Korsun Oh, my Russian land! You're already behind the mound! A Word about Igor's Regiment The Kiev prince Vladimir, who baptized Rus', entered my childhood from the fourth grade and stood next to prophetic Oleg, and Igor and Olga, who sat on a steep hill while they feasted on the shore

M.I. Bazilev, G.V. Kiyanchenko, K.O. Shurupov, L.P. Khodchenko, G.M. Yablonsky. Korsun-Shevchenko operation

When planning military operations for the winter of 1944, the goal of the operations of Soviet troops in the southwestern direction was to launch an offensive with the forces of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Ukrainian Fronts, to defeat Army Groups “South” and “A” , liberate Right Bank Ukraine and create conditions for Soviet troops to reach the southern state border. The Korsun-Shevchenko operation, carried out from January 24 to February 17, 1944, was aimed at destroying the enemy group in a deep ledge formed as a result of the Zhitomir-Berdichev and Kirovograd operations. This grouping included parts of the forces of the German 1st Panzer and 8th Field Armies of Army Group South (Field Marshal E. Manstein). In total, it included 10 infantry, 2 tank divisions, the SS Walloon motorized brigade, 4 assault gun divisions, as well as large number artillery and engineering reinforcement units. It was supported by aviation from the 4th Air Fleet. In total, the Korsun-Shevchenko enemy group numbered more than 170 thousand people, 1,640 guns and mortars, 140 tanks and assault guns, and up to 1,000 aircraft.

The enemy kept the largest reserves in the area west and north-west of Kirovograd (4 tank divisions) and in the area south-west of Okhmatov (3 tank divisions of the 1st Tank Army), which made it possible to quickly transfer them to the Zvenigorod-Mironovsky salient.

The enemy was preparing the ledge not only for stable defense, but also as a starting area for offensive operations. By holding it, he did not allow the adjacent flanks of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian fronts to close, prevented their advance to the Southern Bug, threatened to strike the flanks of the fronts and counted on restoring the defense along the Dnieper.

German tanks in the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky area. January 1944

The nature of the enemy defense along the entire perimeter was different. In front of the 1st Ukrainian Front, in the Tynovka-Kagarlyk sector, the enemy did not have time to create a powerful defense, since he was driven back to this line on January 10-12. Nevertheless, he managed to cover the strong points there with barriers. The enemy created the strongest defense with a developed system of defensive structures and various kinds of barriers in the Kagarlyk, Moshny area.

In the offensive zone of the 2nd Ukrainian Front in the Moshny and Smela sector, the area was swampy, and therefore the enemy’s defense here consisted of separate strong points that intercepted the main roads. And south of Smila it was more powerful and consisted of two stripes. At the same time, the main strip was equipped with a system of strongholds and resistance centers, covered with minefields and barbed wire. The construction of the second strip was not completed by the beginning of the Soviet offensive. The defending enemy formations and units accumulated a wealth of combat experience and, despite the losses suffered in previous battles, maintained a high degree of combat effectiveness.

The headquarters of the Supreme High Command (SHC) assigned the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts the task of encircling and destroying the enemy group in the Korsun-Shevchenko ledge. To solve it, she reinforced them with troops, especially mobile ones, military equipment, weapons and ammunition. Thus, in January, the 47th Combined Arms and 2nd Tank Armies, the 6th Guards Cavalry and the 5th Mechanized Corps were transferred to the 1st Ukrainian Front from the reserve of the Supreme High Command Headquarters. From January 22 to February 3, 400 new T-34 tanks were sent to complete the tank forces. The 2nd Ukrainian Front was reinforced by the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps, redeployed from the offensive zone of the 4th Ukrainian Front.

The operation involved the 40th, 27th, 6th Tank Armies, part of the forces of the 2nd Air Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front, the 52nd, 4th Guards, 53rd, 5th Guards Tank, 5 -I Air Army and the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, as well as the 10th Fighter Aviation Corps of the country's air defense (air defense). In total, the group of Soviet troops included 27 rifle, 3 cavalry divisions, 2 fortified areas, 4 tank and 1 mechanized corps. It consisted of over 336 thousand people, about 4 thousand guns and mortars, 376 tanks and self-propelled artillery units, over 1000 aircraft. Soviet troops outnumbered the enemy in terms of men by almost 2 times, in artillery by 2.4 times, in tanks by 2.7 times, with approximately equality in aviation.

The plan of the operation provided for counter strikes by the troops of the left wing of the 1st Ukrainian and the right wing of the 2nd Ukrainian Front under the base of the ledge in the general direction of Shpola to “encircle and destroy the enemy group in the Zvenigorod-Mironovsky ledge” and create conditions for the development of an offensive towards the Southern Bug.

Based on the general concept of the operation, the commander of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, the army general, decided to break through the enemy’s defenses in the 27-kilometer section of Tynovka, Koshevatoye, having in the first echelon in the direction of the main attack the 40th, 27th combined arms and 6th tank armies . It was assumed that, given the incompleteness of the enemy’s defense equipment in the selected breakthrough area, a powerful initial strike by infantry and tanks could lead to a quick breakthrough and development of an offensive in depth. By the end of the first day of the operation, it was planned to advance 12-15 km, on the second day to capture Zvenigorodka, and by the end of the third day to unite with the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front in the Shpola area. In the future, it was planned to use the 6th Tank Army on the external front of the encirclement, and part of the forces of the 27th Army on the internal one.

