees and tanks could not overcome them. The roads along which armored vehicles could pass were mined and shot through. The buildings were turned into strongholds.
The rifle corps of the 8th Guards Army did not reach the heights at the same time, so the 15-minute fire raid provided for in the offensive plan was carried out as they approached. As a result, there was no simultaneous and powerful artillery strike. The German fire system was not suppressed and our troops were met with heavy artillery, mortar and machine gun fire.

Repeated attempts by the guards infantry and advanced tank units to break into the enemy's defenses were unsuccessful. At the same time, the Germans themselves repeatedly launched counterattacks with forces ranging from a battalion to an infantry regiment, with the support of 10-25 tanks and self-propelled guns, and strong artillery fire. The most brutal fighting took place along the Seelow-Müncheberg highway, where the Germans installed about 200 anti-aircraft guns (up to half 88-mm anti-aircraft guns).
Marshal Zhukov, taking into account the complexity of the upcoming battle, decided to move mobile formations closer to the first echelon. By 12 o'clock On April 16, the tank armies were already completely on the Küstrin bridgehead, fully ready to engage in battle. Assessing the situation in the first half of the day, the front commander came to the conclusion that, despite powerful artillery and air preparation, the enemy’s defense in the second zone was not suppressed and the offensive of the four combined arms armies slowed down. The armies clearly did not have time to complete the task of the day. At 16 o'clock. 30 min. Zhukov gave the order to bring the Guards tank armies into the battle, although according to the original plan they were planned to be brought into battle after breaking through the second line of enemy defense.

Commander of the 1st Belorussian Front, Marshal Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov (1896-1974) at the command post of the Seelow Heights.
On the far right is member of the Front Military Council, Colonel General K.F. Telegin, far left - commander of the artillery of the 1st Belorussian Front, Colonel General V.I. Kazakov, second from left - Chief of Front Logistics, Colonel General N.A. Antipenko.

Mobile formations, in cooperation with infantry, were supposed to break through the second line of enemy defense. The 1st Guards Tank Army was deployed in the offensive zone of the 8th Guards Army. Bogdanov's 2nd Guards Tank Army with its 9th and 12th Guards Tank Corps began moving with the goal of advancing in the general direction of Neuhardenberg and Bernau. However, leaving at 19 o'clock. to the line of the advanced units of the 3rd and 5th shock armies, the tank army could not go further.

A battery of Soviet 122 mm M-30 howitzers fires at Berlin

Combat operations in auxiliary directions

On April 16, the 61st Army regrouped its forces in a new direction and made preparations for an offensive the next day. The troops of the 1st Polish Army went on the offensive in three divisions. The Poles crossed the Oder and advanced 5 km. As a result, by the end of the day, Polish troops broke through the first line of enemy defense. In the evening, the second echelon of the Polish army began to cross the Oder.
The left-flank strike group - the 69th and 33rd armies went on the offensive at different times. Kolpakchi's 69th Army went on the offensive early in the morning under the light of searchlights. Our troops advanced 2-4 km, breaking fierce resistance and repelling fierce enemy counterattacks. Our troops were able to break through on the Lebus-Schönflies highway. By the end of the day, the army broke through the main line of defense and reached the line of Podelzig, Shenfis, Wüste-Kunersdorf. In the area of ​​Shenfis station, our troops reached the second line of enemy defense.
Tsvetaev's 33rd Army began its offensive a little later. Our troops, in forested and swampy terrain, advanced 4-6 km, breaking through two positions of the enemy’s main defense line. On the right flank, the 38th Rifle Corps reached the defensive perimeter by the end of the day Fortress Frankfurt.

Thus, on the first day of the offensive, with strong support from artillery and aviation, our troops broke through only the enemy’s main line, advancing 3-8 kilometers in different directions. It was not possible to completely complete the task on the first day - to break through the second line of enemy defense, which ran along the Seelow Heights. Underestimation of the enemy's defense played a role. The enemy's powerful defenses and the remaining unsuppressed fire system required a regrouping of artillery and new artillery and aviation training.
To speed up the offensive, Zhukov brought both main mobile formations into battle - the tank armies of Katukov and Bogdanov. However, they began to take positions in the evening and were unable to change the situation. The Soviet command on the evening of April 16 ordered to continue the offensive at night and on the morning of April 17 to break through the second line of defense of the German army. To do this, they decided to conduct a second 30-40-minute artillery preparation, concentrating up to 250-270 artillery barrels per 1 kilometer of the front. In addition, the army commanders were ordered not to get involved in protracted battles for enemy strongholds, to bypass them, transferring the tasks of eliminating the encircled German garrisons to the last units of the second and third echelons of the armies. The Guards Tank Armies were ordered to organize cooperation with the infantry.

