Stroygazconsulting LLC is a Russian construction company engaged in the construction and engineering of gas and oil transportation system facilities in the Russian Federation. Cooperates with Gazprom and other large companies, carrying out work different levels difficulties throughout the country.

 

Brief information:

• Company name: Stroygazconsulting
• Legal form of activity: Limited Liability Company
• Type of activity: construction, engineering
• Revenue for 2016: RUB 153 billion
• Beneficiaries: Gazprombank, investment fund UCP
• Number of personnel: more than 25 thousand people
• Company website: www.sgc.ru

The Stroygazconsulting company is a large Russian construction company, performing various works for oil and gas production and transport organizations of the Russian Federation. It is one of the main contractors of Gazprom along with Stroygazmontazh and Stroytransneftegaz. It operates throughout the country and participates in the implementation of a number of large interstate projects. The company's history goes back 22 years; it is at the heart of the creation of the Association of Russian Gas Industry Organizations.

A brief history of the creation and development of Stroygazconsulting

The Stroygazconsulting company (SGK) was founded in 1996 by Russian entrepreneur Ziyad Manasir. He managed to use some assets left over from the times of the USSR, as well as acquire modern equipment and hire qualified personnel for high-quality work.

Gazprom already became the main customer of the work: the presence of business connections allowed the founder to establish contacts and agree on cooperation with the gas giant. SGK helped in the construction and implementation of major projects.

Interesting facts. Gazprom, through business and personal connections, has built close cooperation with its contractor: at one time, one of the people close to the former head of the gas company, Viktor Chernomyrdin, received a large share of 20% of the shares of Stroygazconsulting. In 2001, the daughter of a friend of Russian President Vladimir Putin became one of the shareholders.

In the 2000s, this cooperation developed: so, by 2009, the contractor was servicing 10 major Gazprom projects. Despite the presence of third-party work, the gas monopoly remained the main source of orders for SGC.

The material and technical base was significantly updated:

• the best equipment was purchased, thousands of pieces of heavy equipment (excavators, bulldozers, cranes, etc.);
• The staff of workers increased, the company gathered the most trained employees under its wing.

In 2008-12 the total amount of orders from Stroygazconsulting was approximately 800 billion rubles.

Since 2013, the situation has worsened: Gazprom began to provide fewer orders, and SGK was able to win even fewer of them. The number of orders has dropped by half. This led to a noticeable drop in financial performance: in particular, revenue fell by more than 30% during this period.

Sources familiar with the situation linked this to the deterioration of relations between Ziyad Manasir and representatives of the gas monopoly. Stroygazconsulting incurred debts both to Gazprom and to other partners: in some projects, work was idle, and the lag behind the planned delivery dates reached several months.

Soon the entrepreneur sent a letter to Igor Sechin, who held the post of executive secretary at the Presidential Commission on strategic development fuel and energy complex of Russia. In his message, Manasir described the situation and threatened to file lawsuits against Gazprom due to failure to fulfill obligations. However, the development of the situation led to the fact that the entrepreneur was forced to sell the entire stake.

Important! In 2014, Ziyad Manasir left the construction business, selling his securities to shareholders and specifically to entrepreneur Ruslan Baysarov. The latter increased its stake from 30% to 74.1% for approximately $5 billion. The remaining securities were redistributed among the management of SGC.

In 2015, as a result of several transactions, Gazprombank and the UCP investment fund became the main shareholders of the construction group.

Figure 1. Pipe laying using SGK equipment.
Source: 2gis.com

Soon Stroygazconsulting returned to the list of major construction contractors gas giant, having received the corresponding orders. In 2016, he received the right to participate in the “Power of Siberia” project, as well as in other projects (on total amount more than 121 billion rubles). In the same year, it took second place in terms of the number of orders from Gazprom (after the Stroygazmontazh company).

Brief overview The Gazprom company and other largest organizations of the Russian Federation can be read in the article: “Review of the 7 largest holdings in Russia.”

Projects, production indicators

Stroygazconsulting owns a fleet of equipment exceeding 14 thousand units. The work uses both domestic and foreign equipment. Counts:

• excavators - 865 units;
• bulldozers - 750 units;
• loaders - 245 units.

Interesting fact! To make life more convenient for its employees, SGK uses mobile building technology. They are car-houses for 2-8 people, equipped with all the necessary equipment and equipment for living. Such equipment is ideal for working in uninhabited areas. The company's fleet includes more than 6.5 thousand residential trailers of this type for 40 thousand people and almost 3.7 thousand household mobile buildings.

Figure 2. Mobile home-carriages SGK.
Source: vspro.info

The contractor is engaged in the technical development of fields, the construction of stations for obtaining compressed gas, pipelines, including highways, roads and railways, and the subway.

In addition to Gazprom, among the customers of Stroygazconsulting’s work there are many large organizations.

1. Nord Stream company.
2. Rostransmodernization.
3. Avtodor.
4. Rosavtodor.
5. NK "Transneft".
6. Construction complex of Moscow.

Below is a list of major SGC projects completed or currently underway:

• pipeline system MN "Eastern Siberia - Pacific Ocean»;
• main gas pipeline “Power of Siberia”, designed to transport gas to Russian settlements in the Far East and China;
• main gas pipelines MG "Gryazovets-Vyborg", MG "Bovanenkovo-Ukhta", "Ukhta-Torzhok", MG "Zapolyarye-Purpe", etc.;
• Nord Stream offshore gas pipeline;
• Urengoyskoye oil and gas condensate field. The largest oil and gas condensate field in Russia and the third largest in the world in terms of reserves. Reserves - more than 10.9 trillion cubic meters. m.;
• Bovanenkovskoye oil and gas condensate field. This oil and gas condensate field is one of the five largest in the world (4.9 trillion cubic meters).