The decision of the army general commander of the 2nd Ukrainian Front provided for a breakthrough of the enemy defense in the direction of the main attack in the Verbovka, Krasnosilka area in a 19-kilometer area by the adjacent flanks of the 4th Guards and 53rd armies. In the 53rd Army zone, on the first day of the operation, it was planned to bring the 5th Guards Tank Army into battle to complete the breakthrough of the enemy’s tactical defense zone and develop the offensive with the goal of reaching the Zvenigorodka area on the third or fourth day of the operation.

To the right of the front's strike group, the 52nd Army was supposed to attack. The 5th Guards Tank and 53rd armies were intended for operations on the external front of the encirclement, and formations of the 4th Guards and 52nd armies on the internal front. To hide the direction of the main attack and pin down enemy forces, it was planned to launch an offensive with the forces of the 5th and 7th Guards Armies in the Kirovograd direction the day before the start of the operation.

The troops of the fronts were supported by aviation of the 5th Air Army, and also in the interests of the Korsun-Shevchenko operation, part of the aviation forces of the 2nd Air Army (fighter aviation corps, assault and night bomber aviation divisions) was involved. In order to create strike groupings of the fronts, troop regroupings were carried out. In the 2nd Ukrainian Front, the 5th Guards Tank Army, a breakthrough artillery division and a number of artillery and engineering units were quickly transferred from the Kirovograd area to the direction of the main attack. Internal regroupings and strengthening of the 27th and 40th armies were carried out in the 1st Ukrainian Front. As a result of this, in the directions of the main attacks of the fronts, even greater superiority over the enemy was achieved: in the 1st Ukrainian - twofold in infantry and threefold in tanks and artillery; in the 2nd Ukrainian Front - more than three times in infantry, six times in artillery and ten times in tanks.

The operation was prepared in a short time (within five to seven days). At the same time, individual formations of the fronts did not stop active combat operations in other directions. The thaw and muddy conditions that began early in Ukraine made it difficult to regroup troops and transport supplies. Dilapidated ground airfields and inclement weather limited the capabilities of aviation.

During the preparatory period, the headquarters summarized data on enemy defenses and worked out the organization of interaction between troops. Combat and political training classes were conducted with the personnel. The order of the commander of the 2nd Ukrainian Front of January 23, 1944 ordered that measures be taken to maintain the strictest secrecy, strictly camouflage the grouping of troops, artillery and tanks, prohibit the movement of vehicles and troops during the day, and observe blackout. It was forbidden to use radio communications before the start of the offensive. However, these requirements turned out to be late, since the enemy had fairly complete information about the groupings of Soviet troops in the breakthrough areas.

Early in the morning of January 24, after a powerful artillery attack, the forward battalions of the 4th Guards and 53rd armies of the 2nd Ukrainian Front went on the attack. As a result of stubborn fighting, by the end of the day they had captured strong points in the first and partly in the second position to a depth of 2 to 6 km. On the morning of January 25, after a 10-minute artillery preparation, the main forces of the front, including the 5th Guards Tank Army, went on the offensive. Operating in the first echelon, units of the 20th Tank Corps of the Lieutenant General of Tank Forces liberated Lebedin on the night of January 27 and moved on Shpola. The 29th Tank Corps of the Major General of Tank Forces reached Vodyanoy and Lipyanka with its advanced units.

I.S. Konev and P.S. Rotmistrov at an observation post during the Korsun-Shevchenko offensive operation. Winter 1944

The German command, realizing that the attack by the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front in the direction of Shpola posed a serious threat to the entire Korsun-Shevchenko group, began hastily creating counterattack groupings of troops in the Novo-Mirgorod area (three tank divisions) and north of Pastorskoye (up to three infantry and one tank division). On January 27, they launched a counter-attack from the north and south in the general direction of Ositnyazhka and closed the gap that had formed in the defense. At the same time, the advanced units of the 20th and 29th tank corps that broke through were cut off from the main forces of the front.

To restore contact with these corps and eliminate the threat of the enemy on the flanks of the breakthrough, the front commander brought into the battle the 25th Tank Brigade of the 29th Tank Corps and the 18th Tank Corps, as well as the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps from the front reserve. Through the joint efforts of these formations and the rifle divisions of the 4th Guards and 53rd Armies, after heavy three-day battles in the area of ​​Kapitonovka and Tishkovka, it was possible to push back the enemy and restore broken communications with the 20th and 29th Tank Corps.

At this time, the mobile troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, which had reached the Shpola area, continued to successfully advance forward. At noon on January 28, the 155th Tank Brigade of the 20th Guards Tank Corps was among the first to break into Zvenigorodka. On January 26, the troops of the 40th, 27th and 6th tank armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front attacked the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front from the opposite side of the base of the Korsun-Shevchenko ledge. Having broken through the first enemy position, the troops of the front's main group rushed deep into its defense. The enemy put up stubborn resistance and, with the help of two tank divisions, launched a counterattack on the right flank of the 40th Army in the direction of Okhmatov. To strengthen it, the commander of the front troops transferred the 11th Tank Corps of the 1st Tank Army to the operational subordination of the commander of the 40th Army.