Red Army soldiers are advancing on the Seelow Heights.

The German command hastily took measures to strengthen the defense of the Berlin direction from the east. From April 18 to April 25, from the 3rd and 4th tank armies and the remnants of the East Prussia Army, 2 commands and corps and 9 divisions were transferred to the 9th Army. So on April 18-19, the 11th SS Motorized Rifle Division "Nordland", the 23rd SS Motorized Rifle Division "Netherland" arrived from the 3rd Panzer Army; On April 19, the command of the 56th Tank Corps and the 214th Infantry Division arrived from the 4th Tank Army. Then the command of the 5th Army Corps and other units arrived. The Germans tried with all their might to stop the advance of the 1st Belorussian Front.

Soviet artillery bombardment in the Seelow Heights area

Two Soviet tank crews pose for a photograph, lying in front of a German heavy tank Pz.Kpfw.VI Ausf.B "Royal Tiger" from the 502nd SS heavy tank battalion (SS-s.Pz.Abt.502), abandoned in the Seelow Heights area . Germany, spring 1945.

The 102nd SS Heavy Tank Battalion was formed on July 19, 1943, after an order according to which a tank unit equipped with Tiger tanks was to be created within the 2nd SS Panzer Corps; on November 4, 1943, the formation received the name 102nd Heavy tank battalion, from July to August 1944, the battalion fought in Normandy against the landing Allied forces and destroyed at least 230 enemy tanks and 30 anti-tank guns. In September 1944, the battalion was reorganized at Sennelager and placed under the command of Sturmbannführer Kurt Hartrumff. In March 1945, the unit received new Tiger II tanks and was renamed the 502nd SS Heavy Tank Battalion. As part of the Vistula-Oder operation, the battalion was sent to the front in the Küstrin area.

The unit took part in the last battles in the Halba pocket and southeast of Berlin, destroying about 70 enemy tanks in the second half of April. On May 1, 1945, the battalion had to abandon its last Tiger tank near Elzholz.
Yushchuk's 11th Tank Corps achieved some success and advanced north of the village of Seelow. These tank crews were smart, they dragged mattresses and attached them to the front of the tanks - some salvation from “ Faustpatrons."

Yet Seelow was located inside the German line, not outside it, and the tanks huddled close to the roads, not wanting to become easy targets. The day was terribly difficult - and above all because it did not produce the expected results.

German 105-mm howitzers leFH 18/40, captured by troops of the 1st Belorussian Front near the city of Seelow. April 1945

April 18 was a particularly difficult day for Zhukov among all the difficult ones. The flow of wounded from the front line did not decrease.

A Soviet orderly takes a wounded soldier to the rear on a cart pulled by dogs. Seelow Heights area.

The fourth day of his operation was approaching, and he had not achieved the goals intended for the second day. The soldiers and officers, who had not slept for several days, walked forward with phenomenal silent determination.

With this incredible, desperate determination, the troops entered the third line of German defense. The enemy cannot withstand forces desperate in their selflessness? Fate favors the brave, Chuikov made it through this time too. Stalingraders are not lost. It can't get any worse. Closer to the ground and more calculated in movement. The village of Seelow is already behind us. Gradually, the German forces began to weaken. General Busse saw quite clearly that his left flank could no longer withstand the pressure. 56th Tank Corps Helmut Weidling- the main reserve force of the Germans on this section of the front - was melting before our eyes.

The requested SS divisions, the 18th and Nordland, were late. The 9th Parachute Division, which had taken the full force of Zhukov's initial terrible blow, was beginning to lose its combat strength. It was at this moment that the Fuhrer of the Hitler Youth, Axmann, suggested that Weidling send schoolchildren with Faust cartridges.

To Weidling's credit, he refused such help. "You can't sacrifice these kids for an already lost cause." The general's rage embarrassed Axman, and he left.

Forgetting about themselves and actually dooming themselves, the troops broke into the key point of German defense - Münscheberg. It was April 19, 9 pm, when the 82nd Guards Rifle Division burst into the city from the east. A little further north, Vriesen was taken. These were decisive milestones. Chuikov took the Seelow Heights. No less than thirty thousand heroes died in this terrible battle, where our soldier did not spare himself. Being at the limit of his physical capabilities, Zhukov saw the proverbial light at the end of the tunnel. It was late in the evening on Thursday, April 19, that the marshal saw real signs that the enemy was weakening and giving in. The third line of German defense was taken on a front 70 kilometers wide, from Alt-Oder to Kunersdorf. By April 20, its advanced units reached the suburbs of the German capital.