Figure 3. SGC equipment at the Urengoy oil and gas condensate field.
Source: sgc.ru

As well as dozens of other projects, including the creation of overpasses, transport interchanges, Federal roads, railways, production bases, construction of buildings and complexes.

Thus, in 2014, the contractor began construction of a section of the Moscow Central Ring Road from 96 km to 146 km (total length of almost 50 km).

"Stroygazconsulting" has many certificates, certificates, licenses and permits that allow construction activities, engineering.

Owners and financial results of the company

After Ruslan Baysarov purchased shares from the founder of SGK Ziyad Manasir, the investment fund UCP (United Capital Partners) and Gazprombank became interested in the company. As a result, Baysarov sold his stake, and the remaining securities were purchased from minority shareholders.

Briefly. Now Stroygazconsulting is owned by Gazprombank JSC - 50% of shares - and the UCP fund (owned by businessman Ilya Shcherbovich) - 50%.

General director of SGC is Stanislav Anikeev.

The construction contractor is one of the 200 largest Russian private companies, according to Forbes magazine, ranking 44th in 2017.

Table 1. Change in revenue of the Stroygazconsulting company in 2010-2016.

This year, the discussion in the Russian energy sector has sharply intensified about how much investment in traditional generation is needed and whether it is still worth shifting their return onto consumers. The head of the Siberian Generating Company (SGC), Mikhail Kuznetsov, spoke to Kommersant about the threat of a shortage of energy capacity in Siberia, the effectiveness of investments in the heat supply of cities and possible new transactions.

- The industry is arguing more and more loudly about whether there will be an energy shortage in Siberia, whether it is necessary to build new stations. What do you think? And what will most effectively stimulate the development of generation - new CSAs (power supply contracts with a guarantee of return on investment) or an increase in the price of “old” capacity (competitive selection price - KOM)?

- Best option- that the price of KOM enables companies to independently plan new construction. This would be ideal, but, unfortunately, not very realistic. As for new CSAs, they need to be treated with caution, since thoughtless planning of investments for the sake of investment can only lead to the fact that the consumer pays more, energy workers receive less, and the difference goes to banks, which also attract loans at a cost. It is difficult for me to talk about the first price zone of the energy market (the European part of Russia and the Urals - Kommersant), but there, apparently, excess capacity will persist for a long time. But in the second zone (Siberia - Kommersant) not everything is so simple.

- So the energy shortage in Siberia is real?

- There are days when the real power reserve is less than 1 GW, or even several hundred megawatts. Can this be considered a reserve? Secondly, there is no reason to doubt the consumption forecasts - the construction of aluminum smelters is in full swing and will be completed, it would be stupid not to complete them once they have already begun. The planned growth in the economy as a whole also does not look like a pipe dream. And by 2022, or maybe earlier, by 2020, we in Siberia may well experience a noticeable shortage of energy capacity.

Of course, there is always a temptation to lull oneself into illusions - to believe that there are many factors that will prevent shortages. And in once again hope in the Russian maybe! Yes, maybe there are quite a lot of these: maybe there won’t be a low-water year, maybe Kazakhstan will behave correctly, maybe none of the large generators will fail at the most inopportune moment, maybe we’ll somehow get through.

But I am sure that this winter there will be a lot of cold days, and the low water levels of the rivers are already obvious. And what we will see: visually there is a lot of generation, but this is self-deception. The secret is that you need to look at those who can really work. And then you will see that almost all the available capacity is loaded, and there are days when only 500-600 MW remain unused. This is the actual available reserve.

- Do you mean a normal, not extreme situation?

- We see this regularly. For example, study the situation of January 23–27, 2016, and everything will become quite obvious. If you look at the balance installed capacity and consumption, you will see what appears to be a large reserve.

Of course, I have now entered an area that my colleagues from the System Operator (SO), who are in charge of the balance sheet, can discuss more professionally - they know more. But we, for our part, can also pay attention to something. For example, the algorithms used by CO produce results that are difficult to accept. First, we count hydrogeneration based on how long it lasts for eight hours. Even not in a low-water year, if you look at December-January (and these are the most difficult months for a hydroelectric power station), you will see that it generates four gigawatts less than the calculated value of the KOM. And if the year is also low in water, then this figure may be even less.

- But there is also an opportunity to close the Siberian deficit with supplies from the Urals...

- Yes, it is physically possible for us to transfer up to 2 GW from the European part of Russia, and if there is a power shortage, Europe should help. But only 300 MW goes through our territory, and the rest goes through Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan, I don’t want to offend anyone, is not very punctual when planning supply and demand, and it is unknown how it will behave. If it happens, for example, minus 30°C - and if everything goes well with them, perhaps we will make it through. And if they are not doing well, then they will load their lines first, their shirt is closer to the body. And then Europe will not be able to produce the expected 2 GW. Of course, at this moment it is possible - and will have to - increase hydro generation, it will stand idle for some time, produce the promised 3-4 GW, and, perhaps, during this time the Kazakhs will resolve the situation at home... This is the chain that is being built.

Third. We have generation that submits high price bids. For example, at our Novokuznetsk gas thermal power plant - 300 MW. But the station is designed to fend off unexpected dips or surges in consumption, so such technical exclusivity comes at a price. IN literally pay the cost of production: it is very high. If the GTPP is forced to go through the standard selection route of VSVGO (the technical stage of generation selection preceding COM. - Kommersant), and this will inevitably happen in days of power shortage, then we will get a price in Siberia of 2 thousand rubles. (per MWh, wholesale market price - Kommersant), I’m afraid few people will like this. We won’t have any questions, but we honestly warn about the consequences of a shortage.

And finally, you should not discount one more factor - the network configuration. You need to understand that if the demand, as in Siberia on cold days, is 30 GW, then this means that 32–33 GW or even 35 GW must be turned on. The network itself is living creature, and the reservation cannot be tailored to fit; you need to be able to react to possible deviations. I say all this to show that simple arithmetic is sometimes misleading: it seems that you have 28% of the reserve, but in fact it is only 6-8%. And if the aluminum smelter starts operating and consumption increases by 1 GW, then 6–8% will be like a cow’s tongue.

