Principles of “verification” and “falsification”
Is it possible to clearly distinguish pseudoscientific ideas from the ideas of science itself? For these purposes, different directions of scientific methodology have formulated several principles. One of them is called the principle of verification: any concept or judgment has meaning if it is reducible to direct experience or statements about it, i.e. empirically verifiable. If it is not possible to find something empirically fixed for that judgment, then it either represents a tautology or is meaningless. Since the concepts of a developed theory, as a rule, are not reducible to experimental data, a relaxation has been made for them: indirect verification is also possible. For example, it is impossible to indicate an experimental analogue of the concept “quark”. But the quark theory predicts a number of phenomena that can already be detected experimentally. And thereby indirectly verify the theory itself.
Logical positivists, who put forward verification as the only criterion of scientific knowledge, believe that with its help it is possible to distinguish not only judgments of empirical sciences from non-empirical ones, but also meaningful judgments from meaningless judgments. Among such meaningless judgments they include, first of all, statements of philosophy, which in Western literature is called metaphysics. Although only the judgments of the empirical sciences can be directly verified by facts, it is completely unreasonable to consider all other, unverifiable judgments as meaningless. If we adhere to this approach, then we will have to declare all judgments of pure mathematics meaningless. Moreover, since the general laws and theories of natural sciences also cannot be directly verified with the help of empirical facts, they also turn out to be meaningless.
Subsequently, logical positivists tried to avoid such extreme conclusions, however, their goal was not achieved. All these and other shortcomings caused by the absolutization of the verification criterion are ultimately due to the empirical and anti-dialectical position of logical positivists. Like their early predecessors in the person of O. Comte, J.S. Mill and others, they consider only empirical knowledge reliable and therefore seek to reduce to it theoretical knowledge, which some of their supporters consider the result of purely speculative thinking. The logical positivists themselves were clearly aware that they were continuing the concept of empiricism, supplementing it with a logical analysis of the structure of science. It is no coincidence that they called themselves both empirical and logical positivists.
Perhaps K. Popper was one of the first to sharply oppose the verification criterion, when he lived in Vienna and attended meetings of the Vienna Circle, which laid the foundation for the formation of logical positivism. Pointing out the logically incorrect nature of verification, Popper put forward as a criterion for the scientific nature of empirical systems the possibility of their refutation, or falsification, by experience. From a logical point of view, this criterion is impeccable, since it is based on the rule of refuting the basis of a hypothesis if its consequence is false, known in logic as modus tollens. While confirmation of a hypothesis by its consequences provides only the probability of its truth, the falsity of the consequence refutes, or falsifies, the hypothesis itself.
This fundamental possibility of falsifiability of hypotheses and theoretical systems was accepted by Popper as a true criterion for their scientific character. Such a criterion, in his opinion, made it possible, firstly, to distinguish empirical sciences from non-empirical sciences (mathematics and logic); secondly, he did not reject philosophy as a pseudoscience, but only showed the abstract, non-empirical nature of philosophical knowledge; thirdly, he separated genuine empirical sciences from pseudosciences (astrology, Freudianism, etc.). Their predictions cannot be falsified due to obscurity, imprecision and uncertainty. Given this circumstance, Popper also calls his criterion of falsifiability a criterion for demarcation, or differentiation, of genuine sciences from pseudosciences.
“If we want to avoid the positivist error, which consists in eliminating, in accordance with our criterion, the demarcation of theoretical systems of natural science, then we,” Popper pointed out, “should choose a criterion that would allow us to admit into the field of empirical science even such statements, the verification of which is impossible. At the same time, of course, I recognize a certain system as empirical or scientific only if it is possible to test it experimentally. Based on these considerations, it can be assumed that not verifiability, but the falsifiability of the system should be considered as a demarcation criterion."
The criterion for the scientific status of a theory is its verifiability and fundamental falsifiability.