War Memorial at Seelow Heights

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67 years ago, on April 16, 1945, the famous assault on the Seelow Heights began - natural hills about 90 km east of Berlin. And this great battle, which showed massive examples of heroism and self-sacrifice of our soldiers and officers (and this when, as everyone already felt, there were only a few days left before Victory), at the same time became one of the most slandered pages of the Great Patriotic War.

In our post-perestroika literature and in modern liberal journalism, it is customary to assert that the frontal assault on the Seelow Heights was an unnecessary bloodbath from a military point of view, carried out by the “butcher” - Marshal Zhukov. He, they say, started it only in order to get ahead of his other “butcher” colleague, Marshal Konev, who was advancing on the capital of the Third Reich to the south, in seizing the laurels of the winner of Berlin.

“The beams of the searchlights rest on the smoke, nothing is visible, in front are the Seelow Heights furiously snarling with fire, and behind us are the generals fighting for the right to be the first to be in Berlin. When the defense was finally broken through in great blood, a bloodbath ensued on the streets of the city, in which the tanks burned one after another from well-aimed shots from the Faustians. Such an unsightly image of the final assault has developed in the post-war decades in the mass consciousness,” writes the famous Russian historian Aleksey Isaev and, using archival materials, refutes this Russophobic nonsense.

So why didn't our troops just try to encircle Berlin? Why did tank armies enter the city streets? Let's try to figure out why Zhukov did not send tank armies to bypass Berlin, writes Alexey Isaev.

Proponents of the theory about the expediency of encircling Berlin, the historian immediately notes, lose sight of the obvious question of the qualitative and quantitative composition of the city’s garrison. The German 9th Army stationed on the Oder consisted of 200,000 people. They should not have been given the opportunity to withdraw to Berlin. Zhukov already had before his eyes a chain of assaults on the surrounded cities declared by the Germans as “festungs” (fortresses), both in his front line and among his neighbors. Isolated Budapest defended itself from late December 1944 to February 10, 1945.

Therefore, Zhukov came up with a simple and, without exaggeration, a brilliant plan, says an authoritative historian. If the tank armies manage to break into operational space, then they must reach the outskirts of Berlin and form a kind of cocoon around the German capital, which would prevent the garrison from being strengthened by the 200,000-strong 9th Army or reserves from the west. It was not intended to enter the city at this stage. With the approach of the Soviet combined arms armies, the “cocoon” opened, and Berlin could already be stormed according to all the rules.

The largely unexpected turn of Konev’s troops towards Berlin, the historian notes, led to the modernization of the “cocoon” to a classic encirclement by adjacent flanks of two neighboring fronts. The main forces of the German 9th Army stationed on the Oder were surrounded in the forests southeast of Berlin. This was one of the major defeats of the Germans, undeservedly remaining in the shadow of the actual assault on the city. As a result, the capital of the “thousand-year Reich” was defended by Volkssturmists, members of the Hitler Youth, police and the remnants of units defeated on the Oder front. They numbered about 100,000 people, which was clearly not enough to defend such a large city. Berlin was divided into nine defense sectors. The garrison size of each sector according to the plan was to be 25,000 people. In reality, there were no more than 10,000 - 12,000 people. There was no question of any occupation of each house; only the key buildings of the districts were defended. The entry of a 400,000-strong group of two fronts into the city left no chance for the defenders. This led to a relatively quick assault on Berlin - about 10 days.

What made Zhukov delay his advance to Berlin, so much so that Stalin began sending orders to neighboring fronts to turn to Berlin? Many will give the answer right away: Seelow Heights. However, if you look at the map, the Seelow Heights “shade” only the left flank of the Kyustrin bridgehead, notes Isaev. If some armies got stuck on the heights, then what stopped the rest from breaking through to Berlin?

The legend appeared due to the memoirs of V.I. Chuikov and M.E. Katukova, explains the scientist. Advancing on Berlin outside the Seelow Heights N.E. Berzarin (commander of the 5th Shock Army) and S.I. Bogdanov (commander of the 2nd Guards Tank Army) did not leave any memoirs. The first died in a car accident immediately after the war, the second died in 1960, before the period of active writing of memoirs by our military leaders. At best, Bogdanov and Berzarin could talk about how they viewed the Seelow Heights through binoculars.