- So you think that a new generation is still needed?

- We see that the procedure adopted today for calculating the need for generation is not entirely correct, and I believe that the construction of some more capacity in Siberia will become insurance against possible problems. And we are not talking about tens of gigawatts or even several gigawatts. Our calculations say that 1 GW would be more than enough. In addition, in our cities of presence we see the need to increase thermal generation; these two processes could go in parallel. By building new thermal power plants or expanding existing ones, we could solve two problems - providing cheap heat and reserving power. For our company, this is 200 MW at Barnaul CHPP-3, 200 MW at Krasnoyarsk CHPP-3, perhaps 200 MW in Novokuznetsk - a total of 600-700 MW, in any case less than 1 GW. This is not a very large-scale, but necessary construction, which, in my opinion, meets the challenges facing the energy sector in Siberia.

- Would this be enough to cover the need for both reserve and heat?

- If these two problems were solved in parallel, all issues regarding both electricity and heat would be resolved, and, most importantly, it would not be expensive for the consumer. After all, the current CSA is ending, and if new construction begins, the consumer payment will still decrease.

- Should construction be financed through increased payments for capacity, not exceeding the limits of current CSA? According to what scheme?

- According to the same one. There is a payment for power. In Siberia, it will continue to grow slightly above inflation for another three years, due to the so-called four-year “hump” (the peak of payments for new stations - Kommersant), and then, starting in 2021, it will decline. If a new CSA is made, the payment for capacity for the consumer will in any case increase below inflation. Such construction should be scheduled for 2022–2023. In five years, it is possible to build the planned blocks and stations with high quality, slowly.

- Which option do you support more: CSA for new blocks or an increase in the price of COM?

- Increasing the price of KOM, I'm afraid, is a speculative option. I don’t believe in it, although, I repeat, according to my inner feelings, this option is optimal. This is the position that we, as generators, would defend, but we are not the only side, because there is a main partner - the state.

- Isn’t it worthwhile to increase the possibility of flows from the European part of the Russian Federation at the same time?

- Network construction is a costly business, especially at such distances. Why build network capacity for flow from the European part of Russia to the Eastern part if they are in demand one month a year? In addition, you need to understand that if the power comes from Europe, it will bring a European price. Somewhere in Perm the average annual price is 1100 rubles. (per MW hour - “Kommersant”), here in Belovo - 870 rubles. Given the current difference in nodal prices (taking into account losses during flows), the price comes to us by 100–200 rubles. below. If the situation turns around, then these 100, or even more, rubles will be added to the price in Siberia. We agree, but will Siberian consumers agree?

- In your opinion, is state support needed for the modernization of stations?

- I spoke about the construction of new capacities. Since if you modernize the old ones, there will still not be enough of them, this does not solve Siberian problem. At the same time, in Europe there is definitely more capacity than necessary, even taking into account all the planned closures, and here it may make sense for the regulator to consider some kind of CSA program for modernization. Many capacities are becoming obsolete morally and physically, and it would be cheaper to update them now, since updating, at least when it comes to coal generation, is completely different, less money. So, at the Nazarovskaya GRES at the start of the CSA we received a little more than 400 thousand rubles. per MW per month, and for new construction at the Krasnoyarsk CHPP-3, for example, at the same time we had 1.6 million rubles. per MW per month. So in the European part of Russia, based on general considerations, modernization would be less expensive for the consumer and would allow maintaining capacity for a much longer period. Therefore, in our opinion, the CSA program would be reasonable in this form: not very large-scale construction of new facilities in Siberia and modernization of facilities in the European part of the country. This solution seems to me to be quite adequate for the problems arising in 2024–2026.

- Is there a heat deficit in Siberia?

- By and large, there is enough heat, but there are also nuances here. Cogeneration is always more efficient than separate generation of heat and electricity, so it is much more profitable to produce heat at a combined heat and power plant. And we see that in a number of cases, our water heating part, which is generally intended for consumption peaks, is slowly creeping into the base, and we are covering the peaks with obscenely expensive electric boiler houses. The construction of a thermal power plant would make it possible to generate more heat in the cogeneration cycle, which is more correct from the point of view of the country's economy.

Today, the heat market model does not quite adequately reflect the real efficiency of thermal power plants, and, for example, if we calculate formally, it will seem that they are inferior to condensing stations in terms of efficiency. But this is formal. Because it is drilled into every power engineer from the first year that a thermal power plant is a much more interesting facility in terms of efficiency than any state district power plant, which is actually very correct.

Alas, today regulators are artificially driving these stations into a ghetto of semi-unprofitability, but, generally speaking, if there is a need for heat, they need to be built. But if the quirks of the regulators do not allow this now, then let’s support them with such exclusive tools direct action, like DPM.

- What about the “alternative boiler house” method, when the CHP tariff is calculated from a ceiling equal to the cost of heat from the new boiler house?

- It’s a little about something else, about the heat supply system as a whole, and not about individual power plants.

- To some extent, the alt boiler room makes it possible to increase the profitability of the thermal power plant.

- If the COM was normal, then the construction of new stations would be profitable. But since our COM is regulatory, the revenues from it do not cover the costs, taking into account the fact that our country has a high cost of capital. The alt boiler room is a little different: let’s say that a certain heat supply system has developed in the city - with leaking pipes, half-loaded boiler rooms, inefficient heat sources, and we see that if we reduce the excess, it will become more efficient. To do this, let’s say, you need to invest 8 billion rubles, and after that we will start earning 800 million rubles. per year. Within nine to ten years we will return the invested money, taking into account interest on the loan.