Since the offensive of the 27th and 6th tank armies was developing more successfully, the commander of the front forces decided to transfer the main attack to their zone and transferred the 47th Rifle Corps from the 40th Army to the subordination of the lieutenant general of the tank forces. The immediate task of this corps was to capture a strong point of enemy resistance in the village of Vinograd. The 6th Tank Army was tasked with bypassing it from the south and north, by the end of January 28, reaching the Zvenigorodka area and capturing the Ryzhanovka, Chizhovka, Rizino line.

Commander of the 6th Tank Army A.G. Kravchenko (left) with headquarters officers during the Korsun-Shevchenko operation. Winter 1944

On the morning of January 28, the forward detachment of the 6th Tank Army, under the command of the deputy commander of the 5th Mechanized Corps, Major General of Tank Forces, bypassed the enemy stronghold near the village from the north. Vinograd and, developing the offensive, on January 28 broke into the northwestern outskirts of Zvenigorodka. After stubborn fighting in the western part of the city, at 15:00 the 233rd Tank Brigade of the 5th Mechanized Corps linked up in the Zvenigorodka area with the advanced units of the 20th Tank Corps of the 5th Tank Army of the 2nd Ukrainian Front. Over the course of five days of fighting, counter strikes from troops from two fronts encircled the enemy group at the base of the Korsun-Shevchenko ledge.

On February 1, the commander of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front set the task of the 27th Army to defeat the encircled enemy group together with the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front. On the same day, the commander of the 2nd Ukrainian Front gave a similar order to the troops of the 4th Guards, 52nd Armies and 5th Cavalry Corps. By February 3, a continuous internal front of encirclement by these forces had been created.

On the external front, by this time, in the sector from Tynovka to Zvenigorodka, the 104th Rifle Corps of the 40th Army, the 47th Rifle Corps, the 5th Guards Tank Corps and the 5th Mechanized Corps of the 6th Tank Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front were on the defensive. . From Zvenigorodka to Kanizh the 5th Guards Tank Army, consisting of the 49th Rifle Corps, the 18th, 20th and 29th Tank Corps, as well as the 53rd Army of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, defended. In total, on the outer, 120-kilometer encirclement front, the enemy was confronted by 22 rifle divisions, 4 tank and mechanized corps, numbering about 150 thousand people together with reinforcements, 2,736 guns and mortars, 307 tanks and self-propelled artillery units.

The German command hoped to break through the outer front of the Soviet troops with a strike from tank divisions and release the encircled group. To this end, by January 27, four tank divisions of the 8th Army were concentrated in the Novo-Mirgorod area, and two tank divisions of the 1st Tank Army began moving into the Rizino area from the area west of Okhmatovo. The commander of the 11th Army Corps, General W. Stemmerman, who led the encircled troops, was ordered to fight to the last bullet.

At the end of January - early February, the enemy persistently tried to break through to the encircled troops in the zone of the 2nd Ukrainian Front in the areas of Novo-Mirgorod and Tolmach. An encircled group from the Gorodishche area (10 km north of Vyazovki) attacked them in a southern direction. However, with the stubborn resistance of the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, enemy attacks on the external front were repulsed, and soon the troops of the 52nd and 4th Guards armies eliminated the Gorodishche resistance center. After this, the German command transferred its main efforts to the zone of the 1st Ukrainian Front, to the Ryzhanovka, Rizino area. Here, the commander of the 1st Panzer Army, General G. Hube, concentrated a strong group of four tank divisions, two heavy tank battalions and four assault gun divisions and planned to break through to the encircled troops through Lisyanka. The fact is that it was in this direction that the encircled group holding the Steblevo ledge was closest to the external front.

On February 4, the enemy struck in the Rizino area and, at the cost of heavy losses, managed to penetrate the defenses of the 47th Rifle Corps. There was a danger of the enemy breaking through to the encircled divisions. The commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front ordered the 2nd Tank Army (3rd and 16th Tank Corps) to be brought into battle under the command of a lieutenant general of tank forces. On the morning of February 6, it, in cooperation with formations of the 40th and 6th Tank armies, launched a counteroffensive. As a result, the enemy's advance was stopped, in a number of areas he was thrown back, and some enemy units were surrounded and destroyed in the Kosyakovka, Kuchkovka area. But the enemy’s penetration into the defense of the Soviet troops remained. Moreover, an additional tank division and three divisions of assault guns were brought to this area. To repel a new enemy offensive, by the morning of February 9, the Soviet command advanced to the Lisyanka area the 8th Guards Tank Brigade of the 20th Tank Corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army, reinforced by a self-propelled artillery regiment and one regiment of the 31st Anti-Tank Destruction Brigade. At the same time, the commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army received the task of organizing tank and artillery ambushes on the roads. In addition, anti-tank strong points were organized on the basis of anti-tank artillery units in the corridor separating the encircled enemy troops from the external front. The defense was ready to meet the next enemy offensive, and it did not keep him waiting.