Maybe the problem was Zhukov’s idea to attack under the light of searchlights? Light attacks were not his invention. The Germans had been using floodlight attacks in the dark since 1941. Thus, for example, a bridgehead on the Dnieper near Kremenchug was captured, from which Kyiv was later surrounded. At the end of the war, the German offensive in the Ardennes began with floodlights. This case is closest to an attack under the light of searchlights from the Kyustrin bridgehead. The main goal of this technique was to lengthen the first, most important day of the operation. Yes, the beams of the searchlights were hampered by raised dust and smoke from explosions; it was unrealistic to blind the Germans with several searchlights per kilometer. But the main task was solved: the offensive on April 16 was launched earlier than the time of year allowed. By the way, the positions illuminated by searchlights were overcome quite quickly. Problems arose already at the end of the first day of the operation, when the spotlights had long been turned off. The left-flank armies of Chuikov and Katukov rested on the Seelow Heights, the right-flank armies of Berzarin and Bogdanov had difficulty moving through the network of irrigation canals on the left bank of the Oder. The Soviet offensive was expected near Berlin. Zhukov initially had a harder time than Konev, who broke through the weak German defenses far south of the German capital. This delay made Stalin nervous, especially since Zhukov's plan to send tank armies in the direction of Berlin, and not around it, was revealed.

But the crisis soon passed, the historian writes, and this happened precisely thanks to the tank armies. One of the mechanized brigades of Bogdanov’s army managed to find a weak point among the Germans and break through far into the German defense. The mechanized corps was first drawn into the breach, followed by the main forces of the two tank armies. The defense on the Oder front collapsed on the third day of fighting. The introduction of reserves by the Germans could not turn the tide: our tank armies simply bypassed them on both sides and rushed towards Berlin. After this, Zhukov only had to slightly turn one of the buildings toward the German capital and win the race that he did not start.

Losses at the Seelow Heights, Isaev notes, are often confused with losses in the entire Berlin operation. And he recalls that the irretrievable losses of Soviet troops in it amounted to 80,000 people, and the total losses - 360,000 people. These are the losses of three fronts advancing in a strip 300 km wide, i.e., the 1st Belorussian (commander - Zhukov), 1st Ukrainian (commander - Konev) and 2nd Belorussian (commander - Rokossovsky). To narrow these losses down to just a patch of the Seelow Heights is simply stupid. The only stupid thing is to turn 300,000 total losses into 300,000 killed. In reality, the total losses of the 8th Guards and 69th armies during the offensive in the Seelow Heights area amounted to about 20,000 people, and irretrievable losses - approximately 5,000 people. So much for Zhukov the “butcher”.

The breakthrough of the German defense by the 1st Belorussian Front in April 1945, Isaev believes, is worthy of study in textbooks on tactics and operational art. Unfortunately, due to Zhukov’s disgrace, neither the brilliant “cocoon” plan nor the daring breakthrough of tank armies to Berlin “through the eye of a needle” made it into textbooks.

Summarizing all of the above, we can draw the following conclusions, writes the historian. Zhukov's plan was comprehensively thought out and suited the situation. The German resistance turned out to be stronger than expected, but was quickly broken. Konev's attack on Berlin was not necessary, but it improved the balance of forces during the assault on the city. Also, the turn of Konev's tank armies accelerated the defeat of the German 9th Army. But if the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front had simply carried out the directive of Headquarters, then Wenck’s 12th Army would have been destroyed much faster, and the Fuhrer would not even have had the technical ability to rush around the bunker with the question “Where is Wenck?!”, summarizes Alexey Isaev.

Date: 22.04.2012

67 years ago, on April 16, 1945, the famous assault on the Seelow Heights, natural hills about 90 km east of Berlin, began. And this great battle, which showed massive examples of heroism and self-sacrifice of our soldiers and officers (and this when, as everyone already felt, there were only a few days left before Victory), at the same time became one of the most slandered pages of the Great Patriotic War.

In our post-perestroika literature and in modern liberal journalism, it is customary to assert that the frontal assault on the Seelow Heights was an unnecessary bloodbath from a military point of view, carried out by the “butcher” - Marshal Zhukov. He, they say, started it only in order to get ahead of his other “butcher” colleague, Marshal Konev, who was advancing on the capital of the Third Reich to the south, in seizing the laurels of the winner of Berlin.

“The beams of the searchlights rest on the smoke, nothing is visible, in front are the Seelow Heights furiously snarling with fire, and behind are the generals fighting for the right to be the first to be in Berlin. When the defense was finally broken through in great blood, a bloodbath ensued on the streets of the city, in which the tanks burned one after another from the well-aimed shots of the Faustians. Such an unsightly image of the final assault has developed over the post-war decades in the mass consciousness,” writes the famous Russian historian Alexey Isaev and, using archival materials, refutes this Russophobic nonsense.