But the regulation is such that as soon as I receive these 8 billion rubles. I’ll invest and earn 800 million rubles, these 800 million rubles. They will take it away from me and I will not be able to get back what I invested. This is how tariff regulation is structured using the cost-plus method. To avoid this, we ask that the tariff be guaranteed for 20 years, even if it grows slightly ahead of inflation, we don’t need any more: we will calculate the model, attract a loan, modernize the heating supply, earn money... You will have a profitable heating industry, and we will have money, we will pay taxes, and we will support people, paying them not a symbolic, but a decent salary.

- Are local authorities ready for the arrival of SGC as an investor on such conditions?

- Today, the heat supply system for many governors and city heads is a big headache, and the presence of a profitable participant who worries about his farm and holds on to it is objectively very beneficial for the authorities. The farther from Moscow, from regional centers, the more problem cities there are. And if in Moscow or St. Petersburg several competitors may fight for the right to supply heating services, then in smaller cities you will no longer see such luxury. And in cities with an even smaller population - 100-200 thousand people - a completely opposite situation may emerge: the head of the municipality will sit at a reception with the governor, and the two of them will frantically think about what to do so as not to freeze people.

You see, SGC can come to places where hope has not yet been lost. We come to a place where there is no public money, where we do everything with private funds. And if the situation has gone far, as in Rubtsovsk, we ask for a tariff increase, but within reasonable limits. But if you wait a little longer, when everything falls apart and there is nothing to cling to, then one tariff will no longer be enough: state money will be needed, and the point of attracting our company will disappear. We know how to optimize heat supply systems, how to extract hidden opportunities and how to implement at low capital costs what the state itself would do at a very high cost. Therefore, if there is an alt boiler room, we can enter into such a project, but if the heat supply system degrades, then in such cases the doctor is already powerless.

- How is the project developing in Rubtsovsk?

- There's still a year left. But only from a technical point of view: we have completed the network part, we need to complete the construction of the station. Today South thermal station, where we work, is able to supply heat to the entire city. There are some works left to be done, but they are aimed only at improving the economy. By and large, for the authorities, the project is 90% complete, and all that remains to be finalized is for ourselves, so as not to go down the drain with investments and to return the invested funds.

- Which one? planned date payback?

- About 12 years old.

- Is this taking into account the increase in the efficiency of the station?

- Certainly. I had to discuss with deputies who say: “You raised the tariff by 25%, put it in your pocket, scoundrels!” I answer: 650 million rubles are collected per year for heat, we have raised the tariff by 25% and will collect an additional 160 million rubles from you. And our investments are 2 billion rubles, and I attracted them at 11–12% per annum, which means I pay 220–240 million rubles a year. one percent. Comparing the figures, we see that the tariff increase will not be enough even for interest, so I will make the rest plus repayment of the loan by organizing the heating system smarter. And, frankly, we need to say thank you for costing two billion, because if someone else had come, he would have demanded 5–6 billion rubles, and it’s not a fact that in principle there would have been anyone willing to decide to do this.

- Which cities do you consider from the point of view of participation in heat supply projects?

- Now we are considering Chernogorsk in Khakassia (70-80 thousand people). The situation there is similar to Rubtsovsk politically, but technically it is completely different, but this is one of the options that we will implement in the next two years.

- So you are interested in small cities if the heat supply system there has not yet completely collapsed?

- We are interested in everything. First of all, we are interested in authorities who want to solve the problem for decades to come. In all the projects in which we participate, we can still wait a year or two. We lived by this principle: let’s be patient, and then we’ll see, someone else will decide. And we came to the conclusion that it was already hard to endure. The sooner modernization begins, the cheaper it will be for everyone.

If we, for example, had done a project in Rubtsovsk five or six years ago, I think we would have asked for a ten percent increase in the tariff, and that would have been enough. And if they came in five years, then it would not have been possible without government injections, because the residents would not have been able to withstand the necessary tariff increase. Therefore, we are interested in any projects where the regional or municipal authorities want to find a systemic solution for decades to come and say: “We see that we have a problem slowly brewing, accept it, make a “candy” out of this complex object, make a profit, and if it happens for residents it is not very expensive, then we are with you.” This is not greed on our part: in Rubtsovsk we haven’t even received an alt boiler room yet, we are doing everything as promised. There are no super-profits when you earn money back in three to five years and start earning money. We think in much longer terms, and the payback of a project in seven to ten years is quite acceptable for us. I think that there are not very many participants in this market who are ready to work for such a long term.

- Are you or the authorities the initiators of the process?

- This can only be a joint desire. We are looking at options primarily close to and in our cities of presence. But this does not mean that we are limited to these options. If there is a desire to do something more interesting in another subject of the federation, why not. This is not even a coal or electric problem, but rather a heating network task, this competence is represented in our company. Therefore, we are able to work in any city.

- Now you have Chernogorsk in your plans, but are there any other cities?

- We would like the alt boiler room to operate in all cities of our presence. We understand where billions could be invested in each city. In Barnaul there is room to invest about nine billion: to replace one-day boiler houses, for the maintenance of which mountains of municipal and regional money need to be allocated, while it is sometimes difficult to breathe in the city. We need serious investments, but give us an alt-boiler plant with a slight increase in tariff - 1.5–2% of inflation - for ten years and we will work normally.

- How do the authorities feel about your initiatives?

- Strictly speaking, the legislation on alt-boiler houses is not yet in full form. Therefore, the process has just begun. In all cities of our presence, except Kyzyl, we have such plans with one exception. In the Kemerovo region, in addition to agreeing to an alt boiler room, we have to resolve several more systemic issues, for example, the presence of budget subsidies, which makes business unpredictable, which we would like to avoid.

-Are you going to buy anything?