By February 11, the enemy managed to create several strike groups in the areas: Rizino - from the 1st German Tank Army, Yerki - from the forces of the 8th Army, Steblevo - from the encircled enemy group (parts of two infantry divisions, a heavy tank battalion of a tank division SS "Viking" and motorized brigade of SS "Wallonia"). With counter strikes, the enemy command intended to release their encircled formations and at the same time encircle the Soviet troops operating in the Ryzhanovka, Lisyanka, and Zvenigorodka areas. The enemy offensive began on the outer front of the encirclement on the morning of February 11. In the zone of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, its units advancing from the Yerki area managed to occupy the Zvenigorodka station and a number of other settlements by the end of the day. But later the enemy was stopped by the stubborn resistance of the Soviet troops defending there. In the zone of the 1st Ukrainian Front, in the Rizino area, the enemy’s counterattack group broke through the defenses of the 47th Rifle Corps and reached the Lisyanka area. This fact Marshal Soviet Union in the report explained by the loss of control on the part of the commander of the 6th Tank Army and the commander of the 47th Rifle Corps. He ordered Army General N.F. Vatutin to quickly subordinate them to the commander of the 27th Army. In addition, by the morning of February 12, the main forces of the 2nd Tank Army concentrated in this area. Two brigades of the 5th Guards Tank Army were also transferred there. The 202nd Infantry Division was deployed in the Lisyansky direction. Reserve self-propelled artillery regiments also operated here. On the Gniloya Tikich River, along which the second line of defense of the created group of Soviet troops passed, the enemy was stopped, and his attempt to release the encircled group failed. At this time, Soviet troops were actively operating on the internal front of the encirclement (13 rifle, 3 cavalry divisions, 2 fortified areas, about 2 thousand guns and mortars, 138 tanks and self-propelled artillery units). Strikes with various directions they cut off and then destroyed separate groups and garrisons of the surrounded enemy. They were helped partisan detachments.

The encirclement ring tightened, and by February 8, the territory occupied by enemy troops was completely covered by Soviet artillery. On this day, in order to stop the bloodshed, the Soviet command presented an ultimatum to the encircled troops demanding surrender. However, the ultimatum was rejected. Moreover, the blocked enemy troops, counting on outside help, made attempts to break out of the encirclement.

IN once again They struck from the Steblevo area to the southwest on February 12 in the hope of breaking through the internal front of the Soviet troops and linking up with their tank divisions in the Lisyanka area. Fierce battles broke out, as a result of which the enemy, suffering numerous losses, managed to reach the Shanderovka area. The encircled group was separated by some 10-12 km from the tank divisions that had broken through to the Lisyanka area.

Korsun-Shevchenko offensive operation January 24 - February 17, 1944

Having analyzed the situation, the Supreme Command Headquarters, in its directive, pointed out to its representative a number of shortcomings in the coordination of troops. They noted, in particular: the lack general plan the destruction of the enemy's Korsun-Shevchenko grouping by the joint efforts of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts, the insufficient combat strength of the 27th Army and the failure to take decisive measures to eliminate, first of all, the enemy's Steblevo salient, from where the threat of his breakthrough came. The Supreme Command headquarters required taking effective measures to destroy the encircled enemy group. Following these instructions, additional formations and units of the 5th Guards Tank Army and the 5th Cavalry Corps, as well as other rifle, tank, artillery and engineering units were urgently transferred to the threatened areas.

On February 12, 1944, the Supreme Command Headquarters made a decision to subordinate all troops to the commander of the 2nd Ukrainian Front to destroy the encircled enemy. In accordance with this directive, the 1st Ukrainian Front was entrusted with the task of defense on the external front of the encirclement in its own zone. Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov was charged with coordinating the actions of the troops of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts to repel enemy attempts from the outside to release the encircled troops.

On February 14, formations and units of the 52nd Army liberated the regional center of the Kyiv region - the city of Korsun-Shevchenkovsky, capturing 15 transport aircraft, a lot of other equipment and weapons, as well as warehouses with ammunition and food. Following this, Soviet troops captured several more heavily fortified enemy strongholds, among them Yablonovka, Tarashcha, Steblev. By February 16, the encircled enemy troops occupied only Shanderovka, Khilki and Komarovka. They were hit by aviation and artillery. And yet, early in the morning of February 17, German troops again tried in three columns on a front section of about 4.5 km to break out of the encirclement.

The artillerymen of the 438th Anti-Tank Fighter Regiment showed exceptional bravery and courage in repelling enemy attempts to break out of encirclement. While holding their positions, they successfully repelled attacks by up to 150 enemy soldiers and officers, and destroyed two enemy tanks and one gun. The cadets of the training battalion of the 41st Guards Rifle Division, Major General, fought bravely, killing several dozen Germans and taking 43 prisoners. Based on the results of the battle, the most distinguished soldiers were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

While the rifle units repelled the enemy's onslaught from the front, formations of the 18th, 29th Tank and 5th Guards Cavalry Corps went on the attack from the flanks. With a powerful blow they destroyed scattered columns and groups of the enemy. Only a small number of his tanks and armored personnel carriers managed to break into Lisyanka. By the end of February 17, the enemy group, surrounded in the Korsun-Shevchenko ledge, was eliminated.