So why didn't our troops just try to encircle Berlin? Why did tank armies enter the city streets? Let's try to figure out why Zhukov did not send tank armies to bypass Berlin, writes Alexey Isaev.

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At the Nuremberg trials, General Alfred Jodl, the permanent head of the Operations Staff of the Wehrmacht High Command, admitted: “It was clear to the General Staff that the battle for Berlin would be decided on the Oder, so the bulk of the troops of the 9th Army defending Berlin were brought to the front line. edge. The urgently formed reserves were supposed to be concentrated north of Berlin in order to subsequently launch a counterattack on the flank of Marshal Zhukov’s troops.”
During the battle for the Seelow Heights, the German 9th Army was crushed along with the remnants of the 4th Panzer Army in the so-called. Halbinsky (Frankfurt) boiler. There the Germans alone lost over 200,000 people killed. Of the entire 9th Army, only individual units of General Weidling’s 56th Tank Corps managed to get through to Berlin. By the beginning of the battle, there were about 50,000 people in the corps. Between 13,000 and 15,000 fighters broke into Berlin. Several thousand more Germans scattered across the surrounding fields and forests, and only a few who maintained discipline, like the 11th SS Panzer Corps, made their way to the West to surrender to the Anglo-Americans.

Proponents of the theory about the expediency of encircling Berlin, the historian immediately notes, lose sight of the obvious question of the qualitative and quantitative composition of the city’s garrison. The German 9th Army stationed on the Oder consisted of 200,000 people. They should not have been given the opportunity to withdraw to Berlin. Zhukov already had before his eyes a chain of assaults on the surrounded cities declared by the Germans as “festungs” (fortresses), both in his front line and among his neighbors. Isolated Budapest defended itself from late December 1944 to February 10, 1945.

Therefore, Zhukov came up with a simple and, without exaggeration, a brilliant plan, says an authoritative historian. If the tank armies manage to break into operational space, then they must reach the outskirts of Berlin and form a kind of cocoon around the German capital, which would prevent the garrison from being strengthened by the 200,000-strong 9th Army or reserves from the west. It was not intended to enter the city at this stage. With the approach of the Soviet combined arms armies, the “cocoon” opened, and Berlin could already be stormed according to all the rules.

The largely unexpected turn of Konev’s troops towards Berlin, the historian notes, led to the modernization of the “cocoon” to the classical encirclement of adjacent flanks of two neighboring fronts. The main forces of the German 9th Army stationed on the Oder were surrounded in the forests southeast of Berlin. This was one of the major defeats of the Germans, undeservedly remaining in the shadow of the actual assault on the city. As a result, the capital of the “thousand-year Reich” was defended by Volkssturmists, members of the Hitler Youth, police and the remnants of units defeated on the Oder front. They numbered about 100,000 people, which was clearly not enough to defend such a large city. Berlin was divided into nine defense sectors. The garrison size of each sector according to the plan was to be 25,000 people. In reality, there were no more than 10,000 - 12,000 people. There was no question of any occupation of each house; only the key buildings of the districts were defended. The entry of a 400,000-strong group of two fronts into the city left no chance for the defenders. This led to a relatively quick assault on Berlin - about 10 days.

What made Zhukov delay his advance to Berlin, so much so that Stalin began sending orders to neighboring fronts to turn to Berlin? Many will give the answer right away: Seelow Heights. However, if you look at the map, the Seelow Heights “shade” only the left flank of the Kyustrin bridgehead, notes Isaev. If some armies got stuck on the heights, then what stopped the rest from breaking through to Berlin?

The legend appeared due to the memoirs of V.I. Chuikov and M.E. Katukova, explains the scientist. Advancing on Berlin outside the Seelow Heights N.E. Berzarin (commander of the 5th Shock Army) and S.I. Bogdanov (commander of the 2nd Guards Tank Army) did not leave any memoirs. The first died in a car accident immediately after the war, the second died in 1960, before the period of active writing of memoirs by our military leaders. At best, Bogdanov and Berzarin could talk about how they viewed the Seelow Heights through binoculars.