- All the years that I have been leading this company, we have been constantly in at least one negotiation process for the acquisition of one or another asset. Sometimes these negotiations are successful, sometimes not. Therefore, whenever you ask me if there are plans, I would always answer: “Yes.” We are carrying out such negotiations and such work now. But I can’t tell you specific parameters. Among the well-known ones, we are participating in the competition announced by Enel for the acquisition of the Reftinskaya State District Power Plant, but for now we have simply announced our participation. This work is most initial stage, we have not progressed far yet - simply because it was initiated quite recently.

- Have you submitted a price application?

- Yes. With indicative price. I can’t say which one.

- What is the objective cost of this station?

- I won’t say anything more. We have yet to compete on price and it would be wrong to disclose the information.

Why do we want to buy? Our company can do many things, including unique ones. The whole cycle of necessary competencies is there - heating networks, electrical, construction, trade and so on. In a word, we can manage electrical and thermal power facilities quite professionally. An increase in the number of objects under management will not cause us to significantly increase our apparatus. And we can say that by taking control of the Reftinskaya GRES, we will be able to make it more efficient, this will not bring additional costs.

But, unfortunately, there are very weak fuel synergies there. The station was built in such a way that replacing coal is quite difficult. And the most reasonable thing from an energy and coal point of view is to burn the same Ekibastuz coals (from Kazakhstan - Kommersant) as today. In principle, you can find a replacement for them, but only if for some reason an urgent need arises. This consideration quite tightly ties the Reftinskaya GRES to virtually one supplier, and, by the way, also ties it to a single buyer: almost half of the capacity of the largest open-pit mine is loaded by the GRES.

This is always not a very good, not very stable combination, because if a force majeure situation occurs (no matter for what reasons), it will lead to significant economic consequences. And both for the section and for the station itself. And here the best configuration is partial joint ownership with the fuel supplier, so that all participants are objectively interested in stable production. There is, of course, also a certain currency risk, but it is predictable: in general, the tenge will still follow the ruble.

- Is joint ownership possible?

- Yes, it's possible. If there is such a proposal, we will discuss it. For now, these are rather theoretical considerations.

- In 2016, your assets were sharp jump profit. What explains it?

- We do not disclose or comment on our financial indicators. But in 2015–2016, the growth in company profitability is associated exclusively with accounting factors. The DPM payment is structured in the form of a payment for capacity (fixed monthly, regardless of the load or efficiency of the station - “Kommersant”), therefore, it increases our profit and, as it were, contains this profit. We give part of the payment for capacity as profit, and this is a programmed part of the entire CSA system. So a significant share of the profit growth is due to the commissioned CSA facilities, the last of which were completed by the beginning of 2015. There is also, of course, an increase operational efficiency, but the main thing is the DPM payment.

- How do you see the dynamics of electricity prices in Siberia - will they decrease or increase?

- I won’t tell you an exact forecast: this is a certain know-how. This is our vision, it may be right or wrong, but whoever has it more true will earn more money.

Globally, two factors play a role. First: Siberia and Europe are now united into a single calculation model of the DAM (day-ahead market, the main sector of the wholesale electricity market - “Kommersant”). This leads to the fact that, since our generation is cheap, we supply our electricity to Europe, but the price is also determined in Europe (the European part of the Russian Federation). In Europe, it is primarily determined by the price of gas. Until recently, we predicted an increase in gas prices of about 2%, and subsequently - somewhere at the inflation level. Now the Ministry of Economy is giving a more aggressive price increase, so in this part the DAM price will grow more dynamically. Alas, there is a second factor that will, on the contrary, reduce the price - the introduction of new CSA generation - first of all, nuclear power plants, nuclear companies must introduce more than 4 GW. And this factor will work counter. Therefore, these two factors, when combined, give a much smaller increase in the price on the DAM. And the price of COM, I think, will rise somewhere in line with inflation.

- How do you build your relationship with coal suppliers from SUEK, taking into account the fact that you are part of the same holding?

- We have long-term contracts with predictable and understandable prices. This allows you to make long-term plans, which is important for the development of the company.

- How do you assess the potential for further development of the electricity sector reform?

- We moved away from tariff regulation: when you are efficient, you get less money, when you are less efficient, you get more. This kills all desire to be effective. Okay, we decided that this was a road to nowhere, so we made a market. It seems like something is starting to work out. But at the start it was assumed that now the price for power would be twice as high. The price of power is strictly controlled - price corridors are set. RD (regulated contracts, sale of electricity to the population and equivalent consumers - Kommersant) was not removed, this appendix lives and prospers, a lot of pseudo-businesses have already built a nest there. And now Buryatia has also been given to us (the region has left the energy market in the Republic of Dagestan since this year - Kommersant). Let's go to RD Krasnoyarsk region, give Kemerovo, everything else - and we will get tariff regulation in full. This rollback is very dangerous: we can get exactly what we are now trying to get away from in the heat, when it is not efficient sources that are developing, but those who know how to find the right approach to the souls of those who set prices and distribute government investments. Is this what we want? I think there is a group of people who want this, but there are not many of them. But the more such strange mechanisms there are in regulation, the more people there will be who would like to preserve and increase this fascinating state regulation.

The energy company was headed by Andrey Melnichenko’s long-time partner

The Siberian Generating Company (SGK) has replaced its general director: Sergei Mironosetsky, who headed the SGC since 2009, gave up his chair to Mikhail Kuznetsov, who joined the company’s board of directors several months ago. The new general director has known the owner of SGK, Andrey Melnichenko, for many years: the first project, which later turned into MDM Bank, was organized by businessmen while studying at the physics department of Moscow State University.

Yesterday, the board of directors of the Siberian Generating Company (the main owner is Andrey Melnichenko’s Siberian Energy Investments Ltd; the businessman also owns SUEK through another offshore company) appointed a new general director. This was Mikhail Kuznetsov; the former head of the company, Sergei Mironosetsky, will remain on the board of directors, SGK reported.