There are several criteria for distinguishing between scientific and pseudoscientific ideas. In the 1920s Neopositivist philosophers proposed a verification concept of scientific knowledge. As a criterion for distinguishing scientific knowledge from non-scientific knowledge, neopositivists considered verification, i.e. experimental confirmation. Scientific statements are meaningful because they can be verified against experience; unverifiable statements are meaningless. Scientific propositions are better substantiated the more facts confirming these propositions. Using the verification procedure, neopositivists intended to cleanse science of all meaningless statements and build a model of science that is ideal from the point of view of logic. It is obvious that in the neopositivist model, science was reduced to empirical knowledge, statements about facts confirmed by experience.
The verification concept of scientific knowledge was criticized immediately after its appearance. The essence of the critical provisions boiled down to the assertion that science cannot develop only on the basis of experience, since it presupposes obtaining results that are irreducible to experience and cannot be directly deduced from it. In science, there are statements about the facts of the past, formulations of general laws that cannot be verified using verification criteria. In addition, the principle of verifiability itself is non-verifiable, i.e. it should be classified as meaningless and subject to exclusion from the system of scientific statements.
K. Popper, in his concept of critical rationalism, proposed a different criterion for distinguishing scientific knowledge from non-scientific knowledge - falsification. The theoretical position of critical rationalism developed in polemics with neopositivism. Thus, K. Popper argued that the scientific attitude is, first of all, a critical attitude. Testing a hypothesis for scientific validity should not consist of searching for confirming facts, but of attempting to refute it. Falsifiability is thus equated with empirical falsifiability. From the general provisions of the theory, consequences are derived that can be correlated with experience. These implications are then tested. Refuting one of the consequences of a theory falsifies the entire system. “Unverifiability, and falsifiability of a system should be considered a demarcation criterion... From scientific system I demand that it have such a logical form that makes it possible to isolate it in a negative sense: for an empirical scientific system there must be the possibility of being refuted by experience,” argued K. Popper. In his opinion, science should be understood as a system of hypotheses, conjectures and anticipations that are used as long as they withstand empirical testing.
Thus, K. Popper proposes to analyze science at a theoretical level, as an integral system, and not to engage in confirmation of individual statements. Any theory, in his opinion, if it claims to be scientific, must, in principle, be refuted by experience. If a theory is constructed in such a way that it is in principle irrefutable, then it cannot be considered scientific.
The word "falsification" comes from the Latin words "facio", which means "to do" and "falsus" - "false". The concept is used in various sectors of human life. For example, there is the term “falsification of goods”. This action is aimed at deceiving consumers and represents counterfeiting of a product for personal gain.
The principle of falsification is the verification of the falsity of a theory using theoretical analysis or the term was introduced into scientific circulation by Popper.
The principle of falsification suggests that only those theories that can be refuted in principle can be considered scientific. In other words, a scientific hypothesis can be proven to be false. Verification and falsification are formally symmetrical procedures. The latter is associated with the gap between deduction and induction.
The principle of falsification applies only to isolated empirical propositions. They can be rejected if specific experimental results are available or due to incompatibility with fundamental theories. However, when combining many hypotheses into one theory, it is quite difficult to find a refutation, since some adjustments of some fragments in the tested theory are allowed, based on the results of the experiment. At the same time, there is a need to preserve rejected ideas until more effective assumptions are formed - more alternative ones that can ensure real progress in understanding the world.
The principle of falsification also has disadvantages. One of the most important is the position that concerns the relationship between relative and In this case, the truth of knowledge is relative, at the same time that falsity can acquire an absolute character.
Just as falsification cannot be verified, falsification cannot be falsified. In other words, these systems cannot be proven or disproved using their own evidence base.
The falsification principle is the logical conclusion of the neopositivist attitude towards carrying out everything, including philosophical knowledge.
The main ideas, which represented the reduction of philosophy to the principle of verification, the reduction of philosophical knowledge to the logical analysis of scientific language, the interpretation of mathematics and logic as formal scientific transformations, were formulated by the participants of the Vienna Circle of Mathematicians and Logicians. These ideas became very popular in the thirties and forties.