Maybe the problem was Zhukov’s idea to attack under the light of searchlights? Light attacks were not his invention. The Germans had been using floodlight attacks in the dark since 1941. Thus, for example, a bridgehead on the Dnieper near Kremenchug was captured, from which Kyiv was later surrounded. At the end of the war, the German offensive in the Ardennes began with floodlights. This case is closest to an attack under the light of searchlights from the Kyustrin bridgehead. The main goal of this technique was to lengthen the first, most important day of the operation. Yes, the beams of the searchlights were hampered by raised dust and smoke from explosions; it was unrealistic to blind the Germans with several searchlights per kilometer. But the main task was solved: the offensive on April 16 was launched earlier than the time of year allowed. By the way, the positions illuminated by searchlights were overcome quite quickly. Problems arose already at the end of the first day of the operation, when the spotlights had long been turned off. The left-flank armies of Chuikov and Katukov rested on the Seelow Heights, the right-flank armies of Berzarin and Bogdanov had difficulty moving through the network of irrigation canals on the left bank of the Oder. The Soviet offensive was expected near Berlin. Zhukov initially had a harder time than Konev, who broke through the weak German defenses far south of the German capital. This delay made Stalin nervous, especially since Zhukov's plan to send tank armies in the direction of Berlin, and not around it, was revealed.

But the crisis soon passed, the historian writes, and this happened precisely thanks to the tank armies. One of the mechanized brigades of Bogdanov’s army managed to find a weak point among the Germans and break through far into the German defense. The mechanized corps was first drawn into the breach, followed by the main forces of the two tank armies. The defense on the Oder front collapsed on the third day of fighting. The introduction of reserves by the Germans could not turn the tide: our tank armies simply bypassed them on both sides and rushed towards Berlin. After this, Zhukov only had to slightly turn one of the buildings toward the German capital and win the race that he did not start.

Losses at the Seelow Heights, Isaev notes, are often confused with losses in the entire Berlin operation. And he recalls that the irretrievable losses of Soviet troops in it amounted to 80,000 people, and the total losses - 360,000 people. These are the losses of three fronts advancing in a strip 300 km wide, i.e. 1st Belorussian (commander - Zhukov), 1st Ukrainian (commander - Konev) and 2nd Belorussian (commander - Rokossovsky). To narrow these losses down to just a patch of the Seelow Heights is simply stupid. The only stupid thing is to turn 300,000 total losses into 300,000 killed. In reality, the total losses of the 8th Guards and 69th Armies during the offensive in the Seelow Heights area amounted to about 20,000 people, and irretrievable losses - approximately 5,000 people. So much for Zhukov the “butcher”.

The breakthrough of the German defense by the 1st Belorussian Front in April 1945, Isaev believes, is worthy of study in textbooks on tactics and operational art. Unfortunately, due to Zhukov’s disgrace, neither the brilliant “cocoon” plan nor the daring breakthrough of tank armies to Berlin “through the eye of a needle” made it into textbooks.

Summarizing all of the above, we can draw the following conclusions, writes the historian. Zhukov's plan was comprehensively thought out and suited the situation. The German resistance turned out to be stronger than expected, but was quickly broken. Konev's attack on Berlin was not necessary, but it improved the balance of forces during the assault on the city. Also, the turn of Konev's tank armies accelerated the defeat of the German 9th Army. But if the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front had simply carried out the directive of Headquarters, then Wenck’s 12th Army would have been destroyed much faster, and the Fuhrer would not even have had the technical ability to rush around the bunker with the question “Where is Wenck?!”, summarizes Alexey Isaev.