Sergey Mironosetsky has been working with Andrey Melnichenko since 2005, when he became Deputy General Director for Energy, Mergers and Acquisitions of SUEK. The top manager has headed the Siberian generating company since its founding in 2009 (SGK was created to unite the Siberian energy assets of Andrei Melnichenko). The energy holding emphasizes that the general director left his post due to at will, “there was no conflict with the shareholder.”

An RBC daily interlocutor at the market says that Sergei Mironosetsky has long been planning to resign and for now, most likely, will rest. Among the vacancies on the energy market, the position of general director of Eurosibenergo is now “hanging”, where Sergei Mironosetsky worked as financial director in 2001-2003. The company reported to RBC daily that the decision on the appointment of a general director has not yet been made.

It will be easy for the new head of SGC Mikhail Kuznetsov to find a common language with the owner. The businessmen studied at the Physics Faculty of Moscow State University at approximately the same time, where already in their first years Andrei Melnichenko and his friend Evgeniy Ishchenko organized a private trading enterprise, and Mikhail Kuznetsov soon joined them. After some time, the friends focused on “money trading” and created the MDM Bureau, which then received a banking license. The trio separated in 1997 - Melnichenko bought out the shares of his friends. “They chose a different fate for themselves, were elected deputies to the State Duma, went into politics and decided to leave business,” the businessman said in an interview with Vedomosti.

Now Mikhail Kuznetsov, having worked as a State Duma deputy (from 1995 to 2003) and governor of the Pskov region (2004-2009), is returning to his friend’s business. At the end of his governor’s term, he told reporters: “I’ll find something to do if I want to. My friends call me - let's do this project, let's do that one. I’ll go and meet my friends, I rarely see them, they live with me in Moscow, and I’m here. We’ll discuss something over a glass of tea, maybe something will interest me” (quote from the newspaper “Pskov Province”).

At SGK, Kuznetsov will have to improve the company’s financial performance (one of the two energy divisions of the Kuzbasenergo company had a loss of 843 million rubles at the end of 2012), as well as fight non-payments in the retail heat market (in the summer accounts receivable SGK grew to 7.8 billion rubles, almost one and a half times higher than the costs of the repair program).

Russian company specializing in construction and engineering. Organizationally, it is a holding company, which includes a management company (LLC Stroygazconsulting) and manufacturing enterprises. SGK carries out the development of oil and gas condensate fields, construction and major renovation pipelines, highways.
The total number of specialists working at the company's enterprises exceeds 60 thousand people. The fleet of machines and mechanisms includes more than 14,000 units of equipment.

"Story"

The company was founded in 1996 by Russian entrepreneur of Jordanian origin Ziyad Manasir.

In 2009, 65% of the company's turnover came from Gazprom contracts. Forbes magazine pointed out in its publication a possible connection between the fact that Stroygazconsulting became one of the largest recipients of construction contracts from the gas monopoly and the state and Manasir’s connections with figures close to Russian President Vladimir Putin, as well as the inclusion of such persons among the co-owners of the company (for example, Olga Grigorieva, daughter of the former head of the St. Petersburg FSB Directorate and friend of V. Putin, General Alexander Grigoriev).

"Themes"

"Owners"

The new owners of Stroygazconsulting on a parity basis were UCP and

"Subsidiaries"

"Management"

"News"

The Timchenko family turned out to be the owner of 50% of a large contractor Gazprom

Businessman Gennady Timchenko told RBC that together with his family he owns “at least half” of one of Gazprom’s largest contractors, Stroytransneftegaz. It was previously known that Timchenko himself owns 31.5% of the company

The businessman himself said that Timchenko and his family own “at least half” of Stroytransneftegaz, answering a question from an RBC correspondent on the sidelines of the annual meeting of the Russian-Chinese Business Council on Wednesday, February 8.

Stroygazconsulting received a new contract from Gazprom for 35 billion rubles.

The company received a contract for the construction of 235 km of this pipeline to China worth 35.22 billion rubles. We are talking about the section “KS-3 “Amginskaya” - KS-4 “Nimnyrskaya” 794.8 km - 1029.8 km.”

To be in St. Petersburg: Stroytransgaz and Stroygazconsulting are moving to St. Petersburg

As Forbes found out, of the three largest construction contractors of the gas monopoly in Moscow, only Stroygazmontazh of Arkady Rotenberg will remain

Stroygazconsulting (SGK) will complete its move to St. Petersburg by September, when renovations are completed at the new office, a source close to the company told Forbes and was confirmed by a former employee. Forbes' interlocutor at one of Gazprom's competing contractors added that SGK only has one department left to move.

Baysarov became the main shareholder of Stroygazconsulting for $5 billion

The structures of businessman Ruslan Baysarov increased their share in Stroygazconsulting to 74.1% by purchasing the shares of Ziyad Manasir, who was the main owner of the company. Baysarov’s representative reported this to RBC. In December 2013 The entrepreneur’s structures acquired 30% of Stroygazconsulting.

Timchenko strikes back: ARKS complained about the competition on the Central Ring Road

ARKS does not agree with the victory of Ziyad Manasir’s company in the competition for the construction of the Central Ring Road. In March, Manasir challenged Gennady Timchenko’s right to a Gazprom contract. The ARKS company, in which Gennady Timchenko’s structures own a stake, complained to the Federal Antimonopoly Service about the competition for the construction of the first stage of the Central Ring Road for 49 billion rubles. She is challenging the victory of Stroygazconsulting Ziyad Manasir. Previously, two large contractors competed for Gazprom’s money, now any large infrastructure government contracts are in their interests.

Stroygazconsulting won the competition for the construction of the Central Ring Road

04/29/2014, Moscow 15:10:54 Avtodor has selected a winner for the right to build and maintain the first launch complex of the Central Ring Road (CRR) with a length of 49.5 km. It was Ziyad Manasir’s Stroygazconsulting company, which proposed to build the Central Ring Road for 48.88 billion rubles.