The principle of verification, in particular, was substantiated by Schlick (the head of the circle) and required that any scientific statement that is meaningful be reduced to a set of protocol proposals that should be verified empirically. Those proposals that do not lend themselves to this procedure, that is, are not reduced to, are considered theories devoid of any meaning.
The methodology of logical positivism has been replaced by a complex of methodological concepts that is not special philosophical direction, school or current. Postpositivism represents a stage scientific philosophy. Its onset is associated with the publication of Popper's methodological work and Kuhn's book.
Distinctive feature At this stage there is a significant diversity of methodological concepts, as well as their mutual criticism. Postpositivism recognized that in scientific history revolutionary and significant changes are inevitable. They lead to a revision of previously substantiated and recognized knowledge. Popper came to the conclusion that there is no inductive logic. In this regard, an attempt to translate truth from empirical to theoretical level hopeless. Thus, Popper points to the presence within the framework of deductive logic of destructive deduction, which is the principle of falsification.
Not long ago I had such a strange conversation with one of my friends. He argued that, in essence, what the logical positivists proposed and what Popper proposed are one and the same. Therefore, I have long wanted to make this entry to clarify the situation in the sense that I personally see it.
First, a few words about logical positivism. This may all sound somewhat simplified, but still.
Logical positivism is a movement that developed on the basis of the so-called. “Vienna Circle”, organized in 1922 by M. Schlick. Logical positivists posed an interesting task - finding a reliable basis for scientific knowledge. In addition, they were very interested in the problem of demarcation - the separation of scientific knowledge and extra-scientific knowledge; they, in particular, really wanted to expel philosophy (metaphysics) from science. According to logical positivists, in order for a certain proposition (in the logical sense) to have the status of a scientific one, it is necessary that it can be expressed through some elementary (protocol) propositions that are empirical (for simplicity we will assume this way, although there is something else here -What). That is, in essence, any scientific knowledge must be strictly reduced to empirical experience in one form or another. On the other hand, theoretical knowledge is built on the basis of empirical knowledge through its inductive generalization. Logical positivists put forward verification principle, which a scientific theory must satisfy. Its logical form is
where T is a theory, and is a consequence logically deduced from theory T, and at the same time an elementary sentence expressing an empirically reliable fact. In this case, they say that the theory is confirmed by empirical fact a. The more empirical facts, the higher the degree of confirmation of the theory. This scheme is thus based on induction - particular facts confirm the general theory.
Karl Popper’s concept opposes logical positivism on a number of points, in particular:
- Against induction. Induction as a logical method includes an irrational moment (as David Hume spoke about): at what point can one interrupt the enumeration and move from the premises (a finite set of facts) to the conclusion (a general statement about all such facts)? From a logical point of view - never. There is no logical transition from premises to conclusion. And induction is the logical basis of empiricism. Thus, empiricism is not logically justified.
- Against the principle of verification. It is quite difficult to establish the truth of a certain statement. For example, “All swans are white” will be true if each of the swans is white. That is, every swan needs to be checked. But you can show the falsity of such a statement by finding at least one counterexample. Thus, there is some asymmetry between confirmation and refutation.
- Against the discrediting of philosophy (metaphysics) by positivists. Popper showed (see his "Logic" scientific research"), that if you use the principles of logical positivism, it becomes clear that not only philosophy falls out of the category of science - many statements of theoretical physics also turn out to be extra-scientific. Here I am reminded of the story of general theory relativity. People who understand the issue understand that there is not a single complete confirmation of this theory. There are a number (generally speaking, very small) of confirmations that are in one way or another based on calculating corrections to the Newtonian potential. But this does not make us doubt this theory. And here the point is that it is theory, not experience, that comes to the fore. Popper did not believe* (nor did Einstein, by the way) that a theory should be based on empirical facts, or in any way be provoked by them.
where T is a theory, b is a consequence, not b is an empirical fact that contradicts the consequence. The conclusion affirms the falsity of T.