SEELOW HEIGHTS: A VICTORY WE SURVIVED
In the last days of the war, in the Battle of Berlin, the Soviet military command killed 361,367 soldiers and officers "N and there is silence in the Seelow hills…” - this is how one of the best, perhaps, songs about the war began. Indeed, silence: an inquisitive descendant will not find a single specific study about the battles for the Seelow Heights, which represented the initial phase of the Berlin offensive operation. This is partly due to the fact that everything was eclipsed by the final phase of the operation - the storming of Berlin, the Reichstag and, finally, Victory itself. But the main reason is different. In a clear reluctance to highlight the unsatisfactory leadership of the battles for the heights. Moreover, the operation was commanded by “Marshal of Victory” G.K. Zhukov.
Ten years ago, the secrecy was removed from the figures for losses suffered by the army in this war. And it immediately became clear what an incredible price the people paid for the desire of their military leaders to capture Berlin on the fourth, then the fifth, then the sixth day of the operation. For unprepared, without proper reconnaissance and artillery preparation, frontal attacks.
Losses in the Berlin operation (April 16 - May 8) amounted to 361,367 people killed and wounded. And the average daily losses (15,712 people) are the highest among all offensive operations of the Second World War. For comparison: near Moscow they were 10,910 people; near Stalingrad - 6392; on the Kursk Bulge - 11,313; in Belarus - 11,262.
Not long ago, the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense creakingly, but lifted the veil of secrecy over some operational materials of the April 1945 battles.Z The idea of ​​the Berlin operation was defined in general terms back in November 1944. Even then, planning an offensive in Poland (the Vistula-Oder operation), Headquarters aimed the 1st Belorussian Front at Berlin. At the same time, G.K. was appointed commander of the 1st Belorussian Front, who, in fact, should have received the laurels of the winner. Zhukov. And the commander of this front throughout the 1944 campaign, K.K. Rokossovsky moved to the neighboring 2nd Belorussky, which had a less honorable task - to conquer the northern coast of Germany. Since then, a black cat has run between the marshals. They couldn't even hear about each other indifferently.
Delighted by the successes of the winter offensive in Poland, Zhukov already reported to Headquarters on January 26, 1945 that the troops entrusted to him would cross the Oder on the move on February 1-2 and would “develop an offensive in the Berlin direction.” Zhukov clearly underestimated the enemy. After stubborn fighting, his troops on February 3 were able to cling to only a small bridgehead on the western bank of the Oder, in the Küstrin area.
But this did not cool Georgy Konstantinovich. On February 10, he presented a plan for the Berlin offensive operation to Stalin:
1. The enemy is regrouping the troops of the Vistula Army Group in order to organize a stable defense on the approaches to Stettin and at the turn of the river. Oder.
2. The purpose of the operation is to disrupt the enemy’s operational concentration and break through his defenses on the western bank of the river. Oder and capture the city of Berlin...
...I can begin the attack on Berlin on 20.2.45.
The bet, of course, didn’t mind: you can start. But subsequent events showed the inconsistency of Zhukov’s hasty intentions. Ultimately, a new operation plan was developed with a starting date of April 16. A powerful fist of four combined arms and two tank armies was concentrated in the direction of the main attack.
According to the Headquarters directive, these armies were located “in a line.” Moreover, the introduction of the 1st and 2nd Guards Tank Armies into battle was envisaged “after breaking through the enemy’s defenses to develop success bypassing Berlin from the north and northeast”. However, Zhukov neglected the General Staff's plan and decided to place the tank armies in the second echelon behind the combined arms armies. He planned their entry into the breakthrough “after the infantry captured the Seelow Heights”. It was, let's say, a somewhat unusual decision - to take well-fortified heights dominating the terrain with a head-on attack using the forces of one infantry. The marshal apparently intended to save the tanks for street fighting in Berlin. One must think that Zhukov had incredible penetrating power, since he managed to get Stalin’s permission to adjust the already approved plan.
Even dry lines of documents convey the nervous atmosphere before the battle.
No. 00553/op April 15, 1945 15.30