Stroygazconsulting may lose the contract for the construction of the Murmansk transport hub

Part of the funds is redirected to transport projects in the Azov-Black Sea region

Stroygazconsulting changes customers

Gazprom's oldest contractor expands its presence in other sectors

Gazprom will not reduce construction, although it has questions for builders

Gazprom is preparing to revise this year's investment program upward. The plan, approved at the end of 2011, amounted to almost 777 billion rubles. (compared to 1.3 trillion last year). However, following the results of the first quarter, the program was increased to 843.8 billion, Yaroslav Golko, member of the Gazprom board of directors and head of the investment and construction department, announced today. And in August-September the investment plan may be revised again - also upward, he added.

Manasir bought half of the offices in Tower 2000 from Zanadvorov

The founder of Stroygazconsulting, Ziyad Manasir, bought about 15,000 square meters from the co-owner of the Seventh Continent store chain, Alexander Zanadvorov. m of office space in Tower 2000 at the Moscow International business center“Moscow City,” the Kommersant newspaper writes on Wednesday.

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Stroygazconsulting will pay off Polonsky’s debts

To the company " International Center development”, owned by businessman Ziyad Manasir’s Stroygazconsulting, has filed for bankruptcy. Thus, a group of architects is trying to collect a debt for work on designing the layout of the Mirax Plaza complex, which is planned to be built opposite the MIBC Moscow City.

Yuri Komarov: We can long and persistently declare that there must be Russian equipment

Vice President of Stroygazconsulting LLC Yuri Komarov in an interview with the Gas Information Agency noted: “We can long and persistently declare that there must be Russian equipment. But it all starts with design and procurement management, as well as the engineering process at the specification stage. If we do not manage design, procurement and are not involved in the engineering process, the result will always be the same - the equipment will be what those who manage these processes are used to. If these are foreign EPC contractors, then the answer is obvious.”

Urgently! The general director of the company that built a road in Yamal for Gazprom was detained. He is placed in a temporary detention center and is awaiting preventive measures.

In November last year, information appeared in the press that Igor Nak’s business (which is about 50 companies) was being bought by Russia’s largest oil and gas contractor, Ziyad Manasir’s Stroygazconsulting company. At the same time, Manasir is buying not only the road construction business, but also companies that own licenses for deposits in Yamal.

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Russian kings of government procurement - ranking according to Forbes magazine

2. Head of Stroygazconsulting Ziyad Manasir, who received orders worth 728 billion rubles from Gazprom, Transneft and Rosavtodor. Manasira's company is one of the largest pipeline builders for Transneft.

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Yuri Kogtev: Yuri Komarov argues with Alexey Miller

Perhaps, by seeing Yuri Komarov retire from the post of chief executive officer of Shtokman Development AG in June 2010, Gazprom management believed that it had said goodbye forever to the former head of Gazprom Export, who was 65 years old at the time of his resignation. But Yuri Aleksandrovich reminded himself: on February 13, he answered Interfax’s questions in his capacity as vice president of Stroygazconsulting LLC.

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Ziyad Manasir laid his paw on Gazprom's polar empire

For Yamburggazinvest employees, problems began on January 29, 2009, when the new management of the company gathered them in the hall of one of the modules. In total, about 1,200 people work at the repair site; those who were not working at that moment were present at the meeting. “On January 29, two citizens of Ukraine, the Yakibchuk brothers, who are considered the leaders of the Urengoy Yamalmekhanizatsiya (a division of Stroygazconsulting) arrived and announced that from February 1 we are all moving to Stroygazconsulting (more precisely, a division of Stroygazconsulting-North).

- Oleg Valentinovich, what is coal generation? Why is it worse than gas and is it worse at all? Many people think that we need to switch from coal to gas. Could this transition to gas generation have a beneficial effect on the environmental situation in Khakassia?

First of all, you need to understand what coal generation is. This is a technologically well-established process. We all understand the technology of coal combustion. In the energy sector, there have been no significant breakthroughs in coal combustion technology either. A number of changes have occurred, primarily related to efficiency and environmental friendliness. In all other respects, this is an old, well-established method of obtaining hot water, heat, energy.

You mentioned gas generation. Gas is a relatively new fuel. It is technologically easier to burn gas, but more dangerous.

In general, if we talk about ecology, we still need to understand that yes, thermal power plants burn large volumes of coal. Yes, this involves the formation of emissions. But we need to know what we throw away and how much. The main components that escape into the atmosphere as a result of coal combustion are carbon dioxide, nitrogen oxides and that’s it.

- What about benzopyrene?

We don't have benzopyrene. Because the temperature in the furnaces reaches more than 1000 degrees. Under such conditions, benzopyrene simply decomposes in boilers.

When burning coal, of course, solid particles remain: slag, ash, and volatile ash components. But humanity, at the stages of its development, has learned to catch them quite effectively. For example, let’s take our modern power unit - the fifth boiler, the fourth turbine of the Abakan Thermal Power Plant. It is equipped with probably one of the most modern filters - a five-field electrostatic precipitator. If the emission standard according to our Russian GOSTs is 50 milligrams per cubic meter, and according to European requirements - 20, then our electric precipitator produces 5 milligrams. That is, our emissions are four times less than European standards require.

It is clear that coal has a fireproof part - it is silicon oxide, ordinary quartz sand, there is a little calcium, and tiny amounts of aluminum. But today we have learned - and not only our company, but humanity as a whole - to capture, collect and dispose of all this.

If there is any problem, it is related to the disposal of waste ash and coal slag. And this problem is especially acute in Siberia. If in the western part of the country the management of stations has a headache about how to sell more of this waste, then the directors of Siberian stations are worried about where to place it. All over the world, ash and slag are used in the reclamation of disturbed lands, in road construction - to produce light cements and building materials. This has not yet found mass distribution in our country.

- And abroad?