Destroyed German technology after the battle of Korsun-Shevchenkovsky. February 1944

In general, during the Korsun-Shevchenko operation, Soviet troops defeated 10 enemy divisions and 1 brigade. This greatly weakened and demoralized his group in the southwestern strategic direction. Numbers German losses in people, equipment and weapons for the operation are different. The irretrievable losses of Soviet troops in the operation amounted to more than 24 thousand people.

German prisoners after the defeat of the Korsun-Shevchenko group. February 1944

The main results of the operation include not only the defeat of a powerful enemy group that threatened the flanks of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian fronts, but also a significant reduction in the front line in the middle reaches of the Dnieper and its transfer a considerable distance to the west. Most of the territory of Soviet Ukraine and the population living on it were liberated from the enemy. The Red Army captured the strategically important railway road on the right bank of the Dnieper: Fastov - Bila Tserkva- Korsun-Shevchenkovsky - Znamenka - Dnepropetrovsk. The inhabitants of the liberated area gained freedom.

The operation of the Soviet troops to encircle and destroy a large enemy group in the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky area went down in the history of military art as a brilliant example of this method of defeating the enemy. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief called it “the new Stalingrad.” In the most difficult conditions of winter and muddy roads, Soviet troops demonstrated high maneuverability and speed of action, courage and endurance of soldiers.

To break through the enemy’s tactical defense zone, the front commands succeeded in very short terms create powerful groupings of forces and assets, especially tanks and artillery. The density of artillery in the directions of the main attacks of the fronts in the breakthrough areas reached 100 guns and mortars per kilometer of front. This largely determined the successful breakthrough of the main line of defense.

The distinctive point in the art of this operation is the use of tank armies in the first echelon together with rifle formations to break through enemy defenses. This is how the 6th Tank Army was used in the offensive zone of the 1st Ukrainian Front and the 5th Guards Tank Army as part of the 2nd Ukrainian Front. This was largely due to the lack of direct infantry support tanks on the fronts, and the objectives of the operation required a high rate of breakthrough. Subsequently, tank armies were used to solve a traditional task - developing tactical success into operational success. It was the rapid actions of the tank corps that ensured the creation of both internal and external fronts of encirclement. Thus, tank forces were used in the operation both at the stage of breaking through the enemy’s defenses and for its development.

The massive use of tank troops largely determined the same mass use anti-tank weapons presented in the operation as engineering troops, and anti-tank artillery. IN harsh conditions muddy roads and impassability, a rapidly changing situation, the Soviet command had to quickly maneuver these forces and means in order to have time to create a strong anti-tank defense in the enemy’s path.

The success of the operation, of course, was not possible without the selfless efforts of the “mother infantry.” Only to the outer front of the encirclement, 13 rifle divisions were quickly transferred to the outer front of the encirclement, which covered the off-road route on foot. Such maneuverability of tank and engineering troops, rifle formations and artillery predetermined the positive outcome of the operation of the Soviet troops. They not only managed to react in time to the enemy’s actions, but also largely forestalled him.

Its significant contribution to successful completion The Korsun-Shevchenko operation was carried out by aviation from the 2nd and 5th Air Armies, as well as the country's 10th Air Defense Corps. Almost a third of all 11.3 thousand sorties were carried out to maintain operational air superiority. To support ground forces on the battlefield, strike enemy reserves and conduct aerial reconnaissance, more than 6.5 thousand sorties were flown, or over 60% of their total number. About 1.2 thousand sorties were involved in air transportation of cargo, taking into account off-road conditions.

Without a doubt, the highly maneuverable nature of the operation required incredible efforts by rear workers to supply the troops with fuel and lubricants, ammunition and food, for the evacuation of the wounded. And they generally coped with this task.

The local population provided enormous assistance in this regard. Residents of the liberated areas not only helped repair roads, build defensive structures, and deliver ammunition, but also fought with weapons in their hands. In the village of Kvitki alone, 500 men voluntarily joined the 180th Infantry Division. At the same time, in certain areas of Right Bank Ukraine, Soviet troops encountered fierce resistance from nationalist formations. Despite the appeal on February 12, 1944 by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR to lay down their arms, they did not do so. Therefore, units intended to protect the rear of the active army were forced to fight against Ukrainian nationalists. Thus, on February 16, 1944, a detachment of border troops protecting the rear of the 1st Ukrainian Front, combing the forest in the area of ​​Romeyka, Perespa, Bolshoye Verbche, collided with an armed gang of the UPA (“Ukrainian rebel army") numbering up to 300 people. The assistant chief of staff of the 2nd Border Regiment, who commanded the detachment, decided to encircle and destroy the gang, despite its numerical superiority. As a result of the battle, 46 bandits were killed and up to 100 wounded. Against this background, today the attempts of some forces in Western Ukraine to elevate to national heroes those bandits who fought against Soviet troops during the Great Patriotic War look blasphemous. Patriotic War.