Start artillery preparation at exactly 5.00 on April 16, 1945. Start the infantry attack at the twentieth minute of artillery preparation, i.e. at 5.20 16.4.45
Chief of Staff of the 1st Belorussian Front, Colonel General Malinin.
After 10 minutes, the troops receive a new order:
No. 00554/op April 15, 1945 15.40
The front commander ordered:
Artillery preparation begins at exactly 5.45 on April 16, 1945. Infantry attack - at 6.15. Everything else is according to the previously established plan.
Chief of Staff of the 1st Belorussian Front, Colonel General Malinin.
Be that as it may, 20 minutes of artillery preparation or 30 is still not enough. During other offensives, enemy positions were ironed in an hour or two. But here the infantry alone went on the attack, without the support of tanks and self-propelled guns. Zhukov apparently decided to compensate for such hasty fire support for the attack with a density of attackers that was completely unprecedented for the operations of this war. There were 280 artillery barrels and 1282 people per kilometer of front!
Such an oversaturation (more than one soldier per meter of the battlefield!) was undoubtedly to the advantage of the Germans. Immediately after the start of the attack, they retreated to the second line, located along the heights themselves. Moreover, they fired from there with direct fire from guns without missing a beat.
Having suffered huge losses, the infantry was unable to advance further than the base of the Seelow Hills. Then Zhukov, on the afternoon of April 16, brought both tank armies into battle. This haste ruined the attack plans that had already been adjusted once. After all, the tanks had to be introduced into the places where the infantry had broken through, having received a “green light” to move to the enemy’s rear and bypass the heights from the north. Instead, they climbed up the hills and followed infantry communications, creating real chaos in the operational formations of combined arms armies. There is documented evidence of wounded people, how tanks crushed their own infantry. Under enemy fire, all the troops were mixed up, and complete confusion was created in their control.
Zhukov himself was always at the OP (observation post) of the commander of the 8th Guards Army V.I. Chuikova. According to the latter’s testimony, which, of course, was not included in his official memoirs, at that moment aviation was not performing well. She bombed her own advancing troops with all her might. Several bombs fell near the commander's OP. But for some reason neither Chuikov nor Zhukov had any connection with aviation. In order to somehow stop this massacre, the anti-aircraft gunners were ordered... to open fire on their planes.
Only by the evening of April 17 did the situation become more or less clear for Zhukov himself.
Order from the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front to all army commanders and commanders of individual formations:
April 17, 1945 20.30
1. The worst performers of the offensive Berlin operation are the 69th Army under the command of Colonel General Kolpakchi, the 1st Tank Army under the command of Colonel General Katukov and the 2nd Tank Army under the command of Colonel General Bogdanov.
These armies, having colossal forces and means, have been acting ineptly and indecisively for the second day, trampling in front of a weak enemy.
Army commander Katukov and his corps commanders Yushchuk, Dremov, Babajanyan do not observe the battlefield and the actions of their troops, sitting far in the rear (10-12 km). These generals do not know the situation and are trailing behind events.
2. If we allow slowness in the development of the Berlin operation, the troops will be exhausted. They will use up all their material reserves without taking Berlin.
I demand: A) to develop the speed of the offensive without delay. The 1st and 2nd tank armies and 9th tank armies break through with the support of the 3rd, 5th and 8th Guards. armies behind enemy lines and rapidly advance to the Berlin area.
B) all commanders will be located at the OP of the corps commanders fighting in the main direction, and the corps commanders will be in the brigades and divisions of the first echelon on the main direction.
I categorically prohibit being in the rear...
Zhukov.
Point "B" caused unusually large losses in the officer corps. It is no secret that only platoon lieutenants were “at the front” with the soldiers. All the other commanders, starting with the company commanders, settled in much further than the trenches. Now the generals have removed the colonels from their homes, and they, in turn, have moved the lieutenant colonels, and so on in rank.
But the next day, April 18, did not give the expected results. The troops, climbing up, suffered significant losses in manpower and equipment.
No. 00566/op April 18, 1945 22.00
1. The offensive on Berlin is developing unacceptably slowly. If the operation continues like this, the offensive may fizzle out.
2. The main reason for the poor offensive lies in disorganization, lack of interaction between troops and lack of demands on persons not performing combat missions. I order: 1) All army commanders, corps, division and brigade commanders to go to the forward units and personally understand the situation, namely: a) where and what kind of enemy; b) where are their units, where are the means of reinforcement and what exactly do they do; c) whether the units have interaction, ammunition and how management is organized.
3. Before 12 o’clock on April 19, put the units in order, clarifying the tasks, organize the interaction of all units, replenish ammunition and at 12 o’clock along the entire front begin artillery and aviation preparation and, depending on the nature of the artillery preparation, attack the enemy and rapidly develop the offensive according to the plan ...
4. All transport vehicles of mechanized brigades, mechanized corps and rear of brigades and corps should be immediately removed from the roads and taken to shelters. In the future, the motorized infantry will advance on foot...
Zhukov.
Only after three days of straightforward frontal attacks did Zhukov finally decide to support the bleeding infantry and tank crews with artillery and aviation fire. But even now there is a sense of fuss in the marshal’s actions. Following the issuance of an order common to all armies, Zhukov begins to give orders to corps commanders over the heads of their direct superiors, the army commanders.
Combat order from the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front to the commander of the 9th Guards Tank Corps, Major General Vedeneev:
April 18, 1945 24.00
9th Guards maybe he acts very poorly and indecisively. I reprimand you for your bad actions. By the end of the day on April 19, 1945, at any cost (emphasis added by us - Ed.), the corps, under your responsibility, will reach the Freudenburg area.
Deliver the execution to me personally.
Zhukov.
Combat order to the commander of the 11th Guards Tank Corps, Colonel Babajanyan:
April 18, 1945 24.00
I very strictly warn you about incomplete professional compliance and demand more courageous and organized actions.
At any cost (emphasis added by us. - Ed.) 19.4. exit to the Werder area, Böttorshagen.
Zhukov.
As you know (V. Karpov, in particular, writes about this in his book “The Generalissimo”), the hitch in the offensive of the Soviet troops caused great joy at the headquarters of the German command. Hitler exclaimed with enthusiasm: “We repulsed this blow. At Berlin, the Russians will suffer the bloodiest defeat that can ever happen!
The Fuhrer was wrong. By the end of the day on April 19, the Seelow Heights had been overcome.
The Russians won. The bloodiest in the history of wars.

Alexander MELENBERG

From the editor:
“Any price” is not an exaggeration. Any price. This, alas, is how the modern attitude towards soldiers was formed. Suffice it to recall the first assault on Grozny...

08.05.2003