As a result:
1. The significance of empirical knowledge remains.
2. This mode is deductive and its conclusion is logically certain.
3. Induction is preserved - in a specific sense: the inductive direction of lies from false private knowledge in the premise to false general knowledge in the conclusion.
The principle of falsification is put forward as a criterion for scientificity (demarcation): a theory must have the potential to conflict with empirical facts. The more unsuccessful attempts refutations, the better for the theory. Therefore, falsifiability is a logical relation between a theory and a class of potential falsifiers (this includes not only pure empirical knowledge, but also mental statements). An attempt to rehabilitate a false theory leads, according to Popper, to dogmatism. And here's why. If b is derived from theory, but in practice it turns out not-b, then we must somehow introduce the statement of not-b into the theory. But this can lead to the theory containing a contradiction, and this, as is known, leads to the fact that anything can be deduced from the theory. To demonstrate this simple statement, I will quote Popper's words from his article "What is Dialectics":
"Using our two rules, we can actually show this. Let's say there are two contradictory premises, let's say:Regarding verification, Popper says the following:
(a) The sun is shining now.
(b) The sun is not shining now.
Any statement can be derived from these two premises, for example, “Caesar was a traitor.”
From premise (a) we can deduce, according to rule (1), the following conclusion:
(c) The sun is shining now V Caesar was a traitor. Taking now (b) and (c) as premises, we can ultimately deduce, according to rule (2):
(d) Caesar was a traitor.
It is clear that using the same method we could derive any other statement, for example, “Caesar was not a traitor.” So from “2 + 2 = 5” and “2 + 2 not = 5” we can derive not only the statement we would like, but also its negation, which may not have been part of our plans."
"I can illustrate this with two significant various examples human behavior: the behavior of a person pushing a child into water with the intention of drowning him, and the behavior of a person sacrificing his life in an attempt to save that child. Each of these cases is easily explained in both Freudian and Adlerian terms. According to Freud, the first person suffers from a repression (say, Oedipus) complex, while the second has achieved sublimation. According to Adler, the first person suffers from a feeling of inferiority (which causes him to prove to himself that he is capable of daring to commit a crime), the same thing happens to the second (who has a need to prove to himself that he is capable of saving a child). So, I could not think of any form of human behavior that could not be explained on the basis of each of these theories. And it was precisely this fact - that they coped with everything and always found confirmation - in the eyes of their adherents was the most strong argument in favor of these theories. However, I began to suspect whether this was not an expression of the strength, but, on the contrary, of the weakness of these theories?Popper managed to identify the main shortcomings of the program of logical positivism; he actually closed the problem of the existence of a reliable source of knowledge. The old question of what is in cognitive activity defining: feelings or reason - turned out to be incorrectly formulated, because There are no “pure” empirical facts. They always depend on a certain theory. Popper made us think about the nature of theoretical knowledge and the role of induction in its emergence. The main purpose of a scientist is to put forward risky hypotheses, the falsification of which forces one to put forward new problems and even more risky hypotheses.
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Astrology is not subject to testing. Astrologers are so mistaken about what they consider to be supporting evidence that they pay no attention to examples that are unfavorable to them. Moreover, by making their interpretations and prophecies vague enough, they are able to explain away everything that might be a refutation of their theory if it and the prophecies that follow from it were more accurate. To avoid falsification, they destroy the testability of their theories. This is the usual trick of all soothsayers: to predict events so vaguely that the predictions always come true, that is, so that they are irrefutable.