On February 18, 1944, Moscow saluted the troops who had completed the liquidation of a large enemy group. Many units and formations received the honorary name “Korsun-Shevchenkovsky”. For courage and heroism, dozens of Soviet soldiers were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and thousands were awarded orders and medals of the USSR. Based on the results of the operation, Army General I.S. Konev, the first of the front commanders, was awarded the title "Marshal of the Soviet Union", and the commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army was awarded military rank"Marshal of the Armored Forces"

Reducing the length of the front line in the Korsun-Shevchenko direction made it possible to free up a significant number of troops and use them to perform other tasks. During the operation, troops of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts pinned down 25 enemy divisions, including 9 tank divisions, which created favorable conditions to launch an offensive in the exactly Lutsk and Nikopol directions.

Today, a huge number of monuments and memorials remind us of the heroic victory of Soviet troops in the Korsun-Shevchenko battle. For example, near the village of Steblev, a 7.5-meter reinforced concrete ring was built - a symbol of the encirclement of German units. It’s hard to even list how many tank monuments there are in this area. In the city of Korsun-Shevchenkovsky, in the palace of the princes Lopukhin-Demidov, there is a museum of the history of the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky battle. It contains a diorama of the battle, a huge number of documents, weapons and equipment of those times.

Memorial complex to those killed during the Korsun-Shevchenko operation. Cherkasy region, Zvenigorodka

Vladimir Khokhlov,
Researcher at the Research Institute
(military history) Military Academy
General Staff of the Armed Forces
Russian Federation,
member of the Writers' Union of Russia

"Our Victory" No. 4 from 02/09/15

By the beginning of 1944, the pendulum of war had finally swung towards the Red Army. As a result of the summer-autumn campaign of 1943, Bryansk, Smolensk, Kharkov, Kyiv, Belgorod were liberated... But the enemy was still strong. His fighting spirit was not broken either.

According to the Stalingrad scenario

Moreover, German designers have finally perfected the technical part of their newest “tigers” and “panthers”, turning them into truly formidable weapons (however, in the first months of their use on the Eastern Front, the losses of such tanks mainly did not occur from Soviet artillery fire , but due to failure of the chassis). And back in November 1943, after a series of months-long retreats in the southwest, the Nazis “snarled” with a counter-offensive near Zhitomir. At the cost of incredible efforts and heavy losses, our troops managed to prevent the breakthrough of fascist equipment to Kyiv, but the recently recaptured Zhitomir still had to be abandoned.

It was in such conditions that preparations for the Korsun-Shevchenko offensive operation began. With converging attacks from two fronts, it was supposed to “cut off” the emerging bulge of enemy defense on the right bank of the Dnieper, encircle and destroy the main forces of Hitler’s Army Group “South”. At the same time, the 1st Ukrainian Front, led by Nikolai Vatutin, was supposed to attack from the north. And towards him, from the southeast, rushed the armies of the 2nd Ukrainian Front under the command of our fellow countryman, Army General Ivan Konev

Ten days before the start of the offensive in the area of ​​​​the city of Korsun-Shevchenkovsky, volleys of artillery guns thundered in the north-west. Units of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts, where there were traditionally many conscripts from the Vologda region, went on the attack. During fierce battles, our troops managed to finally lift the blockade of Leningrad. In addition, several reserve enemy divisions from France, which the Nazis initially intended to use in Ukraine, were transferred to the North-West at the very last moment and could no longer intervene in the battle unfolding on the right bank of the Dnieper.

"Thirty-Fours" vs. "Tigers"

On the morning of January 24, after a powerful artillery barrage, the advanced units of the 2nd Ukrainian Front went on the attack and by the end of the day had pushed the enemy back 4-6 kilometers. On the 25th, the “Konev” units increased pressure and were able to break through gaps in the Nazis’ defensive formations. And a day later, the tank brigades of the “Vatutino” front rolled forward, at the forefront of which were the T-34 tanks, which had proven themselves in previous battles.

But the Germans changed tactics, abandoning frontal tank attacks. Their "tigers" now preferred to operate from "double ambushes", taking full advantage of their long-range turret guns. Usually two or three tanks met our mechanized columns on the tops of the hills and began demonstrative shooting. The Thirty-Fours moved forward at full speed to reduce the distance for shots, and at this time exposed their sides to flanking fire from other camouflaged Tigers.

But the Nazis also made fatal mistakes. On the morning of January 28, they almost overnight lost a regiment of “Panthers” (almost 60 armored vehicles), which launched a reckless but self-destructive frontal attack.

On the last day of January, the advanced units of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts met in the Olshan region, completing the encirclement of the Nazi group. About 100 thousand enemy soldiers found themselves inside the Korsun-Shevchenko “cauldron”. All of them were threatened with the fate of repeating the tragic path of the 6th Nazi Army, defeated and captured at Stalingrad.

To save the encircled units, the enemy pulled all reserves to the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky “cauldron”, starting his offensive from outside rings. Deep snow, frost and wind made the usual trench warfare difficult. There was practically no continuous line of defense. Basic fighting were carried out along roads and on the approaches to populated areas.