Almost all over the world, ash and slag is a popular building material. I know for sure that in Germany, Poland, and Serbia, ash and slag are first used in road construction, in the reclamation of disturbed lands, and only then in the production of sand and gravel mixtures.

The share of consumption of our ash and slag is still estimated at insignificant percentages. Krasnoyarsk is actively taking them for the reclamation of solid waste landfills and disturbed lands. In Kuzbass, this process has been quite active.

It is clear that there are no such problems with gas. But gas will cost two to three times more than coal. Twice! And this will be connected with the costs of its transportation. How relevant can gas be for Siberia, which is located on coal fields?

I know that there are people who propose using a gas field in the Altai region. Yes, there is gas there. But, firstly, there is very little of it; according to experts, it will be enough for two to two and a half years to provide heat to Abakan. Secondly, in natural gas high content sulfur. This is definitely very bad for the environment. Plus, we'll ruin our boilers. Any combination of sulfur with moisture or air will lead to the formation of sulfuric acid, which will simply destroy the heating surface of our boilers. It is possible, of course, to purify the gas before supplying it for combustion, but this process is very expensive. And with such volumes of gas it is clearly ineffective. Gas field By the way, there are also in the Minusinsk region, but these are not the reserves to have a serious conversation.

- So, switching to gas is not being considered in any way?

The plans of the Siberian Generating Company are being built until 2040. Gas does not figure in them in any way. Our boilers are not designed to burn gas; they will have to be modernized. And the reconstruction of one boiler will cost at least 800 million rubles. Are authorities and consumers ready to take such a step? I doubt. Now only Moscow is on gas. In Barnaul private sector switched to gas, but the generation in the city is still coal-fired.

It makes sense to use gas in those regions where it is nearby, but transporting coal is expensive. I don’t know a politician who is ready to take what is essentially a coal region and convert it to gas. How to explain to the population the purpose of these transformations? Let's imagine: tomorrow we will magically switch the Abakan Thermal Power Plant to gas.

How will this affect the overall ecology of Abakan? I can answer: “Probably not at all.” Plus, gasification of the private sector will cost no less than centralized heating.

And one more very important point- the republican authorities are betting on the coal industry, the country's president has already approved the development of the southern passage of the Trans-Siberian Railway, and this means transporting millions of tons of coal annually, 20 thousand jobs. Transportation of Khakass coal. And this is a prospect for the years ahead. So draw your own conclusions.

- And if we talk about the pipe that will go from the Abakan Thermal Power Plant towards Chernogorsk, how much will this improve the environment in the city of miners?

Boiler houses in Chernogorsk were built decades ago. They do not have the ability to continuously monitor emissions into the atmosphere when burning fuel. And we have enough modern system gas purification systems are not battery cyclones, but electric precipitators. Plus advanced combustion technology. By switching Chernogorsk to heat from the Abakan Thermal Power Plant, we will not increase emissions into the pipe, which is located on the territory of the station. Because the power of the thermal power plant is excessive for Abakan. It’s just that the steam with which we now generate electricity can be given to the consumer, which will increase the efficiency of the station.

However, you need to understand that we will not solve all the problems with the ecology of Chernogorsk. Main exhaust harmful substances, according to research, give road transport and stove heating. Only the transfer of the private sector to centralized heating can significantly improve the environmental situation in Abakan, Chernogorsk, Minusinsk

- In Soviet times, if you remember, the environmental situation was much worse. Many people remember how many enterprises operated in the Krasnoyarsk Territory, and people at that time did not particularly complain about air pollution, as is happening now.

My student years were spent in Krasnoyarsk. I can’t say for sure that the environment was better at that time. I still remember this constant smell from the wood processing plant and the smell of penicillin on the right bank. And also nearby is Krasmash, a tire factory, and other industries.

Now there are not so many factories, but the attitude of citizens to the quality of life has changed, and we are constantly working to meet modern demands. So, now in Krasnoyarsk the Siberian Generating Company is implementing a large-scale environmental project- construction of a pipe at Krasnoyarsk CHPP No. 1 with a height of 270 meters, which will replace three pipes of smaller height. Thanks to this, the exhaust gases will be dispersed far from the ground, and their concentration in the ground layer will decrease. The cost of the project for SGC is almost a billion rubles. Our company is allocating 350 million rubles for the purchase of the electric precipitator alone, which will be installed there. Environmental events- the pleasure is expensive, but we are going for it, although these funds could be invested in updating heating mains or closing the private sector with centralized heating.

-Oleg Valentinovich, I see that the SGK is ready for pressing questions and close attention from the population. Take, for example, the first festival “Warming” that took place in June this year in Khakassia...

More than six thousand people attended, and 1,300 of them visited the Abakan Thermal Power Plant that day. No, we are not afraid of questions, we took our guests around the station, showed and told everything. The townspeople also saw the electric precipitator and were able to verify that the smoke from the chimney of the Abakan Thermal Power Plant was almost invisible.

But if social activists are determined to solve issues systematically, it is necessary not to excite the population with ideas of transitioning Khakassia to gas, but to develop a program for transferring the private sector to central heating. It seems to me that now this problem must be solved not only and not so much by the energy sector, but by the authorities.

If we want to improve something, we must make sure that these stoves do not work. This can be done in different ways, for example, by installing solar panels for heating, if, of course, there are enough of them, since the sun at our 53-54th parallel is unlikely to be enough, especially in winter. The second option is to abandon coal as a fuel in private homes, but doing this, in my opinion, will be problematic. And the third option is to transfer the private sector to central heating. But this is quite possible if there is a request from the population and the authorities.

We have enough heating capacity for Abakan, Chernogorsk and several other settlements in the Ust-Abakan region today, and we are able to increase them if necessary. The project for the construction of a heating main to Chernogorsk provides for the connection of the villages of Kalinino, Zelenoe, and the villages of Rastsvet and Teplichny. We cannot force anyone to switch to central heating, but if residents take the initiative, we will be only happy.