The two psychoanalytic theories mentioned earlier belong to a different class. They are simply untestable and irrefutable theories. ... This does not mean that Freud and Adler said nothing correct at all ... But it does mean that those “clinical observations” that psychoanalysts naively believe confirm their theory do so no more than the daily confirmations found by astrologers in your practice. As for Freud's description of the I (Ego), the Super-I (Super-Ego) and the Id (Id), it is essentially no more scientific than Homer's stories about Olympus. The theories under consideration describe some facts, but do so in the form of a myth. They contain very interesting psychological assumptions, but they express them in an untestable form.”
—Popper K.R. Conjectures and Refutations. The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. London and Henley. Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972.
The disadvantages traditionally include the fact that consistent implementation of the principle of falsification in real scientific practice has never taken place. A real scientist, faced with contradictions, will not, even after a certain period of time, abandon his theory, but will find out the reasons for the conflict between theory and facts, look for an opportunity to change some parameters of the theory, that is, he will save it, which is fundamentally prohibited in Popper’s methodology.
*) Generally speaking, as far as I remember, Karl Popper himself received no liberal arts education, rather, he was close to mathematics and theoretical physics, as, indeed, were many members of the Vienna circle.
Verification is a method of confirming a hypothesis or theory by independently testing it experimentally or establishing its correspondence to empirically tested and generally accepted fundamental theories (9. - P. 102-104).
The concept of verification (verification and confirmation) was proposed in the 20s. XX century a group of scientists united in the so-called. “Vienna Circle” (Carnap, Neurath, Gödel, etc.) and developed a number of ideas of L. Wittgenstein (“logical positivism”).
Initially, verification was a way of recording experimental facts without any subjective change. Such facts were recognized as reliable, and science was asked to work with them. On their basis, primary generalizations are formed (the so-called “protocol sentences”). It was recommended to eliminate anything that does not coincide with the protocol proposals from science.
Today, the essence of verification is scrupulous adherence to the subjectivity, problematic and methodical nature of knowledge and the use of the so-called. "criteria of truth".
IN humanities and philosophy, the use of verification is limited by a high degree of subjectivity in interpretations. Here, such confirmation extends, first of all, to the logic of reasoning and to compliance with generally accepted rules of text organization, for example, to the relationship of the scientist with a certain tradition, scientific context or qualification requirements.
The main verification role in philosophical knowledge, as in artistic creativity, is played by taste and argumentation. Philosophical work must be compelling and intellectually beautiful.
At the same time, verification as a method of final proof comes into conflict with the fact that for complete verification of any theory an infinite number of facts must be collected.
Another, alternative way theory testing – falsification (10. – P.752). The idea of falsification was proposed by K. Popper and, in the opinion of both himself and his followers (for example, I. Lakatos), it works more accurately and achieves greater reliability than verification. It is assumed that if an infinite number of facts are needed to verify a theory, then one is enough to falsify and refute it. However, the absence of disproving facts does not give the theory the quality of truth; it becomes only scientific and justified.
Falsification just as verification makes it possible to establish the correspondence of a hypothesis to experimental data and fundamental theories. However, if verification achieves direct correspondence, then falsification carries out verification through continuous criticism and attempts to refute theories.
With the falsification approach, there is a search for refuting data. This idea comes from the idea that the theory should work not only for a narrow group of studied subjects, but also for all subjects of a given class. Therefore, the appearance of new objects in the field of view of science forces, first of all, to apply already existing theories to them and thereby test the ability of theories to explain.
Because of its critical focus, falsification, more than verification, corresponds to the dialogue of diverse points of view and positions that is ongoing in the humanities. Therefore, here the confirmation is more falsification than verification.
The verifiability and falsifiability of research results is the basis for confirming its scientific status. For example, in a competent study, the problem, subject and methods are indicated at the very beginning of the work. Their application allows for an independent examination of the results and constitutes the so-called. "academic style" scientific works. If a problem is posed, a subject is defined, a method is chosen and a result is obtained, and then an article is written, then any specialist can pose the same problem, take the same subject and method, and then he should get the same or similar results. If the results turned out to be different, it means that someone made a mistake, did the work incorrectly and his qualifications as a specialist in his field are low.