An attempt to split the encircled group into several isolated parts was unsuccessful; the Germans also fought tooth and nail. In addition, they were encouraged by the cannonade coming from the west. Now no longer taking into account their losses in tanks, Erich von Manstein's relief divisions walked and walked forward, and at some point their vanguards found themselves only 8 kilometers from the inner radius of the “ring”

About the benefits of unity of command

Ivan Konev was appointed in charge of continuing the operation. And such a step justified itself. The coordination and controllability of troops increased, and reserves began to be used more efficiently. Creating a numerical superiority, Soviet troops began to successively occupy key enemy strongholds, inexorably narrowing the inner ring of encirclement.

Everything could have turned upside down - somewhat Soviet armies, weakened by previous battles, risked being surrounded themselves. The situation was aggravated by the lack of unity of command. The two Soviet fronts acted according to their previously established plans, and precious hours were spent coordinating the joint actions of the “joining” units.

And then Ivan Konev proposed to temporarily reassign some of the “neighboring” divisions to him, while at the same time giving him the authority to liquidate the entire encircled group. In this case, Vatutin was left with the defense of the outer front of the “cauldron.” In the post-war memoirs of the military
The officials, who were not without some degree of jealousy for the victories they had won, interpreted this differently. According to Zhukov, contrary to subordination, Konev turned directly to Headquarters, to Stalin, ignoring possible objections from both Vatutin and Georgy Konstantinovich himself.

According to Konev’s recollections, Stalin called him himself, since Headquarters had information about the enemy’s breakthrough in the zone of action of the 27th “Vatutin” army, and inquired about the situation and the decisions made.

Be that as it may, despite the objections of Zhukov and Vatutin, it was Konev who was appointed in charge of continuing the entire operation. And such a step justified itself. The coordination and controllability of troops increased, and reserves began to be used more efficiently. Creating a numerical superiority on a certain section of the front, Soviet troops began to successively occupy key enemy strongholds, slowly but inexorably narrowing the inner ring of encirclement. The situation on the outer radius has also stabilized.

Realizing that there would be no radical change, the Nazis decided to save at least part of their troops. Leaving hundreds of serviceable trucks and guns, as well as almost 2,000 seriously wounded, in the depths of the “cauldron,” they reduced all combat-ready units into two “fists” and on the night of February 17, under the cover of heavy “tigers,” they launched a desperate and final attack.

How General Konev became a marshal

But almost all of the serviceable tanks that were still in service were immediately burned. The Germans were “knocked down” from the main roads and forced to leave the “cauldron” through snow-covered fields and ravines, where they suffered heavy losses not only from fire, but also from frostbite. General Stemmerman, the commander of the main breakthrough group, was killed.

Taking advantage of the absence of a continuous front line, the remnants of Nazi troops were still able to reach the positions of the relief troops. But the two army corps virtually ceased to exist. On February 20, Manstein decided to send all the remnants of the withdrawn divisions for reorganization or merge them into other military units.

The most important thing was that inside the Korsun-Shevchenko “cauldron” and during attempts to relieve the blockade, the enemy lost almost all of its tanks, including about 300 “tigers” and “panthers”. Hitler's elite units, such as the SS Viking or Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler panzer divisions, were also badly battered.

The defeat in the Battle of Korsun-Shevchenko meant for the Nazis fatal consequences. Having failed to restore their strength in Ukraine, they abandoned any offensive actions here, and a few months later, under the continuous attacks of Soviet troops, Army Group South ceased to exist.

For their part, for the exploits and courage shown in the February battles of 1944, 23 Soviet units and formations were given the honorary names “Korsunsky”. More than 70 soldiers and officers became Heroes of the Soviet Union.

A special reward was in store for our fellow countryman. For the defeat of the enemy near Korsun-Shevchenkovsky, Army General Konev, the first front commander during the war, was awarded the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union.

Vladimir Romanov

Korsun-Shevchenko operation 1944

offensive operation of the 1st (commander of Army General N.F. Vatutin) and 2nd (commander of Army General I.S. Konev) Ukrainian fronts January 24 - February 17 during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45. The idea of ​​the Soviet command was to strike with troops of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts in the general direction of Zvenigorodka with the aim of encircling and destroying a group of Nazi troops in the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky ledge, formed during the previous Zhitomir-Berdichev and Kirovograd operations. By the beginning of the operation, Soviet troops had 27 rifle divisions, 1 mechanized and 4 tank corps (255 thousand people, 5300 guns and mortars, 513 tanks and self-propelled artillery units), 772 combat aircraft. The enemy had 14 divisions (including 3 tank divisions) and a motorized brigade (170 thousand people, 2600 guns and mortars, 310 tanks and assault guns), 1000 combat aircraft. On January 24, the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front (4th Guards, 53rd Army, 5th Guards Tank Army), with the support of the 5th Air Army, went on the offensive with advanced detachments, and on January 25 - with the main forces. Troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front (40th, 27th Armies and 6th Tank Army), with the support of the 2nd Air Army, launched an offensive on January 26 and on January 28 joined forces in the Zvenigorodka area with the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front. Up to 10 fascist German divisions and 1 brigade with a total number of about 80 thousand people were surrounded. To assist the encircled troops, the fascist German command attempted to break through the encirclement front in the areas of Novomirgorod and Tolmach (February 3) and Rizino (February 4), but were unsuccessful. The encirclement ring became more and more compressed. On February 8, the Soviet command invited the enemy divisions to lay down their arms, but this proposal was rejected. On the external front, the enemy continued to strengthen the group of troops, which by February 10 had 6 infantry, 8 tank divisions and various individual units (in total over 110 thousand people, 940 tanks and assault guns). On February 11, the enemy again launched an offensive from the Rizino area, at the cost of heavy losses, pushed back the Soviet troops and reached the Lysyanka area. On February 12, surrounded by fascist German troops managed to break through from the Steblevo area to the Shenderovka area, the distance between them and German troops in the Lysyanka area was reduced to 10-12 km. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command, in order to unite the efforts of all troops allocated to destroy the enemy, on February 12 subordinated them to the commander of the 2nd Ukrainian Front. On the night of February 17, the enemy in three columns, under the cover of a snowstorm, moved from Shenderovka to break through the encirclement, but only a small group of tanks and armored personnel carriers managed to break through to their troops in Lysyanka. As a result, K.-Sh. O. About 55 thousand were killed and wounded and over 18 thousand enemy soldiers and officers were captured. The liquidation of the Korsun-Shevchenko enemy group created the conditions for the final liberation of Right Bank Ukraine.

Lit.: History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. 1941-1945, vol. 4, M., 1962; Grylev A.N., Dnieper - Carpathians - Crimea, M., 1970.

A. N. Grylev.

Korsun-Shevchenko operation 1944

Cherkasy cauldron

The offensive operation of the troops of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts, carried out with the aim of destroying the Korsun-Shevchenko enemy group, became part of the strategic offensive of Soviet troops in Right Bank Ukraine. It ended with the complete defeat of the encircled group and the death of more than a third of its personnel.

On January 12, 1944, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command issued an order to the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts to encircle and destroy enemy troops.

Started on January 24 Korsun-Shevchenko operation. At dawn, hundreds of guns opened fire on enemy positions. Powerful artillery fire destroyed defensive structures, filled up trenches and communication passages, and destroyed enemy manpower and military equipment.

As soon as the artillery moved the fire into the depths, the advanced battalions of the 4th Guards and 53rd armies of the 2nd Ukrainian Front went on the attack.

On January 26, from the opposite side of the Korsun-Shevchenko ledge, troops of the 40th, 27th and 6th tank armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front struck.

Having overcome the resistance of the enemy's 34th, 88th and 198th infantry divisions in the first line, the troops of the front shock group sought to develop a strike into the depth of the defense. The enemy, relying on prepared lines in the depths, resisted fiercely, especially in the zone of the 40th Army. Moreover, with the forces of the 16th and 17th tank divisions, he persistently attacked the right flank of the 40th Army in the direction of Okhmatov. Here, together with units of the 40th Army (50th and 51st Rifle Corps), soldiers of the 1st Czechoslovak Brigade, transferred here from near Bila Tserkva, fought. The front command also regrouped the 11th Tank Corps of the 1st Tank Army to strengthen the troops in this direction. The corps was transferred to the operational subordination of the commander of the 40th Army.

The offensive of the right-flank formations of the 27th Army (337th and 180th Rifle Divisions) and the units of the 6th Tank Army interacting with them developed somewhat more successfully, and under these conditions the front commander decided to transfer the entire brunt of the main attack to the 6th Tank Army zone. and the 27th Army. For this purpose, from 23:00 on January 27, the 47th Rifle Corps (167th, 359th Rifle Divisions) from the 40th Army was transferred to the subordination of the 6th Tank Army.

On January 31, the 27th Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front and the 4th Guards Army and the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps of the 2nd Ukrainian Front met in the Olshany area, thereby closing the encirclement ring.

Russian T-34-76 tanks on the march.

By the end of February 3, Soviet troops completed the complete encirclement of the entire Korsun-Shevchenko enemy group, establishing a continuous front line. On February 4–5, fascist German troops unsuccessfully repeated attempts to break through the encirclement front with attacks in the direction of Shpola. Also unsuccessful were the enemy’s attempts to break through the encirclement in the sector of the 1st Ukrainian Front from the Rizino area to Lysyanka.

In order to avoid unnecessary bloodshed, the Soviet command proposed that the fascist German troops surrender on February 8. But, deceived by Hitler’s promises of help, they refused to capitulate and continued to resist. Soviet troops, tightening the encirclement, continued to eliminate the enemy group. Until February 12, the destruction was carried out by the forces of both fronts, and then by the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front alone. On February 11, the enemy launched a large counterattack with five tank divisions from the Yerki area and north of Buka in the general direction of Shanderovka.

On February 12, the troops of the encircled group went on the offensive from the Steblev-Tarasha line in the direction of Lysyanka. At the cost of heavy losses, the advancing fascist German divisions managed to reach the Chesnovka-Lysyanka line by February 16. The German troops breaking out of the encirclement at the same time captured the Khilki-Komarovka and Novo-Buda areas, but they still failed to connect with the divisions advancing towards them. The enemy was first stopped, and then defeated and destroyed. The troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front captured Korsun-Shevchenkovsky with a swift attack on February 14.

Partisan detachments were actively operating in the German rear. The photo shows a group of demolitionists from the Khrushchev detachment near a bridge blown up by partisans.

Corpse of General Stemmermann